<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch, branch v3.18.88</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>arm: KVM: Fix VTTBR_BADDR_MASK BUG_ON off-by-one</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:32:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Zyngier</name>
<email>marc.zyngier@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-16T17:58:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8492c95e430d40e67057f7e626aba6a50b2ccdf6'/>
<id>8492c95e430d40e67057f7e626aba6a50b2ccdf6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5553b142be11e794ebc0805950b2e8313f93d718 upstream.

VTTBR_BADDR_MASK is used to sanity check the size and alignment of the
VTTBR address. It seems to currently be off by one, thereby only
allowing up to 39-bit addresses (instead of 40-bit) and also
insufficiently checking the alignment. This patch fixes it.

This patch is the 32bit pendent of Kristina's arm64 fix, and
she deserves the actual kudos for pinpointing that one.

Fixes: f7ed45be3ba52 ("KVM: ARM: World-switch implementation")
Reported-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5553b142be11e794ebc0805950b2e8313f93d718 upstream.

VTTBR_BADDR_MASK is used to sanity check the size and alignment of the
VTTBR address. It seems to currently be off by one, thereby only
allowing up to 39-bit addresses (instead of 40-bit) and also
insufficiently checking the alignment. This patch fixes it.

This patch is the 32bit pendent of Kristina's arm64 fix, and
she deserves the actual kudos for pinpointing that one.

Fixes: f7ed45be3ba52 ("KVM: ARM: World-switch implementation")
Reported-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sparc64/mm: set fields in deferred pages</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:32:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Tatashin</name>
<email>pasha.tatashin@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-16T01:36:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fdea3b85d3a04bd3af04a2db9be58f509c8e596b'/>
<id>fdea3b85d3a04bd3af04a2db9be58f509c8e596b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2a20aa171071a334d80c4e5d5af719d8374702fc ]

Without deferred struct page feature (CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT),
flags and other fields in "struct page"es are never changed prior to
first initializing struct pages by going through __init_single_page().

With deferred struct page feature enabled there is a case where we set
some fields prior to initializing:

mem_init() {
     register_page_bootmem_info();
     free_all_bootmem();
     ...
}

When register_page_bootmem_info() is called only non-deferred struct
pages are initialized.  But, this function goes through some reserved
pages which might be part of the deferred, and thus are not yet
initialized.

mem_init
register_page_bootmem_info
register_page_bootmem_info_node
 get_page_bootmem
  .. setting fields here ..
  such as: page-&gt;freelist = (void *)type;

free_all_bootmem()
free_low_memory_core_early()
 for_each_reserved_mem_region()
  reserve_bootmem_region()
   init_reserved_page() &lt;- Only if this is deferred reserved page
    __init_single_pfn()
     __init_single_page()
      memset(0) &lt;-- Loose the set fields here

We end up with similar issue as in the previous patch, where currently
we do not observe problem as memory is zeroed.  But, if flag asserts are
changed we can start hitting issues.

Also, because in this patch series we will stop zeroing struct page
memory during allocation, we must make sure that struct pages are
properly initialized prior to using them.

The deferred-reserved pages are initialized in free_all_bootmem().
Therefore, the fix is to switch the above calls.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171013173214.27300-4-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin &lt;pasha.tatashin@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Sistare &lt;steven.sistare@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan &lt;daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bob Picco &lt;bob.picco@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sam Ravnborg &lt;sam@ravnborg.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2a20aa171071a334d80c4e5d5af719d8374702fc ]

Without deferred struct page feature (CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT),
flags and other fields in "struct page"es are never changed prior to
first initializing struct pages by going through __init_single_page().

With deferred struct page feature enabled there is a case where we set
some fields prior to initializing:

mem_init() {
     register_page_bootmem_info();
     free_all_bootmem();
     ...
}

When register_page_bootmem_info() is called only non-deferred struct
pages are initialized.  But, this function goes through some reserved
pages which might be part of the deferred, and thus are not yet
initialized.

mem_init
register_page_bootmem_info
register_page_bootmem_info_node
 get_page_bootmem
  .. setting fields here ..
  such as: page-&gt;freelist = (void *)type;

free_all_bootmem()
free_low_memory_core_early()
 for_each_reserved_mem_region()
  reserve_bootmem_region()
   init_reserved_page() &lt;- Only if this is deferred reserved page
    __init_single_pfn()
     __init_single_page()
      memset(0) &lt;-- Loose the set fields here

We end up with similar issue as in the previous patch, where currently
we do not observe problem as memory is zeroed.  But, if flag asserts are
changed we can start hitting issues.

Also, because in this patch series we will stop zeroing struct page
memory during allocation, we must make sure that struct pages are
properly initialized prior to using them.

The deferred-reserved pages are initialized in free_all_bootmem().
Therefore, the fix is to switch the above calls.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171013173214.27300-4-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin &lt;pasha.tatashin@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Sistare &lt;steven.sistare@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan &lt;daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bob Picco &lt;bob.picco@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sam Ravnborg &lt;sam@ravnborg.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>axonram: Fix gendisk handling</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:32:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-08T13:56:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8364904c104570a76045b23e78cbb438750a3c7e'/>
<id>8364904c104570a76045b23e78cbb438750a3c7e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 672a2c87c83649fb0167202342ce85af9a3b4f1c ]

It is invalid to call del_gendisk() when disk-&gt;queue is NULL. Fix error
handling in axon_ram_probe() to avoid doing that.

Also del_gendisk() does not drop a reference to gendisk allocated by
alloc_disk(). That has to be done by put_disk(). Add that call where
needed.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 672a2c87c83649fb0167202342ce85af9a3b4f1c ]

It is invalid to call del_gendisk() when disk-&gt;queue is NULL. Fix error
handling in axon_ram_probe() to avoid doing that.

Also del_gendisk() does not drop a reference to gendisk allocated by
alloc_disk(). That has to be done by put_disk(). Add that call where
needed.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm: KVM: Survive unknown traps from guests</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:32:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-20T12:30:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0faf52395fa258e39193fe6e4d6e13bb2341e96d'/>
<id>0faf52395fa258e39193fe6e4d6e13bb2341e96d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f050fe7a9164945dd1c28be05bf00e8cfb082ccf ]

Currently we BUG() if we see a HSR.EC value we don't recognise. As
configurable disables/enables are added to the architecture (controlled
by RES1/RES0 bits respectively), with associated synchronous exceptions,
it may be possible for a guest to trigger exceptions with classes that
we don't recognise.

While we can't service these exceptions in a manner useful to the guest,
we can avoid bringing down the host. Per ARM DDI 0406C.c, all currently
unallocated HSR EC encodings are reserved, and per ARM DDI
0487A.k_iss10775, page G6-4395, EC values within the range 0x00 - 0x2c
are reserved for future use with synchronous exceptions, and EC values
within the range 0x2d - 0x3f may be used for either synchronous or
asynchronous exceptions.

The patch makes KVM handle any unknown EC by injecting an UNDEFINED
exception into the guest, with a corresponding (ratelimited) warning in
the host dmesg. We could later improve on this with with a new (opt-in)
exit to the host userspace.

Cc: Dave Martin &lt;dave.martin@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f050fe7a9164945dd1c28be05bf00e8cfb082ccf ]

Currently we BUG() if we see a HSR.EC value we don't recognise. As
configurable disables/enables are added to the architecture (controlled
by RES1/RES0 bits respectively), with associated synchronous exceptions,
it may be possible for a guest to trigger exceptions with classes that
we don't recognise.

While we can't service these exceptions in a manner useful to the guest,
we can avoid bringing down the host. Per ARM DDI 0406C.c, all currently
unallocated HSR EC encodings are reserved, and per ARM DDI
0487A.k_iss10775, page G6-4395, EC values within the range 0x00 - 0x2c
are reserved for future use with synchronous exceptions, and EC values
within the range 0x2d - 0x3f may be used for either synchronous or
asynchronous exceptions.

The patch makes KVM handle any unknown EC by injecting an UNDEFINED
exception into the guest, with a corresponding (ratelimited) warning in
the host dmesg. We could later improve on this with with a new (opt-in)
exit to the host userspace.

Cc: Dave Martin &lt;dave.martin@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: nVMX: reset nested_run_pending if the vCPU is going to be reset</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:32:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wanpeng Li</name>
<email>wanpeng.li@hotmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-06T12:03:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ab8447147ba09ec7d44e6cfe3f2ad7bb5128bf13'/>
<id>ab8447147ba09ec7d44e6cfe3f2ad7bb5128bf13</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2f707d97982286b307ef2a9b034e19aabc1abb56 ]

Reported by syzkaller:

    WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 27742 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:11029
    nested_vmx_vmexit+0x5c35/0x74d0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:11029
    CPU: 1 PID: 27742 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.10.0+ #229
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
     __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
     dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51
     panic+0x1fb/0x412 kernel/panic.c:179
     __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:540
     warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:583
     nested_vmx_vmexit+0x5c35/0x74d0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:11029
     vmx_leave_nested arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:11136 [inline]
     vmx_set_msr+0x1565/0x1910 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:3324
     kvm_set_msr+0xd4/0x170 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:1099
     do_set_msr+0x11e/0x190 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:1128
     __msr_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:2577 [inline]
     msr_io+0x24b/0x450 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:2614
     kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x35b/0x46a0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3497
     kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x232/0x1120 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2721
     vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43 [inline]
     do_vfs_ioctl+0x1bf/0x1790 fs/ioctl.c:683
     SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:698 [inline]
     SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:689
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2

The syzkaller folks reported a nested_run_pending warning during userspace
clear VMX capability which is exposed to L1 before.

The warning gets thrown while doing

(*(uint32_t*)0x20aecfe8 = (uint32_t)0x1);
(*(uint32_t*)0x20aecfec = (uint32_t)0x0);
(*(uint32_t*)0x20aecff0 = (uint32_t)0x3a);
(*(uint32_t*)0x20aecff4 = (uint32_t)0x0);
(*(uint64_t*)0x20aecff8 = (uint64_t)0x0);
r[29] = syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[4], 0x4008ae89ul,
		0x20aecfe8ul, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);

i.e. KVM_SET_MSR ioctl with

struct kvm_msrs {
	.nmsrs = 1,
		.pad = 0,
		.entries = {
			{.index = MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL,
			 .reserved = 0,
			 .data = 0}
		}
}

The VMLANCH/VMRESUME emulation should be stopped since the CPU is going to
reset here. This patch resets the nested_run_pending since the CPU is going
to be reset hence there should be nothing pending.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2f707d97982286b307ef2a9b034e19aabc1abb56 ]

Reported by syzkaller:

    WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 27742 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:11029
    nested_vmx_vmexit+0x5c35/0x74d0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:11029
    CPU: 1 PID: 27742 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.10.0+ #229
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
     __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
     dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51
     panic+0x1fb/0x412 kernel/panic.c:179
     __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:540
     warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:583
     nested_vmx_vmexit+0x5c35/0x74d0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:11029
     vmx_leave_nested arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:11136 [inline]
     vmx_set_msr+0x1565/0x1910 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:3324
     kvm_set_msr+0xd4/0x170 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:1099
     do_set_msr+0x11e/0x190 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:1128
     __msr_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:2577 [inline]
     msr_io+0x24b/0x450 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:2614
     kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x35b/0x46a0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3497
     kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x232/0x1120 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2721
     vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43 [inline]
     do_vfs_ioctl+0x1bf/0x1790 fs/ioctl.c:683
     SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:698 [inline]
     SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:689
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2

The syzkaller folks reported a nested_run_pending warning during userspace
clear VMX capability which is exposed to L1 before.

The warning gets thrown while doing

(*(uint32_t*)0x20aecfe8 = (uint32_t)0x1);
(*(uint32_t*)0x20aecfec = (uint32_t)0x0);
(*(uint32_t*)0x20aecff0 = (uint32_t)0x3a);
(*(uint32_t*)0x20aecff4 = (uint32_t)0x0);
(*(uint64_t*)0x20aecff8 = (uint64_t)0x0);
r[29] = syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[4], 0x4008ae89ul,
		0x20aecfe8ul, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);

i.e. KVM_SET_MSR ioctl with

struct kvm_msrs {
	.nmsrs = 1,
		.pad = 0,
		.entries = {
			{.index = MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL,
			 .reserved = 0,
			 .data = 0}
		}
}

The VMLANCH/VMRESUME emulation should be stopped since the CPU is going to
reset here. This patch resets the nested_run_pending since the CPU is going
to be reset hence there should be nothing pending.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "s390/kbuild: enable modversions for symbols exported from asm"</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:32:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sasha Levin</name>
<email>alexander.levin@verizon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-08T05:11:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ab1d27b51272e0a6c503064b5800b0d8e3e1644b'/>
<id>ab1d27b51272e0a6c503064b5800b0d8e3e1644b</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit cabab3f9f5ca077535080b3252e6168935b914af.

Not needed for &lt; 4.9.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit cabab3f9f5ca077535080b3252e6168935b914af.

Not needed for &lt; 4.9.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: fpsimd: Prevent registers leaking from dead tasks</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:32:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Martin</name>
<email>Dave.Martin@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-05T14:56:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a8779c22fdd5c33ed43efdb4f3ccf7cf3c9b6a27'/>
<id>a8779c22fdd5c33ed43efdb4f3ccf7cf3c9b6a27</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 071b6d4a5d343046f253a5a8835d477d93992002 upstream.

Currently, loading of a task's fpsimd state into the CPU registers
is skipped if that task's state is already present in the registers
of that CPU.

However, the code relies on the struct fpsimd_state * (and by
extension struct task_struct *) to unambiguously identify a task.

There is a particular case in which this doesn't work reliably:
when a task exits, its task_struct may be recycled to describe a
new task.

Consider the following scenario:

 1) Task P loads its fpsimd state onto cpu C.
        per_cpu(fpsimd_last_state, C) := P;
        P-&gt;thread.fpsimd_state.cpu := C;

 2) Task X is scheduled onto C and loads its fpsimd state on C.
        per_cpu(fpsimd_last_state, C) := X;
        X-&gt;thread.fpsimd_state.cpu := C;

 3) X exits, causing X's task_struct to be freed.

 4) P forks a new child T, which obtains X's recycled task_struct.
	T == X.
	T-&gt;thread.fpsimd_state.cpu == C (inherited from P).

 5) T is scheduled on C.
	T's fpsimd state is not loaded, because
	per_cpu(fpsimd_last_state, C) == T (== X) &amp;&amp;
	T-&gt;thread.fpsimd_state.cpu == C.

        (This is the check performed by fpsimd_thread_switch().)

So, T gets X's registers because the last registers loaded onto C
were those of X, in (2).

This patch fixes the problem by ensuring that the sched-in check
fails in (5): fpsimd_flush_task_state(T) is called when T is
forked, so that T-&gt;thread.fpsimd_state.cpu == C cannot be true.
This relies on the fact that T is not schedulable until after
copy_thread() completes.

Once T's fpsimd state has been loaded on some CPU C there may still
be other cpus D for which per_cpu(fpsimd_last_state, D) ==
&amp;X-&gt;thread.fpsimd_state.  But D is necessarily != C in this case,
and the check in (5) must fail.

An alternative fix would be to do refcounting on task_struct.  This
would result in each CPU holding a reference to the last task whose
fpsimd state was loaded there.  It's not clear whether this is
preferable, and it involves higher overhead than the fix proposed
in this patch.  It would also move all the task_struct freeing
work into the context switch critical section, or otherwise some
deferred cleanup mechanism would need to be introduced, neither of
which seems obviously justified.

Fixes: 005f78cd8849 ("arm64: defer reloading a task's FPSIMD state to userland resume")
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
[will: word-smithed the comment so it makes more sense]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 071b6d4a5d343046f253a5a8835d477d93992002 upstream.

Currently, loading of a task's fpsimd state into the CPU registers
is skipped if that task's state is already present in the registers
of that CPU.

However, the code relies on the struct fpsimd_state * (and by
extension struct task_struct *) to unambiguously identify a task.

There is a particular case in which this doesn't work reliably:
when a task exits, its task_struct may be recycled to describe a
new task.

Consider the following scenario:

 1) Task P loads its fpsimd state onto cpu C.
        per_cpu(fpsimd_last_state, C) := P;
        P-&gt;thread.fpsimd_state.cpu := C;

 2) Task X is scheduled onto C and loads its fpsimd state on C.
        per_cpu(fpsimd_last_state, C) := X;
        X-&gt;thread.fpsimd_state.cpu := C;

 3) X exits, causing X's task_struct to be freed.

 4) P forks a new child T, which obtains X's recycled task_struct.
	T == X.
	T-&gt;thread.fpsimd_state.cpu == C (inherited from P).

 5) T is scheduled on C.
	T's fpsimd state is not loaded, because
	per_cpu(fpsimd_last_state, C) == T (== X) &amp;&amp;
	T-&gt;thread.fpsimd_state.cpu == C.

        (This is the check performed by fpsimd_thread_switch().)

So, T gets X's registers because the last registers loaded onto C
were those of X, in (2).

This patch fixes the problem by ensuring that the sched-in check
fails in (5): fpsimd_flush_task_state(T) is called when T is
forked, so that T-&gt;thread.fpsimd_state.cpu == C cannot be true.
This relies on the fact that T is not schedulable until after
copy_thread() completes.

Once T's fpsimd state has been loaded on some CPU C there may still
be other cpus D for which per_cpu(fpsimd_last_state, D) ==
&amp;X-&gt;thread.fpsimd_state.  But D is necessarily != C in this case,
and the check in (5) must fail.

An alternative fix would be to do refcounting on task_struct.  This
would result in each CPU holding a reference to the last task whose
fpsimd state was loaded there.  It's not clear whether this is
preferable, and it involves higher overhead than the fix proposed
in this patch.  It would also move all the task_struct freeing
work into the context switch critical section, or otherwise some
deferred cleanup mechanism would need to be introduced, neither of
which seems obviously justified.

Fixes: 005f78cd8849 ("arm64: defer reloading a task's FPSIMD state to userland resume")
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
[will: word-smithed the comment so it makes more sense]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: VMX: remove I/O port 0x80 bypass on Intel hosts</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:32:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Honig</name>
<email>ahonig@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-01T18:21:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7389171fdc5976066573edd1fcf6c9a81d8df90f'/>
<id>7389171fdc5976066573edd1fcf6c9a81d8df90f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d59d51f088014f25c2562de59b9abff4f42a7468 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2017-1000407.

KVM allows guests to directly access I/O port 0x80 on Intel hosts.  If
the guest floods this port with writes it generates exceptions and
instability in the host kernel, leading to a crash.  With this change
guest writes to port 0x80 on Intel will behave the same as they
currently behave on AMD systems.

Prevent the flooding by removing the code that sets port 0x80 as a
passthrough port.  This is essentially the same as upstream patch
99f85a28a78e96d28907fe036e1671a218fee597, except that patch was
for AMD chipsets and this patch is for Intel.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Fixes: fdef3ad1b386 ("KVM: VMX: Enable io bitmaps to avoid IO port 0x80 VMEXITs")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d59d51f088014f25c2562de59b9abff4f42a7468 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2017-1000407.

KVM allows guests to directly access I/O port 0x80 on Intel hosts.  If
the guest floods this port with writes it generates exceptions and
instability in the host kernel, leading to a crash.  With this change
guest writes to port 0x80 on Intel will behave the same as they
currently behave on AMD systems.

Prevent the flooding by removing the code that sets port 0x80 as a
passthrough port.  This is essentially the same as upstream patch
99f85a28a78e96d28907fe036e1671a218fee597, except that patch was
for AMD chipsets and this patch is for Intel.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Fixes: fdef3ad1b386 ("KVM: VMX: Enable io bitmaps to avoid IO port 0x80 VMEXITs")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: KVM: fix VTTBR_BADDR_MASK BUG_ON off-by-one</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:32:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kristina Martsenko</name>
<email>kristina.martsenko@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-16T17:58:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=140db397a1440a325a144af1defa458e8330680b'/>
<id>140db397a1440a325a144af1defa458e8330680b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 26aa7b3b1c0fb3f1a6176a0c1847204ef4355693 upstream.

VTTBR_BADDR_MASK is used to sanity check the size and alignment of the
VTTBR address. It seems to currently be off by one, thereby only
allowing up to 47-bit addresses (instead of 48-bit) and also
insufficiently checking the alignment. This patch fixes it.

As an example, with 4k pages, before this patch we have:

  PHYS_MASK_SHIFT = 48
  VTTBR_X = 37 - 24 = 13
  VTTBR_BADDR_SHIFT = 13 - 1 = 12
  VTTBR_BADDR_MASK = ((1 &lt;&lt; 35) - 1) &lt;&lt; 12 = 0x00007ffffffff000

Which is wrong, because the mask doesn't allow bit 47 of the VTTBR
address to be set, and only requires the address to be 12-bit (4k)
aligned, while it actually needs to be 13-bit (8k) aligned because we
concatenate two 4k tables.

With this patch, the mask becomes 0x0000ffffffffe000, which is what we
want.

Fixes: 0369f6a34b9f ("arm64: KVM: EL2 register definitions")
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 26aa7b3b1c0fb3f1a6176a0c1847204ef4355693 upstream.

VTTBR_BADDR_MASK is used to sanity check the size and alignment of the
VTTBR address. It seems to currently be off by one, thereby only
allowing up to 47-bit addresses (instead of 48-bit) and also
insufficiently checking the alignment. This patch fixes it.

As an example, with 4k pages, before this patch we have:

  PHYS_MASK_SHIFT = 48
  VTTBR_X = 37 - 24 = 13
  VTTBR_BADDR_SHIFT = 13 - 1 = 12
  VTTBR_BADDR_MASK = ((1 &lt;&lt; 35) - 1) &lt;&lt; 12 = 0x00007ffffffff000

Which is wrong, because the mask doesn't allow bit 47 of the VTTBR
address to be set, and only requires the address to be 12-bit (4k)
aligned, while it actually needs to be 13-bit (8k) aligned because we
concatenate two 4k tables.

With this patch, the mask becomes 0x0000ffffffffe000, which is what we
want.

Fixes: 0369f6a34b9f ("arm64: KVM: EL2 register definitions")
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/PCI: Make broadcom_postcore_init() check acpi_disabled</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:32:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rafael J. Wysocki</name>
<email>rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-01T14:08:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=346178f1aa5e082f5cfbe94affcbfa1e9d6086df'/>
<id>346178f1aa5e082f5cfbe94affcbfa1e9d6086df</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ddec3bdee05b06f1dda20ded003c3e10e4184cab upstream.

acpi_os_get_root_pointer() may return a valid address even if acpi_disabled
is set, but the host bridge information from the ACPI tables is not going
to be used in that case and the Broadcom host bridge initialization should
not be skipped then, So make broadcom_postcore_init() check acpi_disabled
too to avoid this issue.

Fixes: 6361d72b04d1 (x86/PCI: read Broadcom CNB20LE host bridge info before PCI scan)
Reported-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linux PCI &lt;linux-pci@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3186627.pxZj1QbYNg@aspire.rjw.lan
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ddec3bdee05b06f1dda20ded003c3e10e4184cab upstream.

acpi_os_get_root_pointer() may return a valid address even if acpi_disabled
is set, but the host bridge information from the ACPI tables is not going
to be used in that case and the Broadcom host bridge initialization should
not be skipped then, So make broadcom_postcore_init() check acpi_disabled
too to avoid this issue.

Fixes: 6361d72b04d1 (x86/PCI: read Broadcom CNB20LE host bridge info before PCI scan)
Reported-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linux PCI &lt;linux-pci@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3186627.pxZj1QbYNg@aspire.rjw.lan
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
