<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/block, branch v4.1.41</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>block: fix del_gendisk() vs blkdev_ioctl crash</title>
<updated>2017-06-13T13:29:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Williams</name>
<email>dan.j.williams@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-29T22:02:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0c28e96f0fecd9889b4f597fa165525ebad8ad61'/>
<id>0c28e96f0fecd9889b4f597fa165525ebad8ad61</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ac34f15e0c6d2fd58480052b6985f6991fb53bcc ]

When tearing down a block device early in its lifetime, userspace may
still be performing discovery actions like blkdev_ioctl() to re-read
partitions.

The nvdimm_revalidate_disk() implementation depends on
disk-&gt;driverfs_dev to be valid at entry.  However, it is set to NULL in
del_gendisk() and fatally this is happening *before* the disk device is
deleted from userspace view.

There's no reason for del_gendisk() to clear -&gt;driverfs_dev.  That
device is the parent of the disk.  It is guaranteed to not be freed
until the disk, as a child, drops its -&gt;parent reference.

We could also fix this issue locally in nvdimm_revalidate_disk() by
using disk_to_dev(disk)-&gt;parent, but lets fix it globally since
-&gt;driverfs_dev follows the lifetime of the parent.  Longer term we
should probably just add a @parent parameter to add_disk(), and stop
carrying this pointer in the gendisk.

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
 IP: [&lt;ffffffffa00340a8&gt;] nvdimm_revalidate_disk+0x18/0x90 [libnvdimm]
 CPU: 2 PID: 538 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G           O    4.4.0-rc5 #2257
 [..]
 Call Trace:
  [&lt;ffffffff8143e5c7&gt;] rescan_partitions+0x87/0x2c0
  [&lt;ffffffff810f37f9&gt;] ? __lock_is_held+0x49/0x70
  [&lt;ffffffff81438c62&gt;] __blkdev_reread_part+0x72/0xb0
  [&lt;ffffffff81438cc5&gt;] blkdev_reread_part+0x25/0x40
  [&lt;ffffffff8143982d&gt;] blkdev_ioctl+0x4fd/0x9c0
  [&lt;ffffffff811246c9&gt;] ? current_kernel_time64+0x69/0xd0
  [&lt;ffffffff812916dd&gt;] block_ioctl+0x3d/0x50
  [&lt;ffffffff81264c38&gt;] do_vfs_ioctl+0x308/0x560
  [&lt;ffffffff8115dbd1&gt;] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xb1/0x100
  [&lt;ffffffff810031d6&gt;] ? do_audit_syscall_entry+0x66/0x70
  [&lt;ffffffff81264f09&gt;] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
  [&lt;ffffffff81902672&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76

Reported-by: Robert Hu &lt;robert.hu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ac34f15e0c6d2fd58480052b6985f6991fb53bcc ]

When tearing down a block device early in its lifetime, userspace may
still be performing discovery actions like blkdev_ioctl() to re-read
partitions.

The nvdimm_revalidate_disk() implementation depends on
disk-&gt;driverfs_dev to be valid at entry.  However, it is set to NULL in
del_gendisk() and fatally this is happening *before* the disk device is
deleted from userspace view.

There's no reason for del_gendisk() to clear -&gt;driverfs_dev.  That
device is the parent of the disk.  It is guaranteed to not be freed
until the disk, as a child, drops its -&gt;parent reference.

We could also fix this issue locally in nvdimm_revalidate_disk() by
using disk_to_dev(disk)-&gt;parent, but lets fix it globally since
-&gt;driverfs_dev follows the lifetime of the parent.  Longer term we
should probably just add a @parent parameter to add_disk(), and stop
carrying this pointer in the gendisk.

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
 IP: [&lt;ffffffffa00340a8&gt;] nvdimm_revalidate_disk+0x18/0x90 [libnvdimm]
 CPU: 2 PID: 538 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G           O    4.4.0-rc5 #2257
 [..]
 Call Trace:
  [&lt;ffffffff8143e5c7&gt;] rescan_partitions+0x87/0x2c0
  [&lt;ffffffff810f37f9&gt;] ? __lock_is_held+0x49/0x70
  [&lt;ffffffff81438c62&gt;] __blkdev_reread_part+0x72/0xb0
  [&lt;ffffffff81438cc5&gt;] blkdev_reread_part+0x25/0x40
  [&lt;ffffffff8143982d&gt;] blkdev_ioctl+0x4fd/0x9c0
  [&lt;ffffffff811246c9&gt;] ? current_kernel_time64+0x69/0xd0
  [&lt;ffffffff812916dd&gt;] block_ioctl+0x3d/0x50
  [&lt;ffffffff81264c38&gt;] do_vfs_ioctl+0x308/0x560
  [&lt;ffffffff8115dbd1&gt;] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xb1/0x100
  [&lt;ffffffff810031d6&gt;] ? do_audit_syscall_entry+0x66/0x70
  [&lt;ffffffff81264f09&gt;] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
  [&lt;ffffffff81902672&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76

Reported-by: Robert Hu &lt;robert.hu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>blkcg: use blkg_free() in blkcg_init_queue() failure path</title>
<updated>2017-06-08T10:42:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-18T21:55:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=afc6ec14b86349b814ba4984f7c02a4d8216e2a9'/>
<id>afc6ec14b86349b814ba4984f7c02a4d8216e2a9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 994b78327458ea14a1743196ee0560c73ace37f3 ]

When blkcg_init_queue() fails midway after creating a new blkg, it
performs kfree() directly; however, this doesn't free the policy data
areas.  Make it use blkg_free() instead.  In turn, blkg_free() is
updated to handle root request_list special case.

While this fixes a possible memory leak, it's on an unlikely failure
path of an already cold path and the size leaked per occurrence is
miniscule too.  I don't think it needs to be tagged for -stable.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 994b78327458ea14a1743196ee0560c73ace37f3 ]

When blkcg_init_queue() fails midway after creating a new blkg, it
performs kfree() directly; however, this doesn't free the policy data
areas.  Make it use blkg_free() instead.  In turn, blkg_free() is
updated to handle root request_list special case.

While this fixes a possible memory leak, it's on an unlikely failure
path of an already cold path and the size leaked per occurrence is
miniscule too.  I don't think it needs to be tagged for -stable.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>blkcg: always create the blkcg_gq for the root blkcg</title>
<updated>2017-06-08T10:42:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-22T21:13:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f9fac98fc753ca29e5367c2d81b13ff4eee506a8'/>
<id>f9fac98fc753ca29e5367c2d81b13ff4eee506a8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ec13b1d6f0a0457312e615335ce8ceb07da50a11 ]

Currently, blkcg does a minor optimization where the root blkcg is
created when the first blkcg policy is activated on a queue and
destroyed on the deactivation of the last.  On systems where blkcg is
configured but not used, this saves one blkcg_gq struct per queue.  On
systems where blkcg is actually used, there's no difference.  The only
case where this can lead to any meaninful, albeit still minute, save
in memory consumption is when all blkcg policies are deactivated after
being widely used in the system, which is a hihgly unlikely scenario.

The conditional existence of root blkcg_gq has already created several
bugs in blkcg and became an issue once again for the new per-cgroup
wb_congested mechanism for cgroup writeback support leading to a NULL
dereference when no blkcg policy is active.  This is really not worth
bothering with.  This patch makes blkcg always allocate and link the
root blkcg_gq and release it only on queue destruction.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ec13b1d6f0a0457312e615335ce8ceb07da50a11 ]

Currently, blkcg does a minor optimization where the root blkcg is
created when the first blkcg policy is activated on a queue and
destroyed on the deactivation of the last.  On systems where blkcg is
configured but not used, this saves one blkcg_gq struct per queue.  On
systems where blkcg is actually used, there's no difference.  The only
case where this can lead to any meaninful, albeit still minute, save
in memory consumption is when all blkcg policies are deactivated after
being widely used in the system, which is a hihgly unlikely scenario.

The conditional existence of root blkcg_gq has already created several
bugs in blkcg and became an issue once again for the new per-cgroup
wb_congested mechanism for cgroup writeback support leading to a NULL
dereference when no blkcg policy is active.  This is really not worth
bothering with.  This patch makes blkcg always allocate and link the
root blkcg_gq and release it only on queue destruction.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS</title>
<updated>2017-01-13T01:56:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-16T18:42:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3e3267311e3b6557206f293eeb9205b41e090625'/>
<id>3e3267311e3b6557206f293eeb9205b41e090625</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 128394eff343fc6d2f32172f03e24829539c5835 ]

Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those.  Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 128394eff343fc6d2f32172f03e24829539c5835 ]

Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those.  Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: Fix race triggered by blk_set_queue_dying()</title>
<updated>2016-08-31T23:21:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bart Van Assche</name>
<email>bart.vanassche@sandisk.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-16T23:48:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=26390c7073a70d57c5c0de7c44f909fc91f3c66b'/>
<id>26390c7073a70d57c5c0de7c44f909fc91f3c66b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1b856086813be9371929b6cc62045f9fd470f5a0 ]

blk_set_queue_dying() can be called while another thread is
submitting I/O or changing queue flags, e.g. through dm_stop_queue().
Hence protect the QUEUE_FLAG_DYING flag change with locking.

Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche &lt;bart.vanassche@sandisk.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1b856086813be9371929b6cc62045f9fd470f5a0 ]

blk_set_queue_dying() can be called while another thread is
submitting I/O or changing queue flags, e.g. through dm_stop_queue().
Hence protect the QUEUE_FLAG_DYING flag change with locking.

Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche &lt;bart.vanassche@sandisk.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: fix use-after-free in seq file</title>
<updated>2016-08-20T03:08:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vegard Nossum</name>
<email>vegard.nossum@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-29T08:40:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d9ee963b61b93366103b88f10495b4680b256273'/>
<id>d9ee963b61b93366103b88f10495b4680b256273</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84 ]

I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:

    ==================================================================
    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
    Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
    =============================================================================
    BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
    INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
            ___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
            __slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
            kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
            disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
            traverse+0x176/0x860
            seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
            proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
            do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
            do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
            vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
            do_preadv+0x126/0x170
            SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
            do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
            return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
    INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
            __slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
            kfree+0x20a/0x220
            disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
            traverse+0x3b5/0x860
            seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
            proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
            do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
            do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
            vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
            do_preadv+0x126/0x170
            SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
            do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
            return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a

    CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G    B           4.7.0+ #62
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
     ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
     ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
     ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
    Call Trace:
     [&lt;ffffffff81d6ce81&gt;] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
     [&lt;ffffffff8146c7bd&gt;] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
     [&lt;ffffffff814704ff&gt;] object_err+0x2f/0x40
     [&lt;ffffffff814754d1&gt;] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
     [&lt;ffffffff8147590e&gt;] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
     [&lt;ffffffff83888161&gt;] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
     [&lt;ffffffff82404389&gt;] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
     [&lt;ffffffff81d2e8ea&gt;] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
     [&lt;ffffffff8151f812&gt;] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
     [&lt;ffffffff815f8fdc&gt;] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
     [&lt;ffffffff814b24e4&gt;] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
     [&lt;ffffffff814b4c45&gt;] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
     [&lt;ffffffff814b8a17&gt;] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
     [&lt;ffffffff814b8de6&gt;] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
     [&lt;ffffffff814b92ec&gt;] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10

This problem can occur in the following situation:

open()
 - pread()
    - .seq_start()
       - iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
       - seqf-&gt;private = iter
    - .seq_stop()
       - kfree(seqf-&gt;private)
 - pread()
    - .seq_start()
       - iter = kmalloc() // fails
    - .seq_stop()
       - class_dev_iter_exit(seqf-&gt;private) // boom! old pointer

As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.

An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84 ]

I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:

    ==================================================================
    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
    Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
    =============================================================================
    BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
    INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
            ___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
            __slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
            kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
            disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
            traverse+0x176/0x860
            seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
            proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
            do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
            do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
            vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
            do_preadv+0x126/0x170
            SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
            do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
            return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
    INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
            __slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
            kfree+0x20a/0x220
            disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
            traverse+0x3b5/0x860
            seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
            proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
            do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
            do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
            vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
            do_preadv+0x126/0x170
            SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
            do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
            return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a

    CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G    B           4.7.0+ #62
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
     ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
     ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
     ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
    Call Trace:
     [&lt;ffffffff81d6ce81&gt;] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
     [&lt;ffffffff8146c7bd&gt;] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
     [&lt;ffffffff814704ff&gt;] object_err+0x2f/0x40
     [&lt;ffffffff814754d1&gt;] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
     [&lt;ffffffff8147590e&gt;] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
     [&lt;ffffffff83888161&gt;] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
     [&lt;ffffffff82404389&gt;] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
     [&lt;ffffffff81d2e8ea&gt;] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
     [&lt;ffffffff8151f812&gt;] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
     [&lt;ffffffff815f8fdc&gt;] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
     [&lt;ffffffff814b24e4&gt;] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
     [&lt;ffffffff814b4c45&gt;] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
     [&lt;ffffffff814b8a17&gt;] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
     [&lt;ffffffff814b8de6&gt;] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
     [&lt;ffffffff814b92ec&gt;] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10

This problem can occur in the following situation:

open()
 - pread()
    - .seq_start()
       - iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
       - seqf-&gt;private = iter
    - .seq_stop()
       - kfree(seqf-&gt;private)
 - pread()
    - .seq_start()
       - iter = kmalloc() // fails
    - .seq_stop()
       - class_dev_iter_exit(seqf-&gt;private) // boom! old pointer

As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.

An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: fix use-after-free in sys_ioprio_get()</title>
<updated>2016-07-19T17:57:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Omar Sandoval</name>
<email>osandov@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-01T07:39:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=23c63b8c08fe3f0b21594ee1ac4de0fa52225f79'/>
<id>23c63b8c08fe3f0b21594ee1ac4de0fa52225f79</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8ba8682107ee2ca3347354e018865d8e1967c5f4 ]

get_task_ioprio() accesses the task-&gt;io_context without holding the task
lock and thus can race with exit_io_context(), leading to a
use-after-free. The reproducer below hits this within a few seconds on
my 4-core QEMU VM:

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include &lt;assert.h&gt;
#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
#include &lt;sys/syscall.h&gt;
#include &lt;sys/wait.h&gt;

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	pid_t pid, child;
	long nproc, i;

	/* ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE, 0)); */
	syscall(SYS_ioprio_set, 1, 0, 0x6000);

	nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);

	for (i = 0; i &lt; nproc; i++) {
		pid = fork();
		assert(pid != -1);
		if (pid == 0) {
			for (;;) {
				pid = fork();
				assert(pid != -1);
				if (pid == 0) {
					_exit(0);
				} else {
					child = wait(NULL);
					assert(child == pid);
				}
			}
		}

		pid = fork();
		assert(pid != -1);
		if (pid == 0) {
			for (;;) {
				/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
				syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
			}
		}
	}

	for (;;) {
		/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
		syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
	}

	return 0;
}

This gets us KASAN dumps like this:

[   35.526914] ==================================================================
[   35.530009] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_task_ioprio+0x7b/0x90 at addr ffff880066f34e6c
[   35.530009] Read of size 2 by task ioprio-gpf/363
[   35.530009] =============================================================================
[   35.530009] BUG blkdev_ioc (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
[   35.530009] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[   35.530009] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[   35.530009] INFO: Allocated in create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 age=0 cpu=0 pid=360
[   35.530009] 	___slab_alloc+0x55d/0x5a0
[   35.530009] 	__slab_alloc.isra.20+0x2b/0x40
[   35.530009] 	kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x84/0x200
[   35.530009] 	create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370
[   35.530009] 	get_task_io_context+0x92/0xb0
[   35.530009] 	copy_process.part.8+0x5029/0x5660
[   35.530009] 	_do_fork+0x155/0x7e0
[   35.530009] 	SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
[   35.530009] 	do_syscall_64+0x195/0x3a0
[   35.530009] 	return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[   35.530009] INFO: Freed in put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 age=0 cpu=0 pid=1060
[   35.530009] 	__slab_free+0x27b/0x3d0
[   35.530009] 	kmem_cache_free+0x1fb/0x220
[   35.530009] 	put_io_context+0xe7/0x120
[   35.530009] 	put_io_context_active+0x238/0x380
[   35.530009] 	exit_io_context+0x66/0x80
[   35.530009] 	do_exit+0x158e/0x2b90
[   35.530009] 	do_group_exit+0xe5/0x2b0
[   35.530009] 	SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20
[   35.530009] 	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4
[   35.530009] INFO: Slab 0xffffea00019bcd00 objects=20 used=4 fp=0xffff880066f34ff0 flags=0x1fffe0000004080
[   35.530009] INFO: Object 0xffff880066f34e58 @offset=3672 fp=0x0000000000000001
[   35.530009] ==================================================================

Fix it by grabbing the task lock while we poke at the io_context.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval &lt;osandov@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8ba8682107ee2ca3347354e018865d8e1967c5f4 ]

get_task_ioprio() accesses the task-&gt;io_context without holding the task
lock and thus can race with exit_io_context(), leading to a
use-after-free. The reproducer below hits this within a few seconds on
my 4-core QEMU VM:

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include &lt;assert.h&gt;
#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
#include &lt;sys/syscall.h&gt;
#include &lt;sys/wait.h&gt;

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	pid_t pid, child;
	long nproc, i;

	/* ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE, 0)); */
	syscall(SYS_ioprio_set, 1, 0, 0x6000);

	nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);

	for (i = 0; i &lt; nproc; i++) {
		pid = fork();
		assert(pid != -1);
		if (pid == 0) {
			for (;;) {
				pid = fork();
				assert(pid != -1);
				if (pid == 0) {
					_exit(0);
				} else {
					child = wait(NULL);
					assert(child == pid);
				}
			}
		}

		pid = fork();
		assert(pid != -1);
		if (pid == 0) {
			for (;;) {
				/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
				syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
			}
		}
	}

	for (;;) {
		/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
		syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
	}

	return 0;
}

This gets us KASAN dumps like this:

[   35.526914] ==================================================================
[   35.530009] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_task_ioprio+0x7b/0x90 at addr ffff880066f34e6c
[   35.530009] Read of size 2 by task ioprio-gpf/363
[   35.530009] =============================================================================
[   35.530009] BUG blkdev_ioc (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
[   35.530009] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[   35.530009] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[   35.530009] INFO: Allocated in create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 age=0 cpu=0 pid=360
[   35.530009] 	___slab_alloc+0x55d/0x5a0
[   35.530009] 	__slab_alloc.isra.20+0x2b/0x40
[   35.530009] 	kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x84/0x200
[   35.530009] 	create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370
[   35.530009] 	get_task_io_context+0x92/0xb0
[   35.530009] 	copy_process.part.8+0x5029/0x5660
[   35.530009] 	_do_fork+0x155/0x7e0
[   35.530009] 	SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
[   35.530009] 	do_syscall_64+0x195/0x3a0
[   35.530009] 	return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[   35.530009] INFO: Freed in put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 age=0 cpu=0 pid=1060
[   35.530009] 	__slab_free+0x27b/0x3d0
[   35.530009] 	kmem_cache_free+0x1fb/0x220
[   35.530009] 	put_io_context+0xe7/0x120
[   35.530009] 	put_io_context_active+0x238/0x380
[   35.530009] 	exit_io_context+0x66/0x80
[   35.530009] 	do_exit+0x158e/0x2b90
[   35.530009] 	do_group_exit+0xe5/0x2b0
[   35.530009] 	SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20
[   35.530009] 	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4
[   35.530009] INFO: Slab 0xffffea00019bcd00 objects=20 used=4 fp=0xffff880066f34ff0 flags=0x1fffe0000004080
[   35.530009] INFO: Object 0xffff880066f34e58 @offset=3672 fp=0x0000000000000001
[   35.530009] ==================================================================

Fix it by grabbing the task lock while we poke at the io_context.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval &lt;osandov@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm: fix excessive dm-mq context switching</title>
<updated>2016-04-18T12:50:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Snitzer</name>
<email>snitzer@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-05T13:49:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fb1840e257d26b6aad69b864cb7ed4a67ab986b6'/>
<id>fb1840e257d26b6aad69b864cb7ed4a67ab986b6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6acfe68bac7e6f16dc312157b1fa6e2368985013 ]

Request-based DM's blk-mq support (dm-mq) was reported to be 50% slower
than if an underlying null_blk device were used directly.  One of the
reasons for this drop in performance is that blk_insert_clone_request()
was calling blk_mq_insert_request() with @async=true.  This forced the
use of kblockd_schedule_delayed_work_on() to run the blk-mq hw queues
which ushered in ping-ponging between process context (fio in this case)
and kblockd's kworker to submit the cloned request.  The ftrace
function_graph tracer showed:

  kworker-2013  =&gt;   fio-12190
  fio-12190    =&gt;  kworker-2013
  ...
  kworker-2013  =&gt;   fio-12190
  fio-12190    =&gt;  kworker-2013
  ...

Fixing blk_insert_clone_request()'s blk_mq_insert_request() call to
_not_ use kblockd to submit the cloned requests isn't enough to
eliminate the observed context switches.

In addition to this dm-mq specific blk-core fix, there are 2 DM core
fixes to dm-mq that (when paired with the blk-core fix) completely
eliminate the observed context switching:

1)  don't blk_mq_run_hw_queues in blk-mq request completion

    Motivated by desire to reduce overhead of dm-mq, punting to kblockd
    just increases context switches.

    In my testing against a really fast null_blk device there was no benefit
    to running blk_mq_run_hw_queues() on completion (and no other blk-mq
    driver does this).  So hopefully this change doesn't induce the need for
    yet another revert like commit 621739b00e16ca2d !

2)  use blk_mq_complete_request() in dm_complete_request()

    blk_complete_request() doesn't offer the traditional q-&gt;mq_ops vs
    .request_fn branching pattern that other historic block interfaces
    do (e.g. blk_get_request).  Using blk_mq_complete_request() for
    blk-mq requests is important for performance.  It should be noted
    that, like blk_complete_request(), blk_mq_complete_request() doesn't
    natively handle partial completions -- but the request-based
    DM-multipath target does provide the required partial completion
    support by dm.c:end_clone_bio() triggering requeueing of the request
    via dm-mpath.c:multipath_end_io()'s return of DM_ENDIO_REQUEUE.

dm-mq fix #2 is _much_ more important than #1 for eliminating the
context switches.
Before: cpu          : usr=15.10%, sys=59.39%, ctx=7905181, majf=0, minf=475
After:  cpu          : usr=20.60%, sys=79.35%, ctx=2008, majf=0, minf=472

With these changes multithreaded async read IOPs improved from ~950K
to ~1350K for this dm-mq stacked on null_blk test-case.  The raw read
IOPs of the underlying null_blk device for the same workload is ~1950K.

Fixes: 7fb4898e0 ("block: add blk-mq support to blk_insert_cloned_request()")
Fixes: bfebd1cdb ("dm: add full blk-mq support to request-based DM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+
Reported-by: Sagi Grimberg &lt;sagig@dev.mellanox.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6acfe68bac7e6f16dc312157b1fa6e2368985013 ]

Request-based DM's blk-mq support (dm-mq) was reported to be 50% slower
than if an underlying null_blk device were used directly.  One of the
reasons for this drop in performance is that blk_insert_clone_request()
was calling blk_mq_insert_request() with @async=true.  This forced the
use of kblockd_schedule_delayed_work_on() to run the blk-mq hw queues
which ushered in ping-ponging between process context (fio in this case)
and kblockd's kworker to submit the cloned request.  The ftrace
function_graph tracer showed:

  kworker-2013  =&gt;   fio-12190
  fio-12190    =&gt;  kworker-2013
  ...
  kworker-2013  =&gt;   fio-12190
  fio-12190    =&gt;  kworker-2013
  ...

Fixing blk_insert_clone_request()'s blk_mq_insert_request() call to
_not_ use kblockd to submit the cloned requests isn't enough to
eliminate the observed context switches.

In addition to this dm-mq specific blk-core fix, there are 2 DM core
fixes to dm-mq that (when paired with the blk-core fix) completely
eliminate the observed context switching:

1)  don't blk_mq_run_hw_queues in blk-mq request completion

    Motivated by desire to reduce overhead of dm-mq, punting to kblockd
    just increases context switches.

    In my testing against a really fast null_blk device there was no benefit
    to running blk_mq_run_hw_queues() on completion (and no other blk-mq
    driver does this).  So hopefully this change doesn't induce the need for
    yet another revert like commit 621739b00e16ca2d !

2)  use blk_mq_complete_request() in dm_complete_request()

    blk_complete_request() doesn't offer the traditional q-&gt;mq_ops vs
    .request_fn branching pattern that other historic block interfaces
    do (e.g. blk_get_request).  Using blk_mq_complete_request() for
    blk-mq requests is important for performance.  It should be noted
    that, like blk_complete_request(), blk_mq_complete_request() doesn't
    natively handle partial completions -- but the request-based
    DM-multipath target does provide the required partial completion
    support by dm.c:end_clone_bio() triggering requeueing of the request
    via dm-mpath.c:multipath_end_io()'s return of DM_ENDIO_REQUEUE.

dm-mq fix #2 is _much_ more important than #1 for eliminating the
context switches.
Before: cpu          : usr=15.10%, sys=59.39%, ctx=7905181, majf=0, minf=475
After:  cpu          : usr=20.60%, sys=79.35%, ctx=2008, majf=0, minf=472

With these changes multithreaded async read IOPs improved from ~950K
to ~1350K for this dm-mq stacked on null_blk test-case.  The raw read
IOPs of the underlying null_blk device for the same workload is ~1950K.

Fixes: 7fb4898e0 ("block: add blk-mq support to blk_insert_cloned_request()")
Fixes: bfebd1cdb ("dm: add full blk-mq support to request-based DM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+
Reported-by: Sagi Grimberg &lt;sagig@dev.mellanox.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bio: return EINTR if copying to user space got interrupted</title>
<updated>2016-03-04T15:25:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Reinecke</name>
<email>hare@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-12T08:39:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f3dd341b9230ac943f317efa4c5b1bfae587434b'/>
<id>f3dd341b9230ac943f317efa4c5b1bfae587434b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2d99b55d378c996b9692a0c93dd25f4ed5d58934 ]

Commit 35dc248383bbab0a7203fca4d722875bc81ef091 introduced a check for
current-&gt;mm to see if we have a user space context and only copies data
if we do. Now if an IO gets interrupted by a signal data isn't copied
into user space any more (as we don't have a user space context) but
user space isn't notified about it.

This patch modifies the behaviour to return -EINTR from bio_uncopy_user()
to notify userland that a signal has interrupted the syscall, otherwise
it could lead to a situation where the caller may get a buffer with
no data returned.

This can be reproduced by issuing SG_IO ioctl()s in one thread while
constantly sending signals to it.

Fixes: 35dc248 [SCSI] sg: Fix user memory corruption when SG_IO is interrupted by a signal
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn &lt;jthumshirn@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v.3.11+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2d99b55d378c996b9692a0c93dd25f4ed5d58934 ]

Commit 35dc248383bbab0a7203fca4d722875bc81ef091 introduced a check for
current-&gt;mm to see if we have a user space context and only copies data
if we do. Now if an IO gets interrupted by a signal data isn't copied
into user space any more (as we don't have a user space context) but
user space isn't notified about it.

This patch modifies the behaviour to return -EINTR from bio_uncopy_user()
to notify userland that a signal has interrupted the syscall, otherwise
it could lead to a situation where the caller may get a buffer with
no data returned.

This can be reproduced by issuing SG_IO ioctl()s in one thread while
constantly sending signals to it.

Fixes: 35dc248 [SCSI] sg: Fix user memory corruption when SG_IO is interrupted by a signal
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn &lt;jthumshirn@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v.3.11+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>blk-mq: fix buffer overflow when reading sysfs file of 'pending'</title>
<updated>2015-09-29T17:25:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ming Lei</name>
<email>ming.lei@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-09T07:41:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1af97771b397a9ca2ee984c3277bcada3eec95cd'/>
<id>1af97771b397a9ca2ee984c3277bcada3eec95cd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 596f5aad2a704b72934e5abec1b1b4114c16f45b upstream.

There may be lots of pending requests so that the buffer of PAGE_SIZE
can't hold them at all.

One typical example is scsi-mq, the queue depth(.can_queue) of
scsi_host and blk-mq is quite big but scsi_device's queue_depth
is a bit small(.cmd_per_lun), then it is quite easy to have lots
of pending requests in hw queue.

This patch fixes the following warning and the related memory
destruction.

[  359.025101] fill_read_buffer: blk_mq_hw_sysfs_show+0x0/0x7d returned bad count^M
[  359.055595] irq event stamp: 15537^M
[  359.055606] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[  359.055614] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[  359.055660]    (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[  359.055672] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[  359.055678] CPU: 4 PID: 21631 Comm: stress-ng-sysfs Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805 #434^M
[  359.055679] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[  359.055682] task: ffff8802161cc000 ti: ffff88021b4a8000 task.ti: ffff88021b4a8000^M
[  359.055693] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff811541c5&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff811541c5&gt;] __kmalloc+0xe8/0x152^M

Signed-off-by: Ming Lei &lt;ming.lei@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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commit 596f5aad2a704b72934e5abec1b1b4114c16f45b upstream.

There may be lots of pending requests so that the buffer of PAGE_SIZE
can't hold them at all.

One typical example is scsi-mq, the queue depth(.can_queue) of
scsi_host and blk-mq is quite big but scsi_device's queue_depth
is a bit small(.cmd_per_lun), then it is quite easy to have lots
of pending requests in hw queue.

This patch fixes the following warning and the related memory
destruction.

[  359.025101] fill_read_buffer: blk_mq_hw_sysfs_show+0x0/0x7d returned bad count^M
[  359.055595] irq event stamp: 15537^M
[  359.055606] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[  359.055614] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[  359.055660]    (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[  359.055672] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[  359.055678] CPU: 4 PID: 21631 Comm: stress-ng-sysfs Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805 #434^M
[  359.055679] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[  359.055682] task: ffff8802161cc000 ti: ffff88021b4a8000 task.ti: ffff88021b4a8000^M
[  359.055693] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff811541c5&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff811541c5&gt;] __kmalloc+0xe8/0x152^M

Signed-off-by: Ming Lei &lt;ming.lei@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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