<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/block, branch v5.4.285</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>blk-rq-qos: fix crash on rq_qos_wait vs. rq_qos_wake_function race</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:20:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Omar Sandoval</name>
<email>osandov@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-15T17:59:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d04b72c9ef2b0689bfc1057d21c4aeed087c329f'/>
<id>d04b72c9ef2b0689bfc1057d21c4aeed087c329f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e972b08b91ef48488bae9789f03cfedb148667fb upstream.

We're seeing crashes from rq_qos_wake_function that look like this:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffafe180a40084
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 10027c067 PMD 10115d067 PTE 0
  Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-00013-geca631b8fe80 #11
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1d/0x40
  Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 9c 41 5c fa 65 ff 05 62 97 30 4c 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 &lt;f0&gt; 0f b1 17 75 0a 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 cc cc cc cc 89 c6 e8 2c 0b 00
  RSP: 0018:ffffafe180580ca0 EFLAGS: 00010046
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffafe180a3f7a8 RCX: 0000000000000011
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffffafe180a40084
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000001e7240 R09: 0000000000000011
  R10: 0000000000000028 R11: 0000000000000888 R12: 0000000000000002
  R13: ffffafe180a40084 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9aaf1f280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: ffffafe180a40084 CR3: 000000010e428002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   &lt;IRQ&gt;
   try_to_wake_up+0x5a/0x6a0
   rq_qos_wake_function+0x71/0x80
   __wake_up_common+0x75/0xa0
   __wake_up+0x36/0x60
   scale_up.part.0+0x50/0x110
   wb_timer_fn+0x227/0x450
   ...

So rq_qos_wake_function() calls wake_up_process(data-&gt;task), which calls
try_to_wake_up(), which faults in raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&amp;p-&gt;pi_lock).

p comes from data-&gt;task, and data comes from the waitqueue entry, which
is stored on the waiter's stack in rq_qos_wait(). Analyzing the core
dump with drgn, I found that the waiter had already woken up and moved
on to a completely unrelated code path, clobbering what was previously
data-&gt;task. Meanwhile, the waker was passing the clobbered garbage in
data-&gt;task to wake_up_process(), leading to the crash.

What's happening is that in between rq_qos_wake_function() deleting the
waitqueue entry and calling wake_up_process(), rq_qos_wait() is finding
that it already got a token and returning. The race looks like this:

rq_qos_wait()                           rq_qos_wake_function()
==============================================================
prepare_to_wait_exclusive()
                                        data-&gt;got_token = true;
                                        list_del_init(&amp;curr-&gt;entry);
if (data.got_token)
        break;
finish_wait(&amp;rqw-&gt;wait, &amp;data.wq);
  ^- returns immediately because
     list_empty_careful(&amp;wq_entry-&gt;entry)
     is true
... return, go do something else ...
                                        wake_up_process(data-&gt;task)
                                          (NO LONGER VALID!)-^

Normally, finish_wait() is supposed to synchronize against the waker.
But, as noted above, it is returning immediately because the waitqueue
entry has already been removed from the waitqueue.

The bug is that rq_qos_wake_function() is accessing the waitqueue entry
AFTER deleting it. Note that autoremove_wake_function() wakes the waiter
and THEN deletes the waitqueue entry, which is the proper order.

Fix it by swapping the order. We also need to use
list_del_init_careful() to match the list_empty_careful() in
finish_wait().

Fixes: 38cfb5a45ee0 ("blk-wbt: improve waking of tasks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval &lt;osandov@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn &lt;johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d3bee2463a67b1ee597211823bf7ad3721c26e41.1729014591.git.osandov@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e972b08b91ef48488bae9789f03cfedb148667fb upstream.

We're seeing crashes from rq_qos_wake_function that look like this:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffafe180a40084
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 10027c067 PMD 10115d067 PTE 0
  Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-00013-geca631b8fe80 #11
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1d/0x40
  Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 9c 41 5c fa 65 ff 05 62 97 30 4c 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 &lt;f0&gt; 0f b1 17 75 0a 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 cc cc cc cc 89 c6 e8 2c 0b 00
  RSP: 0018:ffffafe180580ca0 EFLAGS: 00010046
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffafe180a3f7a8 RCX: 0000000000000011
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffffafe180a40084
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000001e7240 R09: 0000000000000011
  R10: 0000000000000028 R11: 0000000000000888 R12: 0000000000000002
  R13: ffffafe180a40084 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9aaf1f280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: ffffafe180a40084 CR3: 000000010e428002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   &lt;IRQ&gt;
   try_to_wake_up+0x5a/0x6a0
   rq_qos_wake_function+0x71/0x80
   __wake_up_common+0x75/0xa0
   __wake_up+0x36/0x60
   scale_up.part.0+0x50/0x110
   wb_timer_fn+0x227/0x450
   ...

So rq_qos_wake_function() calls wake_up_process(data-&gt;task), which calls
try_to_wake_up(), which faults in raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&amp;p-&gt;pi_lock).

p comes from data-&gt;task, and data comes from the waitqueue entry, which
is stored on the waiter's stack in rq_qos_wait(). Analyzing the core
dump with drgn, I found that the waiter had already woken up and moved
on to a completely unrelated code path, clobbering what was previously
data-&gt;task. Meanwhile, the waker was passing the clobbered garbage in
data-&gt;task to wake_up_process(), leading to the crash.

What's happening is that in between rq_qos_wake_function() deleting the
waitqueue entry and calling wake_up_process(), rq_qos_wait() is finding
that it already got a token and returning. The race looks like this:

rq_qos_wait()                           rq_qos_wake_function()
==============================================================
prepare_to_wait_exclusive()
                                        data-&gt;got_token = true;
                                        list_del_init(&amp;curr-&gt;entry);
if (data.got_token)
        break;
finish_wait(&amp;rqw-&gt;wait, &amp;data.wq);
  ^- returns immediately because
     list_empty_careful(&amp;wq_entry-&gt;entry)
     is true
... return, go do something else ...
                                        wake_up_process(data-&gt;task)
                                          (NO LONGER VALID!)-^

Normally, finish_wait() is supposed to synchronize against the waker.
But, as noted above, it is returning immediately because the waitqueue
entry has already been removed from the waitqueue.

The bug is that rq_qos_wake_function() is accessing the waitqueue entry
AFTER deleting it. Note that autoremove_wake_function() wakes the waiter
and THEN deletes the waitqueue entry, which is the proper order.

Fix it by swapping the order. We also need to use
list_del_init_careful() to match the list_empty_careful() in
finish_wait().

Fixes: 38cfb5a45ee0 ("blk-wbt: improve waking of tasks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval &lt;osandov@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn &lt;johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d3bee2463a67b1ee597211823bf7ad3721c26e41.1729014591.git.osandov@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block, bfq: don't break merge chain in bfq_split_bfqq()</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:20:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yu Kuai</name>
<email>yukuai3@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-02T13:03:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3a5f45a4ad4e1fd36b0a998eef03d76a4f02a2a8'/>
<id>3a5f45a4ad4e1fd36b0a998eef03d76a4f02a2a8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 42c306ed723321af4003b2a41bb73728cab54f85 ]

Consider the following scenario:

    Process 1       Process 2       Process 3       Process 4
     (BIC1)          (BIC2)          (BIC3)          (BIC4)
      Λ               |               |                |
       \-------------\ \-------------\ \--------------\|
                      V               V                V
      bfqq1---------&gt;bfqq2----------&gt;bfqq3-----------&gt;bfqq4
ref    0              1               2                4

If Process 1 issue a new IO and bfqq2 is found, and then bfq_init_rq()
decide to spilt bfqq2 by bfq_split_bfqq(). Howerver, procress reference
of bfqq2 is 1 and bfq_split_bfqq() just clear the coop flag, which will
break the merge chain.

Expected result: caller will allocate a new bfqq for BIC1

    Process 1       Process 2       Process 3       Process 4
     (BIC1)          (BIC2)          (BIC3)          (BIC4)
                      |               |                |
                       \-------------\ \--------------\|
                                      V                V
      bfqq1---------&gt;bfqq2----------&gt;bfqq3-----------&gt;bfqq4
ref    0              0               1                3

Since the condition is only used for the last bfqq4 when the previous
bfqq2 and bfqq3 are already splited. Fix the problem by checking if
bfqq is the last one in the merge chain as well.

Fixes: 36eca8948323 ("block, bfq: add Early Queue Merge (EQM)")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai &lt;yukuai3@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240902130329.3787024-4-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 42c306ed723321af4003b2a41bb73728cab54f85 ]

Consider the following scenario:

    Process 1       Process 2       Process 3       Process 4
     (BIC1)          (BIC2)          (BIC3)          (BIC4)
      Λ               |               |                |
       \-------------\ \-------------\ \--------------\|
                      V               V                V
      bfqq1---------&gt;bfqq2----------&gt;bfqq3-----------&gt;bfqq4
ref    0              1               2                4

If Process 1 issue a new IO and bfqq2 is found, and then bfq_init_rq()
decide to spilt bfqq2 by bfq_split_bfqq(). Howerver, procress reference
of bfqq2 is 1 and bfq_split_bfqq() just clear the coop flag, which will
break the merge chain.

Expected result: caller will allocate a new bfqq for BIC1

    Process 1       Process 2       Process 3       Process 4
     (BIC1)          (BIC2)          (BIC3)          (BIC4)
                      |               |                |
                       \-------------\ \--------------\|
                                      V                V
      bfqq1---------&gt;bfqq2----------&gt;bfqq3-----------&gt;bfqq4
ref    0              0               1                3

Since the condition is only used for the last bfqq4 when the previous
bfqq2 and bfqq3 are already splited. Fix the problem by checking if
bfqq is the last one in the merge chain as well.

Fixes: 36eca8948323 ("block, bfq: add Early Queue Merge (EQM)")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai &lt;yukuai3@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240902130329.3787024-4-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block, bfq: choose the last bfqq from merge chain in bfq_setup_cooperator()</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:20:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yu Kuai</name>
<email>yukuai3@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-02T13:03:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=140c8e2caa34b07e067c3a296d1ef81571346170'/>
<id>140c8e2caa34b07e067c3a296d1ef81571346170</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0e456dba86c7f9a19792204a044835f1ca2c8dbb ]

Consider the following merge chain:

Process 1       Process 2       Process 3	Process 4
 (BIC1)          (BIC2)          (BIC3)		 (BIC4)
  Λ                |               |               |
   \--------------\ \-------------\ \-------------\|
                   V               V		   V
  bfqq1---------&gt;bfqq2----------&gt;bfqq3-----------&gt;bfqq4

IO from Process 1 will get bfqf2 from BIC1 first, then
bfq_setup_cooperator() will found bfqq2 already merged to bfqq3 and then
handle this IO from bfqq3. However, the merge chain can be much deeper
and bfqq3 can be merged to other bfqq as well.

Fix this problem by iterating to the last bfqq in
bfq_setup_cooperator().

Fixes: 36eca8948323 ("block, bfq: add Early Queue Merge (EQM)")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai &lt;yukuai3@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240902130329.3787024-3-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0e456dba86c7f9a19792204a044835f1ca2c8dbb ]

Consider the following merge chain:

Process 1       Process 2       Process 3	Process 4
 (BIC1)          (BIC2)          (BIC3)		 (BIC4)
  Λ                |               |               |
   \--------------\ \-------------\ \-------------\|
                   V               V		   V
  bfqq1---------&gt;bfqq2----------&gt;bfqq3-----------&gt;bfqq4

IO from Process 1 will get bfqf2 from BIC1 first, then
bfq_setup_cooperator() will found bfqq2 already merged to bfqq3 and then
handle this IO from bfqq3. However, the merge chain can be much deeper
and bfqq3 can be merged to other bfqq as well.

Fix this problem by iterating to the last bfqq in
bfq_setup_cooperator().

Fixes: 36eca8948323 ("block, bfq: add Early Queue Merge (EQM)")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai &lt;yukuai3@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240902130329.3787024-3-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block, bfq: fix possible UAF for bfqq-&gt;bic with merge chain</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:20:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yu Kuai</name>
<email>yukuai3@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-02T13:03:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bc2140534b2aae752e4f7cb4489642dbb5ec4777'/>
<id>bc2140534b2aae752e4f7cb4489642dbb5ec4777</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 18ad4df091dd5d067d2faa8fce1180b79f7041a7 ]

1) initial state, three tasks:

		Process 1       Process 2	Process 3
		 (BIC1)          (BIC2)		 (BIC3)
		  |  Λ            |  Λ		  |  Λ
		  |  |            |  |		  |  |
		  V  |            V  |		  V  |
		  bfqq1           bfqq2		  bfqq3
process ref:	   1		    1		    1

2) bfqq1 merged to bfqq2:

		Process 1       Process 2	Process 3
		 (BIC1)          (BIC2)		 (BIC3)
		  |               |		  |  Λ
		  \--------------\|		  |  |
		                  V		  V  |
		  bfqq1---------&gt;bfqq2		  bfqq3
process ref:	   0		    2		    1

3) bfqq2 merged to bfqq3:

		Process 1       Process 2	Process 3
		 (BIC1)          (BIC2)		 (BIC3)
	 here -&gt; Λ                |		  |
		  \--------------\ \-------------\|
		                  V		  V
		  bfqq1---------&gt;bfqq2----------&gt;bfqq3
process ref:	   0		    1		    3

In this case, IO from Process 1 will get bfqq2 from BIC1 first, and then
get bfqq3 through merge chain, and finially handle IO by bfqq3.
Howerver, current code will think bfqq2 is owned by BIC1, like initial
state, and set bfqq2-&gt;bic to BIC1.

bfq_insert_request
-&gt; by Process 1
 bfqq = bfq_init_rq(rq)
  bfqq = bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split
   bfqq = bic_to_bfqq
   -&gt; get bfqq2 from BIC1
 bfqq-&gt;ref++
 rq-&gt;elv.priv[0] = bic
 rq-&gt;elv.priv[1] = bfqq
 if (bfqq_process_refs(bfqq) == 1)
  bfqq-&gt;bic = bic
  -&gt; record BIC1 to bfqq2

  __bfq_insert_request
   new_bfqq = bfq_setup_cooperator
   -&gt; get bfqq3 from bfqq2-&gt;new_bfqq
   bfqq_request_freed(bfqq)
   new_bfqq-&gt;ref++
   rq-&gt;elv.priv[1] = new_bfqq
   -&gt; handle IO by bfqq3

Fix the problem by checking bfqq is from merge chain fist. And this
might fix a following problem reported by our syzkaller(unreproducible):

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_do_early_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5692 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_do_or_sched_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5805 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_get_queue+0x25b0/0x2610 block/bfq-iosched.c:5889
Write of size 1 at addr ffff888123839eb8 by task kworker/0:1H/18595

CPU: 0 PID: 18595 Comm: kworker/0:1H Tainted: G             L     6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_requeue_work
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline]
 print_report+0x10d/0x610 mm/kasan/report.c:475
 kasan_report+0x8e/0xc0 mm/kasan/report.c:588
 bfq_do_early_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5692 [inline]
 bfq_do_or_sched_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5805 [inline]
 bfq_get_queue+0x25b0/0x2610 block/bfq-iosched.c:5889
 bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0x169/0x5d0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6757
 bfq_init_rq block/bfq-iosched.c:6876 [inline]
 bfq_insert_request block/bfq-iosched.c:6254 [inline]
 bfq_insert_requests+0x1112/0x5cf0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6304
 blk_mq_insert_request+0x290/0x8d0 block/blk-mq.c:2593
 blk_mq_requeue_work+0x6bc/0xa70 block/blk-mq.c:1502
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2627 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2700
 worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 kernel/workqueue.c:2781
 kthread+0x33c/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:305
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Allocated by task 20776:
 kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x87/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:328
 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:188 [inline]
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:763 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3458 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1a4/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3503
 ioc_create_icq block/blk-ioc.c:370 [inline]
 ioc_find_get_icq+0x180/0xaa0 block/blk-ioc.c:436
 bfq_prepare_request+0x39/0xf0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6812
 blk_mq_rq_ctx_init.isra.7+0x6ac/0xa00 block/blk-mq.c:403
 __blk_mq_alloc_requests+0xcc0/0x1070 block/blk-mq.c:517
 blk_mq_get_new_requests block/blk-mq.c:2940 [inline]
 blk_mq_submit_bio+0x624/0x27c0 block/blk-mq.c:3042
 __submit_bio+0x331/0x6f0 block/blk-core.c:624
 __submit_bio_noacct_mq block/blk-core.c:703 [inline]
 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x816/0xb40 block/blk-core.c:732
 submit_bio_noacct+0x7a6/0x1b50 block/blk-core.c:826
 xlog_write_iclog+0x7d5/0xa00 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:1958
 xlog_state_release_iclog+0x3b8/0x720 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:619
 xlog_cil_push_work+0x19c5/0x2270 fs/xfs/xfs_log_cil.c:1330
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2627 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2700
 worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 kernel/workqueue.c:2781
 kthread+0x33c/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:305

Freed by task 946:
 kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:522
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x1c0 mm/kasan/common.c:244
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:164 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1815 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1841 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3786 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0x118/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3808
 rcu_do_batch+0x35c/0xe30 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2189
 rcu_core+0x819/0xd90 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2462
 __do_softirq+0x1b0/0x7a2 kernel/softirq.c:553

Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:492
 __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:2712 [inline]
 call_rcu+0xce/0x1020 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2826
 ioc_destroy_icq+0x54c/0x830 block/blk-ioc.c:105
 ioc_release_fn+0xf0/0x360 block/blk-ioc.c:124
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2627 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2700
 worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 kernel/workqueue.c:2781
 kthread+0x33c/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:305

Second to last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:492
 __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:2712 [inline]
 call_rcu+0xce/0x1020 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2826
 ioc_destroy_icq+0x54c/0x830 block/blk-ioc.c:105
 ioc_release_fn+0xf0/0x360 block/blk-ioc.c:124
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2627 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2700
 worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 kernel/workqueue.c:2781
 kthread+0x33c/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:305

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888123839d68
 which belongs to the cache bfq_io_cq of size 1360
The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of
 freed 1360-byte region [ffff888123839d68, ffff88812383a2b8)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea00048e0e00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88812383f588 pfn:0x123838
head:ffffea00048e0e00 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x17ffffc0000a40(workingset|slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 0017ffffc0000a40 ffff88810588c200 ffffea00048ffa10 ffff888105889488
raw: ffff88812383f588 0000000000150006 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888123839d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff888123839e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
&gt;ffff888123839e80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                        ^
 ffff888123839f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff888123839f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================

Fixes: 36eca8948323 ("block, bfq: add Early Queue Merge (EQM)")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai &lt;yukuai3@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240902130329.3787024-2-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 18ad4df091dd5d067d2faa8fce1180b79f7041a7 ]

1) initial state, three tasks:

		Process 1       Process 2	Process 3
		 (BIC1)          (BIC2)		 (BIC3)
		  |  Λ            |  Λ		  |  Λ
		  |  |            |  |		  |  |
		  V  |            V  |		  V  |
		  bfqq1           bfqq2		  bfqq3
process ref:	   1		    1		    1

2) bfqq1 merged to bfqq2:

		Process 1       Process 2	Process 3
		 (BIC1)          (BIC2)		 (BIC3)
		  |               |		  |  Λ
		  \--------------\|		  |  |
		                  V		  V  |
		  bfqq1---------&gt;bfqq2		  bfqq3
process ref:	   0		    2		    1

3) bfqq2 merged to bfqq3:

		Process 1       Process 2	Process 3
		 (BIC1)          (BIC2)		 (BIC3)
	 here -&gt; Λ                |		  |
		  \--------------\ \-------------\|
		                  V		  V
		  bfqq1---------&gt;bfqq2----------&gt;bfqq3
process ref:	   0		    1		    3

In this case, IO from Process 1 will get bfqq2 from BIC1 first, and then
get bfqq3 through merge chain, and finially handle IO by bfqq3.
Howerver, current code will think bfqq2 is owned by BIC1, like initial
state, and set bfqq2-&gt;bic to BIC1.

bfq_insert_request
-&gt; by Process 1
 bfqq = bfq_init_rq(rq)
  bfqq = bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split
   bfqq = bic_to_bfqq
   -&gt; get bfqq2 from BIC1
 bfqq-&gt;ref++
 rq-&gt;elv.priv[0] = bic
 rq-&gt;elv.priv[1] = bfqq
 if (bfqq_process_refs(bfqq) == 1)
  bfqq-&gt;bic = bic
  -&gt; record BIC1 to bfqq2

  __bfq_insert_request
   new_bfqq = bfq_setup_cooperator
   -&gt; get bfqq3 from bfqq2-&gt;new_bfqq
   bfqq_request_freed(bfqq)
   new_bfqq-&gt;ref++
   rq-&gt;elv.priv[1] = new_bfqq
   -&gt; handle IO by bfqq3

Fix the problem by checking bfqq is from merge chain fist. And this
might fix a following problem reported by our syzkaller(unreproducible):

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_do_early_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5692 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_do_or_sched_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5805 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_get_queue+0x25b0/0x2610 block/bfq-iosched.c:5889
Write of size 1 at addr ffff888123839eb8 by task kworker/0:1H/18595

CPU: 0 PID: 18595 Comm: kworker/0:1H Tainted: G             L     6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_requeue_work
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline]
 print_report+0x10d/0x610 mm/kasan/report.c:475
 kasan_report+0x8e/0xc0 mm/kasan/report.c:588
 bfq_do_early_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5692 [inline]
 bfq_do_or_sched_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5805 [inline]
 bfq_get_queue+0x25b0/0x2610 block/bfq-iosched.c:5889
 bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0x169/0x5d0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6757
 bfq_init_rq block/bfq-iosched.c:6876 [inline]
 bfq_insert_request block/bfq-iosched.c:6254 [inline]
 bfq_insert_requests+0x1112/0x5cf0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6304
 blk_mq_insert_request+0x290/0x8d0 block/blk-mq.c:2593
 blk_mq_requeue_work+0x6bc/0xa70 block/blk-mq.c:1502
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2627 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2700
 worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 kernel/workqueue.c:2781
 kthread+0x33c/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:305
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Allocated by task 20776:
 kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x87/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:328
 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:188 [inline]
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:763 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3458 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1a4/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3503
 ioc_create_icq block/blk-ioc.c:370 [inline]
 ioc_find_get_icq+0x180/0xaa0 block/blk-ioc.c:436
 bfq_prepare_request+0x39/0xf0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6812
 blk_mq_rq_ctx_init.isra.7+0x6ac/0xa00 block/blk-mq.c:403
 __blk_mq_alloc_requests+0xcc0/0x1070 block/blk-mq.c:517
 blk_mq_get_new_requests block/blk-mq.c:2940 [inline]
 blk_mq_submit_bio+0x624/0x27c0 block/blk-mq.c:3042
 __submit_bio+0x331/0x6f0 block/blk-core.c:624
 __submit_bio_noacct_mq block/blk-core.c:703 [inline]
 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x816/0xb40 block/blk-core.c:732
 submit_bio_noacct+0x7a6/0x1b50 block/blk-core.c:826
 xlog_write_iclog+0x7d5/0xa00 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:1958
 xlog_state_release_iclog+0x3b8/0x720 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:619
 xlog_cil_push_work+0x19c5/0x2270 fs/xfs/xfs_log_cil.c:1330
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2627 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2700
 worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 kernel/workqueue.c:2781
 kthread+0x33c/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:305

Freed by task 946:
 kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:522
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x1c0 mm/kasan/common.c:244
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:164 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1815 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1841 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3786 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0x118/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3808
 rcu_do_batch+0x35c/0xe30 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2189
 rcu_core+0x819/0xd90 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2462
 __do_softirq+0x1b0/0x7a2 kernel/softirq.c:553

Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:492
 __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:2712 [inline]
 call_rcu+0xce/0x1020 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2826
 ioc_destroy_icq+0x54c/0x830 block/blk-ioc.c:105
 ioc_release_fn+0xf0/0x360 block/blk-ioc.c:124
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2627 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2700
 worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 kernel/workqueue.c:2781
 kthread+0x33c/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:305

Second to last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:492
 __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:2712 [inline]
 call_rcu+0xce/0x1020 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2826
 ioc_destroy_icq+0x54c/0x830 block/blk-ioc.c:105
 ioc_release_fn+0xf0/0x360 block/blk-ioc.c:124
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2627 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2700
 worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 kernel/workqueue.c:2781
 kthread+0x33c/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:305

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888123839d68
 which belongs to the cache bfq_io_cq of size 1360
The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of
 freed 1360-byte region [ffff888123839d68, ffff88812383a2b8)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea00048e0e00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88812383f588 pfn:0x123838
head:ffffea00048e0e00 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x17ffffc0000a40(workingset|slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 0017ffffc0000a40 ffff88810588c200 ffffea00048ffa10 ffff888105889488
raw: ffff88812383f588 0000000000150006 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888123839d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff888123839e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
&gt;ffff888123839e80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                        ^
 ffff888123839f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff888123839f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================

Fixes: 36eca8948323 ("block, bfq: add Early Queue Merge (EQM)")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai &lt;yukuai3@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240902130329.3787024-2-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: initialize integrity buffer to zero before writing it to media</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:03:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-13T08:48:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=129f95948a96105c1fad8e612c9097763e88ac5f'/>
<id>129f95948a96105c1fad8e612c9097763e88ac5f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 899ee2c3829c5ac14bfc7d3c4a5846c0b709b78f upstream.

Metadata added by bio_integrity_prep is using plain kmalloc, which leads
to random kernel memory being written media.  For PI metadata this is
limited to the app tag that isn't used by kernel generated metadata,
but for non-PI metadata the entire buffer leaks kernel memory.

Fix this by adding the __GFP_ZERO flag to allocations for writes.

Fixes: 7ba1ba12eeef ("block: Block layer data integrity support")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi &lt;joshi.k@samsung.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni &lt;kch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613084839.1044015-2-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal &lt;shivani.agarwal@broadcom.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 899ee2c3829c5ac14bfc7d3c4a5846c0b709b78f upstream.

Metadata added by bio_integrity_prep is using plain kmalloc, which leads
to random kernel memory being written media.  For PI metadata this is
limited to the app tag that isn't used by kernel generated metadata,
but for non-PI metadata the entire buffer leaks kernel memory.

Fix this by adding the __GFP_ZERO flag to allocations for writes.

Fixes: 7ba1ba12eeef ("block: Block layer data integrity support")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi &lt;joshi.k@samsung.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni &lt;kch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613084839.1044015-2-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal &lt;shivani.agarwal@broadcom.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: prevent division by zero in blk_rq_stat_sum()</title>
<updated>2024-04-13T10:51:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roman Smirnov</name>
<email>r.smirnov@omp.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-05T13:45:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=edd073c78d2bf48c5b8bf435bbc3d61d6e7c6c14'/>
<id>edd073c78d2bf48c5b8bf435bbc3d61d6e7c6c14</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 93f52fbeaf4b676b21acfe42a5152620e6770d02 ]

The expression dst-&gt;nr_samples + src-&gt;nr_samples may
have zero value on overflow. It is necessary to add
a check to avoid division by zero.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.

Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov &lt;r.smirnov@omp.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov &lt;s.shtylyov@omp.ru&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240305134509.23108-1-r.smirnov@omp.ru
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 93f52fbeaf4b676b21acfe42a5152620e6770d02 ]

The expression dst-&gt;nr_samples + src-&gt;nr_samples may
have zero value on overflow. It is necessary to add
a check to avoid division by zero.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.

Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov &lt;r.smirnov@omp.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov &lt;s.shtylyov@omp.ru&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240305134509.23108-1-r.smirnov@omp.ru
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: sed-opal: handle empty atoms when parsing response</title>
<updated>2024-03-26T22:22:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Joyce</name>
<email>gjoyce@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-16T21:04:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5d8afc25c7714ff528271f4fa3f5eba74803a75e'/>
<id>5d8afc25c7714ff528271f4fa3f5eba74803a75e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5429c8de56f6b2bd8f537df3a1e04e67b9c04282 ]

The SED Opal response parsing function response_parse() does not
handle the case of an empty atom in the response. This causes
the entry count to be too high and the response fails to be
parsed. Recognizing, but ignoring, empty atoms allows response
handling to succeed.

Signed-off-by: Greg Joyce &lt;gjoyce@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240216210417.3526064-2-gjoyce@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5429c8de56f6b2bd8f537df3a1e04e67b9c04282 ]

The SED Opal response parsing function response_parse() does not
handle the case of an empty atom in the response. This causes
the entry count to be too high and the response fails to be
parsed. Recognizing, but ignoring, empty atoms allows response
handling to succeed.

Signed-off-by: Greg Joyce &lt;gjoyce@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240216210417.3526064-2-gjoyce@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>blk-mq: fix IO hang from sbitmap wakeup race</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:25:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ming Lei</name>
<email>ming.lei@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-12T12:26:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ecd7744a1446eb02ccc63e493e2eb6ede4ef1e10'/>
<id>ecd7744a1446eb02ccc63e493e2eb6ede4ef1e10</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5266caaf5660529e3da53004b8b7174cab6374ed ]

In blk_mq_mark_tag_wait(), __add_wait_queue() may be re-ordered
with the following blk_mq_get_driver_tag() in case of getting driver
tag failure.

Then in __sbitmap_queue_wake_up(), waitqueue_active() may not observe
the added waiter in blk_mq_mark_tag_wait() and wake up nothing, meantime
blk_mq_mark_tag_wait() can't get driver tag successfully.

This issue can be reproduced by running the following test in loop, and
fio hang can be observed in &lt; 30min when running it on my test VM
in laptop.

	modprobe -r scsi_debug
	modprobe scsi_debug delay=0 dev_size_mb=4096 max_queue=1 host_max_queue=1 submit_queues=4
	dev=`ls -d /sys/bus/pseudo/drivers/scsi_debug/adapter*/host*/target*/*/block/* | head -1 | xargs basename`
	fio --filename=/dev/"$dev" --direct=1 --rw=randrw --bs=4k --iodepth=1 \
       		--runtime=100 --numjobs=40 --time_based --name=test \
        	--ioengine=libaio

Fix the issue by adding one explicit barrier in blk_mq_mark_tag_wait(), which
is just fine in case of running out of tag.

Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Kemeng Shi &lt;shikemeng@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Reported-by: Changhui Zhong &lt;czhong@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei &lt;ming.lei@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240112122626.4181044-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5266caaf5660529e3da53004b8b7174cab6374ed ]

In blk_mq_mark_tag_wait(), __add_wait_queue() may be re-ordered
with the following blk_mq_get_driver_tag() in case of getting driver
tag failure.

Then in __sbitmap_queue_wake_up(), waitqueue_active() may not observe
the added waiter in blk_mq_mark_tag_wait() and wake up nothing, meantime
blk_mq_mark_tag_wait() can't get driver tag successfully.

This issue can be reproduced by running the following test in loop, and
fio hang can be observed in &lt; 30min when running it on my test VM
in laptop.

	modprobe -r scsi_debug
	modprobe scsi_debug delay=0 dev_size_mb=4096 max_queue=1 host_max_queue=1 submit_queues=4
	dev=`ls -d /sys/bus/pseudo/drivers/scsi_debug/adapter*/host*/target*/*/block/* | head -1 | xargs basename`
	fio --filename=/dev/"$dev" --direct=1 --rw=randrw --bs=4k --iodepth=1 \
       		--runtime=100 --numjobs=40 --time_based --name=test \
        	--ioengine=libaio

Fix the issue by adding one explicit barrier in blk_mq_mark_tag_wait(), which
is just fine in case of running out of tag.

Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Kemeng Shi &lt;shikemeng@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Reported-by: Changhui Zhong &lt;czhong@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei &lt;ming.lei@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240112122626.4181044-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: prevent an integer overflow in bvec_try_merge_hw_page</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:24:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-04T17:34:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6f2cd02ff5b2aa6fe2b246069de19487adff7d36'/>
<id>6f2cd02ff5b2aa6fe2b246069de19487adff7d36</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3f034c374ad55773c12dd8f3c1607328e17c0072 ]

Reordered a check to avoid a possible overflow when adding len to bv_len.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn &lt;johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204173419.782378-2-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3f034c374ad55773c12dd8f3c1607328e17c0072 ]

Reordered a check to avoid a possible overflow when adding len to bv_len.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn &lt;johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204173419.782378-2-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: Remove special-casing of compound pages</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:24:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)</name>
<email>willy@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-14T14:41:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3f4e660144edb053886fc80f587a71ad7afc2ad6'/>
<id>3f4e660144edb053886fc80f587a71ad7afc2ad6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1b151e2435fc3a9b10c8946c6aebe9f3e1938c55 upstream.

The special casing was originally added in pre-git history; reproducing
the commit log here:

&gt; commit a318a92567d77
&gt; Author: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
&gt; Date:   Sun Sep 21 01:42:22 2003 -0700
&gt;
&gt;     [PATCH] Speed up direct-io hugetlbpage handling
&gt;
&gt;     This patch short-circuits all the direct-io page dirtying logic for
&gt;     higher-order pages.  Without this, we pointlessly bounce BIOs up to
&gt;     keventd all the time.

In the last twenty years, compound pages have become used for more than
just hugetlb.  Rewrite these functions to operate on folios instead
of pages and remove the special case for hugetlbfs; I don't think
it's needed any more (and if it is, we can put it back in as a call
to folio_test_hugetlb()).

This was found by inspection; as far as I can tell, this bug can lead
to pages used as the destination of a direct I/O read not being marked
as dirty.  If those pages are then reclaimed by the MM without being
dirtied for some other reason, they won't be written out.  Then when
they're faulted back in, they will not contain the data they should.
It'll take a pretty unusual setup to produce this problem with several
races all going the wrong way.

This problem predates the folio work; it could for example have been
triggered by mmaping a THP in tmpfs and using that as the target of an
O_DIRECT read.

Fixes: 800d8c63b2e98 ("shmem: add huge pages support")
Cc:  &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1b151e2435fc3a9b10c8946c6aebe9f3e1938c55 upstream.

The special casing was originally added in pre-git history; reproducing
the commit log here:

&gt; commit a318a92567d77
&gt; Author: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
&gt; Date:   Sun Sep 21 01:42:22 2003 -0700
&gt;
&gt;     [PATCH] Speed up direct-io hugetlbpage handling
&gt;
&gt;     This patch short-circuits all the direct-io page dirtying logic for
&gt;     higher-order pages.  Without this, we pointlessly bounce BIOs up to
&gt;     keventd all the time.

In the last twenty years, compound pages have become used for more than
just hugetlb.  Rewrite these functions to operate on folios instead
of pages and remove the special case for hugetlbfs; I don't think
it's needed any more (and if it is, we can put it back in as a call
to folio_test_hugetlb()).

This was found by inspection; as far as I can tell, this bug can lead
to pages used as the destination of a direct I/O read not being marked
as dirty.  If those pages are then reclaimed by the MM without being
dirtied for some other reason, they won't be written out.  Then when
they're faulted back in, they will not contain the data they should.
It'll take a pretty unusual setup to produce this problem with several
races all going the wrong way.

This problem predates the folio work; it could for example have been
triggered by mmaping a THP in tmpfs and using that as the target of an
O_DIRECT read.

Fixes: 800d8c63b2e98 ("shmem: add huge pages support")
Cc:  &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
