linux-stable.git/arch/x86, branch linux-3.7.y

xen: Send spinlock IPI to all waiters

2013-02-27T17:21:07+00:00

commit 76eaca031f0af2bb303e405986f637811956a422 upstream.

There is a loophole between Xen's current implementation of
pv-spinlocks and the scheduler. This was triggerable through
a testcase until v3.6 changed the TLB flushing code. The
problem potentially is still there just not observable in the
same way.

What could happen was (is):

1. CPU n tries to schedule task x away and goes into a slow
   wait for the runq lock of CPU n-# (must be one with a lower
   number).
2. CPU n-#, while processing softirqs, tries to balance domains
   and goes into a slow wait for its own runq lock (for updating
   some records). Since this is a spin_lock_irqsave in softirq
   context, interrupts will be re-enabled for the duration of
   the poll_irq hypercall used by Xen.
3. Before the runq lock of CPU n-# is unlocked, CPU n-1 receives
   an interrupt (e.g. endio) and when processing the interrupt,
   tries to wake up task x. But that is in schedule and still
   on_cpu, so try_to_wake_up goes into a tight loop.
4. The runq lock of CPU n-# gets unlocked, but the message only
   gets sent to the first waiter, which is CPU n-# and that is
   busily stuck.
5. CPU n-# never returns from the nested interruption to take and
   release the lock because the scheduler uses a busy wait.
   And CPU n never finishes the task migration because the unlock
   notification only went to CPU n-#.

To avoid this and since the unlocking code has no real sense of
which waiter is best suited to grab the lock, just send the IPI
to all of them. This causes the waiters to return from the hyper-
call (those not interrupted at least) and do active spinlocking.

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1011792

Acked-by: Jan Beulich 
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader 
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86: Hyper-V: register clocksource only if its advertised

2013-02-27T17:20:55+00:00

commit 32068f6527b8f1822a30671dedaf59c567325026 upstream.

Enable hyperv_clocksource only if its advertised as a feature.
XenServer 6 returns the signature which is checked in
ms_hyperv_platform(), but it does not offer all features. Currently the
clocksource is enabled unconditionally in ms_hyperv_init_platform(), and
the result is a hanging guest.

Hyper-V spec Bit 1 indicates the availability of Partition Reference
Counter.  Register the clocksource only if this bit is set.

The guest in question prints this in dmesg:
 [    0.000000] Hypervisor detected: Microsoft HyperV
 [    0.000000] HyperV: features 0x70, hints 0x0

This bug can be reproduced easily be setting 'viridian=1' in a HVM domU
.cfg file. A workaround without this patch is to boot the HVM guest with
'clocksource=jiffies'.

Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359940959-32168-1-git-send-email-kys@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan 
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86-32, mm: Remove reference to alloc_remap()

2013-02-27T17:20:53+00:00

commit 07f4207a305c834f528d08428df4531744e25678 upstream.

We have removed the remap allocator for x86-32, and x86-64 never had
it (and doesn't need it).  Remove residual reference to it.

Reported-by: Yinghai Lu 
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAE9FiQVn6_QZi3fNQ-JHYiR-7jeDJ5hT0SyT_%2BzVvfOj=PzF3w@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86-32, mm: Remove reference to resume_map_numa_kva()

2013-02-27T17:20:53+00:00

commit bb112aec5ee41427e9b9726e3d57b896709598ed upstream.

Remove reference to removed function resume_map_numa_kva().

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130131005616.1C79F411@kernel.stglabs.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86-32, mm: Rip out x86_32 NUMA remapping code

2013-02-27T17:20:53+00:00

commit f03574f2d5b2d6229dcdf2d322848065f72953c7 upstream.

This code was an optimization for 32-bit NUMA systems.

It has probably been the cause of a number of subtle bugs over
the years, although the conditions to excite them would have
been hard to trigger.  Essentially, we remap part of the kernel
linear mapping area, and then sometimes part of that area gets
freed back in to the bootmem allocator.  If those pages get
used by kernel data structures (say mem_map[] or a dentry),
there's no big deal.  But, if anyone ever tried to use the
linear mapping for these pages _and_ cared about their physical
address, bad things happen.

For instance, say you passed __GFP_ZERO to the page allocator
and then happened to get handed one of these pages, it zero the
remapped page, but it would make a pte to the _old_ page.
There are probably a hundred other ways that it could screw
with things.

We don't need to hang on to performance optimizations for
these old boxes any more.  All my 32-bit NUMA systems are long
dead and buried, and I probably had access to more than most
people.

This code is causing real things to break today:

	https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/1/9/376

I looked in to actually fixing this, but it requires surgery
to way too much brittle code, as well as stuff like
per_cpu_ptr_to_phys().

[ hpa: Cc: this for -stable, since it is a memory corruption issue.
  However, an alternative is to simply mark NUMA as depends BROKEN
  rather than EXPERIMENTAL in the X86_32 subclause... ]

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130131005616.1C79F411@kernel.stglabs.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

efi: Clear EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES rather than EFI_BOOT by "noefi" boot parameter

2013-02-17T18:53:13+00:00

commit 1de63d60cd5b0d33a812efa455d5933bf1564a51 upstream.

There was a serious problem in samsung-laptop that its platform driver is
designed to run under BIOS and running under EFI can cause the machine to
become bricked or can cause Machine Check Exceptions.

    Discussion about this problem:
    https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu-cdimage/+bug/1040557
    https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=47121

    The patches to fix this problem:
    efi: Make 'efi_enabled' a function to query EFI facilities
    83e68189745ad931c2afd45d8ee3303929233e7f

    samsung-laptop: Disable on EFI hardware
    e0094244e41c4d0c7ad69920681972fc45d8ce34

Unfortunately this problem comes back again if users specify "noefi" option.
This parameter clears EFI_BOOT and that driver continues to run even if running
under EFI. Refer to the document, this parameter should clear
EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES instead.

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt:
===============================================================================
...
	noefi		[X86] Disable EFI runtime services support.
...
===============================================================================

Documentation/x86/x86_64/uefi.txt:
===============================================================================
...
- If some or all EFI runtime services don't work, you can try following
  kernel command line parameters to turn off some or all EFI runtime
  services.
	noefi		turn off all EFI runtime services
...
===============================================================================

Signed-off-by: Satoru Takeuchi 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/511C2C04.2070108@jp.fujitsu.com
Cc: Matt Fleming 
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/xen: don't assume %ds is usable in xen_iret for 32-bit PVOPS.

2013-02-17T18:53:13+00:00

commit 13d2b4d11d69a92574a55bfd985cfb0ca77aebdc upstream.

This fixes CVE-2013-0228 / XSA-42

Drew Jones while working on CVE-2013-0190 found that that unprivileged guest user
in 32bit PV guest can use to crash the > guest with the panic like this:

-------------
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/devices/vbd-51712/block/xvda/dev
Modules linked in: sunrpc ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4
iptable_filter ip_tables ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6
xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables ipv6 xen_netfront ext4
mbcache jbd2 xen_blkfront dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last
unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]

Pid: 1250, comm: r Not tainted 2.6.32-356.el6.i686 #1
EIP: 0061:[] EFLAGS: 00010086 CPU: 0
EIP is at xen_iret+0x12/0x2b
EAX: eb8d0000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 08049860 EDX: 00000010
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 003d0f00 EBP: b77f8388 ESP: eb8d1fe0
 DS: 0000 ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 00e0 SS: 0069
Process r (pid: 1250, ti=eb8d0000 task=c2953550 task.ti=eb8d0000)
Stack:
 00000000 0027f416 00000073 00000206 b77f8364 0000007b 00000000 00000000
Call Trace:
Code: c3 8b 44 24 18 81 4c 24 38 00 02 00 00 8d 64 24 30 e9 03 00 00 00
8d 76 00 f7 44 24 08 00 00 02 80 75 33 50 b8 00 e0 ff ff 21 e0 <8b> 40
10 8b 04 85 a0 f6 ab c0 8b 80 0c b0 b3 c0 f6 44 24 0d 02
EIP: [] xen_iret+0x12/0x2b SS:ESP 0069:eb8d1fe0
general protection fault: 0000 [#2]
---[ end trace ab0d29a492dcd330 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Pid: 1250, comm: r Tainted: G      D    ---------------
2.6.32-356.el6.i686 #1
Call Trace:
 [] ? panic+0x6e/0x122
 [] ? oops_end+0xbc/0xd0
 [] ? do_general_protection+0x0/0x210
 [] ? error_code+0x73/
-------------

Petr says: "
 I've analysed the bug and I think that xen_iret() cannot cope with
 mangled DS, in this case zeroed out (null selector/descriptor) by either
 xen_failsafe_callback() or RESTORE_REGS because the corresponding LDT
 entry was invalidated by the reproducer. "

Jan took a look at the preliminary patch and came up a fix that solves
this problem:

"This code gets called after all registers other than those handled by
IRET got already restored, hence a null selector in %ds or a non-null
one that got loaded from a code or read-only data descriptor would
cause a kernel mode fault (with the potential of crashing the kernel
as a whole, if panic_on_oops is set)."

The way to fix this is to realize that the we can only relay on the
registers that IRET restores. The two that are guaranteed are the
%cs and %ss as they are always fixed GDT selectors. Also they are
inaccessible from user mode - so they cannot be altered. This is
the approach taken in this patch.

Another alternative option suggested by Jan would be to relay on
the subtle realization that using the %ebp or %esp relative references uses
the %ss segment.  In which case we could switch from using %eax to %ebp and
would not need the %ss over-rides. That would also require one extra
instruction to compensate for the one place where the register is used
as scaled index. However Andrew pointed out that is too subtle and if
further work was to be done in this code-path it could escape folks attention
and lead to accidents.

Reviewed-by: Petr Matousek 
Reported-by: Petr Matousek 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper 
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich 
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/mm: Check if PUD is large when validating a kernel address

2013-02-17T18:53:12+00:00

commit 0ee364eb316348ddf3e0dfcd986f5f13f528f821 upstream.

A user reported the following oops when a backup process reads
/proc/kcore:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffbb00ff33b000
 IP: [] kern_addr_valid+0xbe/0x110
 [...]

 Call Trace:
  [] read_kcore+0x17a/0x370
  [] proc_reg_read+0x77/0xc0
  [] vfs_read+0xc7/0x130
  [] sys_read+0x53/0xa0
  [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Investigation determined that the bug triggered when reading
system RAM at the 4G mark. On this system, that was the first
address using 1G pages for the virt->phys direct mapping so the
PUD is pointing to a physical address, not a PMD page.

The problem is that the page table walker in kern_addr_valid() is
not checking pud_large() and treats the physical address as if
it was a PMD.  If it happens to look like pmd_none then it'll
silently fail, probably returning zeros instead of real data. If
the data happens to look like a present PMD though, it will be
walked resulting in the oops above.

This patch adds the necessary pud_large() check.

Unfortunately the problem was not readily reproducible and now
they are running the backup program without accessing
/proc/kcore so the patch has not been validated but I think it
makes sense.

Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman 
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel 
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko 
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130211145236.GX21389@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/apic: Work around boot failure on HP ProLiant DL980 G7 Server systems

2013-02-17T18:53:12+00:00

commit cb214ede7657db458fd0b2a25ea0b28dbf900ebc upstream.

When a HP ProLiant DL980 G7 Server boots a regular kernel,
there will be intermittent lost interrupts which could
result in a hang or (in extreme cases) data loss.

The reason is that this system only supports x2apic physical
mode, while the kernel boots with a logical-cluster default
setting.

This bug can be worked around by specifying the "x2apic_phys" or
"nox2apic" boot option, but we want to handle this system
without requiring manual workarounds.

The BIOS sets ACPI_FADT_APIC_PHYSICAL in FADT table.
As all apicids are smaller than 255, BIOS need to pass the
control to the OS with xapic mode, according to x2apic-spec,
chapter 2.9.

Current code handle x2apic when BIOS pass with xapic mode
enabled:

When user specifies x2apic_phys, or FADT indicates PHYSICAL:

1. During madt oem check, apic driver is set with xapic logical
   or xapic phys driver at first.

2. enable_IR_x2apic() will enable x2apic_mode.

3. if user specifies x2apic_phys on the boot line, x2apic_phys_probe()
   will install the correct x2apic phys driver and use x2apic phys mode.
   Otherwise it will skip the driver will let x2apic_cluster_probe to
   take over to install x2apic cluster driver (wrong one) even though FADT
   indicates PHYSICAL, because x2apic_phys_probe does not check
   FADT PHYSICAL.

Add checking x2apic_fadt_phys in x2apic_phys_probe() to fix the
problem.

Signed-off-by: Stoney Wang 
[ updated the changelog and simplified the code ]
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1360263182-16226-1-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86: Do not leak kernel page mapping locations

2013-02-17T18:53:12+00:00

commit e575a86fdc50d013bf3ad3aa81d9100e8e6cc60d upstream.

Without this patch, it is trivial to determine kernel page
mappings by examining the error code reported to dmesg[1].
Instead, declare the entire kernel memory space as a violation
of a present page.

Additionally, since show_unhandled_signals is enabled by
default, switch branch hinting to the more realistic
expectation, and unobfuscate the setting of the PF_PROT bit to
improve readability.

[1] http://vulnfactory.org/blog/2013/02/06/a-linux-memory-trick/

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg 
Suggested-by: Brad Spengler 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Paul E. McKenney 
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130207174413.GA12485@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman