linux-stable.git/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c, branch linux-3.16.y

x86, hibernate: Fix nosave_regions setup for hibernation

2019-02-11T17:53:27+00:00

commit cc55f7537db6af371e9c1c6a71161ee40f918824 upstream.

On 32bit systems, nosave_regions(non RAM areas) located between
max_low_pfn and max_pfn are not excluded from hibernation snapshot
currently, which may result in a machine check exception when
trying to access these unsafe regions during hibernation:

[  612.800453] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[  612.805786] mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 0: Machine Check Exception: 5 Bank 6: fe00000000801136
[  612.814344] mce: [Hardware Error]: RIP !INEXACT! 60:<00000000d90be566> {swsusp_save+0x436/0x560}
[  612.823167] mce: [Hardware Error]: TSC 1f5939fe276 ADDR dd000000 MISC 30e0000086
[  612.830677] mce: [Hardware Error]: PROCESSOR 0:306c3 TIME 1529487426 SOCKET 0 APIC 0 microcode 24
[  612.839581] mce: [Hardware Error]: Run the above through 'mcelog --ascii'
[  612.846394] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Processor context corrupt
[  612.853380] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal machine check
[  612.858978] Kernel Offset: 0x18000000 from 0xc1000000 (relocation range: 0xc0000000-0xf7ffdfff)

This is because on 32bit systems, pages above max_low_pfn are regarded
as high memeory, and accessing unsafe pages might cause expected MCE.
On the problematic 32bit system, there are reserved memory above low
memory, which triggered the MCE:

e820 memory mapping:
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009d7ff] usable
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009d800-0x000000000009ffff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000e0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000d160cfff] usable
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d160d000-0x00000000d1613fff] ACPI NVS
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d1614000-0x00000000d1a44fff] usable
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d1a45000-0x00000000d1ecffff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d1ed0000-0x00000000d7eeafff] usable
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d7eeb000-0x00000000d7ffffff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d8000000-0x00000000d875ffff] usable
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d8760000-0x00000000d87fffff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d8800000-0x00000000d8fadfff] usable
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d8fae000-0x00000000d8ffffff] ACPI data
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000d9000000-0x00000000da71bfff] usable
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000da71c000-0x00000000da7fffff] ACPI NVS
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000da800000-0x00000000dbb8bfff] usable
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000dbb8c000-0x00000000dbffffff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000dd000000-0x00000000df1fffff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000f8000000-0x00000000fbffffff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fec00000-0x00000000fec00fff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed00000-0x00000000fed03fff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed1c000-0x00000000fed1ffff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fee00000-0x00000000fee00fff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000ff000000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved
[    0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000041edfffff] usable

Fix this problem by changing pfn limit from max_low_pfn to max_pfn.
This fix does not impact 64bit system because on 64bit max_low_pfn
is the same as max_pfn.

Signed-off-by: Zhimin Gu 
Acked-by: Pavel Machek 
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu 
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki 
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved

2018-10-03T03:10:00+00:00

commit 10a70416e1f067f6c4efda6ffd8ea96002ac4223 upstream.

The L1TF workaround doesn't make any attempt to mitigate speculate accesses
to the first physical page for zeroed PTEs. Normally it only contains some
data from the early real mode BIOS.

It's not entirely clear that the first page is reserved in all
configurations, so add an extra reservation call to make sure it is really
reserved. In most configurations (e.g.  with the standard reservations)
it's likely a nop.

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Acked-by: Dave Hansen 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

x86/kaiser: Move feature detection up

2018-01-09T00:35:19+00:00

... before the first use of kaiser_enabled as otherwise funky
things happen:

  about to get started...
  (XEN) d0v0 Unhandled page fault fault/trap [#14, ec=0000]
  (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff88022a449090:
  (XEN)  L4[0x110] = 0000000229e0e067 0000000000001e0e
  (XEN)  L3[0x008] = 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN) domain_crash_sync called from entry.S: fault at ffff82d08033fd08
  entry.o#create_bounce_frame+0x135/0x14d
  (XEN) Domain 0 (vcpu#0) crashed on cpu#0:
  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.9.1_02-3.21  x86_64  debug=n   Not tainted ]----
  (XEN) CPU:    0
  (XEN) RIP:    e033:[]
  (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000000286   EM: 1   CONTEXT: pv guest (d0v0)

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

x86/setup: Fix low identity map for >= 2GB kernel range

2015-12-13T17:49:13+00:00

commit 68accac392d859d24adcf1be3a90e41f978bd54c upstream.

The commit f5f3497cad8c extended the low identity mapping. However, if
the kernel uses more than 2 GB (VMSPLIT_2G_OPT or VMSPLIT_1G memory
split), the normal memory mapping is overwritten by the low identity
mapping causing a crash. To avoid overwritting, limit the low identity
map to cover only memory before kernel range (PAGE_OFFSET).

Fixes: f5f3497cad8c "x86/setup: Extend low identity map to cover whole kernel range
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Mazur 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Laszlo Ersek 
Cc: Matt Fleming 
Cc: Paolo Bonzini 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1446815916-22105-1-git-send-email-krzysiek@podlesie.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

x86/setup: Extend low identity map to cover whole kernel range

2015-12-13T17:49:13+00:00

commit f5f3497cad8c8416a74b9aaceb127908755d020a upstream.

On 32-bit systems, the initial_page_table is reused by
efi_call_phys_prolog as an identity map to call
SetVirtualAddressMap.  efi_call_phys_prolog takes care of
converting the current CPU's GDT to a physical address too.

For PAE kernels the identity mapping is achieved by aliasing the
first PDPE for the kernel memory mapping into the first PDPE
of initial_page_table.  This makes the EFI stub's trick "just work".

However, for non-PAE kernels there is no guarantee that the identity
mapping in the initial_page_table extends as far as the GDT; in this
case, accesses to the GDT will cause a page fault (which quickly becomes
a triple fault).  Fix this by copying the kernel mappings from
swapper_pg_dir to initial_page_table twice, both at PAGE_OFFSET and at
identity mapping.

For some reason, this is only reproducible with QEMU's dynamic translation
mode, and not for example with KVM.  However, even under KVM one can clearly
see that the page table is bogus:

    $ qemu-system-i386 -pflash OVMF.fd -M q35 vmlinuz0 -s -S -daemonize
    $ gdb
    (gdb) target remote localhost:1234
    (gdb) hb *0x02858f6f
    Hardware assisted breakpoint 1 at 0x2858f6f
    (gdb) c
    Continuing.

    Breakpoint 1, 0x02858f6f in ?? ()
    (gdb) monitor info registers
    ...
    GDT=     0724e000 000000ff
    IDT=     fffbb000 000007ff
    CR0=0005003b CR2=ff896000 CR3=032b7000 CR4=00000690
    ...

The page directory is sane:

    (gdb) x/4wx 0x32b7000
    0x32b7000:	0x03398063	0x03399063	0x0339a063	0x0339b063
    (gdb) x/4wx 0x3398000
    0x3398000:	0x00000163	0x00001163	0x00002163	0x00003163
    (gdb) x/4wx 0x3399000
    0x3399000:	0x00400003	0x00401003	0x00402003	0x00403003

but our particular page directory entry is empty:

    (gdb) x/1wx 0x32b7000 + (0x724e000 >> 22) * 4
    0x32b7070:	0x00000000

[ It appears that you can skate past this issue if you don't receive
  any interrupts while the bogus GDT pointer is loaded, or if you avoid
  reloading the segment registers in general.

  Andy Lutomirski provides some additional insight:

   "AFAICT it's entirely permissible for the GDTR and/or LDT
    descriptor to point to unmapped memory.  Any attempt to use them
    (segment loads, interrupts, IRET, etc) will try to access that memory
    as if the access came from CPL 0 and, if the access fails, will
    generate a valid page fault with CR2 pointing into the GDT or
    LDT."

  Up until commit 23a0d4e8fa6d ("efi: Disable interrupts around EFI
  calls, not in the epilog/prolog calls") interrupts were disabled
  around the prolog and epilog calls, and the functional GDT was
  re-installed before interrupts were re-enabled.

  Which explains why no one has hit this issue until now. ]

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Reported-by: Laszlo Ersek 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming 
[ Updated changelog. ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

cma: add placement specifier for "cma=" kernel parameter

2014-06-04T23:53:57+00:00

Currently, "cma=" kernel parameter is used to specify the size of CMA,
but we can't specify where it is located.  We want to locate CMA below
4GB for devices only supporting 32-bit addressing on 64-bit systems
without iommu.

This enables to specify the placement of CMA by extending "cma=" kernel
parameter.

Examples:
 1. locate 64MB CMA below 4GB by "cma=64M@0-4G"
 2. locate 64MB CMA exact at 512MB by "cma=64M@512M"

Note that the DMA contiguous memory allocator on x86 assumes that
page_address() works for the pages to allocate.  So this change requires
to limit end address of contiguous memory area upto max_pfn_mapped to
prevent from locating it on highmem area by the argument of
dma_contiguous_reserve().

Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita 
Cc: Marek Szyprowski 
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Cc: David Woodhouse 
Cc: Don Dutile 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Yinghai Lu 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'x86-nuke-platforms-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2014-04-02T20:15:58+00:00

Pull x86 old platform removal from Peter Anvin:
 "This patchset removes support for several completely obsolete
  platforms, where the maintainers either have completely vanished or
  acked the removal.  For some of them it is questionable if there even
  exists functional specimens of the hardware"

Geert Uytterhoeven apparently thought this was a April Fool's pull request ;)

* 'x86-nuke-platforms-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86, platforms: Remove NUMAQ
  x86, platforms: Remove SGI Visual Workstation
  x86, apic: Remove support for IBM Summit/EXA chipset
  x86, apic: Remove support for ia32-based Unisys ES7000

Merge remote-tracking branch 'tip/x86/urgent' into efi-for-mingo

2014-03-05T17:31:41+00:00

Conflicts:
	arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h

x86/efi: Quirk out SGI UV

2014-03-04T23:43:33+00:00

Alex reported hitting the following BUG after the EFI 1:1 virtual
mapping work was merged,

 kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/init_64.c:351!
 invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
 Call Trace:
  [] init_extra_mapping_uc+0x13/0x15
  [] uv_system_init+0x22b/0x124b
  [] ? clockevents_register_device+0x138/0x13d
  [] ? setup_APIC_timer+0xc5/0xc7
  [] ? clockevent_delta2ns+0xb/0xd
  [] ? setup_boot_APIC_clock+0x4a8/0x4b7
  [] ? printk+0x72/0x74
  [] native_smp_prepare_cpus+0x389/0x3d6
  [] kernel_init_freeable+0xb7/0x1fb
  [] ? rest_init+0x74/0x74
  [] kernel_init+0x9/0xff
  [] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
  [] ? rest_init+0x74/0x74

Getting this thing to work with the new mapping scheme would need more
work, so automatically switch to the old memmap layout for SGI UV.

Acked-by: Russ Anderson 
Cc: Alex Thorlton 
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming

efi: Move facility flags to struct efi

2014-03-04T16:16:16+00:00

As we grow support for more EFI architectures they're going to want the
ability to query which EFI features are available on the running system.
Instead of storing this information in an architecture-specific place,
stick it in the global 'struct efi', which is already the central
location for EFI state.

While we're at it, let's change the return value of efi_enabled() to be
bool and replace all references to 'facility' with 'feature', which is
the usual word used to describe the attributes of the running system.

Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming