<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch, branch v6.0.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: emulator: update the emulation mode after CR0 write</title>
<updated>2022-11-10T17:17:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Levitsky</name>
<email>mlevitsk@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-25T12:47:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5711b73a8d0b2a25262cac0fcf2228b4d4ffa4b3'/>
<id>5711b73a8d0b2a25262cac0fcf2228b4d4ffa4b3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ad8f9e69942c7db90758d9d774157e53bce94840 upstream.

Update the emulation mode when handling writes to CR0, because
toggling CR0.PE switches between Real and Protected Mode, and toggling
CR0.PG when EFER.LME=1 switches between Long and Protected Mode.

This is likely a benign bug because there is no writeback of state,
other than the RIP increment, and when toggling CR0.PE, the CPU has
to execute code from a very low memory address.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221025124741.228045-14-mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ad8f9e69942c7db90758d9d774157e53bce94840 upstream.

Update the emulation mode when handling writes to CR0, because
toggling CR0.PE switches between Real and Protected Mode, and toggling
CR0.PG when EFER.LME=1 switches between Long and Protected Mode.

This is likely a benign bug because there is no writeback of state,
other than the RIP increment, and when toggling CR0.PE, the CPU has
to execute code from a very low memory address.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221025124741.228045-14-mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: emulator: update the emulation mode after rsm</title>
<updated>2022-11-10T17:17:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Levitsky</name>
<email>mlevitsk@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-25T12:47:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=191768caed925f73af078da9b90d54527fdecc00'/>
<id>191768caed925f73af078da9b90d54527fdecc00</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 055f37f84e304e59c046d1accfd8f08462f52c4c upstream.

Update the emulation mode after RSM so that RIP will be correctly
written back, because the RSM instruction can switch the CPU mode from
32 bit (or less) to 64 bit.

This fixes a guest crash in case the #SMI is received while the guest
runs a code from an address &gt; 32 bit.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221025124741.228045-13-mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 055f37f84e304e59c046d1accfd8f08462f52c4c upstream.

Update the emulation mode after RSM so that RIP will be correctly
written back, because the RSM instruction can switch the CPU mode from
32 bit (or less) to 64 bit.

This fixes a guest crash in case the #SMI is received while the guest
runs a code from an address &gt; 32 bit.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221025124741.228045-13-mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: emulator: introduce emulator_recalc_and_set_mode</title>
<updated>2022-11-10T17:17:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Levitsky</name>
<email>mlevitsk@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-25T12:47:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9eb0ab82b8ab45bee099b3fb4a20ab1ffd2c2988'/>
<id>9eb0ab82b8ab45bee099b3fb4a20ab1ffd2c2988</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d087e0f79fa0dd336a9a6b2f79ec23120f5eff73 upstream.

Some instructions update the cpu execution mode, which needs to update the
emulation mode.

Extract this code, and make assign_eip_far use it.

assign_eip_far now reads CS, instead of getting it via a parameter,
which is ok, because callers always assign CS to the same value
before calling this function.

No functional change is intended.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221025124741.228045-12-mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d087e0f79fa0dd336a9a6b2f79ec23120f5eff73 upstream.

Some instructions update the cpu execution mode, which needs to update the
emulation mode.

Extract this code, and make assign_eip_far use it.

assign_eip_far now reads CS, instead of getting it via a parameter,
which is ok, because callers always assign CS to the same value
before calling this function.

No functional change is intended.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221025124741.228045-12-mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: emulator: em_sysexit should update ctxt-&gt;mode</title>
<updated>2022-11-10T17:17:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Levitsky</name>
<email>mlevitsk@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-25T12:47:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=067e674d2261d34e5579c59b1caf09c8ab3a44c4'/>
<id>067e674d2261d34e5579c59b1caf09c8ab3a44c4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5015bb89b58225f97df6ac44383e7e8c8662c8c9 upstream.

SYSEXIT is one of the instructions that can change the
processor mode, thus ctxt-&gt;mode should be updated after it.

Note that this is likely a benign bug, because the only problematic
mode change is from 32 bit to 64 bit which can lead to truncation of RIP,
and it is not possible to do with sysexit,
since sysexit running in 32 bit mode will be limited to 32 bit version.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221025124741.228045-11-mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5015bb89b58225f97df6ac44383e7e8c8662c8c9 upstream.

SYSEXIT is one of the instructions that can change the
processor mode, thus ctxt-&gt;mode should be updated after it.

Note that this is likely a benign bug, because the only problematic
mode change is from 32 bit to 64 bit which can lead to truncation of RIP,
and it is not possible to do with sysexit,
since sysexit running in 32 bit mode will be limited to 32 bit version.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221025124741.228045-11-mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: smm: number of GPRs in the SMRAM image depends on the image format</title>
<updated>2022-11-10T17:17:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxim Levitsky</name>
<email>mlevitsk@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-25T12:47:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a7ebfbea0f52550d7cdf12c38f3f5eaa7b2b6494'/>
<id>a7ebfbea0f52550d7cdf12c38f3f5eaa7b2b6494</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 696db303e54f7352623d9f640e6c51d8fa9d5588 upstream.

On 64 bit host, if the guest doesn't have X86_FEATURE_LM, KVM will
access 16 gprs to 32-bit smram image, causing out-ouf-bound ram
access.

On 32 bit host, the rsm_load_state_64/enter_smm_save_state_64
is compiled out, thus access overflow can't happen.

Fixes: b443183a25ab61 ("KVM: x86: Reduce the number of emulator GPRs to '8' for 32-bit KVM")

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221025124741.228045-15-mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 696db303e54f7352623d9f640e6c51d8fa9d5588 upstream.

On 64 bit host, if the guest doesn't have X86_FEATURE_LM, KVM will
access 16 gprs to 32-bit smram image, causing out-ouf-bound ram
access.

On 32 bit host, the rsm_load_state_64/enter_smm_save_state_64
is compiled out, thus access overflow can't happen.

Fixes: b443183a25ab61 ("KVM: x86: Reduce the number of emulator GPRs to '8' for 32-bit KVM")

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221025124741.228045-15-mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: arm64: Fix SMPRI_EL1/TPIDR2_EL0 trapping on VHE</title>
<updated>2022-11-10T17:17:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Zyngier</name>
<email>maz@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-01T12:19:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=192b07253ddc71317df0a7882311e0a76572790d'/>
<id>192b07253ddc71317df0a7882311e0a76572790d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4151bb636acf32bb2e6126cec8216b023117c0e9 upstream.

The trapping of SMPRI_EL1 and TPIDR2_EL0 currently only really
work on nVHE, as only this mode uses the fine-grained trapping
that controls these two registers.

Move the trapping enable/disable code into
__{de,}activate_traps_common(), allowing it to be called when it
actually matters on VHE, and remove the flipping of EL2 control
for TPIDR2_EL0, which only affects the host access of this
register.

Fixes: 861262ab8627 ("KVM: arm64: Handle SME host state when running guests")
Reported-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/86bkpqer4z.wl-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4151bb636acf32bb2e6126cec8216b023117c0e9 upstream.

The trapping of SMPRI_EL1 and TPIDR2_EL0 currently only really
work on nVHE, as only this mode uses the fine-grained trapping
that controls these two registers.

Move the trapping enable/disable code into
__{de,}activate_traps_common(), allowing it to be called when it
actually matters on VHE, and remove the flipping of EL2 control
for TPIDR2_EL0, which only affects the host access of this
register.

Fixes: 861262ab8627 ("KVM: arm64: Handle SME host state when running guests")
Reported-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/86bkpqer4z.wl-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: arm64: Fix bad dereference on MTE-enabled systems</title>
<updated>2022-11-10T17:17:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ryan Roberts</name>
<email>ryan.roberts@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-27T12:09:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fec77482d28436932e7beeb6706ab0ab79d63a55'/>
<id>fec77482d28436932e7beeb6706ab0ab79d63a55</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b6bcdc9f6b8321e4471ff45413b6410e16762a8d upstream.

enter_exception64() performs an MTE check, which involves dereferencing
vcpu-&gt;kvm. While vcpu has already been fixed up to be a HYP VA pointer,
kvm is still a pointer in the kernel VA space.

This only affects nVHE configurations with MTE enabled, as in other
cases, the pointer is either valid (VHE) or not dereferenced (!MTE).

Fix this by first converting kvm to a HYP VA pointer.

Fixes: ea7fc1bb1cd1 ("KVM: arm64: Introduce MTE VM feature")
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts &lt;ryan.roberts@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Price &lt;steven.price@arm.com&gt;
[maz: commit message tidy-up]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027120945.29679-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b6bcdc9f6b8321e4471ff45413b6410e16762a8d upstream.

enter_exception64() performs an MTE check, which involves dereferencing
vcpu-&gt;kvm. While vcpu has already been fixed up to be a HYP VA pointer,
kvm is still a pointer in the kernel VA space.

This only affects nVHE configurations with MTE enabled, as in other
cases, the pointer is either valid (VHE) or not dereferenced (!MTE).

Fix this by first converting kvm to a HYP VA pointer.

Fixes: ea7fc1bb1cd1 ("KVM: arm64: Introduce MTE VM feature")
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts &lt;ryan.roberts@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Price &lt;steven.price@arm.com&gt;
[maz: commit message tidy-up]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027120945.29679-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: Initialize gfn_to_pfn_cache locks in dedicated helper</title>
<updated>2022-11-10T17:17:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Luczaj</name>
<email>mhal@rbox.co</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-13T21:12:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=61242001d6c9c253df7645dab090842d8da08764'/>
<id>61242001d6c9c253df7645dab090842d8da08764</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 52491a38b2c2411f3f0229dc6ad610349c704a41 upstream.

Move the gfn_to_pfn_cache lock initialization to another helper and
call the new helper during VM/vCPU creation.  There are race
conditions possible due to kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init()'s
ability to re-initialize the cache's locks.

For example: a race between ioctl(KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND) and
kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init() leads to a corrupted shinfo gpc lock.

                (thread 1)                |           (thread 2)
                                          |
 kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast                  |
  read_lock_irqsave(&amp;gpc-&gt;lock, ...)      |
                                          | kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init
                                          |  rwlock_init(&amp;gpc-&gt;lock)
  read_unlock_irqrestore(&amp;gpc-&gt;lock, ...) |

Rename "cache_init" and "cache_destroy" to activate+deactivate to
avoid implying that the cache really is destroyed/freed.

Note, there more races in the newly named kvm_gpc_activate() that will
be addressed separately.

Fixes: 982ed0de4753 ("KVM: Reinstate gfn_to_pfn_cache with invalidation support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj &lt;mhal@rbox.co&gt;
[sean: call out that this is a bug fix]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221013211234.1318131-2-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 52491a38b2c2411f3f0229dc6ad610349c704a41 upstream.

Move the gfn_to_pfn_cache lock initialization to another helper and
call the new helper during VM/vCPU creation.  There are race
conditions possible due to kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init()'s
ability to re-initialize the cache's locks.

For example: a race between ioctl(KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND) and
kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init() leads to a corrupted shinfo gpc lock.

                (thread 1)                |           (thread 2)
                                          |
 kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast                  |
  read_lock_irqsave(&amp;gpc-&gt;lock, ...)      |
                                          | kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init
                                          |  rwlock_init(&amp;gpc-&gt;lock)
  read_unlock_irqrestore(&amp;gpc-&gt;lock, ...) |

Rename "cache_init" and "cache_destroy" to activate+deactivate to
avoid implying that the cache really is destroyed/freed.

Note, there more races in the newly named kvm_gpc_activate() that will
be addressed separately.

Fixes: 982ed0de4753 ("KVM: Reinstate gfn_to_pfn_cache with invalidation support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj &lt;mhal@rbox.co&gt;
[sean: call out that this is a bug fix]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221013211234.1318131-2-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: VMX: fully disable SGX if SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING unavailable</title>
<updated>2022-11-10T17:17:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito</name>
<email>eesposit@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-25T12:37:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=da0903388740d9dc6f0a58bf057019fa852a47ec'/>
<id>da0903388740d9dc6f0a58bf057019fa852a47ec</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1c1a41497ab879ac9608f3047f230af833eeef3d upstream.

Clear enable_sgx if ENCLS-exiting is not supported, i.e. if SGX cannot be
virtualized.  When KVM is loaded, adjust_vmx_controls checks that the
bit is available before enabling the feature; however, other parts of the
code check enable_sgx and not clearing the variable caused two different
bugs, mostly affecting nested virtualization scenarios.

First, because enable_sgx remained true, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING
would be marked available in the capability MSR that are accessed by a
nested hypervisor.  KVM would then propagate the control from vmcs12
to vmcs02 even if it isn't supported by the processor, thus causing an
unexpected VM-Fail (exit code 0x7) in L1.

Second, vmx_set_cpu_caps() would not clear the SGX bits when hardware
support is unavailable.  This is a much less problematic bug as it only
happens if SGX is soft-disabled (available in the processor but hidden
in CPUID) or if SGX is supported for bare metal but not in the VMCS
(will never happen when running on bare metal, but can theoertically
happen when running in a VM).

Last but not least, this ensures that module params in sysfs reflect
KVM's actual configuration.

RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2127128
Fixes: 72add915fbd5 ("KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Bandan Das &lt;bsd@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito &lt;eesposit@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221025123749.2201649-1-eesposit@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1c1a41497ab879ac9608f3047f230af833eeef3d upstream.

Clear enable_sgx if ENCLS-exiting is not supported, i.e. if SGX cannot be
virtualized.  When KVM is loaded, adjust_vmx_controls checks that the
bit is available before enabling the feature; however, other parts of the
code check enable_sgx and not clearing the variable caused two different
bugs, mostly affecting nested virtualization scenarios.

First, because enable_sgx remained true, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING
would be marked available in the capability MSR that are accessed by a
nested hypervisor.  KVM would then propagate the control from vmcs12
to vmcs02 even if it isn't supported by the processor, thus causing an
unexpected VM-Fail (exit code 0x7) in L1.

Second, vmx_set_cpu_caps() would not clear the SGX bits when hardware
support is unavailable.  This is a much less problematic bug as it only
happens if SGX is soft-disabled (available in the processor but hidden
in CPUID) or if SGX is supported for bare metal but not in the VMCS
(will never happen when running on bare metal, but can theoertically
happen when running in a VM).

Last but not least, this ensures that module params in sysfs reflect
KVM's actual configuration.

RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2127128
Fixes: 72add915fbd5 ("KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Bandan Das &lt;bsd@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito &lt;eesposit@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221025123749.2201649-1-eesposit@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: VMX: Ignore guest CPUID for host userspace writes to DEBUGCTL</title>
<updated>2022-11-10T17:17:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-06T00:03:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5f7cff22d0c9402c01bb9e65caa00d250ff05211'/>
<id>5f7cff22d0c9402c01bb9e65caa00d250ff05211</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b333b8ebb85d62469f32b52fa03fd7d1522afc03 upstream.

Ignore guest CPUID for host userspace writes to the DEBUGCTL MSR, KVM's
ABI is that setting CPUID vs. state can be done in any order, i.e. KVM
allows userspace to stuff MSRs prior to setting the guest's CPUID that
makes the new MSR "legal".

Keep the vmx_get_perf_capabilities() check for guest writes, even though
it's technically unnecessary since the vCPU's PERF_CAPABILITIES is
consulted when refreshing LBR support.  A future patch will clean up
vmx_get_perf_capabilities() to avoid the RDMSR on every call, at which
point the paranoia will incur no meaningful overhead.

Note, prior to vmx_get_perf_capabilities() checking that the host fully
supports LBRs via x86_perf_get_lbr(), KVM effectively relied on
intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled() to guard against host userspace enabling LBRs
on platforms without full support.

Fixes: c646236344e9 ("KVM: vmx/pmu: Add PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT check when guest LBR is enabled")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221006000314.73240-5-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b333b8ebb85d62469f32b52fa03fd7d1522afc03 upstream.

Ignore guest CPUID for host userspace writes to the DEBUGCTL MSR, KVM's
ABI is that setting CPUID vs. state can be done in any order, i.e. KVM
allows userspace to stuff MSRs prior to setting the guest's CPUID that
makes the new MSR "legal".

Keep the vmx_get_perf_capabilities() check for guest writes, even though
it's technically unnecessary since the vCPU's PERF_CAPABILITIES is
consulted when refreshing LBR support.  A future patch will clean up
vmx_get_perf_capabilities() to avoid the RDMSR on every call, at which
point the paranoia will incur no meaningful overhead.

Note, prior to vmx_get_perf_capabilities() checking that the host fully
supports LBRs via x86_perf_get_lbr(), KVM effectively relied on
intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled() to guard against host userspace enabling LBRs
on platforms without full support.

Fixes: c646236344e9 ("KVM: vmx/pmu: Add PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT check when guest LBR is enabled")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20221006000314.73240-5-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
