<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch, branch v5.2.16</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/build: Add -Wnoaddress-of-packed-member to REALMODE_CFLAGS, to silence GCC9 build warning</title>
<updated>2019-09-19T07:11:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-28T08:56:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2508f833875c94e7ba4b4b2a33ccff1101cd2de8'/>
<id>2508f833875c94e7ba4b4b2a33ccff1101cd2de8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 42e0e95474fc6076b5cd68cab8fa0340a1797a72 upstream.

One of the very few warnings I have in the current build comes from
arch/x86/boot/edd.c, where I get the following with a gcc9 build:

   arch/x86/boot/edd.c: In function ‘query_edd’:
   arch/x86/boot/edd.c:148:11: warning: taking address of packed member of ‘struct boot_params’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Waddress-of-packed-member]
     148 |  mbrptr = boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buffer;
         |           ^~~~~~~~~~~

This warning triggers because we throw away all the CFLAGS and then make
a new set for REALMODE_CFLAGS, so the -Wno-address-of-packed-member we
added in the following commit is not present:

  6f303d60534c ("gcc-9: silence 'address-of-packed-member' warning")

The simplest solution for now is to adjust the warning for this version
of CFLAGS as well, but it would definitely make sense to examine whether
REALMODE_CFLAGS could be derived from CFLAGS, so that it picks up changes
in the compiler flags environment automatically.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 42e0e95474fc6076b5cd68cab8fa0340a1797a72 upstream.

One of the very few warnings I have in the current build comes from
arch/x86/boot/edd.c, where I get the following with a gcc9 build:

   arch/x86/boot/edd.c: In function ‘query_edd’:
   arch/x86/boot/edd.c:148:11: warning: taking address of packed member of ‘struct boot_params’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Waddress-of-packed-member]
     148 |  mbrptr = boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buffer;
         |           ^~~~~~~~~~~

This warning triggers because we throw away all the CFLAGS and then make
a new set for REALMODE_CFLAGS, so the -Wno-address-of-packed-member we
added in the following commit is not present:

  6f303d60534c ("gcc-9: silence 'address-of-packed-member' warning")

The simplest solution for now is to adjust the warning for this version
of CFLAGS as well, but it would definitely make sense to examine whether
REALMODE_CFLAGS could be derived from CFLAGS, so that it picks up changes
in the compiler flags environment automatically.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: SVM: Fix detection of AMD Errata 1096</title>
<updated>2019-09-19T07:11:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Liran Alon</name>
<email>liran.alon@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-16T23:56:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=657d4ca80d64c9868ec21d576e6e212b43c784ab'/>
<id>657d4ca80d64c9868ec21d576e6e212b43c784ab</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 118154bdf54ca79e4b5f3ce6d4a8a7c6b7c2c76f upstream.

When CPU raise #NPF on guest data access and guest CR4.SMAP=1, it is
possible that CPU microcode implementing DecodeAssist will fail
to read bytes of instruction which caused #NPF. This is AMD errata
1096 and it happens because CPU microcode reading instruction bytes
incorrectly attempts to read code as implicit supervisor-mode data
accesses (that is, just like it would read e.g. a TSS), which are
susceptible to SMAP faults. The microcode reads CS:RIP and if it is
a user-mode address according to the page tables, the processor
gives up and returns no instruction bytes.  In this case,
GuestIntrBytes field of the VMCB on a VMEXIT will incorrectly
return 0 instead of the correct guest instruction bytes.

Current KVM code attemps to detect and workaround this errata, but it
has multiple issues:

1) It mistakenly checks if guest CR4.SMAP=0 instead of guest CR4.SMAP=1,
which is required for encountering a SMAP fault.

2) It assumes SMAP faults can only occur when guest CPL==3.
However, in case guest CR4.SMEP=0, the guest can execute an instruction
which reside in a user-accessible page with CPL&lt;3 priviledge. If this
instruction raise a #NPF on it's data access, then CPU DecodeAssist
microcode will still encounter a SMAP violation.  Even though no sane
OS will do so (as it's an obvious priviledge escalation vulnerability),
we still need to handle this semanticly correct in KVM side.

Note that (2) *is* a useful optimization, because CR4.SMAP=1 is an easy
triggerable condition and guests usually enable SMAP together with SMEP.
If the vCPU has CR4.SMEP=1, the errata could indeed be encountered onlt
at guest CPL==3; otherwise, the CPU would raise a SMEP fault to guest
instead of #NPF.  We keep this condition to avoid false positives in
the detection of the errata.

In addition, to avoid future confusion and improve code readbility,
include details of the errata in code and not just in commit message.

Fixes: 05d5a4863525 ("KVM: SVM: Workaround errata#1096 (insn_len maybe zero on SMAP violation)")
Cc: Singh Brijesh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon &lt;liran.alon@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 118154bdf54ca79e4b5f3ce6d4a8a7c6b7c2c76f upstream.

When CPU raise #NPF on guest data access and guest CR4.SMAP=1, it is
possible that CPU microcode implementing DecodeAssist will fail
to read bytes of instruction which caused #NPF. This is AMD errata
1096 and it happens because CPU microcode reading instruction bytes
incorrectly attempts to read code as implicit supervisor-mode data
accesses (that is, just like it would read e.g. a TSS), which are
susceptible to SMAP faults. The microcode reads CS:RIP and if it is
a user-mode address according to the page tables, the processor
gives up and returns no instruction bytes.  In this case,
GuestIntrBytes field of the VMCB on a VMEXIT will incorrectly
return 0 instead of the correct guest instruction bytes.

Current KVM code attemps to detect and workaround this errata, but it
has multiple issues:

1) It mistakenly checks if guest CR4.SMAP=0 instead of guest CR4.SMAP=1,
which is required for encountering a SMAP fault.

2) It assumes SMAP faults can only occur when guest CPL==3.
However, in case guest CR4.SMEP=0, the guest can execute an instruction
which reside in a user-accessible page with CPL&lt;3 priviledge. If this
instruction raise a #NPF on it's data access, then CPU DecodeAssist
microcode will still encounter a SMAP violation.  Even though no sane
OS will do so (as it's an obvious priviledge escalation vulnerability),
we still need to handle this semanticly correct in KVM side.

Note that (2) *is* a useful optimization, because CR4.SMAP=1 is an easy
triggerable condition and guests usually enable SMAP together with SMEP.
If the vCPU has CR4.SMEP=1, the errata could indeed be encountered onlt
at guest CPL==3; otherwise, the CPU would raise a SMEP fault to guest
instead of #NPF.  We keep this condition to avoid false positives in
the detection of the errata.

In addition, to avoid future confusion and improve code readbility,
include details of the errata in code and not just in commit message.

Fixes: 05d5a4863525 ("KVM: SVM: Workaround errata#1096 (insn_len maybe zero on SMAP violation)")
Cc: Singh Brijesh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon &lt;liran.alon@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: nVMX: Remove unnecessary sync_roots from handle_invept</title>
<updated>2019-09-19T07:11:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jim Mattson</name>
<email>jmattson@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-13T16:16:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=54d782e7c86515926b841cff21ae019c8d221bc5'/>
<id>54d782e7c86515926b841cff21ae019c8d221bc5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b119019847fbcac36ed1384f166c91f177d070e7 upstream.

When L0 is executing handle_invept(), the TDP MMU is active. Emulating
an L1 INVEPT does require synchronizing the appropriate shadow EPT
root(s), but a call to kvm_mmu_sync_roots in this context won't do
that. Similarly, the hardware TLB and paging-structure-cache entries
associated with the appropriate shadow EPT root(s) must be flushed,
but requesting a TLB_FLUSH from this context won't do that either.

How did this ever work? KVM always does a sync_roots and TLB flush (in
the correct context) when transitioning from L1 to L2. That isn't the
best choice for nested VM performance, but it effectively papers over
the mistakes here.

Remove the unnecessary operations and leave a comment to try to do
better in the future.

Reported-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Fixes: bfd0a56b90005f ("nEPT: Nested INVEPT")
Cc: Xiao Guangrong &lt;xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Nadav Har'El &lt;nyh@il.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jun Nakajima &lt;jun.nakajima@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Xinhao Xu &lt;xinhao.xu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Yang Zhang &lt;yang.z.zhang@Intel.com&gt;
Cc: Gleb Natapov &lt;gleb@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by Peter Shier &lt;pshier@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b119019847fbcac36ed1384f166c91f177d070e7 upstream.

When L0 is executing handle_invept(), the TDP MMU is active. Emulating
an L1 INVEPT does require synchronizing the appropriate shadow EPT
root(s), but a call to kvm_mmu_sync_roots in this context won't do
that. Similarly, the hardware TLB and paging-structure-cache entries
associated with the appropriate shadow EPT root(s) must be flushed,
but requesting a TLB_FLUSH from this context won't do that either.

How did this ever work? KVM always does a sync_roots and TLB flush (in
the correct context) when transitioning from L1 to L2. That isn't the
best choice for nested VM performance, but it effectively papers over
the mistakes here.

Remove the unnecessary operations and leave a comment to try to do
better in the future.

Reported-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Fixes: bfd0a56b90005f ("nEPT: Nested INVEPT")
Cc: Xiao Guangrong &lt;xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Nadav Har'El &lt;nyh@il.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jun Nakajima &lt;jun.nakajima@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Xinhao Xu &lt;xinhao.xu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Yang Zhang &lt;yang.z.zhang@Intel.com&gt;
Cc: Gleb Natapov &lt;gleb@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by Peter Shier &lt;pshier@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Junaid Shahid &lt;junaids@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too</title>
<updated>2019-09-19T07:11:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-24T17:05:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5924bb61ac943a4224fde8a192ae6f361637fa80'/>
<id>5924bb61ac943a4224fde8a192ae6f361637fa80</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 980ef4d22a95a3cd84a9b8ffaa7b81b391d173c6 upstream.

Checking "SecureBoot" mode is not sufficient, also check "SetupMode".

Fixes: 399574c64eaf ("x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode")
Reported-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 980ef4d22a95a3cd84a9b8ffaa7b81b391d173c6 upstream.

Checking "SecureBoot" mode is not sufficient, also check "SetupMode".

Fixes: 399574c64eaf ("x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode")
Reported-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/boot: Use efi_setup_data for searching RSDP on kexec-ed kernels</title>
<updated>2019-09-19T07:11:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Junichi Nomura</name>
<email>j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-11T13:49:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c5699cc857a037773bbce4f6966d55c227b8436b'/>
<id>c5699cc857a037773bbce4f6966d55c227b8436b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0a23ebc66a46786769dd68bfdaa3102345819b9c upstream.

Commit

  3a63f70bf4c3a ("x86/boot: Early parse RSDP and save it in boot_params")

broke kexec boot on EFI systems. efi_get_rsdp_addr() in the early
parsing code tries to search RSDP from the EFI tables but that will
crash because the table address is virtual when the kernel was booted by
kexec (set_virtual_address_map() has run in the first kernel and cannot
be run again in the second kernel).

In the case of kexec, the physical address of EFI tables is provided via
efi_setup_data in boot_params, which is set up by kexec(1).

Factor out the table parsing code and use different pointers depending
on whether the kernel is booted by kexec or not.

 [ bp: Massage. ]

Fixes: 3a63f70bf4c3a ("x86/boot: Early parse RSDP and save it in boot_params")
Signed-off-by: Jun'ichi Nomura &lt;j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Tested-by: Dirk van der Merwe &lt;dirk.vandermerwe@netronome.com&gt;
Cc: Chao Fan &lt;fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190408231011.GA5402@jeru.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0a23ebc66a46786769dd68bfdaa3102345819b9c upstream.

Commit

  3a63f70bf4c3a ("x86/boot: Early parse RSDP and save it in boot_params")

broke kexec boot on EFI systems. efi_get_rsdp_addr() in the early
parsing code tries to search RSDP from the EFI tables but that will
crash because the table address is virtual when the kernel was booted by
kexec (set_virtual_address_map() has run in the first kernel and cannot
be run again in the second kernel).

In the case of kexec, the physical address of EFI tables is provided via
efi_setup_data in boot_params, which is set up by kexec(1).

Factor out the table parsing code and use different pointers depending
on whether the kernel is booted by kexec or not.

 [ bp: Massage. ]

Fixes: 3a63f70bf4c3a ("x86/boot: Early parse RSDP and save it in boot_params")
Signed-off-by: Jun'ichi Nomura &lt;j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Tested-by: Dirk van der Merwe &lt;dirk.vandermerwe@netronome.com&gt;
Cc: Chao Fan &lt;fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190408231011.GA5402@jeru.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Add barrier_nospec to raw_copy_in_user()</title>
<updated>2019-09-19T07:11:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Suraj Jitindar Singh</name>
<email>sjitindarsingh@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-06T01:10:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a9ce57d57155b21cc667d26f737231b420232a5c'/>
<id>a9ce57d57155b21cc667d26f737231b420232a5c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6fbcdd59094ade30db63f32316e9502425d7b256 upstream.

Commit ddf35cf3764b ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()")
Added barrier_nospec before loading from user-controlled pointers. The
intention was to order the load from the potentially user-controlled
pointer vs a previous branch based on an access_ok() check or similar.

In order to achieve the same result, add a barrier_nospec to the
raw_copy_in_user() function before loading from such a user-controlled
pointer.

Fixes: ddf35cf3764b ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()")
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh &lt;sjitindarsingh@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6fbcdd59094ade30db63f32316e9502425d7b256 upstream.

Commit ddf35cf3764b ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()")
Added barrier_nospec before loading from user-controlled pointers. The
intention was to order the load from the potentially user-controlled
pointer vs a previous branch based on an access_ok() check or similar.

In order to achieve the same result, add a barrier_nospec to the
raw_copy_in_user() function before loading from such a user-controlled
pointer.

Fixes: ddf35cf3764b ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()")
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh &lt;sjitindarsingh@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/purgatory: Change compiler flags from -mcmodel=kernel to -mcmodel=large to fix kexec relocation errors</title>
<updated>2019-09-19T07:11:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve Wahl</name>
<email>steve.wahl@hpe.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-05T20:23:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6876bd0c34c8d472f0fe889ad5c8af9b38534882'/>
<id>6876bd0c34c8d472f0fe889ad5c8af9b38534882</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e16c2983fba0fa6763e43ad10916be35e3d8dc05 upstream.

The last change to this Makefile caused relocation errors when loading
a kdump kernel.  Restore -mcmodel=large (not -mcmodel=kernel),
-ffreestanding, and -fno-zero-initialized-bsss, without reverting to
the former practice of resetting KBUILD_CFLAGS.

Purgatory.ro is a standalone binary that is not linked against the
rest of the kernel.  Its image is copied into an array that is linked
to the kernel, and from there kexec relocates it wherever it desires.

With the previous change to compiler flags, the error "kexec: Overflow
in relocation type 11 value 0x11fffd000" was encountered when trying
to load the crash kernel.  This is from kexec code trying to relocate
the purgatory.ro object.

From the error message, relocation type 11 is R_X86_64_32S.  The
x86_64 ABI says:

  "The R_X86_64_32 and R_X86_64_32S relocations truncate the
   computed value to 32-bits.  The linker must verify that the
   generated value for the R_X86_64_32 (R_X86_64_32S) relocation
   zero-extends (sign-extends) to the original 64-bit value."

This type of relocation doesn't work when kexec chooses to place the
purgatory binary in memory that is not reachable with 32 bit
addresses.

The compiler flag -mcmodel=kernel allows those type of relocations to
be emitted, so revert to using -mcmodel=large as was done before.

Also restore the -ffreestanding and -fno-zero-initialized-bss flags
because they are appropriate for a stand alone piece of object code
which doesn't explicitly zero the bss, and one other report has said
undefined symbols are encountered without -ffreestanding.

These identical compiler flag changes need to happen for every object
that becomes part of the purgatory.ro object, so gather them together
first into PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE and PURGATORY_CFLAGS, and then
apply them to each of the objects that have C source.  Do not apply
any of these flags to kexec-purgatory.o, which is not part of the
standalone object but part of the kernel proper.

Tested-by: Vaibhav Rustagi &lt;vaibhavrustagi@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andreas Smas &lt;andreas@lonelycoder.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve Wahl &lt;steve.wahl@hpe.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: None
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com
Cc: dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com
Cc: mike.travis@hpe.com
Cc: russ.anderson@hpe.com
Fixes: b059f801a937 ("x86/purgatory: Use CFLAGS_REMOVE rather than reset KBUILD_CFLAGS")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190905202346.GA26595@swahl-linux
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andreas Smas &lt;andreas@lonelycoder.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e16c2983fba0fa6763e43ad10916be35e3d8dc05 upstream.

The last change to this Makefile caused relocation errors when loading
a kdump kernel.  Restore -mcmodel=large (not -mcmodel=kernel),
-ffreestanding, and -fno-zero-initialized-bsss, without reverting to
the former practice of resetting KBUILD_CFLAGS.

Purgatory.ro is a standalone binary that is not linked against the
rest of the kernel.  Its image is copied into an array that is linked
to the kernel, and from there kexec relocates it wherever it desires.

With the previous change to compiler flags, the error "kexec: Overflow
in relocation type 11 value 0x11fffd000" was encountered when trying
to load the crash kernel.  This is from kexec code trying to relocate
the purgatory.ro object.

From the error message, relocation type 11 is R_X86_64_32S.  The
x86_64 ABI says:

  "The R_X86_64_32 and R_X86_64_32S relocations truncate the
   computed value to 32-bits.  The linker must verify that the
   generated value for the R_X86_64_32 (R_X86_64_32S) relocation
   zero-extends (sign-extends) to the original 64-bit value."

This type of relocation doesn't work when kexec chooses to place the
purgatory binary in memory that is not reachable with 32 bit
addresses.

The compiler flag -mcmodel=kernel allows those type of relocations to
be emitted, so revert to using -mcmodel=large as was done before.

Also restore the -ffreestanding and -fno-zero-initialized-bss flags
because they are appropriate for a stand alone piece of object code
which doesn't explicitly zero the bss, and one other report has said
undefined symbols are encountered without -ffreestanding.

These identical compiler flag changes need to happen for every object
that becomes part of the purgatory.ro object, so gather them together
first into PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE and PURGATORY_CFLAGS, and then
apply them to each of the objects that have C source.  Do not apply
any of these flags to kexec-purgatory.o, which is not part of the
standalone object but part of the kernel proper.

Tested-by: Vaibhav Rustagi &lt;vaibhavrustagi@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andreas Smas &lt;andreas@lonelycoder.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve Wahl &lt;steve.wahl@hpe.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: None
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com
Cc: dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com
Cc: mike.travis@hpe.com
Cc: russ.anderson@hpe.com
Fixes: b059f801a937 ("x86/purgatory: Use CFLAGS_REMOVE rather than reset KBUILD_CFLAGS")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190905202346.GA26595@swahl-linux
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andreas Smas &lt;andreas@lonelycoder.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: nVMX: handle page fault in vmread</title>
<updated>2019-09-19T07:11:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-13T22:26:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cc0feeebbb3fdb23fc857eb9737f34e441c69362'/>
<id>cc0feeebbb3fdb23fc857eb9737f34e441c69362</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f7eea636c3d505fe6f1d1066234f1aaf7171b681 upstream.

The implementation of vmread to memory is still incomplete, as it
lacks the ability to do vmread to I/O memory just like vmptrst.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f7eea636c3d505fe6f1d1066234f1aaf7171b681 upstream.

The implementation of vmread to memory is still incomplete, as it
lacks the ability to do vmread to I/O memory just like vmptrst.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86/mmu: Reintroduce fast invalidate/zap for flushing memslot</title>
<updated>2019-09-19T07:11:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>sean.j.christopherson@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-13T02:46:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9e8659bdca6680fc834a88214fcaf20f4ed843f8'/>
<id>9e8659bdca6680fc834a88214fcaf20f4ed843f8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 002c5f73c508f7df5681bda339831c27f3c1aef4 upstream.

James Harvey reported a livelock that was introduced by commit
d012a06ab1d23 ("Revert "KVM: x86/mmu: Zap only the relevant pages when
removing a memslot"").

The livelock occurs because kvm_mmu_zap_all() as it exists today will
voluntarily reschedule and drop KVM's mmu_lock, which allows other vCPUs
to add shadow pages.  With enough vCPUs, kvm_mmu_zap_all() can get stuck
in an infinite loop as it can never zap all pages before observing lock
contention or the need to reschedule.  The equivalent of kvm_mmu_zap_all()
that was in use at the time of the reverted commit (4e103134b8623, "KVM:
x86/mmu: Zap only the relevant pages when removing a memslot") employed
a fast invalidate mechanism and was not susceptible to the above livelock.

There are three ways to fix the livelock:

- Reverting the revert (commit d012a06ab1d23) is not a viable option as
  the revert is needed to fix a regression that occurs when the guest has
  one or more assigned devices.  It's unlikely we'll root cause the device
  assignment regression soon enough to fix the regression timely.

- Remove the conditional reschedule from kvm_mmu_zap_all().  However, although
  removing the reschedule would be a smaller code change, it's less safe
  in the sense that the resulting kvm_mmu_zap_all() hasn't been used in
  the wild for flushing memslots since the fast invalidate mechanism was
  introduced by commit 6ca18b6950f8d ("KVM: x86: use the fast way to
  invalidate all pages"), back in 2013.

- Reintroduce the fast invalidate mechanism and use it when zapping shadow
  pages in response to a memslot being deleted/moved, which is what this
  patch does.

For all intents and purposes, this is a revert of commit ea145aacf4ae8
("Revert "KVM: MMU: fast invalidate all pages"") and a partial revert of
commit 7390de1e99a70 ("Revert "KVM: x86: use the fast way to invalidate
all pages""), i.e. restores the behavior of commit 5304b8d37c2a5 ("KVM:
MMU: fast invalidate all pages") and commit 6ca18b6950f8d ("KVM: x86:
use the fast way to invalidate all pages") respectively.

Fixes: d012a06ab1d23 ("Revert "KVM: x86/mmu: Zap only the relevant pages when removing a memslot"")
Reported-by: James Harvey &lt;jamespharvey20@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alex Willamson &lt;alex.williamson@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 002c5f73c508f7df5681bda339831c27f3c1aef4 upstream.

James Harvey reported a livelock that was introduced by commit
d012a06ab1d23 ("Revert "KVM: x86/mmu: Zap only the relevant pages when
removing a memslot"").

The livelock occurs because kvm_mmu_zap_all() as it exists today will
voluntarily reschedule and drop KVM's mmu_lock, which allows other vCPUs
to add shadow pages.  With enough vCPUs, kvm_mmu_zap_all() can get stuck
in an infinite loop as it can never zap all pages before observing lock
contention or the need to reschedule.  The equivalent of kvm_mmu_zap_all()
that was in use at the time of the reverted commit (4e103134b8623, "KVM:
x86/mmu: Zap only the relevant pages when removing a memslot") employed
a fast invalidate mechanism and was not susceptible to the above livelock.

There are three ways to fix the livelock:

- Reverting the revert (commit d012a06ab1d23) is not a viable option as
  the revert is needed to fix a regression that occurs when the guest has
  one or more assigned devices.  It's unlikely we'll root cause the device
  assignment regression soon enough to fix the regression timely.

- Remove the conditional reschedule from kvm_mmu_zap_all().  However, although
  removing the reschedule would be a smaller code change, it's less safe
  in the sense that the resulting kvm_mmu_zap_all() hasn't been used in
  the wild for flushing memslots since the fast invalidate mechanism was
  introduced by commit 6ca18b6950f8d ("KVM: x86: use the fast way to
  invalidate all pages"), back in 2013.

- Reintroduce the fast invalidate mechanism and use it when zapping shadow
  pages in response to a memslot being deleted/moved, which is what this
  patch does.

For all intents and purposes, this is a revert of commit ea145aacf4ae8
("Revert "KVM: MMU: fast invalidate all pages"") and a partial revert of
commit 7390de1e99a70 ("Revert "KVM: x86: use the fast way to invalidate
all pages""), i.e. restores the behavior of commit 5304b8d37c2a5 ("KVM:
MMU: fast invalidate all pages") and commit 6ca18b6950f8d ("KVM: x86:
use the fast way to invalidate all pages") respectively.

Fixes: d012a06ab1d23 ("Revert "KVM: x86/mmu: Zap only the relevant pages when removing a memslot"")
Reported-by: James Harvey &lt;jamespharvey20@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alex Willamson &lt;alex.williamson@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: work around leak of uninitialized stack contents</title>
<updated>2019-09-19T07:10:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fuqian Huang</name>
<email>huangfq.daxian@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-12T04:18:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=db68c0c83a76012b7495469728391796399b4e3c'/>
<id>db68c0c83a76012b7495469728391796399b4e3c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 541ab2aeb28251bf7135c7961f3a6080eebcc705 upstream.

Emulation of VMPTRST can incorrectly inject a page fault
when passed an operand that points to an MMIO address.
The page fault will use uninitialized kernel stack memory
as the CR2 and error code.

The right behavior would be to abort the VM with a KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR
exit to userspace; however, it is not an easy fix, so for now just ensure
that the error code and CR2 are zero.

Signed-off-by: Fuqian Huang &lt;huangfq.daxian@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[add comment]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 541ab2aeb28251bf7135c7961f3a6080eebcc705 upstream.

Emulation of VMPTRST can incorrectly inject a page fault
when passed an operand that points to an MMIO address.
The page fault will use uninitialized kernel stack memory
as the CR2 and error code.

The right behavior would be to abort the VM with a KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR
exit to userspace; however, it is not an easy fix, so for now just ensure
that the error code and CR2 are zero.

Signed-off-by: Fuqian Huang &lt;huangfq.daxian@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[add comment]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
