<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch, branch v3.2.92</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm/32: Set the '__vmalloc_start_set' flag in initmem_init()</title>
<updated>2017-08-26T01:14:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Laura Abbott</name>
<email>labbott@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-08T21:23:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=408ab21ebbf0c95946502005327a173a475c025c'/>
<id>408ab21ebbf0c95946502005327a173a475c025c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 861ce4a3244c21b0af64f880d5bfe5e6e2fb9e4a upstream.

'__vmalloc_start_set' currently only gets set in initmem_init() when
!CONFIG_NEED_MULTIPLE_NODES. This breaks detection of vmalloc address
with virt_addr_valid() with CONFIG_NEED_MULTIPLE_NODES=y, causing
a kernel crash:

  [mm/usercopy] 517e1fbeb6: kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:78!

Set '__vmalloc_start_set' appropriately for that case as well.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: dc16ecf7fd1f ("x86-32: use specific __vmalloc_start_set flag in __virt_addr_valid")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1494278596-30373-1-git-send-email-labbott@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 861ce4a3244c21b0af64f880d5bfe5e6e2fb9e4a upstream.

'__vmalloc_start_set' currently only gets set in initmem_init() when
!CONFIG_NEED_MULTIPLE_NODES. This breaks detection of vmalloc address
with virt_addr_valid() with CONFIG_NEED_MULTIPLE_NODES=y, causing
a kernel crash:

  [mm/usercopy] 517e1fbeb6: kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:78!

Set '__vmalloc_start_set' appropriately for that case as well.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: dc16ecf7fd1f ("x86-32: use specific __vmalloc_start_set flag in __virt_addr_valid")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1494278596-30373-1-git-send-email-labbott@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>um: Fix PTRACE_POKEUSER on x86_64</title>
<updated>2017-08-26T01:14:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Weinberger</name>
<email>richard@nod.at</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-31T22:41:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c58b2c46505568ac70aadffc338a7a90272c6d4b'/>
<id>c58b2c46505568ac70aadffc338a7a90272c6d4b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9abc74a22d85ab29cef9896a2582a530da7e79bf upstream.

This is broken since ever but sadly nobody noticed.
Recent versions of GDB set DR_CONTROL unconditionally and
UML dies due to a heap corruption. It turns out that
the PTRACE_POKEUSER was copy&amp;pasted from i386 and assumes
that addresses are 4 bytes long.

Fix that by using 8 as address size in the calculation.

Reported-by: jie cao &lt;cj3054@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9abc74a22d85ab29cef9896a2582a530da7e79bf upstream.

This is broken since ever but sadly nobody noticed.
Recent versions of GDB set DR_CONTROL unconditionally and
UML dies due to a heap corruption. It turns out that
the PTRACE_POKEUSER was copy&amp;pasted from i386 and assumes
that addresses are 4 bytes long.

Fix that by using 8 as address size in the calculation.

Reported-by: jie cao &lt;cj3054@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: ethernet: ucc_geth: fix MEM_PART_MURAM mode</title>
<updated>2017-08-26T01:14:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@c-s.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-07T09:05:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=36c08d834f3d2a3b0b4c897105dd12e7c0c25217'/>
<id>36c08d834f3d2a3b0b4c897105dd12e7c0c25217</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8b8642af15ed14b9a7a34d3401afbcc274533e13 upstream.

Since commit 5093bb965a163 ("powerpc/QE: switch to the cpm_muram
implementation"), muram area is not part of immrbar mapping anymore
so immrbar_virt_to_phys() is not usable anymore.

Fixes: 5093bb965a163 ("powerpc/QE: switch to the cpm_muram implementation")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@c-s.fr&gt;
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Acked-by: Li Yang &lt;pku.leo@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood &lt;oss@buserror.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8b8642af15ed14b9a7a34d3401afbcc274533e13 upstream.

Since commit 5093bb965a163 ("powerpc/QE: switch to the cpm_muram
implementation"), muram area is not part of immrbar mapping anymore
so immrbar_virt_to_phys() is not usable anymore.

Fixes: 5093bb965a163 ("powerpc/QE: switch to the cpm_muram implementation")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@c-s.fr&gt;
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Acked-by: Li Yang &lt;pku.leo@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood &lt;oss@buserror.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/boot: Fix BSS corruption/overwrite bug in early x86 kernel startup</title>
<updated>2017-08-26T01:14:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashish Kalra</name>
<email>ashish@bluestacks.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-19T15:20:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=85763352fb2513a415a4d12208832f1c9012e410'/>
<id>85763352fb2513a415a4d12208832f1c9012e410</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d594aa0277e541bb997aef0bc0a55172d8138340 upstream.

The minimum size for a new stack (512 bytes) setup for arch/x86/boot components
when the bootloader does not setup/provide a stack for the early boot components
is not "enough".

The setup code executing as part of early kernel startup code, uses the stack
beyond 512 bytes and accidentally overwrites and corrupts part of the BSS
section. This is exposed mostly in the early video setup code, where
it was corrupting BSS variables like force_x, force_y, which in-turn affected
kernel parameters such as screen_info (screen_info.orig_video_cols) and
later caused an exception/panic in console_init().

Most recent boot loaders setup the stack for early boot components, so this
stack overwriting into BSS section issue has not been exposed.

Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish@bluestacks.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170419152015.10011-1-ashishkalra@Ashishs-MacBook-Pro.local
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d594aa0277e541bb997aef0bc0a55172d8138340 upstream.

The minimum size for a new stack (512 bytes) setup for arch/x86/boot components
when the bootloader does not setup/provide a stack for the early boot components
is not "enough".

The setup code executing as part of early kernel startup code, uses the stack
beyond 512 bytes and accidentally overwrites and corrupts part of the BSS
section. This is exposed mostly in the early video setup code, where
it was corrupting BSS variables like force_x, force_y, which in-turn affected
kernel parameters such as screen_info (screen_info.orig_video_cols) and
later caused an exception/panic in console_init().

Most recent boot loaders setup the stack for early boot components, so this
stack overwriting into BSS section issue has not been exposed.

Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish@bluestacks.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170419152015.10011-1-ashishkalra@Ashishs-MacBook-Pro.local
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-05T16:39:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b8f254aa17f720053054c4ecff3920973a83b9d6'/>
<id>b8f254aa17f720053054c4ecff3920973a83b9d6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a4866aa812518ed1a37d8ea0c881dc946409de94 upstream.

Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:

usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)

This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.

Reported-by: Tommi Rantala &lt;tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala &lt;tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a4866aa812518ed1a37d8ea0c881dc946409de94 upstream.

Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:

usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)

This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.

Reported-by: Tommi Rantala &lt;tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala &lt;tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm/init.c: Fix devmem_is_allowed() off by one</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>T Makphaibulchoke</name>
<email>tmac@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-08-29T03:21:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f95fb77e908a1efa2772f2155d1db87ca6664d67'/>
<id>f95fb77e908a1efa2772f2155d1db87ca6664d67</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 73e8f3d7e2cb23614d5115703d76d8e54764b641 upstream.

Fixing an off-by-one error in devmem_is_allowed(), which allows
accesses to physical addresses 0x100000-0x100fff, an extra page
past 1MB.

Signed-off-by: T Makphaibulchoke &lt;tmac@hp.com&gt;
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: yinghai@kernel.org
Cc: tiwai@suse.de
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1346210503-14276-1-git-send-email-tmac@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 73e8f3d7e2cb23614d5115703d76d8e54764b641 upstream.

Fixing an off-by-one error in devmem_is_allowed(), which allows
accesses to physical addresses 0x100000-0x100fff, an extra page
past 1MB.

Signed-off-by: T Makphaibulchoke &lt;tmac@hp.com&gt;
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: yinghai@kernel.org
Cc: tiwai@suse.de
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1346210503-14276-1-git-send-email-tmac@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace/x86: Fix triple fault with graph tracing and suspend-to-ram</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-13T22:53:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1883b91bdc805050e8240f9f0a642b68ca29430f'/>
<id>1883b91bdc805050e8240f9f0a642b68ca29430f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 34a477e5297cbaa6ecc6e17c042a866e1cbe80d6 upstream.

On x86-32, with CONFIG_FIRMWARE and multiple CPUs, if you enable function
graph tracing and then suspend to RAM, it will triple fault and reboot when
it resumes.

The first fault happens when booting a secondary CPU:

startup_32_smp()
  load_ucode_ap()
    prepare_ftrace_return()
      ftrace_graph_is_dead()
        (accesses 'kill_ftrace_graph')

The early head_32.S code calls into load_ucode_ap(), which has an an
ftrace hook, so it calls prepare_ftrace_return(), which calls
ftrace_graph_is_dead(), which tries to access the global
'kill_ftrace_graph' variable with a virtual address, causing a fault
because the CPU is still in real mode.

The fix is to add a check in prepare_ftrace_return() to make sure it's
running in protected mode before continuing.  The check makes sure the
stack pointer is a virtual kernel address.  It's a bit of a hack, but
it's not very intrusive and it works well enough.

For reference, here are a few other (more difficult) ways this could
have potentially been fixed:

- Move startup_32_smp()'s call to load_ucode_ap() down to *after* paging
  is enabled.  (No idea what that would break.)

- Track down load_ucode_ap()'s entire callee tree and mark all the
  functions 'notrace'.  (Probably not realistic.)

- Pause graph tracing in ftrace_suspend_notifier_call() or bringup_cpu()
  or __cpu_up(), and ensure that the pause facility can be queried from
  real mode.

Reported-by: Paul Menzel &lt;pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paul Menzel &lt;pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Len Brown &lt;lenb@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c1272269a580660703ed2eccf44308e790c7a98.1492123841.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 34a477e5297cbaa6ecc6e17c042a866e1cbe80d6 upstream.

On x86-32, with CONFIG_FIRMWARE and multiple CPUs, if you enable function
graph tracing and then suspend to RAM, it will triple fault and reboot when
it resumes.

The first fault happens when booting a secondary CPU:

startup_32_smp()
  load_ucode_ap()
    prepare_ftrace_return()
      ftrace_graph_is_dead()
        (accesses 'kill_ftrace_graph')

The early head_32.S code calls into load_ucode_ap(), which has an an
ftrace hook, so it calls prepare_ftrace_return(), which calls
ftrace_graph_is_dead(), which tries to access the global
'kill_ftrace_graph' variable with a virtual address, causing a fault
because the CPU is still in real mode.

The fix is to add a check in prepare_ftrace_return() to make sure it's
running in protected mode before continuing.  The check makes sure the
stack pointer is a virtual kernel address.  It's a bit of a hack, but
it's not very intrusive and it works well enough.

For reference, here are a few other (more difficult) ways this could
have potentially been fixed:

- Move startup_32_smp()'s call to load_ucode_ap() down to *after* paging
  is enabled.  (No idea what that would break.)

- Track down load_ucode_ap()'s entire callee tree and mark all the
  functions 'notrace'.  (Probably not realistic.)

- Pause graph tracing in ftrace_suspend_notifier_call() or bringup_cpu()
  or __cpu_up(), and ensure that the pause facility can be queried from
  real mode.

Reported-by: Paul Menzel &lt;pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paul Menzel &lt;pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Len Brown &lt;lenb@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c1272269a580660703ed2eccf44308e790c7a98.1492123841.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>MIPS: KGDB: Use kernel context for sleeping threads</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Hogan</name>
<email>james.hogan@imgtec.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-30T15:06:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c38cb25bdc9cdb7579dc9923ae204381fbaa9eaf'/>
<id>c38cb25bdc9cdb7579dc9923ae204381fbaa9eaf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 162b270c664dca2e0944308e92f9fcc887151a72 upstream.

KGDB is a kernel debug stub and it can't be used to debug userland as it
can only safely access kernel memory.

On MIPS however KGDB has always got the register state of sleeping
processes from the userland register context at the beginning of the
kernel stack. This is meaningless for kernel threads (which never enter
userland), and for user threads it prevents the user seeing what it is
doing while in the kernel:

(gdb) info threads
  Id   Target Id         Frame
  ...
  3    Thread 2 (kthreadd) 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
  2    Thread 1 (init)   0x000000007705c4b4 in ?? ()
  1    Thread -2 (shadowCPU0) 0xffffffff8012524c in arch_kgdb_breakpoint () at arch/mips/kernel/kgdb.c:201

Get the register state instead from the (partial) kernel register
context stored in the task's thread_struct for resume() to restore. All
threads now correctly appear to be in context_switch():

(gdb) info threads
  Id   Target Id         Frame
  ...
  3    Thread 2 (kthreadd) context_switch (rq=&lt;optimized out&gt;, cookie=..., next=&lt;optimized out&gt;, prev=0x0) at kernel/sched/core.c:2903
  2    Thread 1 (init)   context_switch (rq=&lt;optimized out&gt;, cookie=..., next=&lt;optimized out&gt;, prev=0x0) at kernel/sched/core.c:2903
  1    Thread -2 (shadowCPU0) 0xffffffff8012524c in arch_kgdb_breakpoint () at arch/mips/kernel/kgdb.c:201

Call clobbered registers which aren't saved and exception registers
(BadVAddr &amp; Cause) which can't be easily determined without stack
unwinding are reported as 0. The PC is taken from the return address,
such that the state presented matches that found immediately after
returning from resume().

Fixes: 8854700115ec ("[MIPS] kgdb: add arch support for the kernel's kgdb core")
Signed-off-by: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Wessel &lt;jason.wessel@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/15829/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 162b270c664dca2e0944308e92f9fcc887151a72 upstream.

KGDB is a kernel debug stub and it can't be used to debug userland as it
can only safely access kernel memory.

On MIPS however KGDB has always got the register state of sleeping
processes from the userland register context at the beginning of the
kernel stack. This is meaningless for kernel threads (which never enter
userland), and for user threads it prevents the user seeing what it is
doing while in the kernel:

(gdb) info threads
  Id   Target Id         Frame
  ...
  3    Thread 2 (kthreadd) 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
  2    Thread 1 (init)   0x000000007705c4b4 in ?? ()
  1    Thread -2 (shadowCPU0) 0xffffffff8012524c in arch_kgdb_breakpoint () at arch/mips/kernel/kgdb.c:201

Get the register state instead from the (partial) kernel register
context stored in the task's thread_struct for resume() to restore. All
threads now correctly appear to be in context_switch():

(gdb) info threads
  Id   Target Id         Frame
  ...
  3    Thread 2 (kthreadd) context_switch (rq=&lt;optimized out&gt;, cookie=..., next=&lt;optimized out&gt;, prev=0x0) at kernel/sched/core.c:2903
  2    Thread 1 (init)   context_switch (rq=&lt;optimized out&gt;, cookie=..., next=&lt;optimized out&gt;, prev=0x0) at kernel/sched/core.c:2903
  1    Thread -2 (shadowCPU0) 0xffffffff8012524c in arch_kgdb_breakpoint () at arch/mips/kernel/kgdb.c:201

Call clobbered registers which aren't saved and exception registers
(BadVAddr &amp; Cause) which can't be easily determined without stack
unwinding are reported as 0. The PC is taken from the return address,
such that the state presented matches that found immediately after
returning from resume().

Fixes: 8854700115ec ("[MIPS] kgdb: add arch support for the kernel's kgdb core")
Signed-off-by: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Wessel &lt;jason.wessel@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/15829/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/vdso: Plug race between mapping and ELF header setup</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-10T15:14:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=df1c5dfda0b4ed3aa39b4450a2f67c4239d8fde4'/>
<id>df1c5dfda0b4ed3aa39b4450a2f67c4239d8fde4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6fdc6dd90272ce7e75d744f71535cfbd8d77da81 upstream.

The vsyscall32 sysctl can racy against a concurrent fork when it switches
from disabled to enabled:

    arch_setup_additional_pages()
	if (vdso32_enabled)
           --&gt; No mapping
                                        sysctl.vsysscall32()
                                          --&gt; vdso32_enabled = true
    create_elf_tables()
      ARCH_DLINFO_IA32
        if (vdso32_enabled) {
           --&gt; Add VDSO entry with NULL pointer

Make ARCH_DLINFO_IA32 check whether the VDSO mapping has been set up for
the newly forked process or not.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170410151723.602367196@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: change the flag passed to ARCH_DLINFO_IA32()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6fdc6dd90272ce7e75d744f71535cfbd8d77da81 upstream.

The vsyscall32 sysctl can racy against a concurrent fork when it switches
from disabled to enabled:

    arch_setup_additional_pages()
	if (vdso32_enabled)
           --&gt; No mapping
                                        sysctl.vsysscall32()
                                          --&gt; vdso32_enabled = true
    create_elf_tables()
      ARCH_DLINFO_IA32
        if (vdso32_enabled) {
           --&gt; Add VDSO entry with NULL pointer

Make ARCH_DLINFO_IA32 check whether the VDSO mapping has been set up for
the newly forked process or not.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170410151723.602367196@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: change the flag passed to ARCH_DLINFO_IA32()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Don't try to fix up misaligned load-with-reservation instructions</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Mackerras</name>
<email>paulus@ozlabs.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-04T04:56:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dda727efc6640aa5d084ae0c2f6eeabdd6710259'/>
<id>dda727efc6640aa5d084ae0c2f6eeabdd6710259</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 48fe9e9488743eec9b7c1addd3c93f12f2123d54 upstream.

In the past, there was only one load-with-reservation instruction,
lwarx, and if a program attempted a lwarx on a misaligned address, it
would take an alignment interrupt and the kernel handler would emulate
it as though it was lwzx, which was not really correct, but benign since
it is loading the right amount of data, and the lwarx should be paired
with a stwcx. to the same address, which would also cause an alignment
interrupt which would result in a SIGBUS being delivered to the process.

We now have 5 different sizes of load-with-reservation instruction. Of
those, lharx and ldarx cause an immediate SIGBUS by luck since their
entries in aligninfo[] overlap instructions which were not fixed up, but
lqarx overlaps with lhz and will be emulated as such. lbarx can never
generate an alignment interrupt since it only operates on 1 byte.

To straighten this out and fix the lqarx case, this adds code to detect
the l[hwdq]arx instructions and return without fixing them up, resulting
in a SIGBUS being delivered to the process.

Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: open-code get_xop()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 48fe9e9488743eec9b7c1addd3c93f12f2123d54 upstream.

In the past, there was only one load-with-reservation instruction,
lwarx, and if a program attempted a lwarx on a misaligned address, it
would take an alignment interrupt and the kernel handler would emulate
it as though it was lwzx, which was not really correct, but benign since
it is loading the right amount of data, and the lwarx should be paired
with a stwcx. to the same address, which would also cause an alignment
interrupt which would result in a SIGBUS being delivered to the process.

We now have 5 different sizes of load-with-reservation instruction. Of
those, lharx and ldarx cause an immediate SIGBUS by luck since their
entries in aligninfo[] overlap instructions which were not fixed up, but
lqarx overlaps with lhz and will be emulated as such. lbarx can never
generate an alignment interrupt since it only operates on 1 byte.

To straighten this out and fix the lqarx case, this adds code to detect
the l[hwdq]arx instructions and return without fixing them up, resulting
in a SIGBUS being delivered to the process.

Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: open-code get_xop()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
