<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch, branch v6.5.7</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Use the GHCB protocol when available for SNP CPUID requests</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:03:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-28T21:09:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f35c0756029f3ba3d44b9749436f155ab90038cd'/>
<id>f35c0756029f3ba3d44b9749436f155ab90038cd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6bc6f7d9d7ac3cdbe9e8b0495538b4a0cc11f032 upstream.

SNP retrieves the majority of CPUID information from the SNP CPUID page.
But there are times when that information needs to be supplemented by the
hypervisor, for example, obtaining the initial APIC ID of the vCPU from
leaf 1.

The current implementation uses the MSR protocol to retrieve the data from
the hypervisor, even when a GHCB exists. The problem arises when an NMI
arrives on return from the VMGEXIT. The NMI will be immediately serviced
and may generate a #VC requiring communication with the hypervisor.

Since a GHCB exists in this case, it will be used. As part of using the
GHCB, the #VC handler will write the GHCB physical address into the GHCB
MSR and the #VC will be handled.

When the NMI completes, processing resumes at the site of the VMGEXIT
which is expecting to read the GHCB MSR and find a CPUID MSR protocol
response. Since the NMI handling overwrote the GHCB MSR response, the
guest will see an invalid reply from the hypervisor and self-terminate.

Fix this problem by using the GHCB when it is available. Any NMI
received is properly handled because the GHCB contents are copied into
a backup page and restored on NMI exit, thus preserving the active GHCB
request or result.

  [ bp: Touchups. ]

Fixes: ee0bfa08a345 ("x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a5856fa1ebe3879de91a8f6298b6bbd901c61881.1690578565.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6bc6f7d9d7ac3cdbe9e8b0495538b4a0cc11f032 upstream.

SNP retrieves the majority of CPUID information from the SNP CPUID page.
But there are times when that information needs to be supplemented by the
hypervisor, for example, obtaining the initial APIC ID of the vCPU from
leaf 1.

The current implementation uses the MSR protocol to retrieve the data from
the hypervisor, even when a GHCB exists. The problem arises when an NMI
arrives on return from the VMGEXIT. The NMI will be immediately serviced
and may generate a #VC requiring communication with the hypervisor.

Since a GHCB exists in this case, it will be used. As part of using the
GHCB, the #VC handler will write the GHCB physical address into the GHCB
MSR and the #VC will be handled.

When the NMI completes, processing resumes at the site of the VMGEXIT
which is expecting to read the GHCB MSR and find a CPUID MSR protocol
response. Since the NMI handling overwrote the GHCB MSR response, the
guest will see an invalid reply from the hypervisor and self-terminate.

Fix this problem by using the GHCB when it is available. Any NMI
received is properly handled because the GHCB contents are copied into
a backup page and restored on NMI exit, thus preserving the active GHCB
request or result.

  [ bp: Touchups. ]

Fixes: ee0bfa08a345 ("x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a5856fa1ebe3879de91a8f6298b6bbd901c61881.1690578565.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Change npages to unsigned long in snp_accept_memory()</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:03:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-22T13:45:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=225d28de3fc3e53d3104afe73954769727886511'/>
<id>225d28de3fc3e53d3104afe73954769727886511</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 62d5e970d022ef4bde18948dd67247c3194384c1 upstream.

In snp_accept_memory(), the npages variables value is calculated from
phys_addr_t variables but is an unsigned int. A very large range passed
into snp_accept_memory() could lead to truncating npages to zero. This
doesn't happen at the moment but let's be prepared.

Fixes: 6c3211796326 ("x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6d511c25576494f682063c9fb6c705b526a3757e.1687441505.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 62d5e970d022ef4bde18948dd67247c3194384c1 upstream.

In snp_accept_memory(), the npages variables value is calculated from
phys_addr_t variables but is an unsigned int. A very large range passed
into snp_accept_memory() could lead to truncating npages to zero. This
doesn't happen at the moment but let's be prepared.

Fixes: 6c3211796326 ("x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6d511c25576494f682063c9fb6c705b526a3757e.1687441505.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>parisc: Fix crash with nr_cpus=1 option</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:03:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-19T13:26:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=161fa3dfd5d756ab25483856cb3313be446844d5'/>
<id>161fa3dfd5d756ab25483856cb3313be446844d5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d3b3c637e4eb8d3bbe53e5692aee66add72f9851 upstream.

John David Anglin reported that giving "nr_cpus=1" on the command
line causes a crash, while "maxcpus=1" works.

Reported-by: John David Anglin &lt;dave.anglin@bell.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.18+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d3b3c637e4eb8d3bbe53e5692aee66add72f9851 upstream.

John David Anglin reported that giving "nr_cpus=1" on the command
line causes a crash, while "maxcpus=1" works.

Reported-by: John David Anglin &lt;dave.anglin@bell.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.18+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>parisc: Restore __ldcw_align for PA-RISC 2.0 processors</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:03:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John David Anglin</name>
<email>dave@parisc-linux.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-19T17:51:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0779db5863335dfd8deaef882199d269dd6e9abe'/>
<id>0779db5863335dfd8deaef882199d269dd6e9abe</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 914988e099fc658436fbd7b8f240160c352b6552 upstream.

Back in 2005, Kyle McMartin removed the 16-byte alignment for
ldcw semaphores on PA 2.0 machines (CONFIG_PA20). This broke
spinlocks on pre PA8800 processors. The main symptom was random
faults in mmap'd memory (e.g., gcc compilations, etc).

Unfortunately, the errata for this ldcw change is lost.

The issue is the 16-byte alignment required for ldcw semaphore
instructions can only be reduced to natural alignment when the
ldcw operation can be handled coherently in cache. Only PA8800
and PA8900 processors actually support doing the operation in
cache.

Aligning the spinlock dynamically adds two integer instructions
to each spinlock.

Tested on rp3440, c8000 and a500.

Signed-off-by: John David Anglin &lt;dave.anglin@bell.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-parisc/6b332788-2227-127f-ba6d-55e99ecf4ed8@bell.net/T/#t
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-parisc/20050609050702.GB4641@roadwarrior.mcmartin.ca/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 914988e099fc658436fbd7b8f240160c352b6552 upstream.

Back in 2005, Kyle McMartin removed the 16-byte alignment for
ldcw semaphores on PA 2.0 machines (CONFIG_PA20). This broke
spinlocks on pre PA8800 processors. The main symptom was random
faults in mmap'd memory (e.g., gcc compilations, etc).

Unfortunately, the errata for this ldcw change is lost.

The issue is the 16-byte alignment required for ldcw semaphore
instructions can only be reduced to natural alignment when the
ldcw operation can be handled coherently in cache. Only PA8800
and PA8900 processors actually support doing the operation in
cache.

Aligning the spinlock dynamically adds two integer instructions
to each spinlock.

Tested on rp3440, c8000 and a500.

Signed-off-by: John David Anglin &lt;dave.anglin@bell.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-parisc/6b332788-2227-127f-ba6d-55e99ecf4ed8@bell.net/T/#t
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-parisc/20050609050702.GB4641@roadwarrior.mcmartin.ca/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86/amd: Do not WARN() on every IRQ</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:03:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Breno Leitao</name>
<email>leitao@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-14T14:28:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c9525513cab17a0ab052206cb03d29ee99b89470'/>
<id>c9525513cab17a0ab052206cb03d29ee99b89470</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 599522d9d2e19d6240e4312577f1c5f3ffca22f6 ]

Zen 4 systems running buggy microcode can hit a WARN_ON() in the PMI
handler, as shown below, several times while perf runs. A simple
`perf top` run is enough to render the system unusable:

  WARNING: CPU: 18 PID: 20608 at arch/x86/events/amd/core.c:944 amd_pmu_v2_handle_irq+0x1be/0x2b0

This happens because the Performance Counter Global Status Register
(PerfCntGlobalStatus) has one or more bits set which are considered
reserved according to the "AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual,
Volume 2: System Programming, 24593":

  https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf

To make this less intrusive, warn just once if any reserved bit is set
and prompt the user to update the microcode. Also sanitize the value to
what the code is handling, so that the overflow events continue to be
handled for the number of counters that are known to be sane.

Going forward, the following microcode patch levels are recommended
for Zen 4 processors in order to avoid such issues with reserved bits:

  Family=0x19 Model=0x11 Stepping=0x01: Patch=0x0a10113e
  Family=0x19 Model=0x11 Stepping=0x02: Patch=0x0a10123e
  Family=0x19 Model=0xa0 Stepping=0x01: Patch=0x0aa00116
  Family=0x19 Model=0xa0 Stepping=0x02: Patch=0x0aa00212

Commit f2eb058afc57 ("linux-firmware: Update AMD cpu microcode") from
the linux-firmware tree has binaries that meet the minimum required
patch levels.

  [ sandipan: - add message to prompt users to update microcode
              - rework commit message and call out required microcode levels ]

Fixes: 7685665c390d ("perf/x86/amd/core: Add PerfMonV2 overflow handling")
Reported-by: Jirka Hladky &lt;jhladky@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das &lt;sandipan.das@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/3540f985652f41041e54ee82aa53e7dbd55739ae.1694696888.git.sandipan.das@amd.com/
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 599522d9d2e19d6240e4312577f1c5f3ffca22f6 ]

Zen 4 systems running buggy microcode can hit a WARN_ON() in the PMI
handler, as shown below, several times while perf runs. A simple
`perf top` run is enough to render the system unusable:

  WARNING: CPU: 18 PID: 20608 at arch/x86/events/amd/core.c:944 amd_pmu_v2_handle_irq+0x1be/0x2b0

This happens because the Performance Counter Global Status Register
(PerfCntGlobalStatus) has one or more bits set which are considered
reserved according to the "AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual,
Volume 2: System Programming, 24593":

  https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf

To make this less intrusive, warn just once if any reserved bit is set
and prompt the user to update the microcode. Also sanitize the value to
what the code is handling, so that the overflow events continue to be
handled for the number of counters that are known to be sane.

Going forward, the following microcode patch levels are recommended
for Zen 4 processors in order to avoid such issues with reserved bits:

  Family=0x19 Model=0x11 Stepping=0x01: Patch=0x0a10113e
  Family=0x19 Model=0x11 Stepping=0x02: Patch=0x0a10123e
  Family=0x19 Model=0xa0 Stepping=0x01: Patch=0x0aa00116
  Family=0x19 Model=0xa0 Stepping=0x02: Patch=0x0aa00212

Commit f2eb058afc57 ("linux-firmware: Update AMD cpu microcode") from
the linux-firmware tree has binaries that meet the minimum required
patch levels.

  [ sandipan: - add message to prompt users to update microcode
              - rework commit message and call out required microcode levels ]

Fixes: 7685665c390d ("perf/x86/amd/core: Add PerfMonV2 overflow handling")
Reported-by: Jirka Hladky &lt;jhladky@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das &lt;sandipan.das@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/3540f985652f41041e54ee82aa53e7dbd55739ae.1694696888.git.sandipan.das@amd.com/
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86/amd/core: Fix overflow reset on hotplug</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:03:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sandipan Das</name>
<email>sandipan.das@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-14T14:06:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=33699a00b89d986ff4f0fc4f5c2865d0787f1553'/>
<id>33699a00b89d986ff4f0fc4f5c2865d0787f1553</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 23d2626b841c2adccdeb477665313c02dff02dc3 ]

Kernels older than v5.19 do not support PerfMonV2 and the PMI handler
does not clear the overflow bits of the PerfCntrGlobalStatus register.
Because of this, loading a recent kernel using kexec from an older
kernel can result in inconsistent register states on Zen 4 systems.

The PMI handler of the new kernel gets confused and shows a warning when
an overflow occurs because some of the overflow bits are set even if the
corresponding counters are inactive. These are remnants from overflows
that were handled by the older kernel.

During CPU hotplug, the PerfCntrGlobalCtl and PerfCntrGlobalStatus
registers should always be cleared for PerfMonV2-capable processors.
However, a condition used for NB event constaints applicable only to
older processors currently prevents this from happening. Move the reset
sequence to an appropriate place and also clear the LBR Freeze bit.

Fixes: 21d59e3e2c40 ("perf/x86/amd/core: Detect PerfMonV2 support")
Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das &lt;sandipan.das@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/882a87511af40792ba69bb0e9026f19a2e71e8a3.1694696888.git.sandipan.das@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 23d2626b841c2adccdeb477665313c02dff02dc3 ]

Kernels older than v5.19 do not support PerfMonV2 and the PMI handler
does not clear the overflow bits of the PerfCntrGlobalStatus register.
Because of this, loading a recent kernel using kexec from an older
kernel can result in inconsistent register states on Zen 4 systems.

The PMI handler of the new kernel gets confused and shows a warning when
an overflow occurs because some of the overflow bits are set even if the
corresponding counters are inactive. These are remnants from overflows
that were handled by the older kernel.

During CPU hotplug, the PerfCntrGlobalCtl and PerfCntrGlobalStatus
registers should always be cleared for PerfMonV2-capable processors.
However, a condition used for NB event constaints applicable only to
older processors currently prevents this from happening. Move the reset
sequence to an appropriate place and also clear the LBR Freeze bit.

Fixes: 21d59e3e2c40 ("perf/x86/amd/core: Detect PerfMonV2 support")
Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das &lt;sandipan.das@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/882a87511af40792ba69bb0e9026f19a2e71e8a3.1694696888.git.sandipan.das@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/bpf: Let arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline return program size</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:02:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Song Liu</name>
<email>song@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-19T06:02:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0aa14ce3cc916873117657e423c484d4f51a571f'/>
<id>0aa14ce3cc916873117657e423c484d4f51a571f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cf094baa3e0f19f1f80ceaf205c80402b024386c ]

arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline() for s390 currently returns 0 on success. This
is not a problem for regular trampoline. However, struct_ops relies on the
return value to advance "image" pointer:

bpf_struct_ops_map_update_elem() {
    ...
    for_each_member(i, t, member) {
        ...
        err = bpf_struct_ops_prepare_trampoline();
        ...
        image += err;
    }
}

When arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline returns 0 on success, all members of the
struct_ops will point to the same trampoline (the last one).

Fix this by returning the program size in arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline (on
success). This is the same behavior as other architectures.

Signed-off-by: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 528eb2cb87bc ("s390/bpf: Implement arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline()")
Reviewed-by: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230919060258.3237176-2-song@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit cf094baa3e0f19f1f80ceaf205c80402b024386c ]

arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline() for s390 currently returns 0 on success. This
is not a problem for regular trampoline. However, struct_ops relies on the
return value to advance "image" pointer:

bpf_struct_ops_map_update_elem() {
    ...
    for_each_member(i, t, member) {
        ...
        err = bpf_struct_ops_prepare_trampoline();
        ...
        image += err;
    }
}

When arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline returns 0 on success, all members of the
struct_ops will point to the same trampoline (the last one).

Fix this by returning the program size in arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline (on
success). This is the same behavior as other architectures.

Signed-off-by: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 528eb2cb87bc ("s390/bpf: Implement arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline()")
Reviewed-by: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230919060258.3237176-2-song@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: errata: Add Cortex-A520 speculative unprivileged load workaround</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:02:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rob Herring</name>
<email>robh@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-21T19:41:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=32b0a4ffcaea44a00a61e40c0d1bcc50362aee25'/>
<id>32b0a4ffcaea44a00a61e40c0d1bcc50362aee25</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 471470bc7052d28ce125901877dd10e4c048e513 upstream.

Implement the workaround for ARM Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298. On an
affected Cortex-A520 core, a speculatively executed unprivileged load
might leak data from a privileged load via a cache side channel. The
issue only exists for loads within a translation regime with the same
translation (e.g. same ASID and VMID). Therefore, the issue only affects
the return to EL0.

The workaround is to execute a TLBI before returning to EL0 after all
loads of privileged data. A non-shareable TLBI to any address is
sufficient.

The workaround isn't necessary if page table isolation (KPTI) is
enabled, but for simplicity it will be. Page table isolation should
normally be disabled for Cortex-A520 as it supports the CSV3 feature
and the E0PD feature (used when KASLR is enabled).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921194156.1050055-2-robh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 471470bc7052d28ce125901877dd10e4c048e513 upstream.

Implement the workaround for ARM Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298. On an
affected Cortex-A520 core, a speculatively executed unprivileged load
might leak data from a privileged load via a cache side channel. The
issue only exists for loads within a translation regime with the same
translation (e.g. same ASID and VMID). Therefore, the issue only affects
the return to EL0.

The workaround is to execute a TLBI before returning to EL0 after all
loads of privileged data. A non-shareable TLBI to any address is
sufficient.

The workaround isn't necessary if page table isolation (KPTI) is
enabled, but for simplicity it will be. Page table isolation should
normally be disabled for Cortex-A520 as it supports the CSV3 feature
and the E0PD feature (used when KASLR is enabled).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921194156.1050055-2-robh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: Add Cortex-A520 CPU part definition</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:02:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rob Herring</name>
<email>robh@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-21T19:41:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=58f88d8f13a9afd3a2bacfe7f8d25104911b69fb'/>
<id>58f88d8f13a9afd3a2bacfe7f8d25104911b69fb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a654a69b9f9c06b2e56387d0b99f0e3e6b0ff4ef upstream.

Add the CPU Part number for the new Arm design.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921194156.1050055-1-robh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a654a69b9f9c06b2e56387d0b99f0e3e6b0ff4ef upstream.

Add the CPU Part number for the new Arm design.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921194156.1050055-1-robh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: cpufeature: Fix CLRBHB and BC detection</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:02:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kristina Martsenko</name>
<email>kristina.martsenko@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-12T13:34:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0b37467cbd2d611d720ea3d3c8b0cf9d42e854ad'/>
<id>0b37467cbd2d611d720ea3d3c8b0cf9d42e854ad</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 479965a2b7ec481737df0cadf553331063b9c343 ]

ClearBHB support is indicated by the CLRBHB field in ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1.
Following some refactoring the kernel incorrectly checks the BC field
instead. Fix the detection to use the right field.

(Note: The original ClearBHB support had it as FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, but this
patch uses FTR_LOWER_SAFE, which seems more correct.)

Also fix the detection of BC (hinted conditional branches) to use
FTR_LOWER_SAFE, so that it is not reported on mismatched systems.

Fixes: 356137e68a9f ("arm64/sysreg: Make BHB clear feature defines match the architecture")
Fixes: 8fcc8285c0e3 ("arm64/sysreg: Convert ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 to automatic generation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912133429.2606875-1-kristina.martsenko@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 479965a2b7ec481737df0cadf553331063b9c343 ]

ClearBHB support is indicated by the CLRBHB field in ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1.
Following some refactoring the kernel incorrectly checks the BC field
instead. Fix the detection to use the right field.

(Note: The original ClearBHB support had it as FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, but this
patch uses FTR_LOWER_SAFE, which seems more correct.)

Also fix the detection of BC (hinted conditional branches) to use
FTR_LOWER_SAFE, so that it is not reported on mismatched systems.

Fixes: 356137e68a9f ("arm64/sysreg: Make BHB clear feature defines match the architecture")
Fixes: 8fcc8285c0e3 ("arm64/sysreg: Convert ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 to automatic generation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912133429.2606875-1-kristina.martsenko@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
