<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/x86/kernel/cpu, branch v5.3</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/CPU/AMD: Clear RDRAND CPUID bit on AMD family 15h/16h</title>
<updated>2019-08-19T17:42:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-19T15:52:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c49a0a80137c7ca7d6ced4c812c9e07a949f6f24'/>
<id>c49a0a80137c7ca7d6ced4c812c9e07a949f6f24</id>
<content type='text'>
There have been reports of RDRAND issues after resuming from suspend on
some AMD family 15h and family 16h systems. This issue stems from a BIOS
not performing the proper steps during resume to ensure RDRAND continues
to function properly.

RDRAND support is indicated by CPUID Fn00000001_ECX[30]. This bit can be
reset by clearing MSR C001_1004[62]. Any software that checks for RDRAND
support using CPUID, including the kernel, will believe that RDRAND is
not supported.

Update the CPU initialization to clear the RDRAND CPUID bit for any family
15h and 16h processor that supports RDRAND. If it is known that the family
15h or family 16h system does not have an RDRAND resume issue or that the
system will not be placed in suspend, the "rdrand=force" kernel parameter
can be used to stop the clearing of the RDRAND CPUID bit.

Additionally, update the suspend and resume path to save and restore the
MSR C001_1004 value to ensure that the RDRAND CPUID setting remains in
place after resuming from suspend.

Note, that clearing the RDRAND CPUID bit does not prevent a processor
that normally supports the RDRAND instruction from executing it. So any
code that determined the support based on family and model won't #UD.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Chen Yu &lt;yu.c.chen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" &lt;linux-doc@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "linux-pm@vger.kernel.org" &lt;linux-pm@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" &lt;x86@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7543af91666f491547bd86cebb1e17c66824ab9f.1566229943.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There have been reports of RDRAND issues after resuming from suspend on
some AMD family 15h and family 16h systems. This issue stems from a BIOS
not performing the proper steps during resume to ensure RDRAND continues
to function properly.

RDRAND support is indicated by CPUID Fn00000001_ECX[30]. This bit can be
reset by clearing MSR C001_1004[62]. Any software that checks for RDRAND
support using CPUID, including the kernel, will believe that RDRAND is
not supported.

Update the CPU initialization to clear the RDRAND CPUID bit for any family
15h and 16h processor that supports RDRAND. If it is known that the family
15h or family 16h system does not have an RDRAND resume issue or that the
system will not be placed in suspend, the "rdrand=force" kernel parameter
can be used to stop the clearing of the RDRAND CPUID bit.

Additionally, update the suspend and resume path to save and restore the
MSR C001_1004 value to ensure that the RDRAND CPUID setting remains in
place after resuming from suspend.

Note, that clearing the RDRAND CPUID bit does not prevent a processor
that normally supports the RDRAND instruction from executing it. So any
code that determined the support based on family and model won't #UD.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Chen Yu &lt;yu.c.chen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" &lt;linux-doc@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "linux-pm@vger.kernel.org" &lt;linux-pm@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" &lt;x86@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7543af91666f491547bd86cebb1e17c66824ab9f.1566229943.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/umwait: Fix error handling in umwait_init()</title>
<updated>2019-08-12T12:51:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fenghua Yu</name>
<email>fenghua.yu@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-10T01:40:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e7409258845a0f64967f8377e99294d438137537'/>
<id>e7409258845a0f64967f8377e99294d438137537</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, failure of cpuhp_setup_state() is ignored and the syscore ops
and the control interfaces can still be added even after the failure. But,
this error handling will cause a few issues:

1. The CPUs may have different values in the IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL
   MSR because there is no way to roll back the control MSR on
   the CPUs which already set the MSR before the failure.

2. If the sysfs interface is added successfully, there will be a mismatch
   between the global control value and the control MSR:
   - The interface shows the default global control value. But,
     the control MSR is not set to the value because the CPU online
     function, which is supposed to set the MSR to the value,
     is not installed.
   - If the sysadmin changes the global control value through
     the interface, the control MSR on all current online CPUs is
     set to the new value. But, the control MSR on newly onlined CPUs
     after the value change will not be set to the new value due to
     lack of the CPU online function.

3. On resume from suspend/hibernation, the boot CPU restores the control
   MSR to the global control value through the syscore ops. But, the
   control MSR on all APs is not set due to lake of the CPU online
   function.

To solve the issues and enforce consistent behavior on the failure
of the CPU hotplug setup, make the following changes:

1. Cache the original control MSR value which is configured by
   hardware or BIOS before kernel boot. This value is likely to
   be 0. But it could be a different number as well. Cache the
   control MSR only once before the MSR is changed.
2. Add the CPU offline function so that the MSR is restored to the
   original control value on all CPUs on the failure.
3. On the failure, exit from cpumait_init() so that the syscore ops
   and the control interfaces are not added.

Reported-by: Valdis Kletnieks &lt;valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu&gt;
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1565401237-60936-1-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently, failure of cpuhp_setup_state() is ignored and the syscore ops
and the control interfaces can still be added even after the failure. But,
this error handling will cause a few issues:

1. The CPUs may have different values in the IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL
   MSR because there is no way to roll back the control MSR on
   the CPUs which already set the MSR before the failure.

2. If the sysfs interface is added successfully, there will be a mismatch
   between the global control value and the control MSR:
   - The interface shows the default global control value. But,
     the control MSR is not set to the value because the CPU online
     function, which is supposed to set the MSR to the value,
     is not installed.
   - If the sysadmin changes the global control value through
     the interface, the control MSR on all current online CPUs is
     set to the new value. But, the control MSR on newly onlined CPUs
     after the value change will not be set to the new value due to
     lack of the CPU online function.

3. On resume from suspend/hibernation, the boot CPU restores the control
   MSR to the global control value through the syscore ops. But, the
   control MSR on all APs is not set due to lake of the CPU online
   function.

To solve the issues and enforce consistent behavior on the failure
of the CPU hotplug setup, make the following changes:

1. Cache the original control MSR value which is configured by
   hardware or BIOS before kernel boot. This value is likely to
   be 0. But it could be a different number as well. Cache the
   control MSR only once before the MSR is changed.
2. Add the CPU offline function so that the MSR is restored to the
   original control value on all CPUs on the failure.
3. On the failure, exit from cpumait_init() so that the syscore ops
   and the control interfaces are not added.

Reported-by: Valdis Kletnieks &lt;valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu&gt;
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1565401237-60936-1-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: mtrr: cyrix: Mark expected switch fall-through</title>
<updated>2019-08-07T13:12:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-05T20:17:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7468a4eae541ce5aff65595aa502aa0a4def6615'/>
<id>7468a4eae541ce5aff65595aa502aa0a4def6615</id>
<content type='text'>
Mark switch cases where we are expecting to fall through.

Fix the following warning (Building: i386_defconfig i386):

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cyrix.c:99:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190805201712.GA19927@embeddedor

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Mark switch cases where we are expecting to fall through.

Fix the following warning (Building: i386_defconfig i386):

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cyrix.c:99:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190805201712.GA19927@embeddedor

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch master from git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T20:22:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-28T20:22:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7a30bdd99f37352b188575b27924c407c6ddff9e'/>
<id>7a30bdd99f37352b188575b27924c407c6ddff9e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pick up the spectre documentation so the Grand Schemozzle can be added.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pick up the spectre documentation so the Grand Schemozzle can be added.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/swapgs: Exclude ATOMs from speculation through SWAPGS</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T19:39:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-17T19:18:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f36cf386e3fec258a341d446915862eded3e13d8'/>
<id>f36cf386e3fec258a341d446915862eded3e13d8</id>
<content type='text'>
Intel provided the following information:

 On all current Atom processors, instructions that use a segment register
 value (e.g. a load or store) will not speculatively execute before the
 last writer of that segment retires. Thus they will not use a
 speculatively written segment value.

That means on ATOMs there is no speculation through SWAPGS, so the SWAPGS
entry paths can be excluded from the extra LFENCE if PTI is disabled.

Create a separate bug flag for the through SWAPGS speculation and mark all
out-of-order ATOMs and AMD/HYGON CPUs as not affected. The in-order ATOMs
are excluded from the whole mitigation mess anyway.

Reported-by: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Intel provided the following information:

 On all current Atom processors, instructions that use a segment register
 value (e.g. a load or store) will not speculatively execute before the
 last writer of that segment retires. Thus they will not use a
 speculatively written segment value.

That means on ATOMs there is no speculation through SWAPGS, so the SWAPGS
entry paths can be excluded from the extra LFENCE if PTI is disabled.

Create a separate bug flag for the through SWAPGS speculation and mark all
out-of-order ATOMs and AMD/HYGON CPUs as not affected. The in-order ATOMs
are excluded from the whole mitigation mess anyway.

Reported-by: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/mds: Apply more accurate check on hypervisor platform</title>
<updated>2019-07-25T10:51:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhenzhong Duan</name>
<email>zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-25T02:39:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=517c3ba00916383af6411aec99442c307c23f684'/>
<id>517c3ba00916383af6411aec99442c307c23f684</id>
<content type='text'>
X86_HYPER_NATIVE isn't accurate for checking if running on native platform,
e.g. CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST isn't set or "nopv" is enabled.

Checking the CPU feature bit X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR to determine if it's
running on native platform is more accurate.

This still doesn't cover the platforms on which X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR is
unsupported, e.g. VMware, but there is nothing which can be done about this
scenario.

Fixes: 8a4b06d391b0 ("x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS")
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan &lt;zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1564022349-17338-1-git-send-email-zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
X86_HYPER_NATIVE isn't accurate for checking if running on native platform,
e.g. CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST isn't set or "nopv" is enabled.

Checking the CPU feature bit X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR to determine if it's
running on native platform is more accurate.

This still doesn't cover the platforms on which X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR is
unsupported, e.g. VMware, but there is nothing which can be done about this
scenario.

Fixes: 8a4b06d391b0 ("x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS")
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan &lt;zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1564022349-17338-1-git-send-email-zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus-5.3a-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip</title>
<updated>2019-07-19T18:41:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-19T18:41:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b5d72dda8976e878be47415b94bca8465d1fa22d'/>
<id>b5d72dda8976e878be47415b94bca8465d1fa22d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull xen updates from Juergen Gross:
 "Fixes and features:

   - A series to introduce a common command line parameter for disabling
     paravirtual extensions when running as a guest in virtualized
     environment

   - A fix for int3 handling in Xen pv guests

   - Removal of the Xen-specific tmem driver as support of tmem in Xen
     has been dropped (and it was experimental only)

   - A security fix for running as Xen dom0 (XSA-300)

   - A fix for IRQ handling when offlining cpus in Xen guests

   - Some small cleanups"

* tag 'for-linus-5.3a-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen: let alloc_xenballooned_pages() fail if not enough memory free
  xen/pv: Fix a boot up hang revealed by int3 self test
  x86/xen: Add "nopv" support for HVM guest
  x86/paravirt: Remove const mark from x86_hyper_xen_hvm variable
  xen: Map "xen_nopv" parameter to "nopv" and mark it obsolete
  x86: Add "nopv" parameter to disable PV extensions
  x86/xen: Mark xen_hvm_need_lapic() and xen_x2apic_para_available() as __init
  xen: remove tmem driver
  Revert "x86/paravirt: Set up the virt_spin_lock_key after static keys get initialized"
  xen/events: fix binding user event channels to cpus
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull xen updates from Juergen Gross:
 "Fixes and features:

   - A series to introduce a common command line parameter for disabling
     paravirtual extensions when running as a guest in virtualized
     environment

   - A fix for int3 handling in Xen pv guests

   - Removal of the Xen-specific tmem driver as support of tmem in Xen
     has been dropped (and it was experimental only)

   - A security fix for running as Xen dom0 (XSA-300)

   - A fix for IRQ handling when offlining cpus in Xen guests

   - Some small cleanups"

* tag 'for-linus-5.3a-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen: let alloc_xenballooned_pages() fail if not enough memory free
  xen/pv: Fix a boot up hang revealed by int3 self test
  x86/xen: Add "nopv" support for HVM guest
  x86/paravirt: Remove const mark from x86_hyper_xen_hvm variable
  xen: Map "xen_nopv" parameter to "nopv" and mark it obsolete
  x86: Add "nopv" parameter to disable PV extensions
  x86/xen: Mark xen_hvm_need_lapic() and xen_x2apic_para_available() as __init
  xen: remove tmem driver
  Revert "x86/paravirt: Set up the virt_spin_lock_key after static keys get initialized"
  xen/events: fix binding user event channels to cpus
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2019-07-19T17:42:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-19T17:42:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=933a90bf4f3505f8ec83bda21a3c7d70d7c2b426'/>
<id>933a90bf4f3505f8ec83bda21a3c7d70d7c2b426</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro:
 "The first part of mount updates.

  Convert filesystems to use the new mount API"

* 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally
  constify ksys_mount() string arguments
  don't bother with registering rootfs
  init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs()
  vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API
  convenience helper: get_tree_single()
  convenience helper get_tree_nodev()
  vfs: Kill sget_userns()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro:
 "The first part of mount updates.

  Convert filesystems to use the new mount API"

* 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally
  constify ksys_mount() string arguments
  don't bother with registering rootfs
  init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs()
  vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API
  convenience helper: get_tree_single()
  convenience helper get_tree_nodev()
  vfs: Kill sget_userns()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/paravirt: Remove const mark from x86_hyper_xen_hvm variable</title>
<updated>2019-07-17T06:09:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhenzhong Duan</name>
<email>zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-16T04:26:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cc8f3b4dd2eb859bc57187ccd94b5cd715d9cfba'/>
<id>cc8f3b4dd2eb859bc57187ccd94b5cd715d9cfba</id>
<content type='text'>
.. as "nopv" support needs it to be changeable at boot up stage.

Checkpatch reports warning, so move variable declarations from
hypervisor.c to hypervisor.h

Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan &lt;zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
.. as "nopv" support needs it to be changeable at boot up stage.

Checkpatch reports warning, so move variable declarations from
hypervisor.c to hypervisor.h

Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan &lt;zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: Add "nopv" parameter to disable PV extensions</title>
<updated>2019-07-17T06:09:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhenzhong Duan</name>
<email>zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-11T12:02:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=30978346372e5c43a652cfbd4533c6bd5427c33b'/>
<id>30978346372e5c43a652cfbd4533c6bd5427c33b</id>
<content type='text'>
In virtualization environment, PV extensions (drivers, interrupts,
timers, etc) are enabled in the majority of use cases which is the
best option.

However, in some cases (kexec not fully working, benchmarking)
we want to disable PV extensions. We have "xen_nopv" for that purpose
but only for XEN. For a consistent admin experience a common command
line parameter "nopv" set across all PV guest implementations is a
better choice.

There are guest types which just won't work without PV extensions,
like Xen PV, Xen PVH and jailhouse. add a "ignore_nopv" member to
struct hypervisor_x86 set to true for those guest types and call
the detect functions only if nopv is false or ignore_nopv is true.

Suggested-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan &lt;zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Jan Kiszka &lt;jan.kiszka@siemens.com&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In virtualization environment, PV extensions (drivers, interrupts,
timers, etc) are enabled in the majority of use cases which is the
best option.

However, in some cases (kexec not fully working, benchmarking)
we want to disable PV extensions. We have "xen_nopv" for that purpose
but only for XEN. For a consistent admin experience a common command
line parameter "nopv" set across all PV guest implementations is a
better choice.

There are guest types which just won't work without PV extensions,
like Xen PV, Xen PVH and jailhouse. add a "ignore_nopv" member to
struct hypervisor_x86 set to true for those guest types and call
the detect functions only if nopv is false or ignore_nopv is true.

Suggested-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan &lt;zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Jan Kiszka &lt;jan.kiszka@siemens.com&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
