linux-stable.git/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c, branch linux-6.8.y Linux kernel stable tree x86/coco: Require seeding RNG with RDRAND on CoCo systems 2024-04-10T14:38:19+00:00 Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com 2024-03-26T16:07:35+00:00 08044b08b37528b82f70a87576c692b4e4b7716e commit 99485c4c026f024e7cb82da84c7951dbe3deb584 upstream. There are few uses of CoCo that don't rely on working cryptography and hence a working RNG. Unfortunately, the CoCo threat model means that the VM host cannot be trusted and may actively work against guests to extract secrets or manipulate computation. Since a malicious host can modify or observe nearly all inputs to guests, the only remaining source of entropy for CoCo guests is RDRAND. If RDRAND is broken -- due to CPU hardware fault -- the RNG as a whole is meant to gracefully continue on gathering entropy from other sources, but since there aren't other sources on CoCo, this is catastrophic. This is mostly a concern at boot time when initially seeding the RNG, as after that the consequences of a broken RDRAND are much more theoretical. So, try at boot to seed the RNG using 256 bits of RDRAND output. If this fails, panic(). This will also trigger if the system is booted without RDRAND, as RDRAND is essential for a safe CoCo boot. Add this deliberately to be "just a CoCo x86 driver feature" and not part of the RNG itself. Many device drivers and platforms have some desire to contribute something to the RNG, and add_device_randomness() is specifically meant for this purpose. Any driver can call it with seed data of any quality, or even garbage quality, and it can only possibly make the quality of the RNG better or have no effect, but can never make it worse. Rather than trying to build something into the core of the RNG, consider the particular CoCo issue just a CoCo issue, and therefore separate it all out into driver (well, arch/platform) code. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326160735.73531-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 99485c4c026f024e7cb82da84c7951dbe3deb584 upstream.

There are few uses of CoCo that don't rely on working cryptography and
hence a working RNG. Unfortunately, the CoCo threat model means that the
VM host cannot be trusted and may actively work against guests to
extract secrets or manipulate computation. Since a malicious host can
modify or observe nearly all inputs to guests, the only remaining source
of entropy for CoCo guests is RDRAND.

If RDRAND is broken -- due to CPU hardware fault -- the RNG as a whole
is meant to gracefully continue on gathering entropy from other sources,
but since there aren't other sources on CoCo, this is catastrophic.
This is mostly a concern at boot time when initially seeding the RNG, as
after that the consequences of a broken RDRAND are much more
theoretical.

So, try at boot to seed the RNG using 256 bits of RDRAND output. If this
fails, panic(). This will also trigger if the system is booted without
RDRAND, as RDRAND is essential for a safe CoCo boot.

Add this deliberately to be "just a CoCo x86 driver feature" and not
part of the RNG itself. Many device drivers and platforms have some
desire to contribute something to the RNG, and add_device_randomness()
is specifically meant for this purpose.

Any driver can call it with seed data of any quality, or even garbage
quality, and it can only possibly make the quality of the RNG better or
have no effect, but can never make it worse.

Rather than trying to build something into the core of the RNG, consider
the particular CoCo issue just a CoCo issue, and therefore separate it
all out into driver (well, arch/platform) code.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326160735.73531-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
x86/sev: Skip ROM range scans and validation for SEV-SNP guests 2024-04-03T13:32:51+00:00 Kevin Loughlin kevinloughlin@google.com 2024-03-13T12:15:46+00:00 bd292c03667c6ea716d6816209d666c60bb81831 commit 0f4a1e80989aca185d955fcd791d7750082044a2 upstream. SEV-SNP requires encrypted memory to be validated before access. Because the ROM memory range is not part of the e820 table, it is not pre-validated by the BIOS. Therefore, if a SEV-SNP guest kernel wishes to access this range, the guest must first validate the range. The current SEV-SNP code does indeed scan the ROM range during early boot and thus attempts to validate the ROM range in probe_roms(). However, this behavior is neither sufficient nor necessary for the following reasons: * With regards to sufficiency, if EFI_CONFIG_TABLES are not enabled and CONFIG_DMI_SCAN_MACHINE_NON_EFI_FALLBACK is set, the kernel will attempt to access the memory at SMBIOS_ENTRY_POINT_SCAN_START (which falls in the ROM range) prior to validation. For example, Project Oak Stage 0 provides a minimal guest firmware that currently meets these configuration conditions, meaning guests booting atop Oak Stage 0 firmware encounter a problematic call chain during dmi_setup() -> dmi_scan_machine() that results in a crash during boot if SEV-SNP is enabled. * With regards to necessity, SEV-SNP guests generally read garbage (which changes across boots) from the ROM range, meaning these scans are unnecessary. The guest reads garbage because the legacy ROM range is unencrypted data but is accessed via an encrypted PMD during early boot (where the PMD is marked as encrypted due to potentially mapping actually-encrypted data in other PMD-contained ranges). In one exceptional case, EISA probing treats the ROM range as unencrypted data, which is inconsistent with other probing. Continuing to allow SEV-SNP guests to use garbage and to inconsistently classify ROM range encryption status can trigger undesirable behavior. For instance, if garbage bytes appear to be a valid signature, memory may be unnecessarily reserved for the ROM range. Future code or other use cases may result in more problematic (arbitrary) behavior that should be avoided. While one solution would be to overhaul the early PMD mapping to always treat the ROM region of the PMD as unencrypted, SEV-SNP guests do not currently rely on data from the ROM region during early boot (and even if they did, they would be mostly relying on garbage data anyways). As a simpler solution, skip the ROM range scans (and the otherwise- necessary range validation) during SEV-SNP guest early boot. The potential SEV-SNP guest crash due to lack of ROM range validation is thus avoided by simply not accessing the ROM range. In most cases, skip the scans by overriding problematic x86_init functions during sme_early_init() to SNP-safe variants, which can be likened to x86_init overrides done for other platforms (ex: Xen); such overrides also avoid the spread of cc_platform_has() checks throughout the tree. In the exceptional EISA case, still use cc_platform_has() for the simplest change, given (1) checks for guest type (ex: Xen domain status) are already performed here, and (2) these checks occur in a subsys initcall instead of an x86_init function. [ bp: Massage commit message, remove "we"s. ] Fixes: 9704c07bf9f7 ("x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active") Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313121546.2964854-1-kevinloughlin@google.com Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 0f4a1e80989aca185d955fcd791d7750082044a2 upstream.

SEV-SNP requires encrypted memory to be validated before access.
Because the ROM memory range is not part of the e820 table, it is not
pre-validated by the BIOS. Therefore, if a SEV-SNP guest kernel wishes
to access this range, the guest must first validate the range.

The current SEV-SNP code does indeed scan the ROM range during early
boot and thus attempts to validate the ROM range in probe_roms().
However, this behavior is neither sufficient nor necessary for the
following reasons:

* With regards to sufficiency, if EFI_CONFIG_TABLES are not enabled and
  CONFIG_DMI_SCAN_MACHINE_NON_EFI_FALLBACK is set, the kernel will
  attempt to access the memory at SMBIOS_ENTRY_POINT_SCAN_START (which
  falls in the ROM range) prior to validation.

  For example, Project Oak Stage 0 provides a minimal guest firmware
  that currently meets these configuration conditions, meaning guests
  booting atop Oak Stage 0 firmware encounter a problematic call chain
  during dmi_setup() -> dmi_scan_machine() that results in a crash
  during boot if SEV-SNP is enabled.

* With regards to necessity, SEV-SNP guests generally read garbage
  (which changes across boots) from the ROM range, meaning these scans
  are unnecessary. The guest reads garbage because the legacy ROM range
  is unencrypted data but is accessed via an encrypted PMD during early
  boot (where the PMD is marked as encrypted due to potentially mapping
  actually-encrypted data in other PMD-contained ranges).

In one exceptional case, EISA probing treats the ROM range as
unencrypted data, which is inconsistent with other probing.

Continuing to allow SEV-SNP guests to use garbage and to inconsistently
classify ROM range encryption status can trigger undesirable behavior.
For instance, if garbage bytes appear to be a valid signature, memory
may be unnecessarily reserved for the ROM range. Future code or other
use cases may result in more problematic (arbitrary) behavior that
should be avoided.

While one solution would be to overhaul the early PMD mapping to always
treat the ROM region of the PMD as unencrypted, SEV-SNP guests do not
currently rely on data from the ROM region during early boot (and even
if they did, they would be mostly relying on garbage data anyways).

As a simpler solution, skip the ROM range scans (and the otherwise-
necessary range validation) during SEV-SNP guest early boot. The
potential SEV-SNP guest crash due to lack of ROM range validation is
thus avoided by simply not accessing the ROM range.

In most cases, skip the scans by overriding problematic x86_init
functions during sme_early_init() to SNP-safe variants, which can be
likened to x86_init overrides done for other platforms (ex: Xen); such
overrides also avoid the spread of cc_platform_has() checks throughout
the tree.

In the exceptional EISA case, still use cc_platform_has() for the
simplest change, given (1) checks for guest type (ex: Xen domain status)
are already performed here, and (2) these checks occur in a subsys
initcall instead of an x86_init function.

  [ bp: Massage commit message, remove "we"s. ]

Fixes: 9704c07bf9f7 ("x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active")
Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313121546.2964854-1-kevinloughlin@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Merge tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip 2024-01-18T21:41:48+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2024-01-18T21:41:48+00:00 b4442cadca2f97239c8b80f64af7937897b867b1 Pull x86 TDX updates from Dave Hansen: "This contains the initial support for host-side TDX support so that KVM can run TDX-protected guests. This does not include the actual KVM-side support which will come from the KVM folks. The TDX host interactions with kexec also needs to be ironed out before this is ready for prime time, so this code is currently Kconfig'd off when kexec is on. The majority of the code here is the kernel telling the TDX module which memory to protect and handing some additional memory over to it to use to store TDX module metadata. That sounds pretty simple, but the TDX architecture is rather flexible and it takes quite a bit of back-and-forth to say, "just protect all memory, please." There is also some code tacked on near the end of the series to handle a hardware erratum. The erratum can make software bugs such as a kernel write to TDX-protected memory cause a machine check and masquerade as a real hardware failure. The erratum handling watches out for these and tries to provide nicer user errors" * tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (21 commits) x86/virt/tdx: Make TDX host depend on X86_MCE x86/virt/tdx: Disable TDX host support when kexec is enabled Documentation/x86: Add documentation for TDX host support x86/mce: Differentiate real hardware #MCs from TDX erratum ones x86/cpu: Detect TDX partial write machine check erratum x86/virt/tdx: Handle TDX interaction with sleep and hibernation x86/virt/tdx: Initialize all TDMRs x86/virt/tdx: Configure global KeyID on all packages x86/virt/tdx: Configure TDX module with the TDMRs and global KeyID x86/virt/tdx: Designate reserved areas for all TDMRs x86/virt/tdx: Allocate and set up PAMTs for TDMRs x86/virt/tdx: Fill out TDMRs to cover all TDX memory regions x86/virt/tdx: Add placeholder to construct TDMRs to cover all TDX memory regions x86/virt/tdx: Get module global metadata for module initialization x86/virt/tdx: Use all system memory when initializing TDX module as TDX memory x86/virt/tdx: Add skeleton to enable TDX on demand x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL error printing for module initialization x86/virt/tdx: Handle SEAMCALL no entropy error in common code x86/virt/tdx: Make INTEL_TDX_HOST depend on X86_X2APIC x86/virt/tdx: Define TDX supported page sizes as macros ... 
Pull x86 TDX updates from Dave Hansen:
 "This contains the initial support for host-side TDX support so that
  KVM can run TDX-protected guests. This does not include the actual
  KVM-side support which will come from the KVM folks. The TDX host
  interactions with kexec also needs to be ironed out before this is
  ready for prime time, so this code is currently Kconfig'd off when
  kexec is on.

  The majority of the code here is the kernel telling the TDX module
  which memory to protect and handing some additional memory over to it
  to use to store TDX module metadata. That sounds pretty simple, but
  the TDX architecture is rather flexible and it takes quite a bit of
  back-and-forth to say, "just protect all memory, please."

  There is also some code tacked on near the end of the series to handle
  a hardware erratum. The erratum can make software bugs such as a
  kernel write to TDX-protected memory cause a machine check and
  masquerade as a real hardware failure. The erratum handling watches
  out for these and tries to provide nicer user errors"

* tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (21 commits)
  x86/virt/tdx: Make TDX host depend on X86_MCE
  x86/virt/tdx: Disable TDX host support when kexec is enabled
  Documentation/x86: Add documentation for TDX host support
  x86/mce: Differentiate real hardware #MCs from TDX erratum ones
  x86/cpu: Detect TDX partial write machine check erratum
  x86/virt/tdx: Handle TDX interaction with sleep and hibernation
  x86/virt/tdx: Initialize all TDMRs
  x86/virt/tdx: Configure global KeyID on all packages
  x86/virt/tdx: Configure TDX module with the TDMRs and global KeyID
  x86/virt/tdx: Designate reserved areas for all TDMRs
  x86/virt/tdx: Allocate and set up PAMTs for TDMRs
  x86/virt/tdx: Fill out TDMRs to cover all TDX memory regions
  x86/virt/tdx: Add placeholder to construct TDMRs to cover all TDX memory regions
  x86/virt/tdx: Get module global metadata for module initialization
  x86/virt/tdx: Use all system memory when initializing TDX module as TDX memory
  x86/virt/tdx: Add skeleton to enable TDX on demand
  x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL error printing for module initialization
  x86/virt/tdx: Handle SEAMCALL no entropy error in common code
  x86/virt/tdx: Make INTEL_TDX_HOST depend on X86_X2APIC
  x86/virt/tdx: Define TDX supported page sizes as macros
  ...
x86/virt/tdx: Use all system memory when initializing TDX module as TDX memory 2023-12-08T17:12:16+00:00 Kai Huang kai.huang@intel.com 2023-12-08T17:07:27+00:00 abe8dbab8f9f8370c26e7b79b49ed795c1b6b70f Start to transit out the "multi-steps" to initialize the TDX module. TDX provides increased levels of memory confidentiality and integrity. This requires special hardware support for features like memory encryption and storage of memory integrity checksums. Not all memory satisfies these requirements. As a result, TDX introduced the concept of a "Convertible Memory Region" (CMR). During boot, the firmware builds a list of all of the memory ranges which can provide the TDX security guarantees. The list of these ranges is available to the kernel by querying the TDX module. CMRs tell the kernel which memory is TDX compatible. The kernel needs to build a list of memory regions (out of CMRs) as "TDX-usable" memory and pass them to the TDX module. Once this is done, those "TDX-usable" memory regions are fixed during module's lifetime. To keep things simple, assume that all TDX-protected memory will come from the page allocator. Make sure all pages in the page allocator *are* TDX-usable memory. As TDX-usable memory is a fixed configuration, take a snapshot of the memory configuration from memblocks at the time of module initialization (memblocks are modified on memory hotplug). This snapshot is used to enable TDX support for *this* memory configuration only. Use a memory hotplug notifier to ensure that no other RAM can be added outside of this configuration. This approach requires all memblock memory regions at the time of module initialization to be TDX convertible memory to work, otherwise module initialization will fail in a later SEAMCALL when passing those regions to the module. This approach works when all boot-time "system RAM" is TDX convertible memory and no non-TDX-convertible memory is hot-added to the core-mm before module initialization. For instance, on the first generation of TDX machines, both CXL memory and NVDIMM are not TDX convertible memory. Using kmem driver to hot-add any CXL memory or NVDIMM to the core-mm before module initialization will result in failure to initialize the module. The SEAMCALL error code will be available in the dmesg to help user to understand the failure. Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231208170740.53979-7-dave.hansen%40intel.com 
Start to transit out the "multi-steps" to initialize the TDX module.

TDX provides increased levels of memory confidentiality and integrity.
This requires special hardware support for features like memory
encryption and storage of memory integrity checksums.  Not all memory
satisfies these requirements.

As a result, TDX introduced the concept of a "Convertible Memory Region"
(CMR).  During boot, the firmware builds a list of all of the memory
ranges which can provide the TDX security guarantees.  The list of these
ranges is available to the kernel by querying the TDX module.

CMRs tell the kernel which memory is TDX compatible.  The kernel needs
to build a list of memory regions (out of CMRs) as "TDX-usable" memory
and pass them to the TDX module.  Once this is done, those "TDX-usable"
memory regions are fixed during module's lifetime.

To keep things simple, assume that all TDX-protected memory will come
from the page allocator.  Make sure all pages in the page allocator
*are* TDX-usable memory.

As TDX-usable memory is a fixed configuration, take a snapshot of the
memory configuration from memblocks at the time of module initialization
(memblocks are modified on memory hotplug).  This snapshot is used to
enable TDX support for *this* memory configuration only.  Use a memory
hotplug notifier to ensure that no other RAM can be added outside of
this configuration.

This approach requires all memblock memory regions at the time of module
initialization to be TDX convertible memory to work, otherwise module
initialization will fail in a later SEAMCALL when passing those regions
to the module.  This approach works when all boot-time "system RAM" is
TDX convertible memory and no non-TDX-convertible memory is hot-added
to the core-mm before module initialization.

For instance, on the first generation of TDX machines, both CXL memory
and NVDIMM are not TDX convertible memory.  Using kmem driver to hot-add
any CXL memory or NVDIMM to the core-mm before module initialization
will result in failure to initialize the module.  The SEAMCALL error
code will be available in the dmesg to help user to understand the
failure.

Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231208170740.53979-7-dave.hansen%40intel.com
x86/setup: Make relocated_ramdisk a local variable of relocate_initrd() 2023-11-13T08:09:37+00:00 Yuntao Wang ytcoode@gmail.com 2023-11-13T03:40:26+00:00 f7a25cf1d4707da39b80df96a3be8a8abd07c35b After 0b62f6cb0773 ("x86/microcode/32: Move early loading after paging enable"), the global variable relocated_ramdisk is no longer used anywhere except for the relocate_initrd() function. Make it a local variable of that function. Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231113034026.130679-1-ytcoode@gmail.com 
After

  0b62f6cb0773 ("x86/microcode/32: Move early loading after paging enable"),

the global variable relocated_ramdisk is no longer used anywhere except
for the relocate_initrd() function. Make it a local variable of that
function.

Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231113034026.130679-1-ytcoode@gmail.com
Merge tag 'tty-6.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty 2023-11-04T01:44:25+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2023-11-04T01:44:25+00:00 1f24458a1071f006e3f7449c08ae0f12af493923 Pull tty and serial updates from Greg KH: "Here is the big set of tty/serial driver changes for 6.7-rc1. Included in here are: - console/vgacon cleanups and removals from Arnd - tty core and n_tty cleanups from Jiri - lots of 8250 driver updates and cleanups - sc16is7xx serial driver updates - dt binding updates - first set of port lock wrapers from Thomas for the printk fixes coming in future releases - other small serial and tty core cleanups and updates All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues" * tag 'tty-6.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty: (193 commits) serdev: Replace custom code with device_match_acpi_handle() serdev: Simplify devm_serdev_device_open() function serdev: Make use of device_set_node() tty: n_gsm: add copyright Siemens Mobility GmbH tty: n_gsm: fix race condition in status line change on dead connections serial: core: Fix runtime PM handling for pending tx vgacon: fix mips/sibyte build regression dt-bindings: serial: drop unsupported samsung bindings tty: serial: samsung: drop earlycon support for unsupported platforms tty: 8250: Add note for PX-835 tty: 8250: Fix IS-200 PCI ID comment tty: 8250: Add Brainboxes Oxford Semiconductor-based quirks tty: 8250: Add support for Intashield IX cards tty: 8250: Add support for additional Brainboxes PX cards tty: 8250: Fix up PX-803/PX-857 tty: 8250: Fix port count of PX-257 tty: 8250: Add support for Intashield IS-100 tty: 8250: Add support for Brainboxes UP cards tty: 8250: Add support for additional Brainboxes UC cards tty: 8250: Remove UC-257 and UC-431 ... 
Pull tty and serial updates from Greg KH:
 "Here is the big set of tty/serial driver changes for 6.7-rc1. Included
  in here are:

   - console/vgacon cleanups and removals from Arnd

   - tty core and n_tty cleanups from Jiri

   - lots of 8250 driver updates and cleanups

   - sc16is7xx serial driver updates

   - dt binding updates

   - first set of port lock wrapers from Thomas for the printk fixes
     coming in future releases

   - other small serial and tty core cleanups and updates

  All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
  issues"

* tag 'tty-6.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty: (193 commits)
  serdev: Replace custom code with device_match_acpi_handle()
  serdev: Simplify devm_serdev_device_open() function
  serdev: Make use of device_set_node()
  tty: n_gsm: add copyright Siemens Mobility GmbH
  tty: n_gsm: fix race condition in status line change on dead connections
  serial: core: Fix runtime PM handling for pending tx
  vgacon: fix mips/sibyte build regression
  dt-bindings: serial: drop unsupported samsung bindings
  tty: serial: samsung: drop earlycon support for unsupported platforms
  tty: 8250: Add note for PX-835
  tty: 8250: Fix IS-200 PCI ID comment
  tty: 8250: Add Brainboxes Oxford Semiconductor-based quirks
  tty: 8250: Add support for Intashield IX cards
  tty: 8250: Add support for additional Brainboxes PX cards
  tty: 8250: Fix up PX-803/PX-857
  tty: 8250: Fix port count of PX-257
  tty: 8250: Add support for Intashield IS-100
  tty: 8250: Add support for Brainboxes UP cards
  tty: 8250: Add support for additional Brainboxes UC cards
  tty: 8250: Remove UC-257 and UC-431
  ...
Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-11-02-14-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm 2023-11-03T06:53:31+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2023-11-03T06:53:31+00:00 8f6f76a6a29f36d2f3e4510d0bde5046672f6924 Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton: "As usual, lots of singleton and doubleton patches all over the tree and there's little I can say which isn't in the individual changelogs. The lengthier patch series are - 'kdump: use generic functions to simplify crashkernel reservation in arch', from Baoquan He. This is mainly cleanups and consolidation of the 'crashkernel=' kernel parameter handling - After much discussion, David Laight's 'minmax: Relax type checks in min() and max()' is here. Hopefully reduces some typecasting and the use of min_t() and max_t() - A group of patches from Oleg Nesterov which clean up and slightly fix our handling of reads from /proc/PID/task/... and which remove task_struct.thread_group" * tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-11-02-14-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (64 commits) scripts/gdb/vmalloc: disable on no-MMU scripts/gdb: fix usage of MOD_TEXT not defined when CONFIG_MODULES=n .mailmap: add address mapping for Tomeu Vizoso mailmap: update email address for Claudiu Beznea tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh: lower the ptrace permissions .mailmap: map Benjamin Poirier's address scripts/gdb: add lx_current support for riscv ocfs2: fix a spelling typo in comment proc: test ProtectionKey in proc-empty-vm test proc: fix proc-empty-vm test with vsyscall fs/proc/base.c: remove unneeded semicolon do_io_accounting: use sig->stats_lock do_io_accounting: use __for_each_thread() ocfs2: replace BUG_ON() at ocfs2_num_free_extents() with ocfs2_error() ocfs2: fix a typo in a comment scripts/show_delta: add __main__ judgement before main code treewide: mark stuff as __ro_after_init fs: ocfs2: check status values proc: test /proc/${pid}/statm compiler.h: move __is_constexpr() to compiler.h ... 
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
 "As usual, lots of singleton and doubleton patches all over the tree
  and there's little I can say which isn't in the individual changelogs.

  The lengthier patch series are

   - 'kdump: use generic functions to simplify crashkernel reservation
     in arch', from Baoquan He. This is mainly cleanups and
     consolidation of the 'crashkernel=' kernel parameter handling

   - After much discussion, David Laight's 'minmax: Relax type checks in
     min() and max()' is here. Hopefully reduces some typecasting and
     the use of min_t() and max_t()

   - A group of patches from Oleg Nesterov which clean up and slightly
     fix our handling of reads from /proc/PID/task/... and which remove
     task_struct.thread_group"

* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-11-02-14-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (64 commits)
  scripts/gdb/vmalloc: disable on no-MMU
  scripts/gdb: fix usage of MOD_TEXT not defined when CONFIG_MODULES=n
  .mailmap: add address mapping for Tomeu Vizoso
  mailmap: update email address for Claudiu Beznea
  tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh: lower the ptrace permissions
  .mailmap: map Benjamin Poirier's address
  scripts/gdb: add lx_current support for riscv
  ocfs2: fix a spelling typo in comment
  proc: test ProtectionKey in proc-empty-vm test
  proc: fix proc-empty-vm test with vsyscall
  fs/proc/base.c: remove unneeded semicolon
  do_io_accounting: use sig->stats_lock
  do_io_accounting: use __for_each_thread()
  ocfs2: replace BUG_ON() at ocfs2_num_free_extents() with ocfs2_error()
  ocfs2: fix a typo in a comment
  scripts/show_delta: add __main__ judgement before main code
  treewide: mark stuff as __ro_after_init
  fs: ocfs2: check status values
  proc: test /proc/${pid}/statm
  compiler.h: move __is_constexpr() to compiler.h
  ...
Merge tag 'x86-mm-2023-10-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip 2023-10-31T01:40:57+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2023-10-31T01:40:57+00:00 f0d25b5d0f8ef0ad35f1beff17da5843279d47a1 Pull x86 mm handling updates from Ingo Molnar: - Add new NX-stack self-test - Improve NUMA partial-CFMWS handling - Fix #VC handler bugs resulting in SEV-SNP boot failures - Drop the 4MB memory size restriction on minimal NUMA nodes - Reorganize headers a bit, in preparation to header dependency reduction efforts - Misc cleanups & fixes * tag 'x86-mm-2023-10-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm: Drop the 4 MB restriction on minimal NUMA node memory size selftests/x86/lam: Zero out buffer for readlink() x86/sev: Drop unneeded #include x86/sev: Move sev_setup_arch() to mem_encrypt.c x86/tdx: Replace deprecated strncpy() with strtomem_pad() selftests/x86/mm: Add new test that userspace stack is in fact NX x86/sev: Make boot_ghcb_page[] static x86/boot: Move x86_cache_alignment initialization to correct spot x86/sev-es: Set x86_virt_bits to the correct value straight away, instead of a two-phase approach x86/sev-es: Allow copy_from_kernel_nofault() in earlier boot x86_64: Show CR4.PSE on auxiliaries like on BSP x86/iommu/docs: Update AMD IOMMU specification document URL x86/sev/docs: Update document URL in amd-memory-encryption.rst x86/mm: Move arch_memory_failure() and arch_is_platform_page() definitions from <asm/processor.h> to <asm/pgtable.h> ACPI/NUMA: Apply SRAT proximity domain to entire CFMWS window x86/numa: Introduce numa_fill_memblks() 
Pull x86 mm handling updates from Ingo Molnar:

 - Add new NX-stack self-test

 - Improve NUMA partial-CFMWS handling

 - Fix #VC handler bugs resulting in SEV-SNP boot failures

 - Drop the 4MB memory size restriction on minimal NUMA nodes

 - Reorganize headers a bit, in preparation to header dependency
   reduction efforts

 - Misc cleanups & fixes

* tag 'x86-mm-2023-10-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mm: Drop the 4 MB restriction on minimal NUMA node memory size
  selftests/x86/lam: Zero out buffer for readlink()
  x86/sev: Drop unneeded #include
  x86/sev: Move sev_setup_arch() to mem_encrypt.c
  x86/tdx: Replace deprecated strncpy() with strtomem_pad()
  selftests/x86/mm: Add new test that userspace stack is in fact NX
  x86/sev: Make boot_ghcb_page[] static
  x86/boot: Move x86_cache_alignment initialization to correct spot
  x86/sev-es: Set x86_virt_bits to the correct value straight away, instead of a two-phase approach
  x86/sev-es: Allow copy_from_kernel_nofault() in earlier boot
  x86_64: Show CR4.PSE on auxiliaries like on BSP
  x86/iommu/docs: Update AMD IOMMU specification document URL
  x86/sev/docs: Update document URL in amd-memory-encryption.rst
  x86/mm: Move arch_memory_failure() and arch_is_platform_page() definitions from <asm/processor.h> to <asm/pgtable.h>
  ACPI/NUMA: Apply SRAT proximity domain to entire CFMWS window
  x86/numa: Introduce numa_fill_memblks()
Merge tag 'x86_platform_for_6.7_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip 2023-10-30T22:32:48+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2023-10-30T22:32:48+00:00 f155f3b3ed1af23884ffaffe8a669722b87ac9d6 Pull x86 platform updates from Borislav Petkov: - Make sure PCI function 4 IDs of AMD family 0x19, models 0x60-0x7f are actually used in the amd_nb.c enumeration - Add support for extracting NUMA information from devicetree for Hyper-V usages - Add PCI device IDs for the new AMD MI300 AI accelerators - Annotate an array in struct uv_rtc_timer_head with the new __counted_by attribute - Rework UV's NMI action parameter handling * tag 'x86_platform_for_6.7_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/amd_nb: Use Family 19h Models 60h-7Fh Function 4 IDs x86/numa: Add Devicetree support x86/of: Move the x86_flattree_get_config() call out of x86_dtb_init() x86/amd_nb: Add AMD Family MI300 PCI IDs x86/platform/uv: Annotate struct uv_rtc_timer_head with __counted_by x86/platform/uv: Rework NMI "action" modparam handling 
Pull x86 platform updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Make sure PCI function 4 IDs of AMD family 0x19, models 0x60-0x7f are
   actually used in the amd_nb.c enumeration

 - Add support for extracting NUMA information from devicetree for
   Hyper-V usages

 - Add PCI device IDs for the new AMD MI300 AI accelerators

 - Annotate an array in struct uv_rtc_timer_head with the new
   __counted_by attribute

 - Rework UV's NMI action parameter handling

* tag 'x86_platform_for_6.7_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/amd_nb: Use Family 19h Models 60h-7Fh Function 4 IDs
  x86/numa: Add Devicetree support
  x86/of: Move the x86_flattree_get_config() call out of x86_dtb_init()
  x86/amd_nb: Add AMD Family MI300 PCI IDs
  x86/platform/uv: Annotate struct uv_rtc_timer_head with __counted_by
  x86/platform/uv: Rework NMI "action" modparam handling
vgacon: remove screen_info dependency 2023-10-17T08:17:02+00:00 Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de 2023-10-09T21:18:41+00:00 acfc788233263fee9413434d39d4201a8de592ba The vga console driver is fairly self-contained, and only used by architectures that explicitly initialize the screen_info settings. Chance every instance that picks the vga console by setting conswitchp to call a function instead, and pass a reference to the screen_info there. Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> Acked-by: Khalid Azzi <khalid@gonehiking.org> Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231009211845.3136536-6-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
The vga console driver is fairly self-contained, and only used by
architectures that explicitly initialize the screen_info settings.

Chance every instance that picks the vga console by setting conswitchp
to call a function instead, and pass a reference to the screen_info
there.

Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Khalid Azzi <khalid@gonehiking.org>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231009211845.3136536-6-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>