<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch, branch v6.18.47</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>m68k: Define NR_CPUS to 1</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:27:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Uwe Kleine-König</name>
<email>ukleinek@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-31T09:49:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c27eed546ae204032fa30a70636b5897c2e4c4f8'/>
<id>c27eed546ae204032fa30a70636b5897c2e4c4f8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1fd495ef09eef96169a379a749c24b5e69974bb8 ]

This fixes a Kconfig warning

	fs/erofs/Kconfig:137:warning: range is invalid

which originates from EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS using
NR_CPUS which up to now didn't exist for ARCH=m68k.  All other
architectures define this symbol, so fix the outlier.

[geert] This also fixes:
  - CONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS being set to the
    literal NR_CPUS instead of a number by automatic configs like
    "make allmodconfig" or "make olddefconfig",
  - An infinite loop in manual configs like "make oldconfig" when
    CONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS is not present or
    has an invalid value in your existing .config.

Fixes: c9b47e6b2311 ("erofs: cap LZMA stream pool size")
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König &lt;ukleinek@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260731094950.1988084-2-ukleinek@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1fd495ef09eef96169a379a749c24b5e69974bb8 ]

This fixes a Kconfig warning

	fs/erofs/Kconfig:137:warning: range is invalid

which originates from EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS using
NR_CPUS which up to now didn't exist for ARCH=m68k.  All other
architectures define this symbol, so fix the outlier.

[geert] This also fixes:
  - CONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS being set to the
    literal NR_CPUS instead of a number by automatic configs like
    "make allmodconfig" or "make olddefconfig",
  - An infinite loop in manual configs like "make oldconfig" when
    CONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS is not present or
    has an invalid value in your existing .config.

Fixes: c9b47e6b2311 ("erofs: cap LZMA stream pool size")
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König &lt;ukleinek@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260731094950.1988084-2-ukleinek@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>riscv: ftrace: Fix ftrace_modify_call failure on kprobed functions</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:27:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pu Lehui</name>
<email>pulehui@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-02T09:49:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6c85d169eeecc6764737465eef00225348f1ad36'/>
<id>6c85d169eeecc6764737465eef00225348f1ad36</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2820d227ad4ee70805d693d698437cc3e88d6c3d ]

We are frequently hitting the following splat during the riscv bpf
selftests:

00000000026dc75a: expected (7c3ff297) but got (00100073)
------------[ ftrace bug ]------------
ftrace failed to modify
[&lt;ffffffff03c44c1c&gt;] bpf_kfunc_common_test+0x4/0x20 [bpf_testmod]
 actual:   e7:82:c2:ce
Updating ftrace call site to call a different ftrace function
ftrace record flags: 80100002
 (2)
 expected tramp: ffffffff80043904
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2278 at ftrace_bug+0x46e/0x4b0, CPU#1: test_progs/98
...
[&lt;ffffffff80008f4e&gt;] ftrace_bug+0x46e/0x4b0
[&lt;ffffffff803d3e86&gt;] ftrace_replace_code+0x16e/0x170
[&lt;ffffffff803d42b6&gt;] ftrace_modify_all_code+0x12e/0x1b8
[&lt;ffffffff800430f4&gt;] arch_ftrace_update_code+0x14/0x28
[&lt;ffffffff803e0324&gt;] ftrace_startup+0x14c/0x2a0
[&lt;ffffffff803e133c&gt;] ftrace_startup_subops+0x584/0x1050
[&lt;ffffffff804500e6&gt;] register_ftrace_graph+0x4e6/0x1018
[&lt;ffffffff804cf9f6&gt;] register_fprobe_ips+0xc66/0x12f8
[&lt;ffffffff8049abe8&gt;] bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach+0x5d8/0xe68
[&lt;ffffffff8050fcaa&gt;] __sys_bpf+0x3d5a/0x47f0
[&lt;ffffffff805107ee&gt;] __riscv_sys_bpf+0xae/0x168
[&lt;ffffffff80034d78&gt;] syscall_handler+0x60/0x100
[&lt;ffffffff8228b4f4&gt;] do_trap_ecall_u+0x174/0x208
[&lt;ffffffff822b69c4&gt;] handle_exception+0x16c/0x178

After debugging, it can be triggered by similar commands below:
```
echo do_nanosleep &gt; set_ftrace_filter
echo function &gt; current_tracer
echo 'p do_nanosleep' &gt; kprobe_events
echo 1 &gt; events/kprobes/enable
echo 'f do_nanosleep' &gt; dynamic_events
echo 1 &gt; events/fprobes/enable
```

The reason is that attaching a kprobe to an ftrace-traced function entry
replaces its initial auipc insn with ebreak. When ftrace_modify_call
later runs, it expects auipc insn, so verification fails and triggers
ftrace_bug.

The expected auipc logic remains conceptually unchanged, and kprobe
single-stepping ensures normal execution. Therefore, if the first insn
is ebreak, bypassing the check to continue patching the jalr insn is
safe and avoids ftrace failures.

Fixes: b2137c3b6d7a ("riscv: ftrace: prepare ftrace for atomic code patching")
Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui &lt;pulehui@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260802094929.3978390-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com
[pjw@kernel.org: fixed reproducer in commit message]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley &lt;pjw@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2820d227ad4ee70805d693d698437cc3e88d6c3d ]

We are frequently hitting the following splat during the riscv bpf
selftests:

00000000026dc75a: expected (7c3ff297) but got (00100073)
------------[ ftrace bug ]------------
ftrace failed to modify
[&lt;ffffffff03c44c1c&gt;] bpf_kfunc_common_test+0x4/0x20 [bpf_testmod]
 actual:   e7:82:c2:ce
Updating ftrace call site to call a different ftrace function
ftrace record flags: 80100002
 (2)
 expected tramp: ffffffff80043904
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2278 at ftrace_bug+0x46e/0x4b0, CPU#1: test_progs/98
...
[&lt;ffffffff80008f4e&gt;] ftrace_bug+0x46e/0x4b0
[&lt;ffffffff803d3e86&gt;] ftrace_replace_code+0x16e/0x170
[&lt;ffffffff803d42b6&gt;] ftrace_modify_all_code+0x12e/0x1b8
[&lt;ffffffff800430f4&gt;] arch_ftrace_update_code+0x14/0x28
[&lt;ffffffff803e0324&gt;] ftrace_startup+0x14c/0x2a0
[&lt;ffffffff803e133c&gt;] ftrace_startup_subops+0x584/0x1050
[&lt;ffffffff804500e6&gt;] register_ftrace_graph+0x4e6/0x1018
[&lt;ffffffff804cf9f6&gt;] register_fprobe_ips+0xc66/0x12f8
[&lt;ffffffff8049abe8&gt;] bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach+0x5d8/0xe68
[&lt;ffffffff8050fcaa&gt;] __sys_bpf+0x3d5a/0x47f0
[&lt;ffffffff805107ee&gt;] __riscv_sys_bpf+0xae/0x168
[&lt;ffffffff80034d78&gt;] syscall_handler+0x60/0x100
[&lt;ffffffff8228b4f4&gt;] do_trap_ecall_u+0x174/0x208
[&lt;ffffffff822b69c4&gt;] handle_exception+0x16c/0x178

After debugging, it can be triggered by similar commands below:
```
echo do_nanosleep &gt; set_ftrace_filter
echo function &gt; current_tracer
echo 'p do_nanosleep' &gt; kprobe_events
echo 1 &gt; events/kprobes/enable
echo 'f do_nanosleep' &gt; dynamic_events
echo 1 &gt; events/fprobes/enable
```

The reason is that attaching a kprobe to an ftrace-traced function entry
replaces its initial auipc insn with ebreak. When ftrace_modify_call
later runs, it expects auipc insn, so verification fails and triggers
ftrace_bug.

The expected auipc logic remains conceptually unchanged, and kprobe
single-stepping ensures normal execution. Therefore, if the first insn
is ebreak, bypassing the check to continue patching the jalr insn is
safe and avoids ftrace failures.

Fixes: b2137c3b6d7a ("riscv: ftrace: prepare ftrace for atomic code patching")
Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui &lt;pulehui@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260802094929.3978390-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com
[pjw@kernel.org: fixed reproducer in commit message]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley &lt;pjw@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: tegra: Add EL2 virtual timer interrupt for Tegra194</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:27:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jon Hunter</name>
<email>jonathanh@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-28T15:50:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d9ecc9787e118b0a715cd4194c279a6b14c570cc'/>
<id>d9ecc9787e118b0a715cd4194c279a6b14c570cc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a7c28483fd57dd0e1487024af70622315320774b ]

Commit d87773de9efe ("clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Default to EL2
virtual timer when running VHE") updated the ARM arch timer driver to
use the virtual timer by default if the CPU is running at EL2 with VHE
enabled. If the CPU is running at EL2 with VHE enabled but there is no
interrupt provided for the virtual timer, then the following warning is
displayed:

 arch_timer: [Firmware Bug]: VHE-capable CPU without EL2 virtual timer
  interrupt

This warning is observed on Tegra194 platforms. Tegra194 SoC includes
NVIDIA Carmel ARM v8.2 CPUs and support an EL2 virtual timer. Fix the
above warning by adding the PPI for the EL2 virtual timer interrupt for
Tegra194.

Fixes: 5425fb15d8ee ("arm64: tegra: Add Tegra194 chip device tree")
Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter &lt;jonathanh@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding &lt;treding@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a7c28483fd57dd0e1487024af70622315320774b ]

Commit d87773de9efe ("clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Default to EL2
virtual timer when running VHE") updated the ARM arch timer driver to
use the virtual timer by default if the CPU is running at EL2 with VHE
enabled. If the CPU is running at EL2 with VHE enabled but there is no
interrupt provided for the virtual timer, then the following warning is
displayed:

 arch_timer: [Firmware Bug]: VHE-capable CPU without EL2 virtual timer
  interrupt

This warning is observed on Tegra194 platforms. Tegra194 SoC includes
NVIDIA Carmel ARM v8.2 CPUs and support an EL2 virtual timer. Fix the
above warning by adding the PPI for the EL2 virtual timer interrupt for
Tegra194.

Fixes: 5425fb15d8ee ("arm64: tegra: Add Tegra194 chip device tree")
Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter &lt;jonathanh@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding &lt;treding@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Cancel delayed I/O APIC EOI handling before destroying vCPUs</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:27:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Weiming Shi</name>
<email>bestswngs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-10T13:39:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5f0a99ea721203a4063618aafcca32abf573cb96'/>
<id>5f0a99ea721203a4063618aafcca32abf573cb96</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9910e835580fef3bef53b70241dd00c4bffad693 ]

Cancel (and flush) the I/O APIC's delayed EOI handling work during the
"pre VM destroy" phase, before vCPUs are destroyed, as processing the EOI
broadcast will inject another IRQ if the line is asserted, i.e. will try
to deliver an IRQ to the target vCPU(s).  Canceling the work after vCPUs
are destroyed leads to UAF if the delayed work is processed after vCPUs are
destroyed.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast+0x9bf/0xa20 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1250
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880499abea0 by task kworker/1:2/1218

  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1218 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc7 #5 PREEMPT(lazy)
  Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: events kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94
   dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378
   print_report+0x139/0x4ad mm/kasan/report.c:482
   kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:595
   __kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast+0x9bf/0xa20 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1250
   __kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic+0xd8/0xbf0 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1345
   kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h:129
   ioapic_service+0x308/0x590 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:492
   kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work+0x13c/0x190 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:532
   process_one_work+0xa59/0x19a0 kernel/workqueue.c:3314
   process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3397
   worker_thread+0x5eb/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3478
   kthread+0x370/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436
   ret_from_fork+0x72b/0xd30 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

Note, the VM is unreachable once kvm_destroy_vm() starts, and scheduling
new work via kvm_ioapic_send_eoi() can only be done via KVM_RUN, i.e.
requires a live vCPU.

Alternatively, KVM could simply destroy the I/O APIC during the "pre" phase
of VM destruction, but that gets more than a bit sketchy as KVM expects the
I/O APIC to exist if ioapic_in_kernel() is true, and nested virtualization
in particular has a bad habit of touching VM-scope state during vCPU
destruction.  E.g. attempting to free the PIC during the pre phase would
lead to a NULL pointer dereference in kvm_cpu_has_extint(), and it's not
hard to imagine the I/O APIC having a similar flaw.

Fixes: 17bcd7144263 ("KVM: x86: Free vCPUs before freeing VM state")
Reported-by: &lt;zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zhong Wang &lt;wangzhong.c0ss4ck@bytedance.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xuanqing Shi &lt;shixuanqing.11@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20260727171718.543491-1-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9910e835580fef3bef53b70241dd00c4bffad693 ]

Cancel (and flush) the I/O APIC's delayed EOI handling work during the
"pre VM destroy" phase, before vCPUs are destroyed, as processing the EOI
broadcast will inject another IRQ if the line is asserted, i.e. will try
to deliver an IRQ to the target vCPU(s).  Canceling the work after vCPUs
are destroyed leads to UAF if the delayed work is processed after vCPUs are
destroyed.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast+0x9bf/0xa20 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1250
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880499abea0 by task kworker/1:2/1218

  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1218 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc7 #5 PREEMPT(lazy)
  Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: events kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94
   dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378
   print_report+0x139/0x4ad mm/kasan/report.c:482
   kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:595
   __kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast+0x9bf/0xa20 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1250
   __kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic+0xd8/0xbf0 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1345
   kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h:129
   ioapic_service+0x308/0x590 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:492
   kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work+0x13c/0x190 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:532
   process_one_work+0xa59/0x19a0 kernel/workqueue.c:3314
   process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3397
   worker_thread+0x5eb/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3478
   kthread+0x370/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436
   ret_from_fork+0x72b/0xd30 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

Note, the VM is unreachable once kvm_destroy_vm() starts, and scheduling
new work via kvm_ioapic_send_eoi() can only be done via KVM_RUN, i.e.
requires a live vCPU.

Alternatively, KVM could simply destroy the I/O APIC during the "pre" phase
of VM destruction, but that gets more than a bit sketchy as KVM expects the
I/O APIC to exist if ioapic_in_kernel() is true, and nested virtualization
in particular has a bad habit of touching VM-scope state during vCPU
destruction.  E.g. attempting to free the PIC during the pre phase would
lead to a NULL pointer dereference in kvm_cpu_has_extint(), and it's not
hard to imagine the I/O APIC having a similar flaw.

Fixes: 17bcd7144263 ("KVM: x86: Free vCPUs before freeing VM state")
Reported-by: &lt;zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zhong Wang &lt;wangzhong.c0ss4ck@bytedance.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xuanqing Shi &lt;shixuanqing.11@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20260727171718.543491-1-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openrisc: signal: do not restore privileged SR bits on sigreturn</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:26:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ali Ahmet Memis</name>
<email>ali@iusegentoo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-07T23:42:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a88d688be8d7f03cbf927f2ab454ea9fa58d2979'/>
<id>a88d688be8d7f03cbf927f2ab454ea9fa58d2979</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 32ef1b30ad736519f7a207bcc2986f3d4129d972 upstream.

restore_sigcontext() copies the whole supervision register (SR) from the
signal frame and only clears SPR_SR_SM before the value is reloaded into
the hardware SR (through ESR and l.rfe) on the return to user space.  All
other SR bits are left under user control.

An unprivileged task can thus return from a signal handler through a
crafted sigframe that clears SPR_SR_DME.  With the data MMU disabled the
CPU performs no translation or protection on data accesses, so the task
gains read and write access to arbitrary physical memory, a local
privilege escalation.  SPR_SR_IME, SPR_SR_SUMRA, SPR_SR_LEE, SPR_SR_EPH
and the cache-enable bits are exposed the same way.  The ptrace GPR regset
already refuses any change to SR for exactly this reason.

Restore only the arithmetic flag bits (F, CY, OV) from the signal frame
and take every privileged control bit from the SR the kernel saved on
signal entry.

Verified with qemu-system-or1k -M or1k-sim: before this change an
unprivileged PoC clears SPR_SR_DME in rt_sigreturn and writes a marker to
physical address 0x03000000 (beyond the kernel's mem=32M); afterwards the
same PoC receives SIGSEGV and physical memory is unchanged.

Fixes: ac689eb7f9d4 ("OpenRISC: Signal handling")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis &lt;ali@iusegentoo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne &lt;shorne@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 32ef1b30ad736519f7a207bcc2986f3d4129d972 upstream.

restore_sigcontext() copies the whole supervision register (SR) from the
signal frame and only clears SPR_SR_SM before the value is reloaded into
the hardware SR (through ESR and l.rfe) on the return to user space.  All
other SR bits are left under user control.

An unprivileged task can thus return from a signal handler through a
crafted sigframe that clears SPR_SR_DME.  With the data MMU disabled the
CPU performs no translation or protection on data accesses, so the task
gains read and write access to arbitrary physical memory, a local
privilege escalation.  SPR_SR_IME, SPR_SR_SUMRA, SPR_SR_LEE, SPR_SR_EPH
and the cache-enable bits are exposed the same way.  The ptrace GPR regset
already refuses any change to SR for exactly this reason.

Restore only the arithmetic flag bits (F, CY, OV) from the signal frame
and take every privileged control bit from the SR the kernel saved on
signal entry.

Verified with qemu-system-or1k -M or1k-sim: before this change an
unprivileged PoC clears SPR_SR_DME in rt_sigreturn and writes a marker to
physical address 0x03000000 (beyond the kernel's mem=32M); afterwards the
same PoC receives SIGSEGV and physical memory is unchanged.

Fixes: ac689eb7f9d4 ("OpenRISC: Signal handling")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis &lt;ali@iusegentoo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne &lt;shorne@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/pseries: papr-phy-attest - validate cmd.length, plug mem leak</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:26:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>George Wilson</name>
<email>gcwilson@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-07T16:56:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=828a8d1a9107aec6353d896882df8383accf7e80'/>
<id>828a8d1a9107aec6353d896882df8383accf7e80</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5b17f3f34391372faf03e79d947e0c50ab6dd258 upstream.

In papr_phy_attest_create_handle(), the params-&gt;cmd.length is not
validated before use, which can result in a buffer overlow.  Check it and
return -EINVAL if it is either 0 or exceeds sizeof(params-&gt;cmd).

Also, params is freed on the success path but not error. Free it on
errors after memory allocation.  And free it on negative fd.

Fixes: 86900ab620a4 ("powerpc/pseries: Add a char driver for physical-attestation RTAS")
Acked-by: Haren Myneni &lt;haren@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry &lt;rnsastry@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.16
Signed-off-by: George Wilson &lt;gcwilson@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan &lt;maddy@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5b17f3f34391372faf03e79d947e0c50ab6dd258 upstream.

In papr_phy_attest_create_handle(), the params-&gt;cmd.length is not
validated before use, which can result in a buffer overlow.  Check it and
return -EINVAL if it is either 0 or exceeds sizeof(params-&gt;cmd).

Also, params is freed on the success path but not error. Free it on
errors after memory allocation.  And free it on negative fd.

Fixes: 86900ab620a4 ("powerpc/pseries: Add a char driver for physical-attestation RTAS")
Acked-by: Haren Myneni &lt;haren@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry &lt;rnsastry@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.16
Signed-off-by: George Wilson &lt;gcwilson@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan &lt;maddy@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/pseries: lparcfg - fix kbuf[] underflow</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:26:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>George Wilson</name>
<email>gcwilson@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-07T16:59:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2bdec532202b3f3c2eaa496f2d8f6f4c3148b107'/>
<id>2bdec532202b3f3c2eaa496f2d8f6f4c3148b107</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fb442a6673ff1046bf67754957d95880fdb394b5 upstream.

In lparcfg_write(), a count of 0 results in kbuf[] being indexed at -1.
Check for count == 0 in the existing check for count &gt; sizeof(kbuf) and
return -EINVAL if true.

Fixes: 74422e2b1939 ("powerpc/pseries: Remove VLA from lparcfg_write()")
Acked-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry &lt;rnsastry@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.20
Signed-off-by: George Wilson &lt;gcwilson@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan &lt;maddy@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fb442a6673ff1046bf67754957d95880fdb394b5 upstream.

In lparcfg_write(), a count of 0 results in kbuf[] being indexed at -1.
Check for count == 0 in the existing check for count &gt; sizeof(kbuf) and
return -EINVAL if true.

Fixes: 74422e2b1939 ("powerpc/pseries: Remove VLA from lparcfg_write()")
Acked-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry &lt;rnsastry@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.20
Signed-off-by: George Wilson &lt;gcwilson@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan &lt;maddy@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/pseries: pci - logic bug</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:26:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>George Wilson</name>
<email>gcwilson@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-07T16:58:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=652e952850d9a9ae54fa24802109e6a0343b15d5'/>
<id>652e952850d9a9ae54fa24802109e6a0343b15d5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 649c10bff5cb7a514bf299094833ec8c9190aac3 upstream.

The checks on num_vfs in pseries_pci_sriov_enable() are ANDed where OR
was apparently intended.  Change it to OR.

Fixes: 9a7f6b438664 ("powerpc/pseries/pci: Associate PEs to VFs in configure SR-IOV")
Acked-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry &lt;rnsastry@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16
Signed-off-by: George Wilson &lt;gcwilson@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan &lt;maddy@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 649c10bff5cb7a514bf299094833ec8c9190aac3 upstream.

The checks on num_vfs in pseries_pci_sriov_enable() are ANDed where OR
was apparently intended.  Change it to OR.

Fixes: 9a7f6b438664 ("powerpc/pseries/pci: Associate PEs to VFs in configure SR-IOV")
Acked-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry &lt;rnsastry@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16
Signed-off-by: George Wilson &lt;gcwilson@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan &lt;maddy@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86/mmu: WARN and clear role.invalid when creating a child shadow page</title>
<updated>2026-08-19T16:18:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-13T15:25:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=66bc868a33cf1de43f22a94acd8857e0fe33393f'/>
<id>66bc868a33cf1de43f22a94acd8857e0fe33393f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5ec42d57655c690234c14aece6dd3f209778c1d8 upstream.

Explicitly clear role.invalid when deriving a child shadow page's role from
its parent to harden against bugs elsewhere in KVM, as violating KVM's
invariant that invalid pages are NOT on the list of active MMU pages leads
to use-after-free due to __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page() using list_add()
instead of list_move() when processing an invalid shadow page, i.e. makes a
bad situation far worse.

Yell loudly if the parent is invalid, as it means KVM has missed a validity
check, i.e. KVM is attempting to map memory using an invalid/obsolete root,
but continue on as the child is otherwise still a valid shadow page.

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page+0x1817/0x1860 [kvm]
  Write of size 8 at addr ff11000153dd1368 by task repro/853

  CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 853 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.2.0-rc2-3aec122bdcaf-next-vm #5 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x4b/0x70
   print_report+0x153/0x49c
   kasan_report+0xbc/0xf0
   __kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page+0x1817/0x1860 [kvm]
   mmu_alloc_root+0x141/0x320 [kvm]
   kvm_mmu_load+0x612/0x20f0 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3dd5/0x6150 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5e4/0x10d0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1b0
   do_syscall_64+0x67/0x5f0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

  Allocated by task 853:
   kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
   kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
   __kasan_slab_alloc+0x5f/0x70
   kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0xfe/0x2e0
   __kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache+0x135/0x530 [kvm]
   paging64_page_fault+0x318/0x1e30 [kvm]
   kvm_mmu_do_page_fault+0x21d/0x630 [kvm]
   kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x18c/0x17b0 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1f35/0x6150 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5e4/0x10d0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1b0
   do_syscall_64+0x67/0x5f0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

  Freed by task 853:
   kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
   kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
   kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
   __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
   kmem_cache_free+0xe2/0x400
   kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page.part.0+0x1e2/0x310 [kvm]
   kvm_mmu_free_roots+0x283/0x560 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x33c8/0x6150 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5e4/0x10d0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1b0
   do_syscall_64+0x67/0x5f0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;imv4bel@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: a770f6f28b1a ("KVM: MMU: Inherit a shadow page's guest level count from vcpu setup")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5ec42d57655c690234c14aece6dd3f209778c1d8 upstream.

Explicitly clear role.invalid when deriving a child shadow page's role from
its parent to harden against bugs elsewhere in KVM, as violating KVM's
invariant that invalid pages are NOT on the list of active MMU pages leads
to use-after-free due to __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page() using list_add()
instead of list_move() when processing an invalid shadow page, i.e. makes a
bad situation far worse.

Yell loudly if the parent is invalid, as it means KVM has missed a validity
check, i.e. KVM is attempting to map memory using an invalid/obsolete root,
but continue on as the child is otherwise still a valid shadow page.

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page+0x1817/0x1860 [kvm]
  Write of size 8 at addr ff11000153dd1368 by task repro/853

  CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 853 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.2.0-rc2-3aec122bdcaf-next-vm #5 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x4b/0x70
   print_report+0x153/0x49c
   kasan_report+0xbc/0xf0
   __kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page+0x1817/0x1860 [kvm]
   mmu_alloc_root+0x141/0x320 [kvm]
   kvm_mmu_load+0x612/0x20f0 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3dd5/0x6150 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5e4/0x10d0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1b0
   do_syscall_64+0x67/0x5f0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

  Allocated by task 853:
   kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
   kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
   __kasan_slab_alloc+0x5f/0x70
   kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0xfe/0x2e0
   __kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache+0x135/0x530 [kvm]
   paging64_page_fault+0x318/0x1e30 [kvm]
   kvm_mmu_do_page_fault+0x21d/0x630 [kvm]
   kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x18c/0x17b0 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1f35/0x6150 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5e4/0x10d0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1b0
   do_syscall_64+0x67/0x5f0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

  Freed by task 853:
   kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
   kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
   kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
   __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
   kmem_cache_free+0xe2/0x400
   kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page.part.0+0x1e2/0x310 [kvm]
   kvm_mmu_free_roots+0x283/0x560 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x33c8/0x6150 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5e4/0x10d0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1b0
   do_syscall_64+0x67/0x5f0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;imv4bel@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: a770f6f28b1a ("KVM: MMU: Inherit a shadow page's guest level count from vcpu setup")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: SVM: Serialize accesses to the owner and mirror list with separate lock</title>
<updated>2026-08-19T16:18:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-06T14:44:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=47976eaaf0a4eb46dade48b3246779090db9e3ec'/>
<id>47976eaaf0a4eb46dade48b3246779090db9e3ec</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1d78d33275ef2a16c6d080910b291d0a97a0e613 upstream.

Interaction between KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM and
KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM can cause two separate issues:

- in sev_migrate_from(), when the destination KVM is a mirror, the mirror
  entry is moved from the source's list to the owner's mirror_vms list,
  without holding the owner's lock unlike other writers of the owner's
  mirror list (sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(), sev_vm_destroy()).
  A concurrent COPY or destroy can race with sev_migrate_from() and
  corrupt the list.

- In sev_vm_destroy(), the *owner* is still active and could receive
  concurrently a KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM that causes
  sev-&gt;enc_context_owner to change.  In this case the incorrect VM
  receives kvm_put_kvm().

The second issue needs particular care because the owner could disappear
altogether (even though the race window is impossibly small) between
reading it and locking it.  There is thus no way to perform the checks
under the owner lock without putting struct kvm under SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
(which would allow kvm_get_kvm_safe() under RCU critical section).

It is much simpler to just use a global lock, since the critical
sections are so small and the new lock is always a leaf lock.

Fixes: b2125513dfc0 ("KVM: SEV: Allow SEV intra-host migration of VM with mirrors")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Shen Yongchao &lt;grayhat@foxmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/tencent_625C0F42824E542C72B34733392AF2C49709@qq.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/tencent_DDC4E4352EC91CAC05A9A8F4E55E8C96730A@qq.com/
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1d78d33275ef2a16c6d080910b291d0a97a0e613 upstream.

Interaction between KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM and
KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM can cause two separate issues:

- in sev_migrate_from(), when the destination KVM is a mirror, the mirror
  entry is moved from the source's list to the owner's mirror_vms list,
  without holding the owner's lock unlike other writers of the owner's
  mirror list (sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(), sev_vm_destroy()).
  A concurrent COPY or destroy can race with sev_migrate_from() and
  corrupt the list.

- In sev_vm_destroy(), the *owner* is still active and could receive
  concurrently a KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM that causes
  sev-&gt;enc_context_owner to change.  In this case the incorrect VM
  receives kvm_put_kvm().

The second issue needs particular care because the owner could disappear
altogether (even though the race window is impossibly small) between
reading it and locking it.  There is thus no way to perform the checks
under the owner lock without putting struct kvm under SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
(which would allow kvm_get_kvm_safe() under RCU critical section).

It is much simpler to just use a global lock, since the critical
sections are so small and the new lock is always a leaf lock.

Fixes: b2125513dfc0 ("KVM: SEV: Allow SEV intra-host migration of VM with mirrors")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Shen Yongchao &lt;grayhat@foxmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/tencent_625C0F42824E542C72B34733392AF2C49709@qq.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/tencent_DDC4E4352EC91CAC05A9A8F4E55E8C96730A@qq.com/
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
