<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/x86/kernel/fpu, branch linux-rolling-stable</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/fpu: Clear XSTATE_BV[i] in guest XSAVE state whenever XFD[i]=1</title>
<updated>2026-01-10T06:17:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-31T15:43:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b45f721775947a84996deb5c661602254ce25ce6'/>
<id>b45f721775947a84996deb5c661602254ce25ce6</id>
<content type='text'>
When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in
response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to
be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn't attempt to load state for
features that are disabled via the guest's XFD.  Because the kernel
executes XRSTOR with the guest's XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1
will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel.

E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #171 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
   switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   &lt;/TASK&gt;
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1,
and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler's
call to fpu_update_guest_xfd().

and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #168 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
   fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120
   kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   &lt;/TASK&gt;
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture.  Per Intel's SDM,
XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as '0' for components that are disabled via XFD
(and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state
component):

  If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i,
  the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1;
  instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was
  in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE
  header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the
  state component (the other instructions do not save state component i).

Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using
a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for
a struct fpu_guest.  However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled
features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar
scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()'s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the
outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the
first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD.

Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above
interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on
preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM
ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features.

Reported-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 820a6ee944e7 ("kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD", 2022-01-14)
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
[Move clearing of XSTATE_BV from fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate
 to kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave. - Paolo]
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu &lt;binbin.wu@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in
response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to
be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn't attempt to load state for
features that are disabled via the guest's XFD.  Because the kernel
executes XRSTOR with the guest's XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1
will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel.

E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #171 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
   switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   &lt;/TASK&gt;
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1,
and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler's
call to fpu_update_guest_xfd().

and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #168 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
   fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120
   kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   &lt;/TASK&gt;
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture.  Per Intel's SDM,
XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as '0' for components that are disabled via XFD
(and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state
component):

  If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i,
  the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1;
  instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was
  in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE
  header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the
  state component (the other instructions do not save state component i).

Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using
a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for
a struct fpu_guest.  However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled
features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar
scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()'s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the
outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the
first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD.

Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above
interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on
preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM
ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features.

Reported-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 820a6ee944e7 ("kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD", 2022-01-14)
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
[Move clearing of XSTATE_BV from fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate
 to kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave. - Paolo]
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu &lt;binbin.wu@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/fpu: Fix FPU state core dump truncation on CPUs with no extended xfeatures</title>
<updated>2025-12-10T07:44:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yongxin Liu</name>
<email>yongxin.liu@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-10T00:02:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c8161e5304abb26e6c0bec6efc947992500fa6c5'/>
<id>c8161e5304abb26e6c0bec6efc947992500fa6c5</id>
<content type='text'>
Zero can be a valid value of num_records. For example, on Intel Atom x6425RE,
only x87 and SSE are supported (features 0, 1), and fpu_user_cfg.max_features
is 3. The for_each_extended_xfeature() loop only iterates feature 2, which is
not enabled, so num_records = 0. This is valid and should not cause core dump
failure.

The issue is that dump_xsave_layout_desc() returns 0 for both genuine errors
(dump_emit() failure) and valid cases (no extended features). Use negative
return values for errors and only abort on genuine failures.

Fixes: ba386777a30b ("x86/elf: Add a new FPU buffer layout info to x86 core files")
Signed-off-by: Yongxin Liu &lt;yongxin.liu@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251210000219.4094353-2-yongxin.liu@windriver.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Zero can be a valid value of num_records. For example, on Intel Atom x6425RE,
only x87 and SSE are supported (features 0, 1), and fpu_user_cfg.max_features
is 3. The for_each_extended_xfeature() loop only iterates feature 2, which is
not enabled, so num_records = 0. This is valid and should not cause core dump
failure.

The issue is that dump_xsave_layout_desc() returns 0 for both genuine errors
(dump_emit() failure) and valid cases (no extended features). Use negative
return values for errors and only abort on genuine failures.

Fixes: ba386777a30b ("x86/elf: Add a new FPU buffer layout info to x86 core files")
Signed-off-by: Yongxin Liu &lt;yongxin.liu@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251210000219.4094353-2-yongxin.liu@windriver.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: Restrict KVM-induced symbol exports to KVM modules where obvious/possible</title>
<updated>2025-11-12T23:29:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-12T17:39:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6276c67f2bc4aeaf350a7cf889c33c38b3330ea9'/>
<id>6276c67f2bc4aeaf350a7cf889c33c38b3330ea9</id>
<content type='text'>
Extend KVM's export macro framework to provide EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(),
and use the helper macro to export symbols for KVM throughout x86 if and
only if KVM will build one or more modules, and only for those modules.

To avoid unnecessary exports when CONFIG_KVM=m but kvm.ko will not be
built (because no vendor modules are selected), let arch code #define
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM to suppress/override the exports.

Note, the set of symbols to restrict to KVM was generated by manual search
and audit; any "misses" are due to human error, not some grand plan.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kai Huang &lt;kai.huang@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Kai Huang &lt;kai.huang@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112173944.1380633-5-seanjc%40google.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Extend KVM's export macro framework to provide EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(),
and use the helper macro to export symbols for KVM throughout x86 if and
only if KVM will build one or more modules, and only for those modules.

To avoid unnecessary exports when CONFIG_KVM=m but kvm.ko will not be
built (because no vendor modules are selected), let arch code #define
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM to suppress/override the exports.

Note, the set of symbols to restrict to KVM was generated by manual search
and audit; any "misses" are due to human error, not some grand plan.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kai Huang &lt;kai.huang@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Kai Huang &lt;kai.huang@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112173944.1380633-5-seanjc%40google.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/fpu: Ensure XFD state on signal delivery</title>
<updated>2025-10-28T19:10:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chang S. Bae</name>
<email>chang.seok.bae@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-10T00:16:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=388eff894d6bc5f921e9bfff0e4b0ab2684a96e9'/>
<id>388eff894d6bc5f921e9bfff0e4b0ab2684a96e9</id>
<content type='text'>
Sean reported [1] the following splat when running KVM tests:

   WARNING: CPU: 232 PID: 15391 at xfd_validate_state+0x65/0x70
   Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    fpu__clear_user_states+0x9c/0x100
    arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x142/0x210
    exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x55/0x100
    do_syscall_64+0x205/0x2c0
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Chao further identified [2] a reproducible scenario involving signal
delivery: a non-AMX task is preempted by an AMX-enabled task which
modifies the XFD MSR.

When the non-AMX task resumes and reloads XSTATE with init values,
a warning is triggered due to a mismatch between fpstate::xfd and the
CPU's current XFD state. fpu__clear_user_states() does not currently
re-synchronize the XFD state after such preemption.

Invoke xfd_update_state() which detects and corrects the mismatch if
there is a dynamic feature.

This also benefits the sigreturn path, as fpu__restore_sig() may call
fpu__clear_user_states() when the sigframe is inaccessible.

[ dhansen: minor changelog munging ]

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/aDCo_SczQOUaB2rS@google.com [1]
Fixes: 672365477ae8a ("x86/fpu: Update XFD state where required")
Reported-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae &lt;chang.seok.bae@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao &lt;chao.gao@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Chao Gao &lt;chao.gao@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aDWbctO%2FRfTGiCg3@intel.com [2]
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250610001700.4097-1-chang.seok.bae%40intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Sean reported [1] the following splat when running KVM tests:

   WARNING: CPU: 232 PID: 15391 at xfd_validate_state+0x65/0x70
   Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    fpu__clear_user_states+0x9c/0x100
    arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x142/0x210
    exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x55/0x100
    do_syscall_64+0x205/0x2c0
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Chao further identified [2] a reproducible scenario involving signal
delivery: a non-AMX task is preempted by an AMX-enabled task which
modifies the XFD MSR.

When the non-AMX task resumes and reloads XSTATE with init values,
a warning is triggered due to a mismatch between fpstate::xfd and the
CPU's current XFD state. fpu__clear_user_states() does not currently
re-synchronize the XFD state after such preemption.

Invoke xfd_update_state() which detects and corrects the mismatch if
there is a dynamic feature.

This also benefits the sigreturn path, as fpu__restore_sig() may call
fpu__clear_user_states() when the sigframe is inaccessible.

[ dhansen: minor changelog munging ]

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/aDCo_SczQOUaB2rS@google.com [1]
Fixes: 672365477ae8a ("x86/fpu: Update XFD state where required")
Reported-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae &lt;chang.seok.bae@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao &lt;chao.gao@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Chao Gao &lt;chao.gao@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aDWbctO%2FRfTGiCg3@intel.com [2]
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250610001700.4097-1-chang.seok.bae%40intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'kernel-6.18-rc1.clone3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs</title>
<updated>2025-09-29T17:36:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-29T17:36:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=722df25ddf4f13e303dcc4cd65b3df5b197a79e6'/>
<id>722df25ddf4f13e303dcc4cd65b3df5b197a79e6</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull copy_process updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This contains the changes to enable support for clone3() on nios2
  which apparently is still a thing.

  The more exciting part of this is that it cleans up the inconsistency
  in how the 64-bit flag argument is passed from copy_process() into the
  various other copy_*() helpers"

[ Fixed up rv ltl_monitor 32-bit support as per Sasha Levin in the merge ]

* tag 'kernel-6.18-rc1.clone3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  nios2: implement architecture-specific portion of sys_clone3
  arch: copy_thread: pass clone_flags as u64
  copy_process: pass clone_flags as u64 across calltree
  copy_sighand: Handle architectures where sizeof(unsigned long) &lt; sizeof(u64)
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull copy_process updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This contains the changes to enable support for clone3() on nios2
  which apparently is still a thing.

  The more exciting part of this is that it cleans up the inconsistency
  in how the 64-bit flag argument is passed from copy_process() into the
  various other copy_*() helpers"

[ Fixed up rv ltl_monitor 32-bit support as per Sasha Levin in the merge ]

* tag 'kernel-6.18-rc1.clone3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  nios2: implement architecture-specific portion of sys_clone3
  arch: copy_thread: pass clone_flags as u64
  copy_process: pass clone_flags as u64 across calltree
  copy_sighand: Handle architectures where sizeof(unsigned long) &lt; sizeof(u64)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arch: copy_thread: pass clone_flags as u64</title>
<updated>2025-09-01T13:31:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Simon Schuster</name>
<email>schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-01T13:09:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bbc46b23af5bb934cd1cf066ef4342cee457a24e'/>
<id>bbc46b23af5bb934cd1cf066ef4342cee457a24e</id>
<content type='text'>
With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add
clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
increased from 32-bit to 64-bit, with a new type of u64 for the flags.
However, for most consumers of clone_flags the interface was not
changed from the previous type of unsigned long.

While this works fine as long as none of the new 64-bit flag bits
(CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND and CLONE_INTO_CGROUP) are evaluated, this is still
undesirable in terms of the principle of least surprise.

Thus, this commit fixes all relevant interfaces of the copy_thread
function that is called from copy_process to consistently pass
clone_flags as u64, so that no truncation to 32-bit integers occurs on
32-bit architectures.

Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster &lt;schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-3-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com
Fixes: c5febea0956fd387 ("fork: Pass struct kernel_clone_args into copy_thread")
Acked-by: Guo Ren (Alibaba Damo Academy) &lt;guoren@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andreas Larsson &lt;andreas@gaisler.com&gt; # sparc
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt; # m68k
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add
clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
increased from 32-bit to 64-bit, with a new type of u64 for the flags.
However, for most consumers of clone_flags the interface was not
changed from the previous type of unsigned long.

While this works fine as long as none of the new 64-bit flag bits
(CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND and CLONE_INTO_CGROUP) are evaluated, this is still
undesirable in terms of the principle of least surprise.

Thus, this commit fixes all relevant interfaces of the copy_thread
function that is called from copy_process to consistently pass
clone_flags as u64, so that no truncation to 32-bit integers occurs on
32-bit architectures.

Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster &lt;schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-3-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com
Fixes: c5febea0956fd387 ("fork: Pass struct kernel_clone_args into copy_thread")
Acked-by: Guo Ren (Alibaba Damo Academy) &lt;guoren@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andreas Larsson &lt;andreas@gaisler.com&gt; # sparc
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt; # m68k
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/fpu: Fix NULL dereference in avx512_status()</title>
<updated>2025-08-11T20:28:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fushuai Wang</name>
<email>wangfushuai@baidu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-11T18:50:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=31cd31c9e17ece125aad27259501a2af69ccb020'/>
<id>31cd31c9e17ece125aad27259501a2af69ccb020</id>
<content type='text'>
Problem
-------
With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU enabled, reading /proc/[kthread]/arch_status
causes a warning and a NULL pointer dereference.

This is because the AVX-512 timestamp code uses x86_task_fpu() but
doesn't check it for NULL. CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU addles that function
for kernel threads (PF_KTHREAD specifically), making it return NULL.

The point of the warning was to ensure that kernel threads only access
task-&gt;fpu after going through kernel_fpu_begin()/_end(). Note: all
kernel tasks exposed in /proc have a valid task-&gt;fpu.

Solution
--------
One option is to silence the warning and check for NULL from
x86_task_fpu(). However, that warning is fairly fresh and seems like a
defense against misuse of the FPU state in kernel threads.

Instead, stop outputting AVX-512_elapsed_ms for kernel threads
altogether. The data was garbage anyway because avx512_timestamp is
only updated for user threads, not kernel threads.

If anyone ever wants to track kernel thread AVX-512 use, they can come
back later and do it properly, separate from this bug fix.

[ dhansen: mostly rewrite changelog ]

Fixes: 22aafe3bcb67 ("x86/fpu: Remove init_task FPU state dependencies, add debugging warning for PF_KTHREAD tasks")
Co-developed-by: Sohil Mehta &lt;sohil.mehta@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta &lt;sohil.mehta@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Fushuai Wang &lt;wangfushuai@baidu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250811185044.2227268-1-sohil.mehta%40intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Problem
-------
With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU enabled, reading /proc/[kthread]/arch_status
causes a warning and a NULL pointer dereference.

This is because the AVX-512 timestamp code uses x86_task_fpu() but
doesn't check it for NULL. CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU addles that function
for kernel threads (PF_KTHREAD specifically), making it return NULL.

The point of the warning was to ensure that kernel threads only access
task-&gt;fpu after going through kernel_fpu_begin()/_end(). Note: all
kernel tasks exposed in /proc have a valid task-&gt;fpu.

Solution
--------
One option is to silence the warning and check for NULL from
x86_task_fpu(). However, that warning is fairly fresh and seems like a
defense against misuse of the FPU state in kernel threads.

Instead, stop outputting AVX-512_elapsed_ms for kernel threads
altogether. The data was garbage anyway because avx512_timestamp is
only updated for user threads, not kernel threads.

If anyone ever wants to track kernel thread AVX-512 use, they can come
back later and do it properly, separate from this bug fix.

[ dhansen: mostly rewrite changelog ]

Fixes: 22aafe3bcb67 ("x86/fpu: Remove init_task FPU state dependencies, add debugging warning for PF_KTHREAD tasks")
Co-developed-by: Sohil Mehta &lt;sohil.mehta@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta &lt;sohil.mehta@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Fushuai Wang &lt;wangfushuai@baidu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250811185044.2227268-1-sohil.mehta%40intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor xfeature support as a guest-only feature</title>
<updated>2025-06-24T20:46:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yang Weijiang</name>
<email>weijiang.yang@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-22T15:10:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8b05b3c988162ca117b3854ae7d497927b415299'/>
<id>8b05b3c988162ca117b3854ae7d497927b415299</id>
<content type='text'>
== Background ==

CET defines two register states: CET user, which includes user-mode control
registers, and CET supervisor, which consists of shadow-stack pointers for
privilege levels 0-2.

Current kernels disable shadow stacks in kernel mode, making the CET
supervisor state unused and eliminating the need for context switching.

== Problem ==

To virtualize CET for guests, KVM must accurately emulate hardware
behavior. A key challenge arises because there is no CPUID flag to indicate
that shadow stack is supported only in user mode. Therefore, KVM cannot
assume guests will not enable shadow stacks in kernel mode and must
preserve the CET supervisor state of vCPUs.

== Solution ==

An initial proposal to manually save and restore CET supervisor states
using raw RDMSR/WRMSR in KVM was rejected due to performance concerns and
its impact on KVM's ABI. Instead, leveraging the kernel's FPU
infrastructure for context switching was favored [1].

The main question then became whether to enable the CET supervisor state
globally for all processes or restrict it to vCPU processes. This decision
involves a trade-off between a 24-byte XSTATE buffer waste for all non-vCPU
processes and approximately 100 lines of code complexity in the kernel [2].
The agreed approach is to first try this optimal solution [3], i.e.,
restricting the CET supervisor state to guest FPUs only and eliminating
unnecessary space waste.

The guest-only xfeature infrastructure has already been added. Now,
introduce CET supervisor xstate support as the first guest-only feature
to prepare for the upcoming CET virtualization in KVM.

Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang &lt;weijiang.yang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao &lt;chao.gao@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe &lt;rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Allen &lt;john.allen@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/ZM1jV3UPL0AMpVDI@google.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/1c2fd06e-2e97-4724-80ab-8695aa4334e7@intel.com/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/2597a87b-1248-b8ce-ce60-94074bc67ea4@intel.com/ [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250522151031.426788-7-chao.gao%40intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
== Background ==

CET defines two register states: CET user, which includes user-mode control
registers, and CET supervisor, which consists of shadow-stack pointers for
privilege levels 0-2.

Current kernels disable shadow stacks in kernel mode, making the CET
supervisor state unused and eliminating the need for context switching.

== Problem ==

To virtualize CET for guests, KVM must accurately emulate hardware
behavior. A key challenge arises because there is no CPUID flag to indicate
that shadow stack is supported only in user mode. Therefore, KVM cannot
assume guests will not enable shadow stacks in kernel mode and must
preserve the CET supervisor state of vCPUs.

== Solution ==

An initial proposal to manually save and restore CET supervisor states
using raw RDMSR/WRMSR in KVM was rejected due to performance concerns and
its impact on KVM's ABI. Instead, leveraging the kernel's FPU
infrastructure for context switching was favored [1].

The main question then became whether to enable the CET supervisor state
globally for all processes or restrict it to vCPU processes. This decision
involves a trade-off between a 24-byte XSTATE buffer waste for all non-vCPU
processes and approximately 100 lines of code complexity in the kernel [2].
The agreed approach is to first try this optimal solution [3], i.e.,
restricting the CET supervisor state to guest FPUs only and eliminating
unnecessary space waste.

The guest-only xfeature infrastructure has already been added. Now,
introduce CET supervisor xstate support as the first guest-only feature
to prepare for the upcoming CET virtualization in KVM.

Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang &lt;weijiang.yang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao &lt;chao.gao@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe &lt;rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Allen &lt;john.allen@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/ZM1jV3UPL0AMpVDI@google.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/1c2fd06e-2e97-4724-80ab-8695aa4334e7@intel.com/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/2597a87b-1248-b8ce-ce60-94074bc67ea4@intel.com/ [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250522151031.426788-7-chao.gao%40intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce "guest-only" supervisor xfeature set</title>
<updated>2025-06-24T20:46:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yang Weijiang</name>
<email>weijiang.yang@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-22T15:10:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=151bf232494d7537e3d995b400e8233fd682ae1a'/>
<id>151bf232494d7537e3d995b400e8233fd682ae1a</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for upcoming CET virtualization support, the CET supervisor
state will be added as a "guest-only" feature, since it is required only by
KVM (i.e., guest FPUs). Establish the infrastructure for "guest-only"
features.

Define a new XFEATURE_MASK_GUEST_SUPERVISOR mask to specify features that
are enabled by default in guest FPUs but not in host FPUs. Specifically,
for any bit in this set, permission is granted and XSAVE space is allocated
during vCPU creation. Non-guest FPUs cannot enable guest-only features,
even dynamically, and no XSAVE space will be allocated for them.

The mask is currently empty, but this will be changed by a subsequent
patch.

Co-developed-by: Chao Gao &lt;chao.gao@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao &lt;chao.gao@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang &lt;weijiang.yang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe &lt;rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Allen &lt;john.allen@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250522151031.426788-6-chao.gao%40intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In preparation for upcoming CET virtualization support, the CET supervisor
state will be added as a "guest-only" feature, since it is required only by
KVM (i.e., guest FPUs). Establish the infrastructure for "guest-only"
features.

Define a new XFEATURE_MASK_GUEST_SUPERVISOR mask to specify features that
are enabled by default in guest FPUs but not in host FPUs. Specifically,
for any bit in this set, permission is granted and XSAVE space is allocated
during vCPU creation. Non-guest FPUs cannot enable guest-only features,
even dynamically, and no XSAVE space will be allocated for them.

The mask is currently empty, but this will be changed by a subsequent
patch.

Co-developed-by: Chao Gao &lt;chao.gao@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao &lt;chao.gao@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang &lt;weijiang.yang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe &lt;rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Allen &lt;john.allen@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250522151031.426788-6-chao.gao%40intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/fpu: Remove xfd argument from __fpstate_reset()</title>
<updated>2025-06-24T20:46:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Gao</name>
<email>chao.gao@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-22T15:10:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fafb29e18db2eef75edafd4240fcde8b5da2c948'/>
<id>fafb29e18db2eef75edafd4240fcde8b5da2c948</id>
<content type='text'>
The initial values for fpstate::xfd differ between guest and host fpstates.
Currently, the initial values are passed as an argument to
__fpstate_reset(). But, __fpstate_reset() already assigns different default
features and sizes based on the type of fpstates (i.e., guest or host). So,
handle fpstate::xfd in a similar way to highlight the differences in the
initial xfd value between guest and host fpstates

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao &lt;chao.gao@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Allen &lt;john.allen@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aBuf7wiiDT0Wflhk@google.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250522151031.426788-5-chao.gao%40intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The initial values for fpstate::xfd differ between guest and host fpstates.
Currently, the initial values are passed as an argument to
__fpstate_reset(). But, __fpstate_reset() already assigns different default
features and sizes based on the type of fpstates (i.e., guest or host). So,
handle fpstate::xfd in a similar way to highlight the differences in the
initial xfd value between guest and host fpstates

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao &lt;chao.gao@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Allen &lt;john.allen@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aBuf7wiiDT0Wflhk@google.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250522151031.426788-5-chao.gao%40intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
