<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/crypto/ablkcipher.c, branch v4.4.232</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: skcipher - Fix -Wstringop-truncation warnings</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T06:52:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stafford Horne</name>
<email>shorne@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-25T12:45:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=52965d6f52e69bfcc55e60145f116840d8529d9d'/>
<id>52965d6f52e69bfcc55e60145f116840d8529d9d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cefd769fd0192c84d638f66da202459ed8ad63ba ]

As of GCC 9.0.0 the build is reporting warnings like:

    crypto/ablkcipher.c: In function ‘crypto_ablkcipher_report’:
    crypto/ablkcipher.c:374:2: warning: ‘strncpy’ specified bound 64 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation]
      strncpy(rblkcipher.geniv, alg-&gt;cra_ablkcipher.geniv ?: "&lt;default&gt;",
      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
       sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv));
       ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This means the strnycpy might create a non null terminated string.  Fix this by
explicitly performing '\0' termination.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Max Filippov &lt;jcmvbkbc@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;nick.desaulniers@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne &lt;shorne@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit cefd769fd0192c84d638f66da202459ed8ad63ba ]

As of GCC 9.0.0 the build is reporting warnings like:

    crypto/ablkcipher.c: In function ‘crypto_ablkcipher_report’:
    crypto/ablkcipher.c:374:2: warning: ‘strncpy’ specified bound 64 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation]
      strncpy(rblkcipher.geniv, alg-&gt;cra_ablkcipher.geniv ?: "&lt;default&gt;",
      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
       sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv));
       ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This means the strnycpy might create a non null terminated string.  Fix this by
explicitly performing '\0' termination.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Max Filippov &lt;jcmvbkbc@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;nick.desaulniers@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne &lt;shorne@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ablkcipher - fix crash flushing dcache in error path</title>
<updated>2018-08-17T18:56:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-23T17:54:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=930787c9cdd7179025f10ef45d9957f1ef38880b'/>
<id>930787c9cdd7179025f10ef45d9957f1ef38880b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 318abdfbe708aaaa652c79fb500e9bd60521f9dc upstream.

Like the skcipher_walk and blkcipher_walk cases:

scatterwalk_done() is only meant to be called after a nonzero number of
bytes have been processed, since scatterwalk_pagedone() will flush the
dcache of the *previous* page.  But in the error case of
ablkcipher_walk_done(), e.g. if the input wasn't an integer number of
blocks, scatterwalk_done() was actually called after advancing 0 bytes.
This caused a crash ("BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request")
during '!PageSlab(page)' on architectures like arm and arm64 that define
ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE, provided that the input was
page-aligned as in that case walk-&gt;offset == 0.

Fix it by reorganizing ablkcipher_walk_done() to skip the
scatterwalk_advance() and scatterwalk_done() if an error has occurred.

Reported-by: Liu Chao &lt;liuchao741@huawei.com&gt;
Fixes: bf06099db18a ("crypto: skcipher - Add ablkcipher_walk interfaces")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v2.6.35+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 318abdfbe708aaaa652c79fb500e9bd60521f9dc upstream.

Like the skcipher_walk and blkcipher_walk cases:

scatterwalk_done() is only meant to be called after a nonzero number of
bytes have been processed, since scatterwalk_pagedone() will flush the
dcache of the *previous* page.  But in the error case of
ablkcipher_walk_done(), e.g. if the input wasn't an integer number of
blocks, scatterwalk_done() was actually called after advancing 0 bytes.
This caused a crash ("BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request")
during '!PageSlab(page)' on architectures like arm and arm64 that define
ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE, provided that the input was
page-aligned as in that case walk-&gt;offset == 0.

Fix it by reorganizing ablkcipher_walk_done() to skip the
scatterwalk_advance() and scatterwalk_done() if an error has occurred.

Reported-by: Liu Chao &lt;liuchao741@huawei.com&gt;
Fixes: bf06099db18a ("crypto: skcipher - Add ablkcipher_walk interfaces")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v2.6.35+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: skcipher - Copy iv from desc even for 0-len walks</title>
<updated>2015-12-09T12:16:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-06T01:51:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=70d906bc17500edfa9bdd8c8b7e59618c7911613'/>
<id>70d906bc17500edfa9bdd8c8b7e59618c7911613</id>
<content type='text'>
Some ciphers actually support encrypting zero length plaintexts. For
example, many AEAD modes support this. The resulting ciphertext for
those winds up being only the authentication tag, which is a result of
the key, the iv, the additional data, and the fact that the plaintext
had zero length. The blkcipher constructors won't copy the IV to the
right place, however, when using a zero length input, resulting in
some significant problems when ciphers call their initialization
routines, only to find that the -&gt;iv parameter is uninitialized. One
such example of this would be using chacha20poly1305 with a zero length
input, which then calls chacha20, which calls the key setup routine,
which eventually OOPSes due to the uninitialized -&gt;iv member.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Some ciphers actually support encrypting zero length plaintexts. For
example, many AEAD modes support this. The resulting ciphertext for
those winds up being only the authentication tag, which is a result of
the key, the iv, the additional data, and the fact that the plaintext
had zero length. The blkcipher constructors won't copy the IV to the
right place, however, when using a zero length input, resulting in
some significant problems when ciphers call their initialization
routines, only to find that the -&gt;iv parameter is uninitialized. One
such example of this would be using chacha20poly1305 with a zero length
input, which then calls chacha20, which calls the key setup routine,
which eventually OOPSes due to the uninitialized -&gt;iv member.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Only abort operations on fatal signal</title>
<updated>2015-10-20T13:59:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-19T10:23:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3fc89adb9fa4beff31374a4bf50b3d099d88ae83'/>
<id>3fc89adb9fa4beff31374a4bf50b3d099d88ae83</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently a number of Crypto API operations may fail when a signal
occurs.  This causes nasty problems as the caller of those operations
are often not in a good position to restart the operation.

In fact there is currently no need for those operations to be
interrupted by user signals at all.  All we need is for them to
be killable.

This patch replaces the relevant calls of signal_pending with
fatal_signal_pending, and wait_for_completion_interruptible with
wait_for_completion_killable, respectively.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently a number of Crypto API operations may fail when a signal
occurs.  This causes nasty problems as the caller of those operations
are often not in a good position to restart the operation.

In fact there is currently no need for those operations to be
interrupted by user signals at all.  All we need is for them to
be killable.

This patch replaces the relevant calls of signal_pending with
fatal_signal_pending, and wait_for_completion_interruptible with
wait_for_completion_killable, respectively.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: skcipher - Allow givencrypt to be NULL</title>
<updated>2015-06-22T07:49:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-21T11:11:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=21dbd96f2287a49219d35a0e916cf3f2bcaab9d0'/>
<id>21dbd96f2287a49219d35a0e916cf3f2bcaab9d0</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently for skcipher IV generators they must provide givencrypt
as that is the whole point.  We are currently replacing skcipher
IV generators with explicit IV generators.  In order to maintain
backwards compatibility, we need to allow the IV generators to
still function as a normal skcipher when the RNG Is not present
(e.g., in the initramfs during boot).  IOW everything but givencrypt
and givdecrypt will still work but those two will fail.

Therefore this patch assigns a default givencrypt that simply
returns an error should it be NULL.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently for skcipher IV generators they must provide givencrypt
as that is the whole point.  We are currently replacing skcipher
IV generators with explicit IV generators.  In order to maintain
backwards compatibility, we need to allow the IV generators to
still function as a normal skcipher when the RNG Is not present
(e.g., in the initramfs during boot).  IOW everything but givencrypt
and givdecrypt will still work but those two will fail.

Therefore this patch assigns a default givencrypt that simply
returns an error should it be NULL.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: skcipher - Use tmpl-&gt;create</title>
<updated>2015-05-25T10:41:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-23T07:41:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=56e34378bbbb7af21cf73d98a92c0411386e091c'/>
<id>56e34378bbbb7af21cf73d98a92c0411386e091c</id>
<content type='text'>
Newer templates use tmpl-&gt;create and have a NULL tmpl-&gt;alloc.  So
we must use tmpl-&gt;create if it is set.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Newer templates use tmpl-&gt;create and have a NULL tmpl-&gt;alloc.  So
we must use tmpl-&gt;create if it is set.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: skcipher - Fix corner case in crypto_lookup_skcipher</title>
<updated>2015-04-26T06:33:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-23T08:34:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=26739535206e819946b0740347c09c94c4e48ba9'/>
<id>26739535206e819946b0740347c09c94c4e48ba9</id>
<content type='text'>
When the user explicitly states that they don't care whether the
algorithm has been tested (type = CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED and mask = 0),
there is a corner case where we may erroneously return ENOENT.

This patch fixes it by correcting the logic in the test.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When the user explicitly states that they don't care whether the
algorithm has been tested (type = CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED and mask = 0),
there is a corner case where we may erroneously return ENOENT.

This patch fixes it by correcting the logic in the test.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: replace scatterwalk_sg_next with sg_next</title>
<updated>2015-01-26T00:34:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cristian Stoica</name>
<email>cristian.stoica@freescale.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-20T08:06:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5be4d4c94b1f98b839344fda7a8752a4a09d0ef5'/>
<id>5be4d4c94b1f98b839344fda7a8752a4a09d0ef5</id>
<content type='text'>
Modify crypto drivers to use the generic SG helper since
both of them are equivalent and the one from crypto is redundant.

See also:
  468577abe37ff7b453a9ac613e0ea155349203ae   reverted in
  b2ab4a57b018aafbba35bff088218f5cc3d2142e

Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica &lt;cristian.stoica@freescale.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Modify crypto drivers to use the generic SG helper since
both of them are equivalent and the one from crypto is redundant.

See also:
  468577abe37ff7b453a9ac613e0ea155349203ae   reverted in
  b2ab4a57b018aafbba35bff088218f5cc3d2142e

Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica &lt;cristian.stoica@freescale.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ablkcipher - fixed style errors in ablkcipher.c</title>
<updated>2014-12-22T12:02:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joshua I. James</name>
<email>joshua@cybercrimetech.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-05T05:06:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a861afbc931b489b3b2362f8011cccd2a071ec37'/>
<id>a861afbc931b489b3b2362f8011cccd2a071ec37</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixed style errors reported by checkpatch.

WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
+       u8 *end_page = (u8 *)(((unsigned long)(start + len - 1)) &amp; PAGE_MASK);
+       return max(start, end_page);

WARNING: line over 80 characters
+               scatterwalk_start(&amp;walk-&gt;out, scatterwalk_sg_next(walk-&gt;out.sg));

WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
+               int err = ablkcipher_copy_iv(walk, tfm, alignmask);
+               if (err)

ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
+       if ((err = crypto_register_instance(tmpl, inst))) {

Signed-off-by: Joshua I. James &lt;joshua@cybercrimetech.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fixed style errors reported by checkpatch.

WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
+       u8 *end_page = (u8 *)(((unsigned long)(start + len - 1)) &amp; PAGE_MASK);
+       return max(start, end_page);

WARNING: line over 80 characters
+               scatterwalk_start(&amp;walk-&gt;out, scatterwalk_sg_next(walk-&gt;out.sg));

WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
+               int err = ablkcipher_copy_iv(walk, tfm, alignmask);
+               if (err)

ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
+       if ((err = crypto_register_instance(tmpl, inst))) {

Signed-off-by: Joshua I. James &lt;joshua@cybercrimetech.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: skcipher - Use eseqiv even on UP machines</title>
<updated>2013-10-30T01:51:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-30T01:51:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f3d53ed038944a5e785f04952170f7e239a49ae8'/>
<id>f3d53ed038944a5e785f04952170f7e239a49ae8</id>
<content type='text'>
Previously we would use eseqiv on all async ciphers in all cases,
and sync ciphers if we have more than one CPU.  This meant that
chainiv is only used in the case of sync ciphers on a UP machine.

As chainiv may aid attackers by making the IV predictable, even
though this risk itself is small, the above usage pattern causes
it to further leak information about the host.

This patch addresses these issues by using eseqiv even if we're
on a UP machine.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Previously we would use eseqiv on all async ciphers in all cases,
and sync ciphers if we have more than one CPU.  This meant that
chainiv is only used in the case of sync ciphers on a UP machine.

As chainiv may aid attackers by making the IV predictable, even
though this risk itself is small, the above usage pattern causes
it to further leak information about the host.

This patch addresses these issues by using eseqiv even if we're
on a UP machine.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
