<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c, branch linux-6.3.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi</title>
<updated>2023-02-23T22:41:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-23T22:41:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=06e1a81c4806d0b7f75f9d742ebf410718244e03'/>
<id>06e1a81c4806d0b7f75f9d742ebf410718244e03</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
 "A healthy mix of EFI contributions this time:

   - Performance tweaks for efifb earlycon (Andy)

   - Preparatory refactoring and cleanup work in the efivar layer, which
     is needed to accommodate the Snapdragon arm64 laptops that expose
     their EFI variable store via a TEE secure world API (Johan)

   - Enhancements to the EFI memory map handling so that Xen dom0 can
     safely access EFI configuration tables (Demi Marie)

   - Wire up the newly introduced IBT/BTI flag in the EFI memory
     attributes table, so that firmware that is generated with ENDBR/BTI
     landing pads will be mapped with enforcement enabled

   - Clean up how we check and print the EFI revision exposed by the
     firmware

   - Incorporate EFI memory attributes protocol definition and wire it
     up in the EFI zboot code (Evgeniy)

     This ensures that these images can execute under new and stricter
     rules regarding the default memory permissions for EFI page
     allocations (More work is in progress here)

   - CPER header cleanup (Dan Williams)

   - Use a raw spinlock to protect the EFI runtime services stack on
     arm64 to ensure the correct semantics under -rt (Pierre)

   - EFI framebuffer quirk for Lenovo Ideapad (Darrell)"

* tag 'efi-next-for-v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi: (24 commits)
  firmware/efi sysfb_efi: Add quirk for Lenovo IdeaPad Duet 3
  arm64: efi: Make efi_rt_lock a raw_spinlock
  efi: Add mixed-mode thunk recipe for GetMemoryAttributes
  efi: x86: Wire up IBT annotation in memory attributes table
  efi: arm64: Wire up BTI annotation in memory attributes table
  efi: Discover BTI support in runtime services regions
  efi/cper, cxl: Remove cxl_err.h
  efi: Use standard format for printing the EFI revision
  efi: Drop minimum EFI version check at boot
  efi: zboot: Use EFI protocol to remap code/data with the right attributes
  efi/libstub: Add memory attribute protocol definitions
  efi: efivars: prevent double registration
  efi: verify that variable services are supported
  efivarfs: always register filesystem
  efi: efivars: add efivars printk prefix
  efi: Warn if trying to reserve memory under Xen
  efi: Actually enable the ESRT under Xen
  efi: Apply allowlist to EFI configuration tables when running under Xen
  efi: xen: Implement memory descriptor lookup based on hypercall
  efi: memmap: Disregard bogus entries instead of returning them
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
 "A healthy mix of EFI contributions this time:

   - Performance tweaks for efifb earlycon (Andy)

   - Preparatory refactoring and cleanup work in the efivar layer, which
     is needed to accommodate the Snapdragon arm64 laptops that expose
     their EFI variable store via a TEE secure world API (Johan)

   - Enhancements to the EFI memory map handling so that Xen dom0 can
     safely access EFI configuration tables (Demi Marie)

   - Wire up the newly introduced IBT/BTI flag in the EFI memory
     attributes table, so that firmware that is generated with ENDBR/BTI
     landing pads will be mapped with enforcement enabled

   - Clean up how we check and print the EFI revision exposed by the
     firmware

   - Incorporate EFI memory attributes protocol definition and wire it
     up in the EFI zboot code (Evgeniy)

     This ensures that these images can execute under new and stricter
     rules regarding the default memory permissions for EFI page
     allocations (More work is in progress here)

   - CPER header cleanup (Dan Williams)

   - Use a raw spinlock to protect the EFI runtime services stack on
     arm64 to ensure the correct semantics under -rt (Pierre)

   - EFI framebuffer quirk for Lenovo Ideapad (Darrell)"

* tag 'efi-next-for-v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi: (24 commits)
  firmware/efi sysfb_efi: Add quirk for Lenovo IdeaPad Duet 3
  arm64: efi: Make efi_rt_lock a raw_spinlock
  efi: Add mixed-mode thunk recipe for GetMemoryAttributes
  efi: x86: Wire up IBT annotation in memory attributes table
  efi: arm64: Wire up BTI annotation in memory attributes table
  efi: Discover BTI support in runtime services regions
  efi/cper, cxl: Remove cxl_err.h
  efi: Use standard format for printing the EFI revision
  efi: Drop minimum EFI version check at boot
  efi: zboot: Use EFI protocol to remap code/data with the right attributes
  efi/libstub: Add memory attribute protocol definitions
  efi: efivars: prevent double registration
  efi: verify that variable services are supported
  efivarfs: always register filesystem
  efi: efivars: add efivars printk prefix
  efi: Warn if trying to reserve memory under Xen
  efi: Actually enable the ESRT under Xen
  efi: Apply allowlist to EFI configuration tables when running under Xen
  efi: xen: Implement memory descriptor lookup based on hypercall
  efi: memmap: Disregard bogus entries instead of returning them
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2023-02-21T22:51:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-21T22:51:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=877934769e5b91798d304d4641647900ee614ce8'/>
<id>877934769e5b91798d304d4641647900ee614ce8</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 cpuid updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Cache the AMD debug registers in per-CPU variables to avoid MSR
   writes where possible, when supporting a debug registers swap feature
   for SEV-ES guests

 - Add support for AMD's version of eIBRS called Automatic IBRS which is
   a set-and-forget control of indirect branch restriction speculation
   resources on privilege change

 - Add support for a new x86 instruction - LKGS - Load kernel GS which
   is part of the FRED infrastructure

 - Reset SPEC_CTRL upon init to accomodate use cases like kexec which
   rediscover

 - Other smaller fixes and cleanups

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/amd: Cache debug register values in percpu variables
  KVM: x86: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest
  x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the SMM_CTL MSR not present feature
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature
  x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the NO_NESTED_DATA_BP feature
  KVM: x86: Move open-coded CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX bit propagation code
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for CPUID_80000021_EAX
  x86/gsseg: Add the new &lt;asm/gsseg.h&gt; header to &lt;asm/asm-prototypes.h&gt;
  x86/gsseg: Use the LKGS instruction if available for load_gs_index()
  x86/gsseg: Move load_gs_index() to its own new header file
  x86/gsseg: Make asm_load_gs_index() take an u16
  x86/opcode: Add the LKGS instruction to x86-opcode-map
  x86/cpufeature: Add the CPU feature bit for LKGS
  x86/bugs: Reset speculation control settings on init
  x86/cpu: Remove redundant extern x86_read_arch_cap_msr()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 cpuid updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Cache the AMD debug registers in per-CPU variables to avoid MSR
   writes where possible, when supporting a debug registers swap feature
   for SEV-ES guests

 - Add support for AMD's version of eIBRS called Automatic IBRS which is
   a set-and-forget control of indirect branch restriction speculation
   resources on privilege change

 - Add support for a new x86 instruction - LKGS - Load kernel GS which
   is part of the FRED infrastructure

 - Reset SPEC_CTRL upon init to accomodate use cases like kexec which
   rediscover

 - Other smaller fixes and cleanups

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/amd: Cache debug register values in percpu variables
  KVM: x86: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest
  x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the SMM_CTL MSR not present feature
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature
  x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the NO_NESTED_DATA_BP feature
  KVM: x86: Move open-coded CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX bit propagation code
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for CPUID_80000021_EAX
  x86/gsseg: Add the new &lt;asm/gsseg.h&gt; header to &lt;asm/asm-prototypes.h&gt;
  x86/gsseg: Use the LKGS instruction if available for load_gs_index()
  x86/gsseg: Move load_gs_index() to its own new header file
  x86/gsseg: Make asm_load_gs_index() take an u16
  x86/opcode: Add the LKGS instruction to x86-opcode-map
  x86/cpufeature: Add the CPU feature bit for LKGS
  x86/bugs: Reset speculation control settings on init
  x86/cpu: Remove redundant extern x86_read_arch_cap_msr()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86-cleanups-2023-02-20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2023-02-21T17:24:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-21T17:24:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=056612fd41fef88eef22a032021cc15ef98cfc34'/>
<id>056612fd41fef88eef22a032021cc15ef98cfc34</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull miscellaneous x86 cleanups from Thomas Gleixner:

 - Correct the common copy and pasted mishandling of kstrtobool() in the
   strict_sas_size() setup function

 - Make recalibrate_cpu_khz() an GPL only export

 - Check TSC feature before doing anything else which avoids pointless
   code execution if TSC is not available

 - Remove or fixup stale and misleading comments

 - Remove unused or pointelessly duplicated variables

 - Spelling and typo fixes

* tag 'x86-cleanups-2023-02-20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/hotplug: Remove incorrect comment about mwait_play_dead()
  x86/tsc: Do feature check as the very first thing
  x86/tsc: Make recalibrate_cpu_khz() export GPL only
  x86/cacheinfo: Remove unused trace variable
  x86/Kconfig: Fix spellos &amp; punctuation
  x86/signal: Fix the value returned by strict_sas_size()
  x86/cpu: Remove misleading comment
  x86/setup: Move duplicate boot_cpu_data definition out of the ifdeffery
  x86/boot/e820: Fix typo in e820.c comment
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull miscellaneous x86 cleanups from Thomas Gleixner:

 - Correct the common copy and pasted mishandling of kstrtobool() in the
   strict_sas_size() setup function

 - Make recalibrate_cpu_khz() an GPL only export

 - Check TSC feature before doing anything else which avoids pointless
   code execution if TSC is not available

 - Remove or fixup stale and misleading comments

 - Remove unused or pointelessly duplicated variables

 - Spelling and typo fixes

* tag 'x86-cleanups-2023-02-20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/hotplug: Remove incorrect comment about mwait_play_dead()
  x86/tsc: Do feature check as the very first thing
  x86/tsc: Make recalibrate_cpu_khz() export GPL only
  x86/cacheinfo: Remove unused trace variable
  x86/Kconfig: Fix spellos &amp; punctuation
  x86/signal: Fix the value returned by strict_sas_size()
  x86/cpu: Remove misleading comment
  x86/setup: Move duplicate boot_cpu_data definition out of the ifdeffery
  x86/boot/e820: Fix typo in e820.c comment
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_vdso_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2023-02-21T16:54:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-21T16:54:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3f0b0903fde584a7398f82fc00bf4f8138610b87'/>
<id>3f0b0903fde584a7398f82fc00bf4f8138610b87</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 vdso updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add getcpu support for the 32-bit version of the vDSO

 - Some smaller fixes

* tag 'x86_vdso_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/vdso: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings
  x86/vdso: Fake 32bit VDSO build on 64bit compile for vgetcpu
  selftests: Emit a warning if getcpu() is missing on 32bit
  x86/vdso: Provide getcpu for x86-32.
  x86/cpu: Provide the full setup for getcpu() on x86-32
  x86/vdso: Move VDSO image init to vdso2c generated code
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 vdso updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add getcpu support for the 32-bit version of the vDSO

 - Some smaller fixes

* tag 'x86_vdso_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/vdso: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings
  x86/vdso: Fake 32bit VDSO build on 64bit compile for vgetcpu
  selftests: Emit a warning if getcpu() is missing on 32bit
  x86/vdso: Provide getcpu for x86-32.
  x86/cpu: Provide the full setup for getcpu() on x86-32
  x86/vdso: Move VDSO image init to vdso2c generated code
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_microcode_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2023-02-21T16:47:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-21T16:47:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=efebca0ba9cfe2bae79dba7b2b09b129c41cfc8e'/>
<id>efebca0ba9cfe2bae79dba7b2b09b129c41cfc8e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 microcode loader updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Fix mixed steppings support on AMD which got broken somewhere along
   the way

 - Improve revision reporting

 - Properly check CPUID capabilities after late microcode upgrade to
   avoid false positives

 - A garden variety of other small fixes

* tag 'x86_microcode_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/microcode/core: Return an error only when necessary
  x86/microcode/AMD: Fix mixed steppings support
  x86/microcode/AMD: Add a @cpu parameter to the reloading functions
  x86/microcode/amd: Remove load_microcode_amd()'s bsp parameter
  x86/microcode: Allow only "1" as a late reload trigger value
  x86/microcode/intel: Print old and new revision during early boot
  x86/microcode/intel: Pass the microcode revision to print_ucode_info() directly
  x86/microcode: Adjust late loading result reporting message
  x86/microcode: Check CPU capabilities after late microcode update correctly
  x86/microcode: Add a parameter to microcode_check() to store CPU capabilities
  x86/microcode: Use the DEVICE_ATTR_RO() macro
  x86/microcode/AMD: Handle multiple glued containers properly
  x86/microcode/AMD: Rename a couple of functions
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 microcode loader updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Fix mixed steppings support on AMD which got broken somewhere along
   the way

 - Improve revision reporting

 - Properly check CPUID capabilities after late microcode upgrade to
   avoid false positives

 - A garden variety of other small fixes

* tag 'x86_microcode_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/microcode/core: Return an error only when necessary
  x86/microcode/AMD: Fix mixed steppings support
  x86/microcode/AMD: Add a @cpu parameter to the reloading functions
  x86/microcode/amd: Remove load_microcode_amd()'s bsp parameter
  x86/microcode: Allow only "1" as a late reload trigger value
  x86/microcode/intel: Print old and new revision during early boot
  x86/microcode/intel: Pass the microcode revision to print_ucode_info() directly
  x86/microcode: Adjust late loading result reporting message
  x86/microcode: Check CPU capabilities after late microcode update correctly
  x86/microcode: Add a parameter to microcode_check() to store CPU capabilities
  x86/microcode: Use the DEVICE_ATTR_RO() macro
  x86/microcode/AMD: Handle multiple glued containers properly
  x86/microcode/AMD: Rename a couple of functions
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Identify processors vulnerable to SMT RSB predictions</title>
<updated>2023-02-10T11:43:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-09T15:22:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=be8de49bea505e7777a69ef63d60e02ac1712683'/>
<id>be8de49bea505e7777a69ef63d60e02ac1712683</id>
<content type='text'>
Certain AMD processors are vulnerable to a cross-thread return address
predictions bug. When running in SMT mode and one of the sibling threads
transitions out of C0 state, the other sibling thread could use return
target predictions from the sibling thread that transitioned out of C0.

The Spectre v2 mitigations cover the Linux kernel, as it fills the RSB
when context switching to the idle thread. However, KVM allows a VMM to
prevent exiting guest mode when transitioning out of C0. A guest could
act maliciously in this situation, so create a new x86 BUG that can be
used to detect if the processor is vulnerable.

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;91cec885656ca1fcd4f0185ce403a53dd9edecb7.1675956146.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Certain AMD processors are vulnerable to a cross-thread return address
predictions bug. When running in SMT mode and one of the sibling threads
transitions out of C0 state, the other sibling thread could use return
target predictions from the sibling thread that transitioned out of C0.

The Spectre v2 mitigations cover the Linux kernel, as it fills the RSB
when context switching to the idle thread. However, KVM allows a VMM to
prevent exiting guest mode when transitioning out of C0. A guest could
act maliciously in this situation, so create a new x86 BUG that can be
used to detect if the processor is vulnerable.

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;91cec885656ca1fcd4f0185ce403a53dd9edecb7.1675956146.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi: x86: Wire up IBT annotation in memory attributes table</title>
<updated>2023-02-09T18:30:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ardb@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-06T12:33:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=93be2859e26c3be847780c65313da1b261833451'/>
<id>93be2859e26c3be847780c65313da1b261833451</id>
<content type='text'>
UEFI v2.10 extends the EFI memory attributes table with a flag that
indicates whether or not all RuntimeServicesCode regions were
constructed with ENDBR landing pads, permitting the OS to map these
regions with IBT restrictions enabled.

So let's take this into account on x86 as well.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt; # ibt_save() changes
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
UEFI v2.10 extends the EFI memory attributes table with a flag that
indicates whether or not all RuntimeServicesCode regions were
constructed with ENDBR landing pads, permitting the OS to map these
regions with IBT restrictions enabled.

So let's take this into account on x86 as well.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt; # ibt_save() changes
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Provide the full setup for getcpu() on x86-32</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T14:48:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-25T09:42:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=717cce3bdcf34705417f641bf2fcdf9b038ec36c'/>
<id>717cce3bdcf34705417f641bf2fcdf9b038ec36c</id>
<content type='text'>
setup_getcpu() configures two things:

  - it writes the current CPU &amp; node information into MSR_TSC_AUX
  - it writes the same information as a GDT entry.

By using the "full" setup_getcpu() on i386 it is possible to read the CPU
information in userland via RDTSCP() or via LSL from the GDT.

Provide an GDT_ENTRY_CPUNODE for x86-32 and make the setup function
unconditionally available.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Roland Mainz &lt;roland.mainz@nrubsig.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221125094216.3663444-2-bigeasy@linutronix.de

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
setup_getcpu() configures two things:

  - it writes the current CPU &amp; node information into MSR_TSC_AUX
  - it writes the same information as a GDT entry.

By using the "full" setup_getcpu() on i386 it is possible to read the CPU
information in userland via RDTSCP() or via LSL from the GDT.

Provide an GDT_ENTRY_CPUNODE for x86-32 and make the setup function
unconditionally available.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Roland Mainz &lt;roland.mainz@nrubsig.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221125094216.3663444-2-bigeasy@linutronix.de

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS</title>
<updated>2023-01-25T16:16:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kim Phillips</name>
<email>kim.phillips@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-24T16:33:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e7862eda309ecfccc36bb5558d937ed3ace07f3f'/>
<id>e7862eda309ecfccc36bb5558d937ed3ace07f3f</id>
<content type='text'>
The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS.

It is a "set-and-forget" feature that means that, like Intel's Enhanced IBRS,
h/w manages its IBRS mitigation resources automatically across CPL transitions.

The feature is advertised by CPUID_Fn80000021_EAX bit 8 and is enabled by
setting MSR C000_0080 (EFER) bit 21.

Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present.  It typically
provides greater performance over the incumbent generic retpolines mitigation.

Reuse the SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum.  AMD Automatic IBRS and
Intel Enhanced IBRS have similar enablement.  Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to
cpu_vuln_whitelist, since AMD Automatic IBRS isn't affected by PBRSB-eIBRS.

The kernel command line option spectre_v2=eibrs is used to select AMD Automatic
IBRS, if available.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124163319.2277355-8-kim.phillips@amd.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS.

It is a "set-and-forget" feature that means that, like Intel's Enhanced IBRS,
h/w manages its IBRS mitigation resources automatically across CPL transitions.

The feature is advertised by CPUID_Fn80000021_EAX bit 8 and is enabled by
setting MSR C000_0080 (EFER) bit 21.

Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present.  It typically
provides greater performance over the incumbent generic retpolines mitigation.

Reuse the SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum.  AMD Automatic IBRS and
Intel Enhanced IBRS have similar enablement.  Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to
cpu_vuln_whitelist, since AMD Automatic IBRS isn't affected by PBRSB-eIBRS.

The kernel command line option spectre_v2=eibrs is used to select AMD Automatic
IBRS, if available.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124163319.2277355-8-kim.phillips@amd.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature</title>
<updated>2023-01-25T15:25:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kim Phillips</name>
<email>kim.phillips@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-24T16:33:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5b909d4ae59aedc711b7a432da021be0e82c95a0'/>
<id>5b909d4ae59aedc711b7a432da021be0e82c95a0</id>
<content type='text'>
The Null Selector Clears Base feature was being open-coded for KVM.
Add it to its newly added native CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX proper.

Also drop the bit description comments now it's more self-describing.

  [ bp: Convert test in check_null_seg_clears_base() too. ]

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124163319.2277355-6-kim.phillips@amd.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The Null Selector Clears Base feature was being open-coded for KVM.
Add it to its newly added native CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX proper.

Also drop the bit description comments now it's more self-describing.

  [ bp: Convert test in check_null_seg_clears_base() too. ]

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124163319.2277355-6-kim.phillips@amd.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
