<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c, branch linux-3.16.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code</title>
<updated>2019-05-22T22:15:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-25T18:33:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=041dfaa5383be85a3162d1e70fac23bde3839524'/>
<id>041dfaa5383be85a3162d1e70fac23bde3839524</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ff16701a29cba3aafa0bd1656d766813b2d0a811 upstream.

Move the conditional invocation of __switch_to_xtra() into an inline
function so the logic can be shared between 32 and 64 bit.

Remove the handthrough of the TSS pointer and retrieve the pointer directly
in the bitmap handling function. Use this_cpu_ptr() instead of the
per_cpu() indirection.

This is a preparatory change so integration of conditional indirect branch
speculation optimization happens only in one place.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Asit Mallick &lt;asit.k.mallick@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman9394@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Stewart &lt;david.c.stewart@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.280855518@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Use init_tss instead of cpu_tss_rw
 - __switch_to() still uses the tss variable, so don't delete it
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ff16701a29cba3aafa0bd1656d766813b2d0a811 upstream.

Move the conditional invocation of __switch_to_xtra() into an inline
function so the logic can be shared between 32 and 64 bit.

Remove the handthrough of the TSS pointer and retrieve the pointer directly
in the bitmap handling function. Use this_cpu_ptr() instead of the
per_cpu() indirection.

This is a preparatory change so integration of conditional indirect branch
speculation optimization happens only in one place.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey.schaufler@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Asit Mallick &lt;asit.k.mallick@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman9394@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Stewart &lt;david.c.stewart@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.280855518@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Use init_tss instead of cpu_tss_rw
 - __switch_to() still uses the tss variable, so don't delete it
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/process: Don't mix user/kernel regs in 64bit __show_regs()</title>
<updated>2018-12-16T22:09:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-31T19:41:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d3eb8015ec4bd5d1afc01cabf9c0a72285173e21'/>
<id>d3eb8015ec4bd5d1afc01cabf9c0a72285173e21</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9fe6299dde587788f245e9f7a5a1b296fad4e8c7 upstream.

When the kernel.print-fatal-signals sysctl has been enabled, a simple
userspace crash will cause the kernel to write a crash dump that contains,
among other things, the kernel gsbase into dmesg.

As suggested by Andy, limit output to pt_regs, FS_BASE and KERNEL_GS_BASE
in this case.

This also moves the bitness-specific logic from show_regs() into
process_{32,64}.c.

Fixes: 45807a1df9f5 ("vdso: print fatal signals")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180831194151.123586-1-jannh@google.com
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Keep using user_mode_vm() to in 32-bit show_regs()
 - Also update call to __show_regs() in kmemcheck
 - Don't add redundant rdmsrl()s in 64-bit __show_regs()
 - Adjust filenames, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9fe6299dde587788f245e9f7a5a1b296fad4e8c7 upstream.

When the kernel.print-fatal-signals sysctl has been enabled, a simple
userspace crash will cause the kernel to write a crash dump that contains,
among other things, the kernel gsbase into dmesg.

As suggested by Andy, limit output to pt_regs, FS_BASE and KERNEL_GS_BASE
in this case.

This also moves the bitness-specific logic from show_regs() into
process_{32,64}.c.

Fixes: 45807a1df9f5 ("vdso: print fatal signals")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180831194151.123586-1-jannh@google.com
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Keep using user_mode_vm() to in 32-bit show_regs()
 - Also update call to __show_regs() in kmemcheck
 - Don't add redundant rdmsrl()s in 64-bit __show_regs()
 - Adjust filenames, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/process: Re-export start_thread()</title>
<updated>2018-12-16T22:08:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rian Hunter</name>
<email>rian@alum.mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-19T23:08:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f346ea7c7416fb302ebe9d6b349ad8c2d366d03c'/>
<id>f346ea7c7416fb302ebe9d6b349ad8c2d366d03c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dc76803e57cc86589c4efcb5362918f9b0c0436f upstream.

The consolidation of the start_thread() functions removed the export
unintentionally. This breaks binfmt handlers built as a module.

Add it back.

Fixes: e634d8fc792c ("x86-64: merge the standard and compat start_thread() functions")
Signed-off-by: Rian Hunter &lt;rian@alum.mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180819230854.7275-1-rian@alum.mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit dc76803e57cc86589c4efcb5362918f9b0c0436f upstream.

The consolidation of the start_thread() functions removed the export
unintentionally. This breaks binfmt handlers built as a module.

Add it back.

Fixes: e634d8fc792c ("x86-64: merge the standard and compat start_thread() functions")
Signed-off-by: Rian Hunter &lt;rian@alum.mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180819230854.7275-1-rian@alum.mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KAISER: Kernel Address Isolation</title>
<updated>2018-01-09T00:35:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Fellner</name>
<email>richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-04T12:26:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f9a1666f97b32836058839ab03f49daef0528ca0'/>
<id>f9a1666f97b32836058839ab03f49daef0528ca0</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch introduces our implementation of KAISER (Kernel Address Isolation to
have Side-channels Efficiently Removed), a kernel isolation technique to close
hardware side channels on kernel address information.

More information about the patch can be found on:

        https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER

From: Richard Fellner &lt;richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at&gt;
From: Daniel Gruss &lt;daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Subject: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel in user mode
Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 14:26:50 +0200
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=149390087310405&amp;w=2
Kaiser-4.10-SHA1: c4b1831d44c6144d3762ccc72f0c4e71a0c713e5

To: &lt;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org&gt;
To: &lt;kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;clementine.maurice@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: &lt;moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Michael Schwarz &lt;michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Richard Fellner &lt;richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;anders.fogh@gdata-adan.de&gt;

After several recent works [1,2,3] KASLR on x86_64 was basically
considered dead by many researchers. We have been working on an
efficient but effective fix for this problem and found that not mapping
the kernel space when running in user mode is the solution to this
problem [4] (the corresponding paper [5] will be presented at ESSoS17).

With this RFC patch we allow anybody to configure their kernel with the
flag CONFIG_KAISER to add our defense mechanism.

If there are any questions we would love to answer them.
We also appreciate any comments!

Cheers,
Daniel (+ the KAISER team from Graz University of Technology)

[1] http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a191.pdf
[2] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Fogh-Using-Undocumented-CPU-Behaviour-To-See-Into-Kernel-Mode-And-Break-KASLR-In-The-Process.pdf
[3] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Jang-Breaking-Kernel-Address-Space-Layout-Randomization-KASLR-With-Intel-TSX.pdf
[4] https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
[5] https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf

(cherry picked from Change-Id: I0eb000c33290af01fc4454ca0c701d00f1d30b1d)

Conflicts:
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S (not in this tree)
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S (patched instead of that)
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S (not in this tree)
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S (patched instead of that)
arch/x86/include/asm/hw_irq.h
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
arch/x86/kernel/process.c
arch/x86/mm/Makefile
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
init/main.c

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
[bwh: Folded in the follow-up patches from Hugh:
 - kaiser: merged update
 - kaiser: do not set _PAGE_NX on pgd_none
 - kaiser: stack map PAGE_SIZE at THREAD_SIZE-PAGE_SIZE
 - kaiser: fix build and FIXME in alloc_ldt_struct()
 - kaiser: KAISER depends on SMP
 - kaiser: fix regs to do_nmi() ifndef CONFIG_KAISER
 - kaiser: fix perf crashes
 - kaiser: ENOMEM if kaiser_pagetable_walk() NULL
 - kaiser: tidied up asm/kaiser.h somewhat
 - kaiser: tidied up kaiser_add/remove_mapping slightly
 - kaiser: kaiser_remove_mapping() move along the pgd
 - kaiser: align addition to x86/mm/Makefile
 - kaiser: cleanups while trying for gold link
 - kaiser: name that 0x1000 KAISER_SHADOW_PGD_OFFSET
 - kaiser: delete KAISER_REAL_SWITCH option
 - kaiser: vmstat show NR_KAISERTABLE as nr_overhead
 - kaiser: enhanced by kernel and user PCIDs
 - kaiser: load_new_mm_cr3() let SWITCH_USER_CR3 flush user
 - kaiser: PCID 0 for kernel and 128 for user
 - kaiser: x86_cr3_pcid_noflush and x86_cr3_pcid_user
 - kaiser: paranoid_entry pass cr3 need to paranoid_exit
 - kaiser: _pgd_alloc() without __GFP_REPEAT to avoid stalls
 - kaiser: fix unlikely error in alloc_ldt_struct()
 - kaiser: drop is_atomic arg to kaiser_pagetable_walk()
 Backported to 3.16:
 - Add missing #include in arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
 - Use variable PEBS buffer size since we have "perf/x86/intel: Use PAGE_SIZE
   for PEBS buffer size on Core2"
 - Renumber X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE to avoid collision
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch introduces our implementation of KAISER (Kernel Address Isolation to
have Side-channels Efficiently Removed), a kernel isolation technique to close
hardware side channels on kernel address information.

More information about the patch can be found on:

        https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER

From: Richard Fellner &lt;richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at&gt;
From: Daniel Gruss &lt;daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Subject: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel in user mode
Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 14:26:50 +0200
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=149390087310405&amp;w=2
Kaiser-4.10-SHA1: c4b1831d44c6144d3762ccc72f0c4e71a0c713e5

To: &lt;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org&gt;
To: &lt;kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;clementine.maurice@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: &lt;moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Michael Schwarz &lt;michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Richard Fellner &lt;richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;anders.fogh@gdata-adan.de&gt;

After several recent works [1,2,3] KASLR on x86_64 was basically
considered dead by many researchers. We have been working on an
efficient but effective fix for this problem and found that not mapping
the kernel space when running in user mode is the solution to this
problem [4] (the corresponding paper [5] will be presented at ESSoS17).

With this RFC patch we allow anybody to configure their kernel with the
flag CONFIG_KAISER to add our defense mechanism.

If there are any questions we would love to answer them.
We also appreciate any comments!

Cheers,
Daniel (+ the KAISER team from Graz University of Technology)

[1] http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a191.pdf
[2] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Fogh-Using-Undocumented-CPU-Behaviour-To-See-Into-Kernel-Mode-And-Break-KASLR-In-The-Process.pdf
[3] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Jang-Breaking-Kernel-Address-Space-Layout-Randomization-KASLR-With-Intel-TSX.pdf
[4] https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
[5] https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf

(cherry picked from Change-Id: I0eb000c33290af01fc4454ca0c701d00f1d30b1d)

Conflicts:
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S (not in this tree)
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S (patched instead of that)
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S (not in this tree)
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S (patched instead of that)
arch/x86/include/asm/hw_irq.h
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
arch/x86/kernel/process.c
arch/x86/mm/Makefile
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
init/main.c

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
[bwh: Folded in the follow-up patches from Hugh:
 - kaiser: merged update
 - kaiser: do not set _PAGE_NX on pgd_none
 - kaiser: stack map PAGE_SIZE at THREAD_SIZE-PAGE_SIZE
 - kaiser: fix build and FIXME in alloc_ldt_struct()
 - kaiser: KAISER depends on SMP
 - kaiser: fix regs to do_nmi() ifndef CONFIG_KAISER
 - kaiser: fix perf crashes
 - kaiser: ENOMEM if kaiser_pagetable_walk() NULL
 - kaiser: tidied up asm/kaiser.h somewhat
 - kaiser: tidied up kaiser_add/remove_mapping slightly
 - kaiser: kaiser_remove_mapping() move along the pgd
 - kaiser: align addition to x86/mm/Makefile
 - kaiser: cleanups while trying for gold link
 - kaiser: name that 0x1000 KAISER_SHADOW_PGD_OFFSET
 - kaiser: delete KAISER_REAL_SWITCH option
 - kaiser: vmstat show NR_KAISERTABLE as nr_overhead
 - kaiser: enhanced by kernel and user PCIDs
 - kaiser: load_new_mm_cr3() let SWITCH_USER_CR3 flush user
 - kaiser: PCID 0 for kernel and 128 for user
 - kaiser: x86_cr3_pcid_noflush and x86_cr3_pcid_user
 - kaiser: paranoid_entry pass cr3 need to paranoid_exit
 - kaiser: _pgd_alloc() without __GFP_REPEAT to avoid stalls
 - kaiser: fix unlikely error in alloc_ldt_struct()
 - kaiser: drop is_atomic arg to kaiser_pagetable_walk()
 Backported to 3.16:
 - Add missing #include in arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
 - Use variable PEBS buffer size since we have "perf/x86/intel: Use PAGE_SIZE
   for PEBS buffer size on Core2"
 - Renumber X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE to avoid collision
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/iopl/64: Properly context-switch IOPL on Xen PV</title>
<updated>2016-04-11T08:54:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-05T19:24:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a6a2cb781be75d0a135a8e4ddd87854f09377928'/>
<id>a6a2cb781be75d0a135a8e4ddd87854f09377928</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b7a584598aea7ca73140cb87b40319944dd3393f upstream.

On Xen PV, regs-&gt;flags doesn't reliably reflect IOPL and the
exit-to-userspace code doesn't change IOPL.  We need to context
switch it manually.

I'm doing this without going through paravirt because this is
specific to Xen PV.  After the dust settles, we can merge this with
the 32-bit code, tidy up the iopl syscall implementation, and remove
the set_iopl pvop entirely.

Fixes XSA-171.

Reviewewd-by: Jan Beulich &lt;JBeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Beulich &lt;JBeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/693c3bd7aeb4d3c27c92c622b7d0f554a458173c.1458162709.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[ kamal: backport to 3.19-stable: no X86_FEATURE_XENPV so just call
  xen_pv_domain() directly ]
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa &lt;kamal@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b7a584598aea7ca73140cb87b40319944dd3393f upstream.

On Xen PV, regs-&gt;flags doesn't reliably reflect IOPL and the
exit-to-userspace code doesn't change IOPL.  We need to context
switch it manually.

I'm doing this without going through paravirt because this is
specific to Xen PV.  After the dust settles, we can merge this with
the 32-bit code, tidy up the iopl syscall implementation, and remove
the set_iopl pvop entirely.

Fixes XSA-171.

Reviewewd-by: Jan Beulich &lt;JBeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Beulich &lt;JBeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/693c3bd7aeb4d3c27c92c622b7d0f554a458173c.1458162709.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[ kamal: backport to 3.19-stable: no X86_FEATURE_XENPV so just call
  xen_pv_domain() directly ]
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa &lt;kamal@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/LDT: Print the real LDT base address</title>
<updated>2016-02-02T19:39:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Beulich</name>
<email>JBeulich@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-22T15:42:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=279aba8e33f270467f39567a2619851dfdc1021d'/>
<id>279aba8e33f270467f39567a2619851dfdc1021d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0d430e3fb3f7cdc13c0d22078b820f682821b45a upstream.

This was meant to print base address and entry count; make it do so
again.

Fixes: 37868fe113ff "x86/ldt: Make modify_ldt synchronous"
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/56797D8402000078000C24F0@prv-mh.provo.novell.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0d430e3fb3f7cdc13c0d22078b820f682821b45a upstream.

This was meant to print base address and entry count; make it do so
again.

Fixes: 37868fe113ff "x86/ldt: Make modify_ldt synchronous"
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/56797D8402000078000C24F0@prv-mh.provo.novell.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/ldt: Make modify_ldt synchronous</title>
<updated>2015-08-31T13:14:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-30T21:31:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b29f804421c40778a4858c428746a899f934d67c'/>
<id>b29f804421c40778a4858c428746a899f934d67c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 37868fe113ff2ba814b3b4eb12df214df555f8dc upstream.

modify_ldt() has questionable locking and does not synchronize
threads.  Improve it: redesign the locking and synchronize all
threads' LDTs using an IPI on all modifications.

This will dramatically slow down modify_ldt in multithreaded
programs, but there shouldn't be any multithreaded programs that
care about modify_ldt's performance in the first place.

This fixes some fallout from the CVE-2015-5157 fixes.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: security@kernel.org &lt;security@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: xen-devel &lt;xen-devel@lists.xen.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4c6978476782160600471bd865b318db34c7b628.1438291540.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[ luis: backported to 3.16:
  - dropped changes to comments in switch_mm()
  - included asm/mmu_context.h in perf_event.c
  - adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 37868fe113ff2ba814b3b4eb12df214df555f8dc upstream.

modify_ldt() has questionable locking and does not synchronize
threads.  Improve it: redesign the locking and synchronize all
threads' LDTs using an IPI on all modifications.

This will dramatically slow down modify_ldt in multithreaded
programs, but there shouldn't be any multithreaded programs that
care about modify_ldt's performance in the first place.

This fixes some fallout from the CVE-2015-5157 fixes.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: security@kernel.org &lt;security@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: xen-devel &lt;xen-devel@lists.xen.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4c6978476782160600471bd865b318db34c7b628.1438291540.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[ luis: backported to 3.16:
  - dropped changes to comments in switch_mm()
  - included asm/mmu_context.h in perf_event.c
  - adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86_64, switch_to(): Load TLS descriptors before switching DS and ES</title>
<updated>2015-01-15T10:43:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@amacapital.net</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-08T21:55:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=82def0d6911ef554d8e3df4223755c2cbb1dd64d'/>
<id>82def0d6911ef554d8e3df4223755c2cbb1dd64d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f647d7c155f069c1a068030255c300663516420e upstream.

Otherwise, if buggy user code points DS or ES into the TLS
array, they would be corrupted after a context switch.

This also significantly improves the comments and documents some
gotchas in the code.

Before this patch, the both tests below failed.  With this
patch, the es test passes, although the gsbase test still fails.

 ----- begin es test -----

/*
 * Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
 * GPL v2
 */

static unsigned short GDT3(int idx)
{
	return (idx &lt;&lt; 3) | 3;
}

static int create_tls(int idx, unsigned int base)
{
	struct user_desc desc = {
		.entry_number    = idx,
		.base_addr       = base,
		.limit           = 0xfffff,
		.seg_32bit       = 1,
		.contents        = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
		.read_exec_only  = 0,
		.limit_in_pages  = 1,
		.seg_not_present = 0,
		.useable         = 0,
	};

	if (syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &amp;desc) != 0)
		err(1, "set_thread_area");

	return desc.entry_number;
}

int main()
{
	int idx = create_tls(-1, 0);
	printf("Allocated GDT index %d\n", idx);

	unsigned short orig_es;
	asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (orig_es));

	int errors = 0;
	int total = 1000;
	for (int i = 0; i &lt; total; i++) {
		asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (GDT3(idx)));
		usleep(100);

		unsigned short es;
		asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (es));
		asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (orig_es));
		if (es != GDT3(idx)) {
			if (errors == 0)
				printf("[FAIL]\tES changed from 0x%hx to 0x%hx\n",
				       GDT3(idx), es);
			errors++;
		}
	}

	if (errors) {
		printf("[FAIL]\tES was corrupted %d/%d times\n", errors, total);
		return 1;
	} else {
		printf("[OK]\tES was preserved\n");
		return 0;
	}
}

 ----- end es test -----

 ----- begin gsbase test -----

/*
 * gsbase.c, a gsbase test
 * Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
 * GPL v2
 */

static unsigned char *testptr, *testptr2;

static unsigned char read_gs_testvals(void)
{
	unsigned char ret;
	asm volatile ("movb %%gs:%1, %0" : "=r" (ret) : "m" (*testptr));
	return ret;
}

int main()
{
	int errors = 0;

	testptr = mmap((void *)0x200000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
		       MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
	if (testptr == MAP_FAILED)
		err(1, "mmap");

	testptr2 = mmap((void *)0x300000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
		       MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
	if (testptr2 == MAP_FAILED)
		err(1, "mmap");

	*testptr = 0;
	*testptr2 = 1;

	if (syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_SET_GS,
		    (unsigned long)testptr2 - (unsigned long)testptr) != 0)
		err(1, "ARCH_SET_GS");

	usleep(100);

	if (read_gs_testvals() == 1) {
		printf("[OK]\tARCH_SET_GS worked\n");
	} else {
		printf("[FAIL]\tARCH_SET_GS failed\n");
		errors++;
	}

	asm volatile ("mov %0,%%gs" : : "r" (0));

	if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
		printf("[OK]\tWriting 0 to gs worked\n");
	} else {
		printf("[FAIL]\tWriting 0 to gs failed\n");
		errors++;
	}

	usleep(100);

	if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
		printf("[OK]\tgsbase is still zero\n");
	} else {
		printf("[FAIL]\tgsbase was corrupted\n");
		errors++;
	}

	return errors == 0 ? 0 : 1;
}

 ----- end gsbase test -----

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;andi@firstfloor.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/509d27c9fec78217691c3dad91cec87e1006b34a.1418075657.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f647d7c155f069c1a068030255c300663516420e upstream.

Otherwise, if buggy user code points DS or ES into the TLS
array, they would be corrupted after a context switch.

This also significantly improves the comments and documents some
gotchas in the code.

Before this patch, the both tests below failed.  With this
patch, the es test passes, although the gsbase test still fails.

 ----- begin es test -----

/*
 * Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
 * GPL v2
 */

static unsigned short GDT3(int idx)
{
	return (idx &lt;&lt; 3) | 3;
}

static int create_tls(int idx, unsigned int base)
{
	struct user_desc desc = {
		.entry_number    = idx,
		.base_addr       = base,
		.limit           = 0xfffff,
		.seg_32bit       = 1,
		.contents        = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
		.read_exec_only  = 0,
		.limit_in_pages  = 1,
		.seg_not_present = 0,
		.useable         = 0,
	};

	if (syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &amp;desc) != 0)
		err(1, "set_thread_area");

	return desc.entry_number;
}

int main()
{
	int idx = create_tls(-1, 0);
	printf("Allocated GDT index %d\n", idx);

	unsigned short orig_es;
	asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (orig_es));

	int errors = 0;
	int total = 1000;
	for (int i = 0; i &lt; total; i++) {
		asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (GDT3(idx)));
		usleep(100);

		unsigned short es;
		asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (es));
		asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (orig_es));
		if (es != GDT3(idx)) {
			if (errors == 0)
				printf("[FAIL]\tES changed from 0x%hx to 0x%hx\n",
				       GDT3(idx), es);
			errors++;
		}
	}

	if (errors) {
		printf("[FAIL]\tES was corrupted %d/%d times\n", errors, total);
		return 1;
	} else {
		printf("[OK]\tES was preserved\n");
		return 0;
	}
}

 ----- end es test -----

 ----- begin gsbase test -----

/*
 * gsbase.c, a gsbase test
 * Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
 * GPL v2
 */

static unsigned char *testptr, *testptr2;

static unsigned char read_gs_testvals(void)
{
	unsigned char ret;
	asm volatile ("movb %%gs:%1, %0" : "=r" (ret) : "m" (*testptr));
	return ret;
}

int main()
{
	int errors = 0;

	testptr = mmap((void *)0x200000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
		       MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
	if (testptr == MAP_FAILED)
		err(1, "mmap");

	testptr2 = mmap((void *)0x300000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
		       MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
	if (testptr2 == MAP_FAILED)
		err(1, "mmap");

	*testptr = 0;
	*testptr2 = 1;

	if (syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_SET_GS,
		    (unsigned long)testptr2 - (unsigned long)testptr) != 0)
		err(1, "ARCH_SET_GS");

	usleep(100);

	if (read_gs_testvals() == 1) {
		printf("[OK]\tARCH_SET_GS worked\n");
	} else {
		printf("[FAIL]\tARCH_SET_GS failed\n");
		errors++;
	}

	asm volatile ("mov %0,%%gs" : : "r" (0));

	if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
		printf("[OK]\tWriting 0 to gs worked\n");
	} else {
		printf("[FAIL]\tWriting 0 to gs failed\n");
		errors++;
	}

	usleep(100);

	if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
		printf("[OK]\tgsbase is still zero\n");
	} else {
		printf("[FAIL]\tgsbase was corrupted\n");
		errors++;
	}

	return errors == 0 ? 0 : 1;
}

 ----- end gsbase test -----

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;andi@firstfloor.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/509d27c9fec78217691c3dad91cec87e1006b34a.1418075657.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'perf/urgent' into perf/core, to resolve conflict and to prepare for new patches</title>
<updated>2014-06-06T05:55:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-06T05:55:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ec00010972a0971b2c1da4fbe4e5c7d8ed1ecb05'/>
<id>ec00010972a0971b2c1da4fbe4e5c7d8ed1ecb05</id>
<content type='text'>
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kernel/traps.c

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kernel/traps.c

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>asmlinkage, x86: Add explicit __visible to arch/x86/*</title>
<updated>2014-05-05T23:07:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andi Kleen</name>
<email>ak@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-01T22:44:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2605fc216fa492f9e7c488bdc7f687cd6dcc703b'/>
<id>2605fc216fa492f9e7c488bdc7f687cd6dcc703b</id>
<content type='text'>
As requested by Linus add explicit __visible to the asmlinkage users.
This marks all functions visible to assembler.

Tree sweep for arch/x86/*

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398984278-29319-3-git-send-email-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As requested by Linus add explicit __visible to the asmlinkage users.
This marks all functions visible to assembler.

Tree sweep for arch/x86/*

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398984278-29319-3-git-send-email-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
