<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/crypto/Kconfig, branch linux-5.11.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: mips/poly1305 - enable for all MIPS processors</title>
<updated>2021-03-17T16:11:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maciej W. Rozycki</name>
<email>macro@orcam.me.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-03T01:16:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=138bd4da2c7657fe0bc583824005f4e3bc153e47'/>
<id>138bd4da2c7657fe0bc583824005f4e3bc153e47</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6c810cf20feef0d4338e9b424ab7f2644a8b353e upstream.

The MIPS Poly1305 implementation is generic MIPS code written such as to
support down to the original MIPS I and MIPS III ISA for the 32-bit and
64-bit variant respectively.  Lift the current limitation then to enable
code for MIPSr1 ISA or newer processors only and have it available for
all MIPS processors.

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki &lt;macro@orcam.me.uk&gt;
Fixes: a11d055e7a64 ("crypto: mips/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS optimized implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer &lt;tsbogend@alpha.franken.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6c810cf20feef0d4338e9b424ab7f2644a8b353e upstream.

The MIPS Poly1305 implementation is generic MIPS code written such as to
support down to the original MIPS I and MIPS III ISA for the 32-bit and
64-bit variant respectively.  Lift the current limitation then to enable
code for MIPSr1 ISA or newer processors only and have it available for
all MIPS processors.

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki &lt;macro@orcam.me.uk&gt;
Fixes: a11d055e7a64 ("crypto: mips/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS optimized implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer &lt;tsbogend@alpha.franken.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: tcrypt - permit tcrypt.ko to be builtin</title>
<updated>2020-11-27T06:13:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ardb@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-20T11:04:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=00ea27f11c4f96ffc9ebc147b5ea045babb02ce3'/>
<id>00ea27f11c4f96ffc9ebc147b5ea045babb02ce3</id>
<content type='text'>
When working on crypto algorithms, being able to run tcrypt quickly
without booting an entire Linux installation can be very useful. For
instance, QEMU/kvm can be used to boot a kernel from the command line,
and having tcrypt.ko builtin would allow tcrypt to be executed to run
benchmarks, or to run tests for algorithms that need to be instantiated
from templates, without the need to make it past the point where the
rootfs is mounted.

So let's relax the requirement that tcrypt can only be built as a module
when CONFIG_EXPERT is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When working on crypto algorithms, being able to run tcrypt quickly
without booting an entire Linux installation can be very useful. For
instance, QEMU/kvm can be used to boot a kernel from the command line,
and having tcrypt.ko builtin would allow tcrypt to be executed to run
benchmarks, or to run tests for algorithms that need to be instantiated
from templates, without the need to make it past the point where the
rootfs is mounted.

So let's relax the requirement that tcrypt can only be built as a module
when CONFIG_EXPERT is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: Kconfig - CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS requires the manager</title>
<updated>2020-11-13T09:38:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-02T13:48:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6569e3097f1c4a490bdf2b23d326855e04942dfd'/>
<id>6569e3097f1c4a490bdf2b23d326855e04942dfd</id>
<content type='text'>
The extra tests in the manager actually require the manager to be
selected too. Otherwise the linker gives errors like:

ld: arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.o: in function `chacha_simd_stream_xor':
chacha_glue.c:(.text+0x422): undefined reference to `crypto_simd_disabled_for_test'

Fixes: 2343d1529aff ("crypto: Kconfig - allow tests to be disabled when manager is disabled")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The extra tests in the manager actually require the manager to be
selected too. Otherwise the linker gives errors like:

ld: arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.o: in function `chacha_simd_stream_xor':
chacha_glue.c:(.text+0x422): undefined reference to `crypto_simd_disabled_for_test'

Fixes: 2343d1529aff ("crypto: Kconfig - allow tests to be disabled when manager is disabled")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: sm2 - introduce OSCCA SM2 asymmetric cipher algorithm</title>
<updated>2020-09-25T07:48:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tianjia Zhang</name>
<email>tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-20T16:20:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ea7ecb66440b37c035e899c60ceaf7a03d364930'/>
<id>ea7ecb66440b37c035e899c60ceaf7a03d364930</id>
<content type='text'>
This new module implement the SM2 public key algorithm. It was
published by State Encryption Management Bureau, China.
List of specifications for SM2 elliptic curve public key cryptography:

* GM/T 0003.1-2012
* GM/T 0003.2-2012
* GM/T 0003.3-2012
* GM/T 0003.4-2012
* GM/T 0003.5-2012

IETF: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
oscca: http://www.oscca.gov.cn/sca/xxgk/2010-12/17/content_1002386.shtml
scctc: http://www.gmbz.org.cn/main/bzlb.html

Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang &lt;tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang &lt;yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This new module implement the SM2 public key algorithm. It was
published by State Encryption Management Bureau, China.
List of specifications for SM2 elliptic curve public key cryptography:

* GM/T 0003.1-2012
* GM/T 0003.2-2012
* GM/T 0003.3-2012
* GM/T 0003.4-2012
* GM/T 0003.5-2012

IETF: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
oscca: http://www.oscca.gov.cn/sca/xxgk/2010-12/17/content_1002386.shtml
scctc: http://www.gmbz.org.cn/main/bzlb.html

Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang &lt;tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang &lt;yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: af_alg - add extra parameters for DRBG interface</title>
<updated>2020-09-25T07:48:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Elena Petrova</name>
<email>lenaptr@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-18T15:42:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=77ebdabe8de7c02f43c6de3357f79ff96f9f0579'/>
<id>77ebdabe8de7c02f43c6de3357f79ff96f9f0579</id>
<content type='text'>
Extend the user-space RNG interface:
  1. Add entropy input via ALG_SET_DRBG_ENTROPY setsockopt option;
  2. Add additional data input via sendmsg syscall.

This allows DRBG to be tested with test vectors, for example for the
purpose of CAVP testing, which otherwise isn't possible.

To prevent erroneous use of entropy input, it is hidden under
CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG_CAVP config option and requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN to
succeed.

Signed-off-by: Elena Petrova &lt;lenaptr@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephan Müller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Extend the user-space RNG interface:
  1. Add entropy input via ALG_SET_DRBG_ENTROPY setsockopt option;
  2. Add additional data input via sendmsg syscall.

This allows DRBG to be tested with test vectors, for example for the
purpose of CAVP testing, which otherwise isn't possible.

To prevent erroneous use of entropy input, it is hidden under
CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG_CAVP config option and requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN to
succeed.

Signed-off-by: Elena Petrova &lt;lenaptr@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephan Müller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: Kconfig - mark unused ciphers as obsolete</title>
<updated>2020-09-18T07:20:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ardb@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-11T14:11:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1674aea5f080c9f61424354f6870a548770eb07e'/>
<id>1674aea5f080c9f61424354f6870a548770eb07e</id>
<content type='text'>
We have a few interesting pieces in our cipher museum, which are never
used internally, and were only ever provided as generic C implementations.

Unfortunately, we cannot simply remove this code, as we cannot be sure
that it is not being used via the AF_ALG socket API, however unlikely.

So let's mark the Anubis, Khazad, SEED and TEA algorithms as obsolete,
which means they can only be enabled in the build if the socket API is
enabled in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We have a few interesting pieces in our cipher museum, which are never
used internally, and were only ever provided as generic C implementations.

Unfortunately, we cannot simply remove this code, as we cannot be sure
that it is not being used via the AF_ALG socket API, however unlikely.

So let's mark the Anubis, Khazad, SEED and TEA algorithms as obsolete,
which means they can only be enabled in the build if the socket API is
enabled in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: arc4 - mark ecb(arc4) skcipher as obsolete</title>
<updated>2020-09-11T04:39:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ardb@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-31T15:16:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9ace6771831017ce75a2bdf03c284b686dd39dba'/>
<id>9ace6771831017ce75a2bdf03c284b686dd39dba</id>
<content type='text'>
Cryptographic algorithms may have a lifespan that is significantly
shorter than Linux's, and so we need to start phasing out algorithms
that are known to be broken, and are no longer fit for general use.

RC4 (or arc4) is a good example here: there are a few areas where its
use is still somewhat acceptable, e.g., for interoperability with legacy
wifi hardware that can only use WEP or TKIP data encryption, but that
should not imply that, for instance, use of RC4 based EAP-TLS by the WPA
supplicant for negotiating TKIP keys is equally acceptable, or that RC4
should remain available as a general purpose cryptographic transform for
all in-kernel and user space clients.

Now that all in-kernel users that need to retain support have moved to
the arc4 library interface, and the known users of ecb(arc4) via the
socket API (iwd [0] and libell [1][2]) have been updated to switch to a
local implementation, we can take the next step, and mark the ecb(arc4)
skcipher as obsolete, and only provide it if the socket API is enabled in
the first place, as well as provide the option to disable all algorithms
that have been marked as obsolete.

[0] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/wireless/iwd.git/commit/?id=1db8a85a60c64523
[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/commit/?id=53482ce421b727c2
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/commit/?id=7f6a137809d42f6b

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Cryptographic algorithms may have a lifespan that is significantly
shorter than Linux's, and so we need to start phasing out algorithms
that are known to be broken, and are no longer fit for general use.

RC4 (or arc4) is a good example here: there are a few areas where its
use is still somewhat acceptable, e.g., for interoperability with legacy
wifi hardware that can only use WEP or TKIP data encryption, but that
should not imply that, for instance, use of RC4 based EAP-TLS by the WPA
supplicant for negotiating TKIP keys is equally acceptable, or that RC4
should remain available as a general purpose cryptographic transform for
all in-kernel and user space clients.

Now that all in-kernel users that need to retain support have moved to
the arc4 library interface, and the known users of ecb(arc4) via the
socket API (iwd [0] and libell [1][2]) have been updated to switch to a
local implementation, we can take the next step, and mark the ecb(arc4)
skcipher as obsolete, and only provide it if the socket API is enabled in
the first place, as well as provide the option to disable all algorithms
that have been marked as obsolete.

[0] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/wireless/iwd.git/commit/?id=1db8a85a60c64523
[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/commit/?id=53482ce421b727c2
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/commit/?id=7f6a137809d42f6b

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones</title>
<updated>2020-07-23T07:34:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander A. Klimov</name>
<email>grandmaster@al2klimov.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-19T16:49:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9332a9e73918bd0a1d5ef40a3357931b9fe0cf8a'/>
<id>9332a9e73918bd0a1d5ef40a3357931b9fe0cf8a</id>
<content type='text'>
Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.

Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
  If not .svg:
    For each line:
      If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
        For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
	  If neither `\bgnu\.org/license`, nor `\bmozilla\.org/MPL\b`:
            If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
            return 200 OK and serve the same content:
              Replace HTTP with HTTPS.

Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov &lt;grandmaster@al2klimov.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.

Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
  If not .svg:
    For each line:
      If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
        For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
	  If neither `\bgnu\.org/license`, nor `\bmozilla\.org/MPL\b`:
            If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
            return 200 OK and serve the same content:
              Replace HTTP with HTTPS.

Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov &lt;grandmaster@al2klimov.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'rwonce/rework' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/will/linux</title>
<updated>2020-06-10T21:46:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-10T21:46:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4152d146ee2169653297e03b9fa2e0f476923959'/>
<id>4152d146ee2169653297e03b9fa2e0f476923959</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull READ/WRITE_ONCE rework from Will Deacon:
 "This the READ_ONCE rework I've been working on for a while, which
  bumps the minimum GCC version and improves code-gen on arm64 when
  stack protector is enabled"

[ Side note: I'm _really_ tempted to raise the minimum gcc version to
  4.9, so that we can just say that we require _Generic() support.

  That would allow us to more cleanly handle a lot of the cases where we
  depend on very complex macros with 'sizeof' or __builtin_choose_expr()
  with __builtin_types_compatible_p() etc.

  This branch has a workaround for sparse not handling _Generic(),
  either, but that was already fixed in the sparse development branch,
  so it's really just gcc-4.9 that we'd require.   - Linus ]

* 'rwonce/rework' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/will/linux:
  compiler_types.h: Use unoptimized __unqual_scalar_typeof for sparse
  compiler_types.h: Optimize __unqual_scalar_typeof compilation time
  compiler.h: Enforce that READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() access size is sizeof(long)
  compiler-types.h: Include naked type in __pick_integer_type() match
  READ_ONCE: Fix comment describing 2x32-bit atomicity
  gcov: Remove old GCC 3.4 support
  arm64: barrier: Use '__unqual_scalar_typeof' for acquire/release macros
  locking/barriers: Use '__unqual_scalar_typeof' for load-acquire macros
  READ_ONCE: Drop pointer qualifiers when reading from scalar types
  READ_ONCE: Enforce atomicity for {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() memory accesses
  READ_ONCE: Simplify implementations of {READ,WRITE}_ONCE()
  arm64: csum: Disable KASAN for do_csum()
  fault_inject: Don't rely on "return value" from WRITE_ONCE()
  net: tls: Avoid assigning 'const' pointer to non-const pointer
  netfilter: Avoid assigning 'const' pointer to non-const pointer
  compiler/gcc: Raise minimum GCC version for kernel builds to 4.8
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull READ/WRITE_ONCE rework from Will Deacon:
 "This the READ_ONCE rework I've been working on for a while, which
  bumps the minimum GCC version and improves code-gen on arm64 when
  stack protector is enabled"

[ Side note: I'm _really_ tempted to raise the minimum gcc version to
  4.9, so that we can just say that we require _Generic() support.

  That would allow us to more cleanly handle a lot of the cases where we
  depend on very complex macros with 'sizeof' or __builtin_choose_expr()
  with __builtin_types_compatible_p() etc.

  This branch has a workaround for sparse not handling _Generic(),
  either, but that was already fixed in the sparse development branch,
  so it's really just gcc-4.9 that we'd require.   - Linus ]

* 'rwonce/rework' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/will/linux:
  compiler_types.h: Use unoptimized __unqual_scalar_typeof for sparse
  compiler_types.h: Optimize __unqual_scalar_typeof compilation time
  compiler.h: Enforce that READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() access size is sizeof(long)
  compiler-types.h: Include naked type in __pick_integer_type() match
  READ_ONCE: Fix comment describing 2x32-bit atomicity
  gcov: Remove old GCC 3.4 support
  arm64: barrier: Use '__unqual_scalar_typeof' for acquire/release macros
  locking/barriers: Use '__unqual_scalar_typeof' for load-acquire macros
  READ_ONCE: Drop pointer qualifiers when reading from scalar types
  READ_ONCE: Enforce atomicity for {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() memory accesses
  READ_ONCE: Simplify implementations of {READ,WRITE}_ONCE()
  arm64: csum: Disable KASAN for do_csum()
  fault_inject: Don't rely on "return value" from WRITE_ONCE()
  net: tls: Avoid assigning 'const' pointer to non-const pointer
  netfilter: Avoid assigning 'const' pointer to non-const pointer
  compiler/gcc: Raise minimum GCC version for kernel builds to 4.8
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: drbg - should select CTR</title>
<updated>2020-04-30T05:19:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Corentin Labbe</name>
<email>clabbe@baylibre.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-24T13:40:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d6fc1a4592219b9ccb85854282d0e59d35fddebc'/>
<id>d6fc1a4592219b9ccb85854282d0e59d35fddebc</id>
<content type='text'>
if CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR is builtin and CTR is module, allocating such algo
will fail.
DRBG: could not allocate CTR cipher TFM handle: ctr(aes)
alg: drbg: Failed to reset rng
alg: drbg: Test 0 failed for drbg_pr_ctr_aes128
DRBG: could not allocate CTR cipher TFM handle: ctr(aes)
alg: drbg: Failed to reset rng
alg: drbg: Test 0 failed for drbg_nopr_ctr_aes128
DRBG: could not allocate CTR cipher TFM handle: ctr(aes)
alg: drbg: Failed to reset rng
alg: drbg: Test 0 failed for drbg_nopr_ctr_aes192
DRBG: could not allocate CTR cipher TFM handle: ctr(aes)
alg: drbg: Failed to reset rng
alg: drbg: Test 0 failed for drbg_nopr_ctr_aes256

So let's select CTR instead of just depend on it.

Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe &lt;clabbe@baylibre.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
if CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR is builtin and CTR is module, allocating such algo
will fail.
DRBG: could not allocate CTR cipher TFM handle: ctr(aes)
alg: drbg: Failed to reset rng
alg: drbg: Test 0 failed for drbg_pr_ctr_aes128
DRBG: could not allocate CTR cipher TFM handle: ctr(aes)
alg: drbg: Failed to reset rng
alg: drbg: Test 0 failed for drbg_nopr_ctr_aes128
DRBG: could not allocate CTR cipher TFM handle: ctr(aes)
alg: drbg: Failed to reset rng
alg: drbg: Test 0 failed for drbg_nopr_ctr_aes192
DRBG: could not allocate CTR cipher TFM handle: ctr(aes)
alg: drbg: Failed to reset rng
alg: drbg: Test 0 failed for drbg_nopr_ctr_aes256

So let's select CTR instead of just depend on it.

Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe &lt;clabbe@baylibre.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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