<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c, branch v6.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Flush IBP in ib_prctl_set()</title>
<updated>2023-01-04T10:25:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rodrigo Branco</name>
<email>bsdaemon@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-03T20:17:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a664ec9158eeddd75121d39c9a0758016097fa96'/>
<id>a664ec9158eeddd75121d39c9a0758016097fa96</id>
<content type='text'>
We missed the window between the TIF flag update and the next reschedule.

Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Branco &lt;bsdaemon@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We missed the window between the TIF flag update and the next reschedule.

Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Branco &lt;bsdaemon@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2022-12-14T23:03:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-14T23:03:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=94a855111ed9106971ca2617c5d075269e6aefde'/>
<id>94a855111ed9106971ca2617c5d075269e6aefde</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add the call depth tracking mitigation for Retbleed which has been
   long in the making. It is a lighterweight software-only fix for
   Skylake-based cores where enabling IBRS is a big hammer and causes a
   significant performance impact.

   What it basically does is, it aligns all kernel functions to 16 bytes
   boundary and adds a 16-byte padding before the function, objtool
   collects all functions' locations and when the mitigation gets
   applied, it patches a call accounting thunk which is used to track
   the call depth of the stack at any time.

   When that call depth reaches a magical, microarchitecture-specific
   value for the Return Stack Buffer, the code stuffs that RSB and
   avoids its underflow which could otherwise lead to the Intel variant
   of Retbleed.

   This software-only solution brings a lot of the lost performance
   back, as benchmarks suggest:

       https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220915111039.092790446@infradead.org/

   That page above also contains a lot more detailed explanation of the
   whole mechanism

 - Implement a new control flow integrity scheme called FineIBT which is
   based on the software kCFI implementation and uses hardware IBT
   support where present to annotate and track indirect branches using a
   hash to validate them

 - Other misc fixes and cleanups

* tag 'x86_core_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (80 commits)
  x86/paravirt: Use common macro for creating simple asm paravirt functions
  x86/paravirt: Remove clobber bitmask from .parainstructions
  x86/debug: Include percpu.h in debugreg.h to get DECLARE_PER_CPU() et al
  x86/cpufeatures: Move X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH from bit 18 to bit 19 of word 11, to leave space for WIP X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA bit
  x86/Kconfig: Enable kernel IBT by default
  x86,pm: Force out-of-line memcpy()
  objtool: Fix weak hole vs prefix symbol
  objtool: Optimize elf_dirty_reloc_sym()
  x86/cfi: Add boot time hash randomization
  x86/cfi: Boot time selection of CFI scheme
  x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT
  objtool: Add --cfi to generate the .cfi_sites section
  x86: Add prefix symbols for function padding
  objtool: Add option to generate prefix symbols
  objtool: Avoid O(bloody terrible) behaviour -- an ode to libelf
  objtool: Slice up elf_create_section_symbol()
  kallsyms: Revert "Take callthunks into account"
  x86: Unconfuse CONFIG_ and X86_FEATURE_ namespaces
  x86/retpoline: Fix crash printing warning
  x86/paravirt: Fix a !PARAVIRT build warning
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add the call depth tracking mitigation for Retbleed which has been
   long in the making. It is a lighterweight software-only fix for
   Skylake-based cores where enabling IBRS is a big hammer and causes a
   significant performance impact.

   What it basically does is, it aligns all kernel functions to 16 bytes
   boundary and adds a 16-byte padding before the function, objtool
   collects all functions' locations and when the mitigation gets
   applied, it patches a call accounting thunk which is used to track
   the call depth of the stack at any time.

   When that call depth reaches a magical, microarchitecture-specific
   value for the Return Stack Buffer, the code stuffs that RSB and
   avoids its underflow which could otherwise lead to the Intel variant
   of Retbleed.

   This software-only solution brings a lot of the lost performance
   back, as benchmarks suggest:

       https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220915111039.092790446@infradead.org/

   That page above also contains a lot more detailed explanation of the
   whole mechanism

 - Implement a new control flow integrity scheme called FineIBT which is
   based on the software kCFI implementation and uses hardware IBT
   support where present to annotate and track indirect branches using a
   hash to validate them

 - Other misc fixes and cleanups

* tag 'x86_core_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (80 commits)
  x86/paravirt: Use common macro for creating simple asm paravirt functions
  x86/paravirt: Remove clobber bitmask from .parainstructions
  x86/debug: Include percpu.h in debugreg.h to get DECLARE_PER_CPU() et al
  x86/cpufeatures: Move X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH from bit 18 to bit 19 of word 11, to leave space for WIP X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA bit
  x86/Kconfig: Enable kernel IBT by default
  x86,pm: Force out-of-line memcpy()
  objtool: Fix weak hole vs prefix symbol
  objtool: Optimize elf_dirty_reloc_sym()
  x86/cfi: Add boot time hash randomization
  x86/cfi: Boot time selection of CFI scheme
  x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT
  objtool: Add --cfi to generate the .cfi_sites section
  x86: Add prefix symbols for function padding
  objtool: Add option to generate prefix symbols
  objtool: Avoid O(bloody terrible) behaviour -- an ode to libelf
  objtool: Slice up elf_create_section_symbol()
  kallsyms: Revert "Take callthunks into account"
  x86: Unconfuse CONFIG_ and X86_FEATURE_ namespaces
  x86/retpoline: Fix crash printing warning
  x86/paravirt: Fix a !PARAVIRT build warning
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2022-12-13T22:56:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-13T22:56:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3ef3ace4e2ecf4aa4c8ddff1d35683671a09b05e'/>
<id>3ef3ace4e2ecf4aa4c8ddff1d35683671a09b05e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 cpu updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Split MTRR and PAT init code to accomodate at least Xen PV and TDX
   guests which do not get MTRRs exposed but only PAT. (TDX guests do
   not support the cache disabling dance when setting up MTRRs so they
   fall under the same category)

   This is a cleanup work to remove all the ugly workarounds for such
   guests and init things separately (Juergen Gross)

 - Add two new Intel CPUs to the list of CPUs with "normal" Energy
   Performance Bias, leading to power savings

 - Do not do bus master arbitration in C3 (ARB_DISABLE) on modern
   Centaur CPUs

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
  x86/mtrr: Make message for disabled MTRRs more descriptive
  x86/pat: Handle TDX guest PAT initialization
  x86/cpuid: Carve out all CPUID functionality
  x86/cpu: Switch to cpu_feature_enabled() for X86_FEATURE_XENPV
  x86/cpu: Remove X86_FEATURE_XENPV usage in setup_cpu_entry_area()
  x86/cpu: Drop 32-bit Xen PV guest code in update_task_stack()
  x86/cpu: Remove unneeded 64-bit dependency in arch_enter_from_user_mode()
  x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_XENPV to disabled-features.h
  x86/acpi/cstate: Optimize ARB_DISABLE on Centaur CPUs
  x86/mtrr: Simplify mtrr_ops initialization
  x86/cacheinfo: Switch cache_ap_init() to hotplug callback
  x86: Decouple PAT and MTRR handling
  x86/mtrr: Add a stop_machine() handler calling only cache_cpu_init()
  x86/mtrr: Let cache_aps_delayed_init replace mtrr_aps_delayed_init
  x86/mtrr: Get rid of __mtrr_enabled bool
  x86/mtrr: Simplify mtrr_bp_init()
  x86/mtrr: Remove set_all callback from struct mtrr_ops
  x86/mtrr: Disentangle MTRR init from PAT init
  x86/mtrr: Move cache control code to cacheinfo.c
  x86/mtrr: Split MTRR-specific handling from cache dis/enabling
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 cpu updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Split MTRR and PAT init code to accomodate at least Xen PV and TDX
   guests which do not get MTRRs exposed but only PAT. (TDX guests do
   not support the cache disabling dance when setting up MTRRs so they
   fall under the same category)

   This is a cleanup work to remove all the ugly workarounds for such
   guests and init things separately (Juergen Gross)

 - Add two new Intel CPUs to the list of CPUs with "normal" Energy
   Performance Bias, leading to power savings

 - Do not do bus master arbitration in C3 (ARB_DISABLE) on modern
   Centaur CPUs

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
  x86/mtrr: Make message for disabled MTRRs more descriptive
  x86/pat: Handle TDX guest PAT initialization
  x86/cpuid: Carve out all CPUID functionality
  x86/cpu: Switch to cpu_feature_enabled() for X86_FEATURE_XENPV
  x86/cpu: Remove X86_FEATURE_XENPV usage in setup_cpu_entry_area()
  x86/cpu: Drop 32-bit Xen PV guest code in update_task_stack()
  x86/cpu: Remove unneeded 64-bit dependency in arch_enter_from_user_mode()
  x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_XENPV to disabled-features.h
  x86/acpi/cstate: Optimize ARB_DISABLE on Centaur CPUs
  x86/mtrr: Simplify mtrr_ops initialization
  x86/cacheinfo: Switch cache_ap_init() to hotplug callback
  x86: Decouple PAT and MTRR handling
  x86/mtrr: Add a stop_machine() handler calling only cache_cpu_init()
  x86/mtrr: Let cache_aps_delayed_init replace mtrr_aps_delayed_init
  x86/mtrr: Get rid of __mtrr_enabled bool
  x86/mtrr: Simplify mtrr_bp_init()
  x86/mtrr: Remove set_all callback from struct mtrr_ops
  x86/mtrr: Disentangle MTRR init from PAT init
  x86/mtrr: Move cache control code to cacheinfo.c
  x86/mtrr: Split MTRR-specific handling from cache dis/enabling
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Make sure MSR_SPEC_CTRL is updated properly upon resume from S3</title>
<updated>2022-12-02T23:45:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-30T15:25:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=66065157420c5b9b3f078f43d313c153e1ff7f83'/>
<id>66065157420c5b9b3f078f43d313c153e1ff7f83</id>
<content type='text'>
The "force" argument to write_spec_ctrl_current() is currently ambiguous
as it does not guarantee the MSR write. This is due to the optimization
that writes to the MSR happen only when the new value differs from the
cached value.

This is fine in most cases, but breaks for S3 resume when the cached MSR
value gets out of sync with the hardware MSR value due to S3 resetting
it.

When x86_spec_ctrl_current is same as x86_spec_ctrl_base, the MSR write
is skipped. Which results in SPEC_CTRL mitigations not getting restored.

Move the MSR write from write_spec_ctrl_current() to a new function that
unconditionally writes to the MSR. Update the callers accordingly and
rename functions.

  [ bp: Rework a bit. ]

Fixes: caa0ff24d5d0 ("x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value")
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/806d39b0bfec2fe8f50dc5446dff20f5bb24a959.1669821572.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The "force" argument to write_spec_ctrl_current() is currently ambiguous
as it does not guarantee the MSR write. This is due to the optimization
that writes to the MSR happen only when the new value differs from the
cached value.

This is fine in most cases, but breaks for S3 resume when the cached MSR
value gets out of sync with the hardware MSR value due to S3 resetting
it.

When x86_spec_ctrl_current is same as x86_spec_ctrl_base, the MSR write
is skipped. Which results in SPEC_CTRL mitigations not getting restored.

Move the MSR write from write_spec_ctrl_current() to a new function that
unconditionally writes to the MSR. Update the callers accordingly and
rename functions.

  [ bp: Rework a bit. ]

Fixes: caa0ff24d5d0 ("x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value")
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/806d39b0bfec2fe8f50dc5446dff20f5bb24a959.1669821572.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Switch to cpu_feature_enabled() for X86_FEATURE_XENPV</title>
<updated>2022-11-22T15:18:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-04T07:27:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6007878a782eb96f50a71c3a06cf3e931cf8aac1'/>
<id>6007878a782eb96f50a71c3a06cf3e931cf8aac1</id>
<content type='text'>
Convert the remaining cases of static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) and
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) to use cpu_feature_enabled(), allowing
more efficient code in case the kernel is configured without
CONFIG_XEN_PV.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221104072701.20283-6-jgross@suse.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Convert the remaining cases of static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) and
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) to use cpu_feature_enabled(), allowing
more efficient code in case the kernel is configured without
CONFIG_XEN_PV.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221104072701.20283-6-jgross@suse.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'v6.1-rc6' into x86/core, to resolve conflicts</title>
<updated>2022-11-21T22:01:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-21T21:54:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0ce096db719ebaf46d4faf93e1ed1341c1853919'/>
<id>0ce096db719ebaf46d4faf93e1ed1341c1853919</id>
<content type='text'>
Resolve conflicts between these commits in arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c:

 # upstream:
 debc5a1ec0d1 ("KVM: x86: use a separate asm-offsets.c file")

 # retbleed work in x86/core:
 5d8213864ade ("x86/retbleed: Add SKL return thunk")

... and these commits in include/linux/bpf.h:

  # upstram:
  18acb7fac22f ("bpf: Revert ("Fix dispatcher patchable function entry to 5 bytes nop")")

  # x86/core commits:
  931ab63664f0 ("x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT")
  bea75b33895f ("x86/Kconfig: Introduce function padding")

The latter two modify BPF_DISPATCHER_ATTRIBUTES(), which was removed upstream.

 Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
	include/linux/bpf.h

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Resolve conflicts between these commits in arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c:

 # upstream:
 debc5a1ec0d1 ("KVM: x86: use a separate asm-offsets.c file")

 # retbleed work in x86/core:
 5d8213864ade ("x86/retbleed: Add SKL return thunk")

... and these commits in include/linux/bpf.h:

  # upstram:
  18acb7fac22f ("bpf: Revert ("Fix dispatcher patchable function entry to 5 bytes nop")")

  # x86/core commits:
  931ab63664f0 ("x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT")
  bea75b33895f ("x86/Kconfig: Introduce function padding")

The latter two modify BPF_DISPATCHER_ATTRIBUTES(), which was removed upstream.

 Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
	include/linux/bpf.h

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, KVM: remove unnecessary argument to x86_virt_spec_ctrl and callers</title>
<updated>2022-11-09T17:26:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-30T18:48:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bd3d394e367e66e773a6cb25a82c29b04464230b'/>
<id>bd3d394e367e66e773a6cb25a82c29b04464230b</id>
<content type='text'>
x86_virt_spec_ctrl only deals with the paravirtualized
MSR_IA32_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL now and does not handle MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
anymore; remove the corresponding, unused argument.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
x86_virt_spec_ctrl only deals with the paravirtualized
MSR_IA32_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL now and does not handle MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
anymore; remove the corresponding, unused argument.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: SVM: move MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL save/restore to assembly</title>
<updated>2022-11-09T17:25:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-30T18:24:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9f2febf3f04daebdaaa5a43cfa20e3844905c0f9'/>
<id>9f2febf3f04daebdaaa5a43cfa20e3844905c0f9</id>
<content type='text'>
Restoration of the host IA32_SPEC_CTRL value is probably too late
with respect to the return thunk training sequence.

With respect to the user/kernel boundary, AMD says, "If software chooses
to toggle STIBP (e.g., set STIBP on kernel entry, and clear it on kernel
exit), software should set STIBP to 1 before executing the return thunk
training sequence." I assume the same requirements apply to the guest/host
boundary. The return thunk training sequence is in vmenter.S, quite close
to the VM-exit. On hosts without V_SPEC_CTRL, however, the host's
IA32_SPEC_CTRL value is not restored until much later.

To avoid this, move the restoration of host SPEC_CTRL to assembly and,
for consistency, move the restoration of the guest SPEC_CTRL as well.
This is not particularly difficult, apart from some care to cover both
32- and 64-bit, and to share code between SEV-ES and normal vmentry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbcf3 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Suggested-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Restoration of the host IA32_SPEC_CTRL value is probably too late
with respect to the return thunk training sequence.

With respect to the user/kernel boundary, AMD says, "If software chooses
to toggle STIBP (e.g., set STIBP on kernel entry, and clear it on kernel
exit), software should set STIBP to 1 before executing the return thunk
training sequence." I assume the same requirements apply to the guest/host
boundary. The return thunk training sequence is in vmenter.S, quite close
to the VM-exit. On hosts without V_SPEC_CTRL, however, the host's
IA32_SPEC_CTRL value is not restored until much later.

To avoid this, move the restoration of host SPEC_CTRL to assembly and,
for consistency, move the restoration of the guest SPEC_CTRL as well.
This is not particularly difficult, apart from some care to cover both
32- and 64-bit, and to share code between SEV-ES and normal vmentry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbcf3 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Suggested-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Add retbleed=force</title>
<updated>2022-10-17T14:41:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra (Intel)</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-17T14:41:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5c9a92dec3235b0c1d51e92860f8014753161593'/>
<id>5c9a92dec3235b0c1d51e92860f8014753161593</id>
<content type='text'>
Debug aid, allows running retbleed=force,stuff on non-affected uarchs

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Debug aid, allows running retbleed=force,stuff on non-affected uarchs

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/retbleed: Add call depth tracking mitigation</title>
<updated>2022-10-17T14:41:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-15T11:11:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d82a0345cf218f5050f5ad913e1ae6c579105731'/>
<id>d82a0345cf218f5050f5ad913e1ae6c579105731</id>
<content type='text'>
The fully secure mitigation for RSB underflow on Intel SKL CPUs is IBRS,
which inflicts up to 30% penalty for pathological syscall heavy work loads.

Software based call depth tracking and RSB refill is not perfect, but
reduces the attack surface massively. The penalty for the pathological case
is about 8% which is still annoying but definitely more palatable than IBRS.

Add a retbleed=stuff command line option to enable the call depth tracking
and software refill of the RSB.

This gives admins a choice. IBeeRS are safe and cause headaches, call depth
tracking is considered to be s(t)ufficiently safe.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915111149.029587352@infradead.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The fully secure mitigation for RSB underflow on Intel SKL CPUs is IBRS,
which inflicts up to 30% penalty for pathological syscall heavy work loads.

Software based call depth tracking and RSB refill is not perfect, but
reduces the attack surface massively. The penalty for the pathological case
is about 8% which is still annoying but definitely more palatable than IBRS.

Add a retbleed=stuff command line option to enable the call depth tracking
and software refill of the RSB.

This gives admins a choice. IBeeRS are safe and cause headaches, call depth
tracking is considered to be s(t)ufficiently safe.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915111149.029587352@infradead.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
