<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch, branch v5.4.52</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>s390/maccess: add no DAT mode to kernel_write</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:16:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Gorbik</name>
<email>gor@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-24T15:39:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1a70857590f70efbfb67e088220e639c2766d63f'/>
<id>1a70857590f70efbfb67e088220e639c2766d63f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d6df52e9996dcc2062c3d9c9123288468bb95b52 ]

To be able to patch kernel code before paging is initialized do plain
memcpy if DAT is off. This is required to enable early jump label
initialization.

Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d6df52e9996dcc2062c3d9c9123288468bb95b52 ]

To be able to patch kernel code before paging is initialized do plain
memcpy if DAT is off. This is required to enable early jump label
initialization.

Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390: Change s390_kernel_write() return type to match memcpy()</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:16:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-29T15:24:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=627d15eecb61c25fb4a5e1335f737c43ad99a1c1'/>
<id>627d15eecb61c25fb4a5e1335f737c43ad99a1c1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cb2cceaefb4c4dc28fc27ff1f1b2d258bfc10353 ]

s390_kernel_write()'s function type is almost identical to memcpy().
Change its return type to "void *" so they can be used interchangeably.

Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Gerald Schaefer &lt;gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com&gt; # s390
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit cb2cceaefb4c4dc28fc27ff1f1b2d258bfc10353 ]

s390_kernel_write()'s function type is almost identical to memcpy().
Change its return type to "void *" so they can be used interchangeably.

Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Gerald Schaefer &lt;gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com&gt; # s390
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/mm: fix huge pte soft dirty copying</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:16:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Janosch Frank</name>
<email>frankja@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-07T13:38:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2dfd182451d99dfa007072cb4bc7c7b39938be9a'/>
<id>2dfd182451d99dfa007072cb4bc7c7b39938be9a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 528a9539348a0234375dfaa1ca5dbbb2f8f8e8d2 upstream.

If the pmd is soft dirty we must mark the pte as soft dirty (and not dirty).
This fixes some cases for guest migration with huge page backings.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.8
Fixes: bc29b7ac1d9f ("s390/mm: clean up pte/pmd encoding")
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Gerald Schaefer &lt;gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank &lt;frankja@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 528a9539348a0234375dfaa1ca5dbbb2f8f8e8d2 upstream.

If the pmd is soft dirty we must mark the pte as soft dirty (and not dirty).
This fixes some cases for guest migration with huge page backings.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.8
Fixes: bc29b7ac1d9f ("s390/mm: clean up pte/pmd encoding")
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Gerald Schaefer &lt;gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank &lt;frankja@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/setup: init jump labels before command line parsing</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:16:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Gorbik</name>
<email>gor@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-18T15:17:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0d62bc7e960f5b86ad8b57f9d39b3ea5fc8e4ad2'/>
<id>0d62bc7e960f5b86ad8b57f9d39b3ea5fc8e4ad2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 95e61b1b5d6394b53d147c0fcbe2ae70fbe09446 upstream.

Command line parameters might set static keys. This is true for s390 at
least since commit 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1
and init_on_free=1 boot options"). To avoid the following WARN:

static_key_enable_cpuslocked(): static key 'init_on_alloc+0x0/0x40' used
before call to jump_label_init()

call jump_label_init() just before parse_early_param().
jump_label_init() is safe to call multiple times (x86 does that), doesn't
do any memory allocations and hence should be safe to call that early.

Fixes: 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 5.3: d6df52e9996d: s390/maccess: add no DAT mode to kernel_write
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 5.3
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 95e61b1b5d6394b53d147c0fcbe2ae70fbe09446 upstream.

Command line parameters might set static keys. This is true for s390 at
least since commit 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1
and init_on_free=1 boot options"). To avoid the following WARN:

static_key_enable_cpuslocked(): static key 'init_on_alloc+0x0/0x40' used
before call to jump_label_init()

call jump_label_init() just before parse_early_param().
jump_label_init() is safe to call multiple times (x86 does that), doesn't
do any memory allocations and hence should be safe to call that early.

Fixes: 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 5.3: d6df52e9996d: s390/maccess: add no DAT mode to kernel_write
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 5.3
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARC: elf: use right ELF_ARCH</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:16:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vineet Gupta</name>
<email>vgupta@synopsys.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-27T21:18:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e6de7cbbcacb164f34d6263e44118df88621b420'/>
<id>e6de7cbbcacb164f34d6263e44118df88621b420</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b7faf971081a4e56147f082234bfff55135305cb upstream.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b7faf971081a4e56147f082234bfff55135305cb upstream.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARC: entry: fix potential EFA clobber when TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:16:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vineet Gupta</name>
<email>vgupta@synopsys.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-20T05:28:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=854827a2697a9e538fbe9b7f68ee9405d18bcc53'/>
<id>854827a2697a9e538fbe9b7f68ee9405d18bcc53</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 00fdec98d9881bf5173af09aebd353ab3b9ac729 upstream.

Trap handler for syscall tracing reads EFA (Exception Fault Address),
in case strace wants PC of trap instruction (EFA is not part of pt_regs
as of current code).

However this EFA read is racy as it happens after dropping to pure
kernel mode (re-enabling interrupts). A taken interrupt could
context-switch, trigger a different task's trap, clobbering EFA for this
execution context.

Fix this by reading EFA early, before re-enabling interrupts. A slight
side benefit is de-duplication of FAKE_RET_FROM_EXCPN in trap handler.
The trap handler is common to both ARCompact and ARCv2 builds too.

This just came out of code rework/review and no real problem was reported
but is clearly a potential problem specially for strace.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 00fdec98d9881bf5173af09aebd353ab3b9ac729 upstream.

Trap handler for syscall tracing reads EFA (Exception Fault Address),
in case strace wants PC of trap instruction (EFA is not part of pt_regs
as of current code).

However this EFA read is racy as it happens after dropping to pure
kernel mode (re-enabling interrupts). A taken interrupt could
context-switch, trigger a different task's trap, clobbering EFA for this
execution context.

Fix this by reading EFA early, before re-enabling interrupts. A slight
side benefit is de-duplication of FAKE_RET_FROM_EXCPN in trap handler.
The trap handler is common to both ARCompact and ARCv2 builds too.

This just came out of code rework/review and no real problem was reported
but is clearly a potential problem specially for strace.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: arm64: Fix kvm_reset_vcpu() return code being incorrect with SVE</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:16:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Price</name>
<email>steven.price@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-17T10:54:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=79aaeec71271edbf5971894d7b31122dde588802'/>
<id>79aaeec71271edbf5971894d7b31122dde588802</id>
<content type='text'>
If SVE is enabled then 'ret' can be assigned the return value of
kvm_vcpu_enable_sve() which may be 0 causing future "goto out" sites to
erroneously return 0 on failure rather than -EINVAL as expected.

Remove the initialisation of 'ret' and make setting the return value
explicit to avoid this situation in the future.

Fixes: 9a3cdf26e336 ("KVM: arm64/sve: Allow userspace to enable SVE for vcpus")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Price &lt;steven.price@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200617105456.28245-1-steven.price@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If SVE is enabled then 'ret' can be assigned the return value of
kvm_vcpu_enable_sve() which may be 0 causing future "goto out" sites to
erroneously return 0 on failure rather than -EINVAL as expected.

Remove the initialisation of 'ret' and make setting the return value
explicit to avoid this situation in the future.

Fixes: 9a3cdf26e336 ("KVM: arm64/sve: Allow userspace to enable SVE for vcpus")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Price &lt;steven.price@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200617105456.28245-1-steven.price@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Mark CR4.TSD as being possibly owned by the guest</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:16:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>sean.j.christopherson@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-03T04:04:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a494529add3f17ea983c5feb889b0281cea01f4b'/>
<id>a494529add3f17ea983c5feb889b0281cea01f4b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7c83d096aed055a7763a03384f92115363448b71 upstream.

Mark CR4.TSD as being possibly owned by the guest as that is indeed the
case on VMX.  Without TSD being tagged as possibly owned by the guest, a
targeted read of CR4 to get TSD could observe a stale value.  This bug
is benign in the current code base as the sole consumer of TSD is the
emulator (for RDTSC) and the emulator always "reads" the entirety of CR4
when grabbing bits.

Add a build-time assertion in to ensure VMX doesn't hand over more CR4
bits without also updating x86.

Fixes: 52ce3c21aec3 ("x86,kvm,vmx: Don't trap writes to CR4.TSD")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20200703040422.31536-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7c83d096aed055a7763a03384f92115363448b71 upstream.

Mark CR4.TSD as being possibly owned by the guest as that is indeed the
case on VMX.  Without TSD being tagged as possibly owned by the guest, a
targeted read of CR4 to get TSD could observe a stale value.  This bug
is benign in the current code base as the sole consumer of TSD is the
emulator (for RDTSC) and the emulator always "reads" the entirety of CR4
when grabbing bits.

Add a build-time assertion in to ensure VMX doesn't hand over more CR4
bits without also updating x86.

Fixes: 52ce3c21aec3 ("x86,kvm,vmx: Don't trap writes to CR4.TSD")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20200703040422.31536-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Inject #GP if guest attempts to toggle CR4.LA57 in 64-bit mode</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:16:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>sean.j.christopherson@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-03T02:17:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d29a79fa7559b1f081f58194a7452bf8f0d01531'/>
<id>d29a79fa7559b1f081f58194a7452bf8f0d01531</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d74fcfc1f0ff4b6c26ecef1f9e48d8089ab4eaac upstream.

Inject a #GP on MOV CR4 if CR4.LA57 is toggled in 64-bit mode, which is
illegal per Intel's SDM:

  CR4.LA57
    57-bit linear addresses (bit 12 of CR4) ... blah blah blah ...
    This bit cannot be modified in IA-32e mode.

Note, the pseudocode for MOV CR doesn't call out the fault condition,
which is likely why the check was missed during initial development.
This is arguably an SDM bug and will hopefully be fixed in future
release of the SDM.

Fixes: fd8cb433734ee ("KVM: MMU: Expose the LA57 feature to VM.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sebastien Boeuf &lt;sebastien.boeuf@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20200703021714.5549-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d74fcfc1f0ff4b6c26ecef1f9e48d8089ab4eaac upstream.

Inject a #GP on MOV CR4 if CR4.LA57 is toggled in 64-bit mode, which is
illegal per Intel's SDM:

  CR4.LA57
    57-bit linear addresses (bit 12 of CR4) ... blah blah blah ...
    This bit cannot be modified in IA-32e mode.

Note, the pseudocode for MOV CR doesn't call out the fault condition,
which is likely why the check was missed during initial development.
This is arguably an SDM bug and will hopefully be fixed in future
release of the SDM.

Fixes: fd8cb433734ee ("KVM: MMU: Expose the LA57 feature to VM.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sebastien Boeuf &lt;sebastien.boeuf@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20200703021714.5549-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: bit 8 of non-leaf PDPEs is not reserved</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:16:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-30T11:07:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3f108b1680022a4c7feb7b93d852f8fb24a116a6'/>
<id>3f108b1680022a4c7feb7b93d852f8fb24a116a6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5ecad245de2ae23dc4e2dbece92f8ccfbaed2fa7 upstream.

Bit 8 would be the "global" bit, which does not quite make sense for non-leaf
page table entries.  Intel ignores it; AMD ignores it in PDEs and PDPEs, but
reserves it in PML4Es.

Probably, earlier versions of the AMD manual documented it as reserved in PDPEs
as well, and that behavior made it into KVM as well as kvm-unit-tests; fix it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Nadav Amit &lt;namit@vmware.com&gt;
Fixes: a0c0feb57992 ("KVM: x86: reserve bit 8 of non-leaf PDPEs and PML4Es in 64-bit mode on AMD", 2014-09-03)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5ecad245de2ae23dc4e2dbece92f8ccfbaed2fa7 upstream.

Bit 8 would be the "global" bit, which does not quite make sense for non-leaf
page table entries.  Intel ignores it; AMD ignores it in PDEs and PDPEs, but
reserves it in PML4Es.

Probably, earlier versions of the AMD manual documented it as reserved in PDPEs
as well, and that behavior made it into KVM as well as kvm-unit-tests; fix it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Nadav Amit &lt;namit@vmware.com&gt;
Fixes: a0c0feb57992 ("KVM: x86: reserve bit 8 of non-leaf PDPEs and PML4Es in 64-bit mode on AMD", 2014-09-03)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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