<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch, branch v4.4.258</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>xen/arm: don't ignore return errors from set_phys_to_machine</title>
<updated>2021-02-23T12:58:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefano Stabellini</name>
<email>stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-15T07:53:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=57fbd8f535fb781f0547775097671c48c9485e79'/>
<id>57fbd8f535fb781f0547775097671c48c9485e79</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 36bf1dfb8b266e089afa9b7b984217f17027bf35 upstream.

set_phys_to_machine can fail due to lack of memory, see the kzalloc call
in arch/arm/xen/p2m.c:__set_phys_to_machine_multi.

Don't ignore the potential return error in set_foreign_p2m_mapping,
returning it to the caller instead.

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall &lt;jgrall@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 36bf1dfb8b266e089afa9b7b984217f17027bf35 upstream.

set_phys_to_machine can fail due to lack of memory, see the kzalloc call
in arch/arm/xen/p2m.c:__set_phys_to_machine_multi.

Don't ignore the potential return error in set_foreign_p2m_mapping,
returning it to the caller instead.

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall &lt;jgrall@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Xen/x86: also check kernel mapping in set_foreign_p2m_mapping()</title>
<updated>2021-02-23T12:58:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Beulich</name>
<email>jbeulich@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-15T07:50:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2e915736abc8478f754ed6b591af0d4d1385dd8b'/>
<id>2e915736abc8478f754ed6b591af0d4d1385dd8b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b512e1b077e5ccdbd6e225b15d934ab12453b70a upstream.

We should not set up further state if either mapping failed; paying
attention to just the user mapping's status isn't enough.

Also use GNTST_okay instead of implying its value (zero).

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b512e1b077e5ccdbd6e225b15d934ab12453b70a upstream.

We should not set up further state if either mapping failed; paying
attention to just the user mapping's status isn't enough.

Also use GNTST_okay instead of implying its value (zero).

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Xen/x86: don't bail early from clear_foreign_p2m_mapping()</title>
<updated>2021-02-23T12:58:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Beulich</name>
<email>jbeulich@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-15T07:49:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=15b6ca2cef13f06ef41d9ebc094ef7770fd98ab3'/>
<id>15b6ca2cef13f06ef41d9ebc094ef7770fd98ab3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a35f2ef3b7376bfd0a57f7844bd7454389aae1fc upstream.

Its sibling (set_foreign_p2m_mapping()) as well as the sibling of its
only caller (gnttab_map_refs()) don't clean up after themselves in case
of error. Higher level callers are expected to do so. However, in order
for that to really clean up any partially set up state, the operation
should not terminate upon encountering an entry in unexpected state. It
is particularly relevant to notice here that set_foreign_p2m_mapping()
would skip setting up a p2m entry if its grant mapping failed, but it
would continue to set up further p2m entries as long as their mappings
succeeded.

Arguably down the road set_foreign_p2m_mapping() may want its page state
related WARN_ON() also converted to an error return.

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a35f2ef3b7376bfd0a57f7844bd7454389aae1fc upstream.

Its sibling (set_foreign_p2m_mapping()) as well as the sibling of its
only caller (gnttab_map_refs()) don't clean up after themselves in case
of error. Higher level callers are expected to do so. However, in order
for that to really clean up any partially set up state, the operation
should not terminate upon encountering an entry in unexpected state. It
is particularly relevant to notice here that set_foreign_p2m_mapping()
would skip setting up a p2m entry if its grant mapping failed, but it
would continue to set up further p2m entries as long as their mappings
succeeded.

Arguably down the road set_foreign_p2m_mapping() may want its page state
related WARN_ON() also converted to an error return.

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/build: Disable CET instrumentation in the kernel for 32-bit too</title>
<updated>2021-02-23T12:58:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov</name>
<email>bp@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-08T15:43:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0769ec67ae0a37a1ae4bbcb709bcb20e7cbbffce'/>
<id>0769ec67ae0a37a1ae4bbcb709bcb20e7cbbffce</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 256b92af784d5043eeb7d559b6d5963dcc2ecb10 upstream.

Commit

  20bf2b378729 ("x86/build: Disable CET instrumentation in the kernel")

disabled CET instrumentation which gets added by default by the Ubuntu
gcc9 and 10 by default, but did that only for 64-bit builds. It would
still fail when building a 32-bit target. So disable CET for all x86
builds.

Fixes: 20bf2b378729 ("x86/build: Disable CET instrumentation in the kernel")
Reported-by: AC &lt;achirvasub@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: AC &lt;achirvasub@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YCCIgMHkzh/xT4ex@arch-chirva.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 256b92af784d5043eeb7d559b6d5963dcc2ecb10 upstream.

Commit

  20bf2b378729 ("x86/build: Disable CET instrumentation in the kernel")

disabled CET instrumentation which gets added by default by the Ubuntu
gcc9 and 10 by default, but did that only for 64-bit builds. It would
still fail when building a 32-bit target. So disable CET for all x86
builds.

Fixes: 20bf2b378729 ("x86/build: Disable CET instrumentation in the kernel")
Reported-by: AC &lt;achirvasub@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: AC &lt;achirvasub@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YCCIgMHkzh/xT4ex@arch-chirva.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>h8300: fix PREEMPTION build, TI_PRE_COUNT undefined</title>
<updated>2021-02-23T12:58:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-13T04:52:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3283cc99f1ba4bc887b9f0a923c5055bc0ab6bfd'/>
<id>3283cc99f1ba4bc887b9f0a923c5055bc0ab6bfd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ade9679c159d5bbe14fb7e59e97daf6062872e2b ]

Fix a build error for undefined 'TI_PRE_COUNT' by adding it to
asm-offsets.c.

  h8300-linux-ld: arch/h8300/kernel/entry.o: in function `resume_kernel': (.text+0x29a): undefined reference to `TI_PRE_COUNT'

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210212021650.22740-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Fixes: df2078b8daa7 ("h8300: Low level entry")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ade9679c159d5bbe14fb7e59e97daf6062872e2b ]

Fix a build error for undefined 'TI_PRE_COUNT' by adding it to
asm-offsets.c.

  h8300-linux-ld: arch/h8300/kernel/entry.o: in function `resume_kernel': (.text+0x29a): undefined reference to `TI_PRE_COUNT'

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210212021650.22740-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Fixes: df2078b8daa7 ("h8300: Low level entry")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/apic: Add extra serialization for non-serializing MSRs</title>
<updated>2021-02-10T08:07:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Hansen</name>
<email>dave.hansen@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-05T17:47:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=36e5fe7f7e2d7e78f3677d8ca0ff94766dda1df7'/>
<id>36e5fe7f7e2d7e78f3677d8ca0ff94766dda1df7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 25a068b8e9a4eb193d755d58efcb3c98928636e0 upstream.

Jan Kiszka reported that the x2apic_wrmsr_fence() function uses a plain
MFENCE while the Intel SDM (10.12.3 MSR Access in x2APIC Mode) calls for
MFENCE; LFENCE.

Short summary: we have special MSRs that have weaker ordering than all
the rest. Add fencing consistent with current SDM recommendations.

This is not known to cause any issues in practice, only in theory.

Longer story below:

The reason the kernel uses a different semantic is that the SDM changed
(roughly in late 2017). The SDM changed because folks at Intel were
auditing all of the recommended fences in the SDM and realized that the
x2apic fences were insufficient.

Why was the pain MFENCE judged insufficient?

WRMSR itself is normally a serializing instruction. No fences are needed
because the instruction itself serializes everything.

But, there are explicit exceptions for this serializing behavior written
into the WRMSR instruction documentation for two classes of MSRs:
IA32_TSC_DEADLINE and the X2APIC MSRs.

Back to x2apic: WRMSR is *not* serializing in this specific case.
But why is MFENCE insufficient? MFENCE makes writes visible, but
only affects load/store instructions. WRMSR is unfortunately not a
load/store instruction and is unaffected by MFENCE. This means that a
non-serializing WRMSR could be reordered by the CPU to execute before
the writes made visible by the MFENCE have even occurred in the first
place.

This means that an x2apic IPI could theoretically be triggered before
there is any (visible) data to process.

Does this affect anything in practice? I honestly don't know. It seems
quite possible that by the time an interrupt gets to consume the (not
yet) MFENCE'd data, it has become visible, mostly by accident.

To be safe, add the SDM-recommended fences for all x2apic WRMSRs.

This also leaves open the question of the _other_ weakly-ordered WRMSR:
MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE. While it has the same ordering architecture as
the x2APIC MSRs, it seems substantially less likely to be a problem in
practice. While writes to the in-memory Local Vector Table (LVT) might
theoretically be reordered with respect to a weakly-ordered WRMSR like
TSC_DEADLINE, the SDM has this to say:

  In x2APIC mode, the WRMSR instruction is used to write to the LVT
  entry. The processor ensures the ordering of this write and any
  subsequent WRMSR to the deadline; no fencing is required.

But, that might still leave xAPIC exposed. The safest thing to do for
now is to add the extra, recommended LFENCE.

 [ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos, drop accidentally added
   newline to tools/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h. ]

Reported-by: Jan Kiszka &lt;jan.kiszka@siemens.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305174708.F77040DD@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 25a068b8e9a4eb193d755d58efcb3c98928636e0 upstream.

Jan Kiszka reported that the x2apic_wrmsr_fence() function uses a plain
MFENCE while the Intel SDM (10.12.3 MSR Access in x2APIC Mode) calls for
MFENCE; LFENCE.

Short summary: we have special MSRs that have weaker ordering than all
the rest. Add fencing consistent with current SDM recommendations.

This is not known to cause any issues in practice, only in theory.

Longer story below:

The reason the kernel uses a different semantic is that the SDM changed
(roughly in late 2017). The SDM changed because folks at Intel were
auditing all of the recommended fences in the SDM and realized that the
x2apic fences were insufficient.

Why was the pain MFENCE judged insufficient?

WRMSR itself is normally a serializing instruction. No fences are needed
because the instruction itself serializes everything.

But, there are explicit exceptions for this serializing behavior written
into the WRMSR instruction documentation for two classes of MSRs:
IA32_TSC_DEADLINE and the X2APIC MSRs.

Back to x2apic: WRMSR is *not* serializing in this specific case.
But why is MFENCE insufficient? MFENCE makes writes visible, but
only affects load/store instructions. WRMSR is unfortunately not a
load/store instruction and is unaffected by MFENCE. This means that a
non-serializing WRMSR could be reordered by the CPU to execute before
the writes made visible by the MFENCE have even occurred in the first
place.

This means that an x2apic IPI could theoretically be triggered before
there is any (visible) data to process.

Does this affect anything in practice? I honestly don't know. It seems
quite possible that by the time an interrupt gets to consume the (not
yet) MFENCE'd data, it has become visible, mostly by accident.

To be safe, add the SDM-recommended fences for all x2apic WRMSRs.

This also leaves open the question of the _other_ weakly-ordered WRMSR:
MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE. While it has the same ordering architecture as
the x2APIC MSRs, it seems substantially less likely to be a problem in
practice. While writes to the in-memory Local Vector Table (LVT) might
theoretically be reordered with respect to a weakly-ordered WRMSR like
TSC_DEADLINE, the SDM has this to say:

  In x2APIC mode, the WRMSR instruction is used to write to the LVT
  entry. The processor ensures the ordering of this write and any
  subsequent WRMSR to the deadline; no fencing is required.

But, that might still leave xAPIC exposed. The safest thing to do for
now is to add the extra, recommended LFENCE.

 [ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos, drop accidentally added
   newline to tools/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h. ]

Reported-by: Jan Kiszka &lt;jan.kiszka@siemens.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305174708.F77040DD@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/build: Disable CET instrumentation in the kernel</title>
<updated>2021-02-10T08:07:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-28T21:52:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dee55c07b037429a8554e77bf1eff51bba9e39e1'/>
<id>dee55c07b037429a8554e77bf1eff51bba9e39e1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 20bf2b378729c4a0366a53e2018a0b70ace94bcd upstream.

With retpolines disabled, some configurations of GCC, and specifically
the GCC versions 9 and 10 in Ubuntu will add Intel CET instrumentation
to the kernel by default. That breaks certain tracing scenarios by
adding a superfluous ENDBR64 instruction before the fentry call, for
functions which can be called indirectly.

CET instrumentation isn't currently necessary in the kernel, as CET is
only supported in user space. Disable it unconditionally and move it
into the x86's Makefile as CET/CFI... enablement should be a per-arch
decision anyway.

 [ bp: Massage and extend commit message. ]

Fixes: 29be86d7f9cb ("kbuild: add -fcf-protection=none when using retpoline flags")
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nborisov@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nborisov@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nborisov@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Seth Forshee &lt;seth.forshee@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210128215219.6kct3h2eiustncws@treble
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 20bf2b378729c4a0366a53e2018a0b70ace94bcd upstream.

With retpolines disabled, some configurations of GCC, and specifically
the GCC versions 9 and 10 in Ubuntu will add Intel CET instrumentation
to the kernel by default. That breaks certain tracing scenarios by
adding a superfluous ENDBR64 instruction before the fentry call, for
functions which can be called indirectly.

CET instrumentation isn't currently necessary in the kernel, as CET is
only supported in user space. Disable it unconditionally and move it
into the x86's Makefile as CET/CFI... enablement should be a per-arch
decision anyway.

 [ bp: Massage and extend commit message. ]

Fixes: 29be86d7f9cb ("kbuild: add -fcf-protection=none when using retpoline flags")
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nborisov@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nborisov@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nborisov@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Seth Forshee &lt;seth.forshee@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210128215219.6kct3h2eiustncws@treble
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARM: footbridge: fix dc21285 PCI configuration accessors</title>
<updated>2021-02-10T08:07:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Russell King</name>
<email>rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-18T08:39:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7daa4d7c1c87248f2e7a638f261630769536d2a0'/>
<id>7daa4d7c1c87248f2e7a638f261630769536d2a0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 39d3454c3513840eb123b3913fda6903e45ce671 upstream.

Building with gcc 4.9.2 reveals a latent bug in the PCI accessors
for Footbridge platforms, which causes a fatal alignment fault
while accessing IO memory. Fix this by making the assembly volatile.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 39d3454c3513840eb123b3913fda6903e45ce671 upstream.

Building with gcc 4.9.2 reveals a latent bug in the PCI accessors
for Footbridge platforms, which causes a fatal alignment fault
while accessing IO memory. Fix this by making the assembly volatile.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ELF/MIPS build fix</title>
<updated>2021-02-10T08:07:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ralf Baechle</name>
<email>ralf@linux-mips.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-23T23:22:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eab1253fdecfa3391aad6f427ee7937ef85830ba'/>
<id>eab1253fdecfa3391aad6f427ee7937ef85830ba</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f43edca7ed08fc02279f2a62015da5cb6aa0ad61 upstream.

CONFIG_MIPS32_N32=y but CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF disabled results in the
following linker errors:

  arch/mips/built-in.o: In function `elf_core_dump':
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x23dbc): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x246e4): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_data_size'
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x248d0): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x24ac4): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_data'

CONFIG_MIPS32_O32=y but CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF disabled results in the following
linker errors:

  arch/mips/built-in.o: In function `elf_core_dump':
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x28a04): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x29330): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_data_size'
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x2951c): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x29710): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_data'

This is because binfmt_elfn32 and binfmt_elfo32 are using symbols from
elfcore but for these configurations elfcore will not be built.

Fixed by making elfcore selectable by a separate config symbol which
unlike the current mechanism can also be used from other directories
than kernel/, then having each flavor of ELF that relies on elfcore.o,
select it in Kconfig, including CONFIG_MIPS32_N32 and CONFIG_MIPS32_O32
which fixes this issue.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160520141705.GA1913@linux-mips.org
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: "Maciej W. Rozycki" &lt;macro@linux-mips.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f43edca7ed08fc02279f2a62015da5cb6aa0ad61 upstream.

CONFIG_MIPS32_N32=y but CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF disabled results in the
following linker errors:

  arch/mips/built-in.o: In function `elf_core_dump':
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x23dbc): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x246e4): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_data_size'
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x248d0): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfn32.c:(.text+0x24ac4): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_data'

CONFIG_MIPS32_O32=y but CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF disabled results in the following
linker errors:

  arch/mips/built-in.o: In function `elf_core_dump':
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x28a04): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x29330): undefined reference to `elf_core_extra_data_size'
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x2951c): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_phdrs'
  binfmt_elfo32.c:(.text+0x29710): undefined reference to `elf_core_write_extra_data'

This is because binfmt_elfn32 and binfmt_elfo32 are using symbols from
elfcore but for these configurations elfcore will not be built.

Fixed by making elfcore selectable by a separate config symbol which
unlike the current mechanism can also be used from other directories
than kernel/, then having each flavor of ELF that relies on elfcore.o,
select it in Kconfig, including CONFIG_MIPS32_N32 and CONFIG_MIPS32_O32
which fixes this issue.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160520141705.GA1913@linux-mips.org
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: "Maciej W. Rozycki" &lt;macro@linux-mips.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARM: imx: build suspend-imx6.S with arm instruction set</title>
<updated>2021-02-03T22:16:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Max Krummenacher</name>
<email>max.oss.09@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-11T15:17:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=73acc9bd999ec0a50ea07284fd982341df7b5e45'/>
<id>73acc9bd999ec0a50ea07284fd982341df7b5e45</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a88afa46b86ff461c89cc33fc3a45267fff053e8 upstream.

When the kernel is configured to use the Thumb-2 instruction set
"suspend-to-memory" fails to resume. Observed on a Colibri iMX6ULL
(i.MX 6ULL) and Apalis iMX6 (i.MX 6Q).

It looks like the CPU resumes unconditionally in ARM instruction mode
and then chokes on the presented Thumb-2 code it should execute.

Fix this by using the arm instruction set for all code in
suspend-imx6.S.

Signed-off-by: Max Krummenacher &lt;max.krummenacher@toradex.com&gt;
Fixes: df595746fa69 ("ARM: imx: add suspend in ocram support for i.mx6q")
Acked-by: Oleksandr Suvorov &lt;oleksandr.suvorov@toradex.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo &lt;shawnguo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a88afa46b86ff461c89cc33fc3a45267fff053e8 upstream.

When the kernel is configured to use the Thumb-2 instruction set
"suspend-to-memory" fails to resume. Observed on a Colibri iMX6ULL
(i.MX 6ULL) and Apalis iMX6 (i.MX 6Q).

It looks like the CPU resumes unconditionally in ARM instruction mode
and then chokes on the presented Thumb-2 code it should execute.

Fix this by using the arm instruction set for all code in
suspend-imx6.S.

Signed-off-by: Max Krummenacher &lt;max.krummenacher@toradex.com&gt;
Fixes: df595746fa69 ("ARM: imx: add suspend in ocram support for i.mx6q")
Acked-by: Oleksandr Suvorov &lt;oleksandr.suvorov@toradex.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo &lt;shawnguo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
