linux-stable.git/arch, branch v5.4.97 Linux kernel stable tree x86/apic: Add extra serialization for non-serializing MSRs 2021-02-10T08:25:32+00:00 Dave Hansen dave.hansen@linux.intel.com 2020-03-05T17:47:08+00:00 2d5705150707a4f3ec16054ab180fbd48d2ae049 commit 25a068b8e9a4eb193d755d58efcb3c98928636e0 upstream. Jan Kiszka reported that the x2apic_wrmsr_fence() function uses a plain MFENCE while the Intel SDM (10.12.3 MSR Access in x2APIC Mode) calls for MFENCE; LFENCE. Short summary: we have special MSRs that have weaker ordering than all the rest. Add fencing consistent with current SDM recommendations. This is not known to cause any issues in practice, only in theory. Longer story below: The reason the kernel uses a different semantic is that the SDM changed (roughly in late 2017). The SDM changed because folks at Intel were auditing all of the recommended fences in the SDM and realized that the x2apic fences were insufficient. Why was the pain MFENCE judged insufficient? WRMSR itself is normally a serializing instruction. No fences are needed because the instruction itself serializes everything. But, there are explicit exceptions for this serializing behavior written into the WRMSR instruction documentation for two classes of MSRs: IA32_TSC_DEADLINE and the X2APIC MSRs. Back to x2apic: WRMSR is *not* serializing in this specific case. But why is MFENCE insufficient? MFENCE makes writes visible, but only affects load/store instructions. WRMSR is unfortunately not a load/store instruction and is unaffected by MFENCE. This means that a non-serializing WRMSR could be reordered by the CPU to execute before the writes made visible by the MFENCE have even occurred in the first place. This means that an x2apic IPI could theoretically be triggered before there is any (visible) data to process. Does this affect anything in practice? I honestly don't know. It seems quite possible that by the time an interrupt gets to consume the (not yet) MFENCE'd data, it has become visible, mostly by accident. To be safe, add the SDM-recommended fences for all x2apic WRMSRs. This also leaves open the question of the _other_ weakly-ordered WRMSR: MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE. While it has the same ordering architecture as the x2APIC MSRs, it seems substantially less likely to be a problem in practice. While writes to the in-memory Local Vector Table (LVT) might theoretically be reordered with respect to a weakly-ordered WRMSR like TSC_DEADLINE, the SDM has this to say: In x2APIC mode, the WRMSR instruction is used to write to the LVT entry. The processor ensures the ordering of this write and any subsequent WRMSR to the deadline; no fencing is required. But, that might still leave xAPIC exposed. The safest thing to do for now is to add the extra, recommended LFENCE. [ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos, drop accidentally added newline to tools/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h. ] Reported-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305174708.F77040DD@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 25a068b8e9a4eb193d755d58efcb3c98928636e0 upstream.

Jan Kiszka reported that the x2apic_wrmsr_fence() function uses a plain
MFENCE while the Intel SDM (10.12.3 MSR Access in x2APIC Mode) calls for
MFENCE; LFENCE.

Short summary: we have special MSRs that have weaker ordering than all
the rest. Add fencing consistent with current SDM recommendations.

This is not known to cause any issues in practice, only in theory.

Longer story below:

The reason the kernel uses a different semantic is that the SDM changed
(roughly in late 2017). The SDM changed because folks at Intel were
auditing all of the recommended fences in the SDM and realized that the
x2apic fences were insufficient.

Why was the pain MFENCE judged insufficient?

WRMSR itself is normally a serializing instruction. No fences are needed
because the instruction itself serializes everything.

But, there are explicit exceptions for this serializing behavior written
into the WRMSR instruction documentation for two classes of MSRs:
IA32_TSC_DEADLINE and the X2APIC MSRs.

Back to x2apic: WRMSR is *not* serializing in this specific case.
But why is MFENCE insufficient? MFENCE makes writes visible, but
only affects load/store instructions. WRMSR is unfortunately not a
load/store instruction and is unaffected by MFENCE. This means that a
non-serializing WRMSR could be reordered by the CPU to execute before
the writes made visible by the MFENCE have even occurred in the first
place.

This means that an x2apic IPI could theoretically be triggered before
there is any (visible) data to process.

Does this affect anything in practice? I honestly don't know. It seems
quite possible that by the time an interrupt gets to consume the (not
yet) MFENCE'd data, it has become visible, mostly by accident.

To be safe, add the SDM-recommended fences for all x2apic WRMSRs.

This also leaves open the question of the _other_ weakly-ordered WRMSR:
MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE. While it has the same ordering architecture as
the x2APIC MSRs, it seems substantially less likely to be a problem in
practice. While writes to the in-memory Local Vector Table (LVT) might
theoretically be reordered with respect to a weakly-ordered WRMSR like
TSC_DEADLINE, the SDM has this to say:

  In x2APIC mode, the WRMSR instruction is used to write to the LVT
  entry. The processor ensures the ordering of this write and any
  subsequent WRMSR to the deadline; no fencing is required.

But, that might still leave xAPIC exposed. The safest thing to do for
now is to add the extra, recommended LFENCE.

 [ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos, drop accidentally added
   newline to tools/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h. ]

Reported-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305174708.F77040DD@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
x86/build: Disable CET instrumentation in the kernel 2021-02-10T08:25:32+00:00 Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com 2021-01-28T21:52:19+00:00 bc1a3aeeff0ff3719a9758d27a03283ff413b08a commit 20bf2b378729c4a0366a53e2018a0b70ace94bcd upstream. With retpolines disabled, some configurations of GCC, and specifically the GCC versions 9 and 10 in Ubuntu will add Intel CET instrumentation to the kernel by default. That breaks certain tracing scenarios by adding a superfluous ENDBR64 instruction before the fentry call, for functions which can be called indirectly. CET instrumentation isn't currently necessary in the kernel, as CET is only supported in user space. Disable it unconditionally and move it into the x86's Makefile as CET/CFI... enablement should be a per-arch decision anyway. [ bp: Massage and extend commit message. ] Fixes: 29be86d7f9cb ("kbuild: add -fcf-protection=none when using retpoline flags") Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Tested-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210128215219.6kct3h2eiustncws@treble Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 20bf2b378729c4a0366a53e2018a0b70ace94bcd upstream.

With retpolines disabled, some configurations of GCC, and specifically
the GCC versions 9 and 10 in Ubuntu will add Intel CET instrumentation
to the kernel by default. That breaks certain tracing scenarios by
adding a superfluous ENDBR64 instruction before the fentry call, for
functions which can be called indirectly.

CET instrumentation isn't currently necessary in the kernel, as CET is
only supported in user space. Disable it unconditionally and move it
into the x86's Makefile as CET/CFI... enablement should be a per-arch
decision anyway.

 [ bp: Massage and extend commit message. ]

Fixes: 29be86d7f9cb ("kbuild: add -fcf-protection=none when using retpoline flags")
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Tested-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210128215219.6kct3h2eiustncws@treble
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ARM: footbridge: fix dc21285 PCI configuration accessors 2021-02-10T08:25:31+00:00 Russell King rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk 2020-10-18T08:39:21+00:00 75be4852490f0c465796be423a9deb41aeffee51 commit 39d3454c3513840eb123b3913fda6903e45ce671 upstream. Building with gcc 4.9.2 reveals a latent bug in the PCI accessors for Footbridge platforms, which causes a fatal alignment fault while accessing IO memory. Fix this by making the assembly volatile. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 39d3454c3513840eb123b3913fda6903e45ce671 upstream.

Building with gcc 4.9.2 reveals a latent bug in the PCI accessors
for Footbridge platforms, which causes a fatal alignment fault
while accessing IO memory. Fix this by making the assembly volatile.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
KVM: x86: Update emulator context mode if SYSENTER xfers to 64-bit mode 2021-02-10T08:25:31+00:00 Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com 2021-02-02T16:55:46+00:00 b2640b08c43c689d4351e9e51d7a3e9ad532cb3a commit 943dea8af21bd896e0d6c30ea221203fb3cd3265 upstream. Set the emulator context to PROT64 if SYSENTER transitions from 32-bit userspace (compat mode) to a 64-bit kernel, otherwise the RIP update at the end of x86_emulate_insn() will incorrectly truncate the new RIP. Note, this bug is mostly limited to running an Intel virtual CPU model on an AMD physical CPU, as other combinations of virtual and physical CPUs do not trigger full emulation. On Intel CPUs, SYSENTER in compatibility mode is legal, and unconditionally transitions to 64-bit mode. On AMD CPUs, SYSENTER is illegal in compatibility mode and #UDs. If the vCPU is AMD, KVM injects a #UD on SYSENTER in compat mode. If the pCPU is Intel, SYSENTER will execute natively and not trigger #UD->VM-Exit (ignoring guest TLB shenanigans). Fixes: fede8076aab4 ("KVM: x86: handle wrap around 32-bit address space") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonny Barker <jonny@jonnybarker.com> [sean: wrote changelog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210202165546.2390296-1-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 943dea8af21bd896e0d6c30ea221203fb3cd3265 upstream.

Set the emulator context to PROT64 if SYSENTER transitions from 32-bit
userspace (compat mode) to a 64-bit kernel, otherwise the RIP update at
the end of x86_emulate_insn() will incorrectly truncate the new RIP.

Note, this bug is mostly limited to running an Intel virtual CPU model on
an AMD physical CPU, as other combinations of virtual and physical CPUs
do not trigger full emulation.  On Intel CPUs, SYSENTER in compatibility
mode is legal, and unconditionally transitions to 64-bit mode.  On AMD
CPUs, SYSENTER is illegal in compatibility mode and #UDs.  If the vCPU is
AMD, KVM injects a #UD on SYSENTER in compat mode.  If the pCPU is Intel,
SYSENTER will execute natively and not trigger #UD->VM-Exit (ignoring
guest TLB shenanigans).

Fixes: fede8076aab4 ("KVM: x86: handle wrap around 32-bit address space")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonny Barker <jonny@jonnybarker.com>
[sean: wrote changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210202165546.2390296-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
KVM: SVM: Treat SVM as unsupported when running as an SEV guest 2021-02-10T08:25:31+00:00 Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com 2021-02-02T21:20:17+00:00 6d3201c77be55545317cc4bb6010a0040688e6a1 commit ccd85d90ce092bdb047a7f6580f3955393833b22 upstream. Don't let KVM load when running as an SEV guest, regardless of what CPUID says. Memory is encrypted with a key that is not accessible to the host (L0), thus it's impossible for L0 to emulate SVM, e.g. it'll see garbage when reading the VMCB. Technically, KVM could decrypt all memory that needs to be accessible to the L0 and use shadow paging so that L0 does not need to shadow NPT, but exposing such information to L0 largely defeats the purpose of running as an SEV guest. This can always be revisited if someone comes up with a use case for running VMs inside SEV guests. Note, VMLOAD, VMRUN, etc... will also #GP on GPAs with C-bit set, i.e. KVM is doomed even if the SEV guest is debuggable and the hypervisor is willing to decrypt the VMCB. This may or may not be fixed on CPUs that have the SVME_ADDR_CHK fix. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210202212017.2486595-1-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit ccd85d90ce092bdb047a7f6580f3955393833b22 upstream.

Don't let KVM load when running as an SEV guest, regardless of what
CPUID says.  Memory is encrypted with a key that is not accessible to
the host (L0), thus it's impossible for L0 to emulate SVM, e.g. it'll
see garbage when reading the VMCB.

Technically, KVM could decrypt all memory that needs to be accessible to
the L0 and use shadow paging so that L0 does not need to shadow NPT, but
exposing such information to L0 largely defeats the purpose of running as
an SEV guest.  This can always be revisited if someone comes up with a
use case for running VMs inside SEV guests.

Note, VMLOAD, VMRUN, etc... will also #GP on GPAs with C-bit set, i.e. KVM
is doomed even if the SEV guest is debuggable and the hypervisor is willing
to decrypt the VMCB.  This may or may not be fixed on CPUs that have the
SVME_ADDR_CHK fix.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210202212017.2486595-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ARM: dts: sun7i: a20: bananapro: Fix ethernet phy-mode 2021-02-10T08:25:28+00:00 Hermann Lauer Hermann.Lauer@uni-heidelberg.de 2021-01-28T11:18:42+00:00 f1c87b4b2c7bf50c644c215f078a57d39e1165c7 [ Upstream commit a900cac3750b9f0b8f5ed0503d9c6359532f644d ] BPi Pro needs TX and RX delay for Gbit to work reliable and avoid high packet loss rates. The realtek phy driver overrides the settings of the pull ups for the delays, so fix this for BananaPro. Fix the phy-mode description to correctly reflect this so that the implementation doesn't reconfigure the delays incorrectly. This happened with commit bbc4d71d6354 ("net: phy: realtek: fix rtl8211e rx/tx delay config"). Fixes: 10662a33dcd9 ("ARM: dts: sun7i: Add dts file for Bananapro board") Signed-off-by: Hermann Lauer <Hermann.Lauer@uni-heidelberg.de> Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210128111842.GA11919@lemon.iwr.uni-heidelberg.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit a900cac3750b9f0b8f5ed0503d9c6359532f644d ]

BPi Pro needs TX and RX delay for Gbit to work reliable and avoid high
packet loss rates. The realtek phy driver overrides the settings of the
pull ups for the delays, so fix this for BananaPro.

Fix the phy-mode description to correctly reflect this so that the
implementation doesn't reconfigure the delays incorrectly. This
happened with commit bbc4d71d6354 ("net: phy: realtek: fix rtl8211e
rx/tx delay config").

Fixes: 10662a33dcd9 ("ARM: dts: sun7i: Add dts file for Bananapro board")
Signed-off-by: Hermann Lauer <Hermann.Lauer@uni-heidelberg.de>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210128111842.GA11919@lemon.iwr.uni-heidelberg.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
arm64: dts: ls1046a: fix dcfg address range 2021-02-10T08:25:27+00:00 Zyta Szpak zr@semihalf.com 2021-01-21T15:52:37+00:00 5ce999efcaa7efc430d7fd024c1d7920af5c59d0 [ Upstream commit aa880c6f3ee6dbd0d5ab02026a514ff8ea0a3328 ] Dcfg was overlapping with clockgen address space which resulted in failure in memory allocation for dcfg. According regs description dcfg size should not be bigger than 4KB. Signed-off-by: Zyta Szpak <zr@semihalf.com> Fixes: 8126d88162a5 ("arm64: dts: add QorIQ LS1046A SoC support") Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit aa880c6f3ee6dbd0d5ab02026a514ff8ea0a3328 ]

Dcfg was overlapping with clockgen address space which resulted
in failure in memory allocation for dcfg. According regs description
dcfg size should not be bigger than 4KB.

Signed-off-by: Zyta Szpak <zr@semihalf.com>
Fixes: 8126d88162a5 ("arm64: dts: add QorIQ LS1046A SoC support")
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
um: virtio: free vu_dev only with the contained struct device 2021-02-10T08:25:27+00:00 Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com 2021-01-07T21:15:21+00:00 98650c3d0e33726292dc8fb3b23e129c68c88108 [ Upstream commit f4172b084342fd3f9e38c10650ffe19eac30d8ce ] Since struct device is refcounted, we shouldn't free the vu_dev immediately when it's removed from the platform device, but only when the references actually all go away. Move the freeing to the release to accomplish that. Fixes: 5d38f324993f ("um: drivers: Add virtio vhost-user driver") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit f4172b084342fd3f9e38c10650ffe19eac30d8ce ]

Since struct device is refcounted, we shouldn't free the vu_dev
immediately when it's removed from the platform device, but only
when the references actually all go away. Move the freeing to
the release to accomplish that.

Fixes: 5d38f324993f ("um: drivers: Add virtio vhost-user driver")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
arm64: dts: rockchip: fix vopl iommu irq on px30 2021-02-10T08:25:27+00:00 Sandy Huang hjc@rock-chips.com 2021-01-08T11:06:27+00:00 4921f81ce65aaaebaebd78c3fb154ce067b442ba [ Upstream commit 656c648354e1561fa4f445b0b3252ec1d24e3951 ] The vop-mmu shares the irq with its matched vop but not the vpu. Fixes: 7053e06b1422 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: add core dtsi file for PX30 SoCs") Signed-off-by: Sandy Huang <hjc@rock-chips.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de> Reviewed-by: Ezequiel Garcia <ezequiel@collabora.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Kocialkowski <paul.kocialkowski@bootlin.com> Tested-by: Paul Kocialkowski <paul.kocialkowski@bootlin.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108110627.3231226-1-heiko@sntech.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 656c648354e1561fa4f445b0b3252ec1d24e3951 ]

The vop-mmu shares the irq with its matched vop but not the vpu.

Fixes: 7053e06b1422 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: add core dtsi file for PX30 SoCs")
Signed-off-by: Sandy Huang <hjc@rock-chips.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Reviewed-by: Ezequiel Garcia <ezequiel@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Kocialkowski <paul.kocialkowski@bootlin.com>
Tested-by: Paul Kocialkowski <paul.kocialkowski@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108110627.3231226-1-heiko@sntech.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
arm64: dts: amlogic: meson-g12: Set FL-adj property value 2021-02-10T08:25:26+00:00 Serge Semin Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru 2020-12-10T09:17:47+00:00 831132b13f0d2e1ed089c064705e62749101f478 [ Upstream commit 7386a559caa6414e74578172c2bc4e636d6bd0a0 ] In accordance with the DWC USB3 bindings the property is supposed to have uint32 type. It's erroneous from the DT schema and driver points of view to declare it as boolean. As Neil suggested set it to 0x20 so not break the platform and to make the dtbs checker happy. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/20201010224121.12672-16-Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru/ Signed-off-by: Serge Semin <Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru> Reviewed-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com> Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Fixes: 9baf7d6be730 ("arm64: dts: meson: g12a: Add G12A USB nodes") Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman@baylibre.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201210091756.18057-3-Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 7386a559caa6414e74578172c2bc4e636d6bd0a0 ]

In accordance with the DWC USB3 bindings the property is supposed to have
uint32 type. It's erroneous from the DT schema and driver points of view
to declare it as boolean. As Neil suggested set it to 0x20 so not break
the platform and to make the dtbs checker happy.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/20201010224121.12672-16-Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru/
Signed-off-by: Serge Semin <Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru>
Reviewed-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Fixes: 9baf7d6be730 ("arm64: dts: meson: g12a: Add G12A USB nodes")
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman@baylibre.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201210091756.18057-3-Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>