linux-stable.git/block, branch v3.16.40

sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS

2017-02-23T03:54:47+00:00

commit 128394eff343fc6d2f32172f03e24829539c5835 upstream.

Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those.  Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

blkcg: Annotate blkg_hint correctly

2017-02-23T03:54:03+00:00

commit 55679c8d23d191c24ad133abc5647e3054ca8de1 upstream.

Avoid that sparse complains about blkg_hint manipulations.

Fixes: a637120e4902 ("blkcg: use radix tree to index blkgs from blkcg")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche 
Acked-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

block: fix bdi vs gendisk lifetime mismatch

2016-11-20T01:17:05+00:00

commit df08c32ce3be5be138c1dbfcba203314a3a7cd6f upstream.

The name for a bdi of a gendisk is derived from the gendisk's devt.
However, since the gendisk is destroyed before the bdi it leaves a
window where a new gendisk could dynamically reuse the same devt while a
bdi with the same name is still live.  Arrange for the bdi to hold a
reference against its "owner" disk device while it is registered.
Otherwise we can hit sysfs duplicate name collisions like the following:

 WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 2078 at fs/sysfs/dir.c:31 sysfs_warn_dup+0x64/0x80
 sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/virtual/bdi/259:1'

 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL580 Gen8, BIOS P79 05/06/2015
  0000000000000286 0000000002c04ad5 ffff88006f24f970 ffffffff8134caec
  ffff88006f24f9c0 0000000000000000 ffff88006f24f9b0 ffffffff8108c351
  0000001f0000000c ffff88105d236000 ffff88105d1031e0 ffff8800357427f8
 Call Trace:
  [] dump_stack+0x63/0x87
  [] __warn+0xd1/0xf0
  [] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5f/0x80
  [] sysfs_warn_dup+0x64/0x80
  [] sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x7e/0x90
  [] kobject_add_internal+0xaa/0x320
  [] ? vsnprintf+0x34e/0x4d0
  [] kobject_add+0x75/0xd0
  [] ? mutex_lock+0x12/0x2f
  [] device_add+0x125/0x610
  [] device_create_groups_vargs+0xd8/0x100
  [] device_create_vargs+0x1c/0x20
  [] bdi_register+0x8c/0x180
  [] bdi_register_dev+0x27/0x30
  [] add_disk+0x175/0x4a0

Reported-by: Yi Zhang 
Tested-by: Yi Zhang 
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams 

Fixed up missing 0 return in bdi_register_owner().

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

block: fix use-after-free in seq file

2016-11-20T01:17:04+00:00

commit 77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84 upstream.

I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:

    ==================================================================
    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
    Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
    =============================================================================
    BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
    INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
            ___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
            __slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
            kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
            disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
            traverse+0x176/0x860
            seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
            proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
            do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
            do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
            vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
            do_preadv+0x126/0x170
            SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
            do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
            return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
    INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
            __slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
            kfree+0x20a/0x220
            disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
            traverse+0x3b5/0x860
            seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
            proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
            do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
            do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
            vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
            do_preadv+0x126/0x170
            SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
            do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
            return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a

    CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G    B           4.7.0+ #62
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
     ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
     ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
     ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
    Call Trace:
     [] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
     [] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
     [] object_err+0x2f/0x40
     [] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
     [] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
     [] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
     [] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
     [] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
     [] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
     [] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
     [] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
     [] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
     [] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
     [] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
     [] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10

This problem can occur in the following situation:

open()
 - pread()
    - .seq_start()
       - iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
       - seqf->private = iter
    - .seq_stop()
       - kfree(seqf->private)
 - pread()
    - .seq_start()
       - iter = kmalloc() // fails
    - .seq_stop()
       - class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer

As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.

An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.

Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum 
Acked-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

block: fix use-after-free in sys_ioprio_get()

2016-08-22T21:38:26+00:00

commit 8ba8682107ee2ca3347354e018865d8e1967c5f4 upstream.

get_task_ioprio() accesses the task->io_context without holding the task
lock and thus can race with exit_io_context(), leading to a
use-after-free. The reproducer below hits this within a few seconds on
my 4-core QEMU VM:

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	pid_t pid, child;
	long nproc, i;

	/* ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE, 0)); */
	syscall(SYS_ioprio_set, 1, 0, 0x6000);

	nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);

	for (i = 0; i < nproc; i++) {
		pid = fork();
		assert(pid != -1);
		if (pid == 0) {
			for (;;) {
				pid = fork();
				assert(pid != -1);
				if (pid == 0) {
					_exit(0);
				} else {
					child = wait(NULL);
					assert(child == pid);
				}
			}
		}

		pid = fork();
		assert(pid != -1);
		if (pid == 0) {
			for (;;) {
				/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
				syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
			}
		}
	}

	for (;;) {
		/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
		syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
	}

	return 0;
}

This gets us KASAN dumps like this:

[   35.526914] ==================================================================
[   35.530009] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_task_ioprio+0x7b/0x90 at addr ffff880066f34e6c
[   35.530009] Read of size 2 by task ioprio-gpf/363
[   35.530009] =============================================================================
[   35.530009] BUG blkdev_ioc (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
[   35.530009] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[   35.530009] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[   35.530009] INFO: Allocated in create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 age=0 cpu=0 pid=360
[   35.530009] 	___slab_alloc+0x55d/0x5a0
[   35.530009] 	__slab_alloc.isra.20+0x2b/0x40
[   35.530009] 	kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x84/0x200
[   35.530009] 	create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370
[   35.530009] 	get_task_io_context+0x92/0xb0
[   35.530009] 	copy_process.part.8+0x5029/0x5660
[   35.530009] 	_do_fork+0x155/0x7e0
[   35.530009] 	SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
[   35.530009] 	do_syscall_64+0x195/0x3a0
[   35.530009] 	return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[   35.530009] INFO: Freed in put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 age=0 cpu=0 pid=1060
[   35.530009] 	__slab_free+0x27b/0x3d0
[   35.530009] 	kmem_cache_free+0x1fb/0x220
[   35.530009] 	put_io_context+0xe7/0x120
[   35.530009] 	put_io_context_active+0x238/0x380
[   35.530009] 	exit_io_context+0x66/0x80
[   35.530009] 	do_exit+0x158e/0x2b90
[   35.530009] 	do_group_exit+0xe5/0x2b0
[   35.530009] 	SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20
[   35.530009] 	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4
[   35.530009] INFO: Slab 0xffffea00019bcd00 objects=20 used=4 fp=0xffff880066f34ff0 flags=0x1fffe0000004080
[   35.530009] INFO: Object 0xffff880066f34e58 @offset=3672 fp=0x0000000000000001
[   35.530009] ==================================================================

Fix it by grabbing the task lock while we poke at the io_context.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov 
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

blk-mq: fix undefined behaviour in order_to_size()

2016-08-22T21:37:59+00:00

commit b3a834b1596ac668df206aa2bb1f191c31f5f5e4 upstream.

When this_order variable in blk_mq_init_rq_map() becomes zero
the code incorrectly decrements the variable and passes the result
to order_to_size() helper causing undefined behaviour:

 UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in block/blk-mq.c:1459:27
 shift exponent 4294967295 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int'
 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.6.0-rc6-00072-g33656a1 #22

Fix the code by checking this_order variable for not having the zero
value first.

Reported-by: Meelis Roos 
Fixes: 320ae51feed5 ("blk-mq: new multi-queue block IO queueing mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

bio: return EINTR if copying to user space got interrupted

2016-03-04T10:26:40+00:00

commit 2d99b55d378c996b9692a0c93dd25f4ed5d58934 upstream.

Commit 35dc248383bbab0a7203fca4d722875bc81ef091 introduced a check for
current->mm to see if we have a user space context and only copies data
if we do. Now if an IO gets interrupted by a signal data isn't copied
into user space any more (as we don't have a user space context) but
user space isn't notified about it.

This patch modifies the behaviour to return -EINTR from bio_uncopy_user()
to notify userland that a signal has interrupted the syscall, otherwise
it could lead to a situation where the caller may get a buffer with
no data returned.

This can be reproduced by issuing SG_IO ioctl()s in one thread while
constantly sending signals to it.

Fixes: 35dc248 [SCSI] sg: Fix user memory corruption when SG_IO is interrupted by a signal
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn 
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
[ luis: backported to 3.16: based on Johannes' backport to 3.14 ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

SCSI: Fix NULL pointer dereference in runtime PM

2016-01-11T10:50:18+00:00

commit 4fd41a8552afc01054d9d9fc7f1a63c324867d27 upstream.

The routines in scsi_pm.c assume that if a runtime-PM callback is
invoked for a SCSI device, it can only mean that the device's driver
has asked the block layer to handle the runtime power management (by
calling blk_pm_runtime_init(), which among other things sets q->dev).

However, this assumption turns out to be wrong for things like the ses
driver.  Normally ses devices are not allowed to do runtime PM, but
userspace can override this setting.  If this happens, the kernel gets
a NULL pointer dereference when blk_post_runtime_resume() tries to use
the uninitialized q->dev pointer.

This patch fixes the problem by checking q->dev in block layer before
handle runtime PM. Since ses doesn't define any PM callbacks and call
blk_pm_runtime_init(), the crash won't occur.

This fixes Bugzilla #101371.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101371

More discussion can be found from below link.
http://marc.info/?l=linux-scsi&m=144163730531875&w=2

Signed-off-by: Ken Xue 
Acked-by: Alan Stern 
Cc: Xiangliang Yu 
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley 
Cc: Jens Axboe 
Cc: Michael Terry 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

block: Always check queue limits for cloned requests

2016-01-05T11:22:20+00:00

commit bf4e6b4e757488dee1b6a581f49c7ac34cd217f8 upstream.

When a cloned request is retried on other queues it always needs
to be checked against the queue limits of that queue.
Otherwise the calculations for nr_phys_segments might be wrong,
leading to a crash in scsi_init_sgtable().

To clarify this the patch renames blk_rq_check_limits()
to blk_cloned_rq_check_limits() and removes the symbol
export, as the new function should only be used for
cloned requests and never exported.

Cc: Mike Snitzer 
Cc: Ewan Milne 
Cc: Jeff Moyer 
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke 
Fixes: e2a60da74 ("block: Clean up special command handling logic")
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

mac: validate mac_partition is within sector

2015-12-18T16:06:30+00:00

commit 02e2a5bfebe99edcf9d694575a75032d53fe1b73 upstream.

If md->signature == MAC_DRIVER_MAGIC and md->block_size == 1023, a single
512 byte sector would be read (secsize / 512). However the partition
structure would be located past the end of the buffer (secsize % 512).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques