<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/x86/kernel, branch v5.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'trace-v5.2-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace</title>
<updated>2019-07-04T01:26:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-04T01:26:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=550d1f5bda33fa3b203d8cf8df1396825dbfd213'/>
<id>550d1f5bda33fa3b203d8cf8df1396825dbfd213</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
 "This includes three fixes:

   - Fix a deadlock from a previous fix to keep module loading and
     function tracing text modifications from stepping on each other
     (this has a few patches to help document the issue in comments)

   - Fix a crash when the snapshot buffer gets out of sync with the main
     ring buffer

   - Fix a memory leak when reading the memory logs"

* tag 'trace-v5.2-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
  ftrace/x86: Anotate text_mutex split between ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process() and ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare()
  tracing/snapshot: Resize spare buffer if size changed
  tracing: Fix memory leak in tracing_err_log_open()
  ftrace/x86: Add a comment to why we take text_mutex in ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare()
  ftrace/x86: Remove possible deadlock between register_kprobe() and ftrace_run_update_code()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
 "This includes three fixes:

   - Fix a deadlock from a previous fix to keep module loading and
     function tracing text modifications from stepping on each other
     (this has a few patches to help document the issue in comments)

   - Fix a crash when the snapshot buffer gets out of sync with the main
     ring buffer

   - Fix a memory leak when reading the memory logs"

* tag 'trace-v5.2-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
  ftrace/x86: Anotate text_mutex split between ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process() and ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare()
  tracing/snapshot: Resize spare buffer if size changed
  tracing: Fix memory leak in tracing_err_log_open()
  ftrace/x86: Add a comment to why we take text_mutex in ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare()
  ftrace/x86: Remove possible deadlock between register_kprobe() and ftrace_run_update_code()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace/x86: Anotate text_mutex split between ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process() and ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare()</title>
<updated>2019-07-02T19:41:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Kosina</name>
<email>jkosina@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-29T21:22:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=074376ac0e1d1fcd4fafebca86ee6158e7c20680'/>
<id>074376ac0e1d1fcd4fafebca86ee6158e7c20680</id>
<content type='text'>
ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare() is acquiring text_mutex, while the
corresponding release is happening in ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process().

This has already been documented in the code, but let's also make the fact
that this is intentional clear to the semantic analysis tools such as sparse.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1906292321170.27227@cbobk.fhfr.pm

Fixes: 39611265edc1a ("ftrace/x86: Add a comment to why we take text_mutex in ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare()")
Fixes: d5b844a2cf507 ("ftrace/x86: Remove possible deadlock between register_kprobe() and ftrace_run_update_code()")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare() is acquiring text_mutex, while the
corresponding release is happening in ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process().

This has already been documented in the code, but let's also make the fact
that this is intentional clear to the semantic analysis tools such as sparse.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1906292321170.27227@cbobk.fhfr.pm

Fixes: 39611265edc1a ("ftrace/x86: Add a comment to why we take text_mutex in ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare()")
Fixes: d5b844a2cf507 ("ftrace/x86: Remove possible deadlock between register_kprobe() and ftrace_run_update_code()")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2019-06-29T11:42:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-29T11:42:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=728254541ebcc7fee869c3c4c3f36f96be791edb'/>
<id>728254541ebcc7fee869c3c4c3f36f96be791edb</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Misc fixes all over the place:

   - might_sleep() atomicity fix in the microcode loader

   - resctrl boundary condition fix

   - APIC arithmethics bug fix for frequencies &gt;= 4.2 GHz

   - three 5-level paging crash fixes

   - two speculation fixes

   - a perf/stacktrace fix"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/unwind/orc: Fall back to using frame pointers for generated code
  perf/x86: Always store regs-&gt;ip in perf_callchain_kernel()
  x86/speculation: Allow guests to use SSBD even if host does not
  x86/mm: Handle physical-virtual alignment mismatch in phys_p4d_init()
  x86/boot/64: Add missing fixup_pointer() for next_early_pgt access
  x86/boot/64: Fix crash if kernel image crosses page table boundary
  x86/apic: Fix integer overflow on 10 bit left shift of cpu_khz
  x86/resctrl: Prevent possible overrun during bitmap operations
  x86/microcode: Fix the microcode load on CPU hotplug for real
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Misc fixes all over the place:

   - might_sleep() atomicity fix in the microcode loader

   - resctrl boundary condition fix

   - APIC arithmethics bug fix for frequencies &gt;= 4.2 GHz

   - three 5-level paging crash fixes

   - two speculation fixes

   - a perf/stacktrace fix"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/unwind/orc: Fall back to using frame pointers for generated code
  perf/x86: Always store regs-&gt;ip in perf_callchain_kernel()
  x86/speculation: Allow guests to use SSBD even if host does not
  x86/mm: Handle physical-virtual alignment mismatch in phys_p4d_init()
  x86/boot/64: Add missing fixup_pointer() for next_early_pgt access
  x86/boot/64: Fix crash if kernel image crosses page table boundary
  x86/apic: Fix integer overflow on 10 bit left shift of cpu_khz
  x86/resctrl: Prevent possible overrun during bitmap operations
  x86/microcode: Fix the microcode load on CPU hotplug for real
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2019-06-29T11:39:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-29T11:39:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=57103eb7c6cad04c0611b7a5767a381b34b8b0ab'/>
<id>57103eb7c6cad04c0611b7a5767a381b34b8b0ab</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Various fixes, most of them related to bugs perf fuzzing found in the
  x86 code"

* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  perf/x86/regs: Use PERF_REG_EXTENDED_MASK
  perf/x86: Remove pmu-&gt;pebs_no_xmm_regs
  perf/x86: Clean up PEBS_XMM_REGS
  perf/x86/regs: Check reserved bits
  perf/x86: Disable extended registers for non-supported PMUs
  perf/ioctl: Add check for the sample_period value
  perf/core: Fix perf_sample_regs_user() mm check
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Various fixes, most of them related to bugs perf fuzzing found in the
  x86 code"

* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  perf/x86/regs: Use PERF_REG_EXTENDED_MASK
  perf/x86: Remove pmu-&gt;pebs_no_xmm_regs
  perf/x86: Clean up PEBS_XMM_REGS
  perf/x86/regs: Check reserved bits
  perf/x86: Disable extended registers for non-supported PMUs
  perf/ioctl: Add check for the sample_period value
  perf/core: Fix perf_sample_regs_user() mm check
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace/x86: Add a comment to why we take text_mutex in ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare()</title>
<updated>2019-06-28T18:21:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-28T01:18:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=39611265edc1af3d574178202e19c31e187e7cf2'/>
<id>39611265edc1af3d574178202e19c31e187e7cf2</id>
<content type='text'>
Taking the text_mutex in ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare() is to fix a
race against module loading and live kernel patching that might try to
change the text permissions while ftrace has it as read/write. This
really needs to be documented in the code. Add a comment that does such.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627211819.5a591f52@gandalf.local.home

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Taking the text_mutex in ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare() is to fix a
race against module loading and live kernel patching that might try to
change the text permissions while ftrace has it as read/write. This
really needs to be documented in the code. Add a comment that does such.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627211819.5a591f52@gandalf.local.home

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace/x86: Remove possible deadlock between register_kprobe() and ftrace_run_update_code()</title>
<updated>2019-06-28T18:20:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Mladek</name>
<email>pmladek@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-27T08:13:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d5b844a2cf507fc7642c9ae80a9d585db3065c28'/>
<id>d5b844a2cf507fc7642c9ae80a9d585db3065c28</id>
<content type='text'>
The commit 9f255b632bf12c4dd7 ("module: Fix livepatch/ftrace module text
permissions race") causes a possible deadlock between register_kprobe()
and ftrace_run_update_code() when ftrace is using stop_machine().

The existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-&gt; #1 (text_mutex){+.+.}:
       validate_chain.isra.21+0xb32/0xd70
       __lock_acquire+0x4b8/0x928
       lock_acquire+0x102/0x230
       __mutex_lock+0x88/0x908
       mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40
       register_kprobe+0x254/0x658
       init_kprobes+0x11a/0x168
       do_one_initcall+0x70/0x318
       kernel_init_freeable+0x456/0x508
       kernel_init+0x22/0x150
       ret_from_fork+0x30/0x34
       kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0xc

-&gt; #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}:
       check_prev_add+0x90c/0xde0
       validate_chain.isra.21+0xb32/0xd70
       __lock_acquire+0x4b8/0x928
       lock_acquire+0x102/0x230
       cpus_read_lock+0x62/0xd0
       stop_machine+0x2e/0x60
       arch_ftrace_update_code+0x2e/0x40
       ftrace_run_update_code+0x40/0xa0
       ftrace_startup+0xb2/0x168
       register_ftrace_function+0x64/0x88
       klp_patch_object+0x1a2/0x290
       klp_enable_patch+0x554/0x980
       do_one_initcall+0x70/0x318
       do_init_module+0x6e/0x250
       load_module+0x1782/0x1990
       __s390x_sys_finit_module+0xaa/0xf0
       system_call+0xd8/0x2d0

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(text_mutex);
                               lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem);
                               lock(text_mutex);
  lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem);

It is similar problem that has been solved by the commit 2d1e38f56622b9b
("kprobes: Cure hotplug lock ordering issues"). Many locks are involved.
To be on the safe side, text_mutex must become a low level lock taken
after cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem.

This can't be achieved easily with the current ftrace design.
For example, arm calls set_all_modules_text_rw() already in
ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare(), see arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c.
This functions is called:

  + outside stop_machine() from ftrace_run_update_code()
  + without stop_machine() from ftrace_module_enable()

Fortunately, the problematic fix is needed only on x86_64. It is
the only architecture that calls set_all_modules_text_rw()
in ftrace path and supports livepatching at the same time.

Therefore it is enough to move text_mutex handling from the generic
kernel/trace/ftrace.c into arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c:

   ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare()
   ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process()

This patch basically reverts the ftrace part of the problematic
commit 9f255b632bf12c4dd7 ("module: Fix livepatch/ftrace module
text permissions race"). And provides x86_64 specific-fix.

Some refactoring of the ftrace code will be needed when livepatching
is implemented for arm or nds32. These architectures call
set_all_modules_text_rw() and use stop_machine() at the same time.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627081334.12793-1-pmladek@suse.com

Fixes: 9f255b632bf12c4dd7 ("module: Fix livepatch/ftrace module text permissions race")
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reported-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
[
  As reviewed by Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;, removed return value of
  ftrace_run_update_code() as it is a void function.
]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The commit 9f255b632bf12c4dd7 ("module: Fix livepatch/ftrace module text
permissions race") causes a possible deadlock between register_kprobe()
and ftrace_run_update_code() when ftrace is using stop_machine().

The existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-&gt; #1 (text_mutex){+.+.}:
       validate_chain.isra.21+0xb32/0xd70
       __lock_acquire+0x4b8/0x928
       lock_acquire+0x102/0x230
       __mutex_lock+0x88/0x908
       mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40
       register_kprobe+0x254/0x658
       init_kprobes+0x11a/0x168
       do_one_initcall+0x70/0x318
       kernel_init_freeable+0x456/0x508
       kernel_init+0x22/0x150
       ret_from_fork+0x30/0x34
       kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0xc

-&gt; #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}:
       check_prev_add+0x90c/0xde0
       validate_chain.isra.21+0xb32/0xd70
       __lock_acquire+0x4b8/0x928
       lock_acquire+0x102/0x230
       cpus_read_lock+0x62/0xd0
       stop_machine+0x2e/0x60
       arch_ftrace_update_code+0x2e/0x40
       ftrace_run_update_code+0x40/0xa0
       ftrace_startup+0xb2/0x168
       register_ftrace_function+0x64/0x88
       klp_patch_object+0x1a2/0x290
       klp_enable_patch+0x554/0x980
       do_one_initcall+0x70/0x318
       do_init_module+0x6e/0x250
       load_module+0x1782/0x1990
       __s390x_sys_finit_module+0xaa/0xf0
       system_call+0xd8/0x2d0

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(text_mutex);
                               lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem);
                               lock(text_mutex);
  lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem);

It is similar problem that has been solved by the commit 2d1e38f56622b9b
("kprobes: Cure hotplug lock ordering issues"). Many locks are involved.
To be on the safe side, text_mutex must become a low level lock taken
after cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem.

This can't be achieved easily with the current ftrace design.
For example, arm calls set_all_modules_text_rw() already in
ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare(), see arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c.
This functions is called:

  + outside stop_machine() from ftrace_run_update_code()
  + without stop_machine() from ftrace_module_enable()

Fortunately, the problematic fix is needed only on x86_64. It is
the only architecture that calls set_all_modules_text_rw()
in ftrace path and supports livepatching at the same time.

Therefore it is enough to move text_mutex handling from the generic
kernel/trace/ftrace.c into arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c:

   ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare()
   ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process()

This patch basically reverts the ftrace part of the problematic
commit 9f255b632bf12c4dd7 ("module: Fix livepatch/ftrace module
text permissions race"). And provides x86_64 specific-fix.

Some refactoring of the ftrace code will be needed when livepatching
is implemented for arm or nds32. These architectures call
set_all_modules_text_rw() and use stop_machine() at the same time.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627081334.12793-1-pmladek@suse.com

Fixes: 9f255b632bf12c4dd7 ("module: Fix livepatch/ftrace module text permissions race")
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reported-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
[
  As reviewed by Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;, removed return value of
  ftrace_run_update_code() as it is a void function.
]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/unwind/orc: Fall back to using frame pointers for generated code</title>
<updated>2019-06-27T22:11:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-27T00:33:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ae6a45a0868986f69039a2150d3b2b9ca294c378'/>
<id>ae6a45a0868986f69039a2150d3b2b9ca294c378</id>
<content type='text'>
The ORC unwinder can't unwind through BPF JIT generated code because
there are no ORC entries associated with the code.

If an ORC entry isn't available, try to fall back to frame pointers.  If
BPF and other generated code always do frame pointer setup (even with
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTERS=n) then this will allow ORC to unwind through most
generated code despite there being no corresponding ORC entries.

Fixes: d15d356887e7 ("perf/x86: Make perf callchains work without CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER")
Reported-by: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Kairui Song &lt;kasong@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b6f69208ddff4343d56b7bfac1fc7cfcd62689e8.1561595111.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The ORC unwinder can't unwind through BPF JIT generated code because
there are no ORC entries associated with the code.

If an ORC entry isn't available, try to fall back to frame pointers.  If
BPF and other generated code always do frame pointer setup (even with
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTERS=n) then this will allow ORC to unwind through most
generated code despite there being no corresponding ORC entries.

Fixes: d15d356887e7 ("perf/x86: Make perf callchains work without CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER")
Reported-by: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Kairui Song &lt;kasong@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b6f69208ddff4343d56b7bfac1fc7cfcd62689e8.1561595111.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Allow guests to use SSBD even if host does not</title>
<updated>2019-06-26T14:38:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alejandro Jimenez</name>
<email>alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-10T17:20:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c1f7fec1eb6a2c86d01bc22afce772c743451d88'/>
<id>c1f7fec1eb6a2c86d01bc22afce772c743451d88</id>
<content type='text'>
The bits set in x86_spec_ctrl_mask are used to calculate the guest's value
of SPEC_CTRL that is written to the MSR before VMENTRY, and control which
mitigations the guest can enable.  In the case of SSBD, unless the host has
enabled SSBD always on mode (by passing "spec_store_bypass_disable=on" in
the kernel parameters), the SSBD bit is not set in the mask and the guest
can not properly enable the SSBD always on mitigation mode.

This has been confirmed by running the SSBD PoC on a guest using the SSBD
always on mitigation mode (booted with kernel parameter
"spec_store_bypass_disable=on"), and verifying that the guest is vulnerable
unless the host is also using SSBD always on mode. In addition, the guest
OS incorrectly reports the SSB vulnerability as mitigated.

Always set the SSBD bit in x86_spec_ctrl_mask when the host CPU supports
it, allowing the guest to use SSBD whether or not the host has chosen to
enable the mitigation in any of its modes.

Fixes: be6fcb5478e9 ("x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic")
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Jimenez &lt;alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick &lt;liam.merwick@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda &lt;mark.kanda@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560187210-11054-1-git-send-email-alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The bits set in x86_spec_ctrl_mask are used to calculate the guest's value
of SPEC_CTRL that is written to the MSR before VMENTRY, and control which
mitigations the guest can enable.  In the case of SSBD, unless the host has
enabled SSBD always on mode (by passing "spec_store_bypass_disable=on" in
the kernel parameters), the SSBD bit is not set in the mask and the guest
can not properly enable the SSBD always on mitigation mode.

This has been confirmed by running the SSBD PoC on a guest using the SSBD
always on mitigation mode (booted with kernel parameter
"spec_store_bypass_disable=on"), and verifying that the guest is vulnerable
unless the host is also using SSBD always on mode. In addition, the guest
OS incorrectly reports the SSB vulnerability as mitigated.

Always set the SSBD bit in x86_spec_ctrl_mask when the host CPU supports
it, allowing the guest to use SSBD whether or not the host has chosen to
enable the mitigation in any of its modes.

Fixes: be6fcb5478e9 ("x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic")
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Jimenez &lt;alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick &lt;liam.merwick@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda &lt;mark.kanda@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560187210-11054-1-git-send-email-alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/boot/64: Add missing fixup_pointer() for next_early_pgt access</title>
<updated>2019-06-26T05:25:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill@shutemov.name</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-20T11:24:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c1887159eb48ba40e775584cfb2a443962cf1a05'/>
<id>c1887159eb48ba40e775584cfb2a443962cf1a05</id>
<content type='text'>
__startup_64() uses fixup_pointer() to access global variables in a
position-independent fashion. Access to next_early_pgt was wrapped into the
helper, but one instance in the 5-level paging branch was missed.

GCC generates a R_X86_64_PC32 PC-relative relocation for the access which
doesn't trigger the issue, but Clang emmits a R_X86_64_32S which leads to
an invalid memory access and system reboot.

Fixes: 187e91fe5e91 ("x86/boot/64/clang: Use fixup_pointer() to access 'next_early_pgt'")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190620112422.29264-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
__startup_64() uses fixup_pointer() to access global variables in a
position-independent fashion. Access to next_early_pgt was wrapped into the
helper, but one instance in the 5-level paging branch was missed.

GCC generates a R_X86_64_PC32 PC-relative relocation for the access which
doesn't trigger the issue, but Clang emmits a R_X86_64_32S which leads to
an invalid memory access and system reboot.

Fixes: 187e91fe5e91 ("x86/boot/64/clang: Use fixup_pointer() to access 'next_early_pgt'")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190620112422.29264-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/boot/64: Fix crash if kernel image crosses page table boundary</title>
<updated>2019-06-26T05:25:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill@shutemov.name</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-20T11:23:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=81c7ed296dcd02bc0b4488246d040e03e633737a'/>
<id>81c7ed296dcd02bc0b4488246d040e03e633737a</id>
<content type='text'>
A kernel which boots in 5-level paging mode crashes in a small percentage
of cases if KASLR is enabled.

This issue was tracked down to the case when the kernel image unpacks in a
way that it crosses an 1G boundary. The crash is caused by an overrun of
the PMD page table in __startup_64() and corruption of P4D page table
allocated next to it. This particular issue is not visible with 4-level
paging as P4D page tables are not used.

But the P4D and the PUD calculation have similar problems.

The PMD index calculation is wrong due to operator precedence, which fails
to confine the PMDs in the PMD array on wrap around.

The P4D calculation for 5-level paging and the PUD calculation calculate
the first index correctly, but then blindly increment it which causes the
same issue when a kernel image is located across a 512G and for 5-level
paging across a 46T boundary.

This wrap around mishandling was introduced when these parts moved from
assembly to C.

Restore it to the correct behaviour.

Fixes: c88d71508e36 ("x86/boot/64: Rewrite startup_64() in C")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190620112345.28833-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A kernel which boots in 5-level paging mode crashes in a small percentage
of cases if KASLR is enabled.

This issue was tracked down to the case when the kernel image unpacks in a
way that it crosses an 1G boundary. The crash is caused by an overrun of
the PMD page table in __startup_64() and corruption of P4D page table
allocated next to it. This particular issue is not visible with 4-level
paging as P4D page tables are not used.

But the P4D and the PUD calculation have similar problems.

The PMD index calculation is wrong due to operator precedence, which fails
to confine the PMDs in the PMD array on wrap around.

The P4D calculation for 5-level paging and the PUD calculation calculate
the first index correctly, but then blindly increment it which causes the
same issue when a kernel image is located across a 512G and for 5-level
paging across a 46T boundary.

This wrap around mishandling was introduced when these parts moved from
assembly to C.

Restore it to the correct behaviour.

Fixes: c88d71508e36 ("x86/boot/64: Rewrite startup_64() in C")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190620112345.28833-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
