linux-stable.git/arch, branch v4.4.112

x86/alternatives: Add missing '\n' at end of ALTERNATIVE inline asm

2018-01-17T08:35:33+00:00

commit b9e705ef7cfaf22db0daab91ad3cd33b0fa32eb9 upstream.

Where an ALTERNATIVE is used in the middle of an inline asm block, this
would otherwise lead to the following instruction being appended directly
to the trailing ".popsection", and a failed compile.

Fixes: 9cebed423c84 ("x86, alternative: Use .pushsection/.popsection")
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: Tim Chen 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Paul Turner 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180104143710.8961-8-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking

2018-01-17T08:35:33+00:00

commit 612e8e9350fd19cae6900cf36ea0c6892d1a0dca upstream.

The alternatives code checks only the first byte whether it is a NOP, but
with NOPs in front of the payload and having actual instructions after it
breaks the "optimized' test.

Make sure to scan all bytes before deciding to optimize the NOPs in there.

Reported-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Tom Lendacky 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Tim Chen 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Andrew Lutomirski 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Paul Turner 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110112815.mgciyf5acwacphkq@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions

2018-01-17T08:35:33+00:00

commit 61dc0f555b5c761cdafb0ba5bd41ecf22d68a4c4 upstream.

Implement the CPU vulnerabilty show functions for meltdown, spectre_v1 and
spectre_v2.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: David Woodhouse 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.177414879@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/cpu: Merge bugs.c and bugs_64.c

2018-01-17T08:35:32+00:00

commit 62a67e123e058a67db58bc6a14354dd037bafd0a upstream.

Should be easier when following boot paths. It probably is a left over
from the x86 unification eons ago.

No functionality change.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brian Gerst 
Cc: Denys Vlasenko 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161024173844.23038-3-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Razvan Ghitulete 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12]

2018-01-17T08:35:32+00:00

commit 99c6fa2511d8a683e61468be91b83f85452115fa upstream.

Add the bug bits for spectre v1/2 and force them unconditionally for all
cpus.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Tim Chen 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Paul Turner 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515239374-23361-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Razvan Ghitulete 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN

2018-01-17T08:35:32+00:00

commit de791821c295cc61419a06fe5562288417d1bc58 upstream.

Use the name associated with the particular attack which needs page table
isolation for mitigation.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Acked-by: David Woodhouse 
Cc: Alan Cox 
Cc: Jiri Koshina 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Tim Chen 
Cc: Andi Lutomirski  
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Paul Turner 
Cc: Tom Lendacky 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801051525300.1724@nanos
Signed-off-by: Razvan Ghitulete 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE

2018-01-17T08:35:32+00:00

commit a89f040fa34ec9cd682aed98b8f04e3c47d998bd upstream.

Many x86 CPUs leak information to user space due to missing isolation of
user space and kernel space page tables. There are many well documented
ways to exploit that.

The upcoming software migitation of isolating the user and kernel space
page tables needs a misfeature flag so code can be made runtime
conditional.

Add the BUG bits which indicates that the CPU is affected and add a feature
bit which indicates that the software migitation is enabled.

Assume for now that _ALL_ x86 CPUs are affected by this. Exceptions can be
made later.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brian Gerst 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: David Laight 
Cc: Denys Vlasenko 
Cc: Eduardo Valentin 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky

2018-01-17T08:35:32+00:00

commit 6cbd2171e89b13377261d15e64384df60ecb530e upstream.

There is currently no way to force CPU bug bits like CPU feature bits. That
makes it impossible to set a bug bit once at boot and have it stick for all
upcoming CPUs.

Extend the force set/clear arrays to handle bug bits as well.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brian Gerst 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: David Laight 
Cc: Denys Vlasenko 
Cc: Eduardo Valentin 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.992156574@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/cpu: Factor out application of forced CPU caps

2018-01-17T08:35:32+00:00

commit 8bf1ebca215c262e48c15a4a15f175991776f57f upstream.

There are multiple call sites that apply forced CPU caps.  Factor
them into a helper.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brian Gerst 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Fenghua Yu 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Matthew Whitehead 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: One Thousand Gnomes 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/623ff7555488122143e4417de09b18be2085ad06.1484705016.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kaiser: Set _PAGE_NX only if supported

2018-01-17T08:35:30+00:00

This finally resolve crash if loaded under qemu + haxm. Haitao Shan pointed
out that the reason of that crash is that NX bit get set for page tables.
It seems we missed checking if _PAGE_NX is supported in kaiser_add_user_map

Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/kernel/msg2689835.html

Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck 
Signed-off-by: Lepton Wu 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman