<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c, branch linux-6.3.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS</title>
<updated>2023-02-27T17:57:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>KP Singh</name>
<email>kpsingh@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-27T06:05:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6921ed9049bc7457f66c1596c5b78aec0dae4a9d'/>
<id>6921ed9049bc7457f66c1596c5b78aec0dae4a9d</id>
<content type='text'>
When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed.

The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target
injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on
returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace
threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which
STIBP protects.

Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for
enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if
selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter).

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
Reported-by: José Oliveira &lt;joseloliveira11@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco &lt;rodrigo@kernelhacking.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221184908.2349578-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed.

The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target
injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on
returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace
threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which
STIBP protects.

Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for
enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if
selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter).

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
Reported-by: José Oliveira &lt;joseloliveira11@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco &lt;rodrigo@kernelhacking.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221184908.2349578-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2023-02-21T22:51:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-21T22:51:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=877934769e5b91798d304d4641647900ee614ce8'/>
<id>877934769e5b91798d304d4641647900ee614ce8</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 cpuid updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Cache the AMD debug registers in per-CPU variables to avoid MSR
   writes where possible, when supporting a debug registers swap feature
   for SEV-ES guests

 - Add support for AMD's version of eIBRS called Automatic IBRS which is
   a set-and-forget control of indirect branch restriction speculation
   resources on privilege change

 - Add support for a new x86 instruction - LKGS - Load kernel GS which
   is part of the FRED infrastructure

 - Reset SPEC_CTRL upon init to accomodate use cases like kexec which
   rediscover

 - Other smaller fixes and cleanups

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/amd: Cache debug register values in percpu variables
  KVM: x86: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest
  x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the SMM_CTL MSR not present feature
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature
  x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the NO_NESTED_DATA_BP feature
  KVM: x86: Move open-coded CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX bit propagation code
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for CPUID_80000021_EAX
  x86/gsseg: Add the new &lt;asm/gsseg.h&gt; header to &lt;asm/asm-prototypes.h&gt;
  x86/gsseg: Use the LKGS instruction if available for load_gs_index()
  x86/gsseg: Move load_gs_index() to its own new header file
  x86/gsseg: Make asm_load_gs_index() take an u16
  x86/opcode: Add the LKGS instruction to x86-opcode-map
  x86/cpufeature: Add the CPU feature bit for LKGS
  x86/bugs: Reset speculation control settings on init
  x86/cpu: Remove redundant extern x86_read_arch_cap_msr()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 cpuid updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Cache the AMD debug registers in per-CPU variables to avoid MSR
   writes where possible, when supporting a debug registers swap feature
   for SEV-ES guests

 - Add support for AMD's version of eIBRS called Automatic IBRS which is
   a set-and-forget control of indirect branch restriction speculation
   resources on privilege change

 - Add support for a new x86 instruction - LKGS - Load kernel GS which
   is part of the FRED infrastructure

 - Reset SPEC_CTRL upon init to accomodate use cases like kexec which
   rediscover

 - Other smaller fixes and cleanups

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/amd: Cache debug register values in percpu variables
  KVM: x86: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest
  x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the SMM_CTL MSR not present feature
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature
  x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add the NO_NESTED_DATA_BP feature
  KVM: x86: Move open-coded CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX bit propagation code
  x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for CPUID_80000021_EAX
  x86/gsseg: Add the new &lt;asm/gsseg.h&gt; header to &lt;asm/asm-prototypes.h&gt;
  x86/gsseg: Use the LKGS instruction if available for load_gs_index()
  x86/gsseg: Move load_gs_index() to its own new header file
  x86/gsseg: Make asm_load_gs_index() take an u16
  x86/opcode: Add the LKGS instruction to x86-opcode-map
  x86/cpufeature: Add the CPU feature bit for LKGS
  x86/bugs: Reset speculation control settings on init
  x86/cpu: Remove redundant extern x86_read_arch_cap_msr()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'v6.2-rc6' into sched/core, to pick up fixes</title>
<updated>2023-01-31T14:01:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-31T14:01:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=57a30218fa25c469ed507964bbf028b7a064309a'/>
<id>57a30218fa25c469ed507964bbf028b7a064309a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pick up fixes before merging another batch of cpuidle updates.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pick up fixes before merging another batch of cpuidle updates.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS</title>
<updated>2023-01-25T16:16:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kim Phillips</name>
<email>kim.phillips@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-24T16:33:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e7862eda309ecfccc36bb5558d937ed3ace07f3f'/>
<id>e7862eda309ecfccc36bb5558d937ed3ace07f3f</id>
<content type='text'>
The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS.

It is a "set-and-forget" feature that means that, like Intel's Enhanced IBRS,
h/w manages its IBRS mitigation resources automatically across CPL transitions.

The feature is advertised by CPUID_Fn80000021_EAX bit 8 and is enabled by
setting MSR C000_0080 (EFER) bit 21.

Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present.  It typically
provides greater performance over the incumbent generic retpolines mitigation.

Reuse the SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum.  AMD Automatic IBRS and
Intel Enhanced IBRS have similar enablement.  Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to
cpu_vuln_whitelist, since AMD Automatic IBRS isn't affected by PBRSB-eIBRS.

The kernel command line option spectre_v2=eibrs is used to select AMD Automatic
IBRS, if available.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124163319.2277355-8-kim.phillips@amd.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS.

It is a "set-and-forget" feature that means that, like Intel's Enhanced IBRS,
h/w manages its IBRS mitigation resources automatically across CPL transitions.

The feature is advertised by CPUID_Fn80000021_EAX bit 8 and is enabled by
setting MSR C000_0080 (EFER) bit 21.

Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present.  It typically
provides greater performance over the incumbent generic retpolines mitigation.

Reuse the SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum.  AMD Automatic IBRS and
Intel Enhanced IBRS have similar enablement.  Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to
cpu_vuln_whitelist, since AMD Automatic IBRS isn't affected by PBRSB-eIBRS.

The kernel command line option spectre_v2=eibrs is used to select AMD Automatic
IBRS, if available.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124163319.2277355-8-kim.phillips@amd.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpuidle, intel_idle: Fix CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS</title>
<updated>2023-01-13T10:48:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-12T19:43:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9b461a6faae7b220c32466261965778b10189e54'/>
<id>9b461a6faae7b220c32466261965778b10189e54</id>
<content type='text'>
objtool to the rescue:

  vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: intel_idle_ibrs+0x17: call to spec_ctrl_current() leaves .noinstr.text section
  vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: intel_idle_ibrs+0x27: call to wrmsrl.constprop.0() leaves .noinstr.text section

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Tony Lindgren &lt;tony@atomide.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ulf Hansson &lt;ulf.hansson@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112195540.556912863@infradead.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
objtool to the rescue:

  vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: intel_idle_ibrs+0x17: call to spec_ctrl_current() leaves .noinstr.text section
  vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: intel_idle_ibrs+0x27: call to wrmsrl.constprop.0() leaves .noinstr.text section

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Tony Lindgren &lt;tony@atomide.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ulf Hansson &lt;ulf.hansson@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112195540.556912863@infradead.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Reset speculation control settings on init</title>
<updated>2023-01-12T10:37:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Breno Leitao</name>
<email>leitao@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-28T15:31:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0125acda7d76b943ca55811df40ed6ec0ecf670f'/>
<id>0125acda7d76b943ca55811df40ed6ec0ecf670f</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, x86_spec_ctrl_base is read at boot time and speculative bits
are set if Kconfig items are enabled. For example, IBRS is enabled if
CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY is configured, etc. These MSR bits are not cleared
if the mitigations are disabled.

This is a problem when kexec-ing a kernel that has the mitigation
disabled from a kernel that has the mitigation enabled. In this case,
the MSR bits are not cleared during the new kernel boot. As a result,
this might have some performance degradation that is hard to pinpoint.

This problem does not happen if the machine is (hard) rebooted because
the bit will be cleared by default.

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221128153148.1129350-1-leitao@debian.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently, x86_spec_ctrl_base is read at boot time and speculative bits
are set if Kconfig items are enabled. For example, IBRS is enabled if
CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY is configured, etc. These MSR bits are not cleared
if the mitigations are disabled.

This is a problem when kexec-ing a kernel that has the mitigation
disabled from a kernel that has the mitigation enabled. In this case,
the MSR bits are not cleared during the new kernel boot. As a result,
this might have some performance degradation that is hard to pinpoint.

This problem does not happen if the machine is (hard) rebooted because
the bit will be cleared by default.

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221128153148.1129350-1-leitao@debian.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Remove redundant extern x86_read_arch_cap_msr()</title>
<updated>2023-01-10T11:40:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashok Raj</name>
<email>ashok.raj@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-28T17:24:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bb5525a50601f8be7d0ffb04740e1714506e60c4'/>
<id>bb5525a50601f8be7d0ffb04740e1714506e60c4</id>
<content type='text'>
The prototype for the x86_read_arch_cap_msr() function has moved to
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h - kill the redundant definition in arch/x86/kernel/cpu.h
and include the header.

Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj &lt;ashok.raj@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Sneddon &lt;daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221128172451.792595-1-ashok.raj@intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The prototype for the x86_read_arch_cap_msr() function has moved to
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h - kill the redundant definition in arch/x86/kernel/cpu.h
and include the header.

Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj &lt;ashok.raj@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Sneddon &lt;daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221128172451.792595-1-ashok.raj@intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Flush IBP in ib_prctl_set()</title>
<updated>2023-01-04T10:25:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rodrigo Branco</name>
<email>bsdaemon@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-03T20:17:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a664ec9158eeddd75121d39c9a0758016097fa96'/>
<id>a664ec9158eeddd75121d39c9a0758016097fa96</id>
<content type='text'>
We missed the window between the TIF flag update and the next reschedule.

Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Branco &lt;bsdaemon@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We missed the window between the TIF flag update and the next reschedule.

Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Branco &lt;bsdaemon@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2022-12-14T23:03:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-14T23:03:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=94a855111ed9106971ca2617c5d075269e6aefde'/>
<id>94a855111ed9106971ca2617c5d075269e6aefde</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add the call depth tracking mitigation for Retbleed which has been
   long in the making. It is a lighterweight software-only fix for
   Skylake-based cores where enabling IBRS is a big hammer and causes a
   significant performance impact.

   What it basically does is, it aligns all kernel functions to 16 bytes
   boundary and adds a 16-byte padding before the function, objtool
   collects all functions' locations and when the mitigation gets
   applied, it patches a call accounting thunk which is used to track
   the call depth of the stack at any time.

   When that call depth reaches a magical, microarchitecture-specific
   value for the Return Stack Buffer, the code stuffs that RSB and
   avoids its underflow which could otherwise lead to the Intel variant
   of Retbleed.

   This software-only solution brings a lot of the lost performance
   back, as benchmarks suggest:

       https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220915111039.092790446@infradead.org/

   That page above also contains a lot more detailed explanation of the
   whole mechanism

 - Implement a new control flow integrity scheme called FineIBT which is
   based on the software kCFI implementation and uses hardware IBT
   support where present to annotate and track indirect branches using a
   hash to validate them

 - Other misc fixes and cleanups

* tag 'x86_core_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (80 commits)
  x86/paravirt: Use common macro for creating simple asm paravirt functions
  x86/paravirt: Remove clobber bitmask from .parainstructions
  x86/debug: Include percpu.h in debugreg.h to get DECLARE_PER_CPU() et al
  x86/cpufeatures: Move X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH from bit 18 to bit 19 of word 11, to leave space for WIP X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA bit
  x86/Kconfig: Enable kernel IBT by default
  x86,pm: Force out-of-line memcpy()
  objtool: Fix weak hole vs prefix symbol
  objtool: Optimize elf_dirty_reloc_sym()
  x86/cfi: Add boot time hash randomization
  x86/cfi: Boot time selection of CFI scheme
  x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT
  objtool: Add --cfi to generate the .cfi_sites section
  x86: Add prefix symbols for function padding
  objtool: Add option to generate prefix symbols
  objtool: Avoid O(bloody terrible) behaviour -- an ode to libelf
  objtool: Slice up elf_create_section_symbol()
  kallsyms: Revert "Take callthunks into account"
  x86: Unconfuse CONFIG_ and X86_FEATURE_ namespaces
  x86/retpoline: Fix crash printing warning
  x86/paravirt: Fix a !PARAVIRT build warning
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add the call depth tracking mitigation for Retbleed which has been
   long in the making. It is a lighterweight software-only fix for
   Skylake-based cores where enabling IBRS is a big hammer and causes a
   significant performance impact.

   What it basically does is, it aligns all kernel functions to 16 bytes
   boundary and adds a 16-byte padding before the function, objtool
   collects all functions' locations and when the mitigation gets
   applied, it patches a call accounting thunk which is used to track
   the call depth of the stack at any time.

   When that call depth reaches a magical, microarchitecture-specific
   value for the Return Stack Buffer, the code stuffs that RSB and
   avoids its underflow which could otherwise lead to the Intel variant
   of Retbleed.

   This software-only solution brings a lot of the lost performance
   back, as benchmarks suggest:

       https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220915111039.092790446@infradead.org/

   That page above also contains a lot more detailed explanation of the
   whole mechanism

 - Implement a new control flow integrity scheme called FineIBT which is
   based on the software kCFI implementation and uses hardware IBT
   support where present to annotate and track indirect branches using a
   hash to validate them

 - Other misc fixes and cleanups

* tag 'x86_core_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (80 commits)
  x86/paravirt: Use common macro for creating simple asm paravirt functions
  x86/paravirt: Remove clobber bitmask from .parainstructions
  x86/debug: Include percpu.h in debugreg.h to get DECLARE_PER_CPU() et al
  x86/cpufeatures: Move X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH from bit 18 to bit 19 of word 11, to leave space for WIP X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA bit
  x86/Kconfig: Enable kernel IBT by default
  x86,pm: Force out-of-line memcpy()
  objtool: Fix weak hole vs prefix symbol
  objtool: Optimize elf_dirty_reloc_sym()
  x86/cfi: Add boot time hash randomization
  x86/cfi: Boot time selection of CFI scheme
  x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT
  objtool: Add --cfi to generate the .cfi_sites section
  x86: Add prefix symbols for function padding
  objtool: Add option to generate prefix symbols
  objtool: Avoid O(bloody terrible) behaviour -- an ode to libelf
  objtool: Slice up elf_create_section_symbol()
  kallsyms: Revert "Take callthunks into account"
  x86: Unconfuse CONFIG_ and X86_FEATURE_ namespaces
  x86/retpoline: Fix crash printing warning
  x86/paravirt: Fix a !PARAVIRT build warning
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2022-12-13T22:56:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-13T22:56:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3ef3ace4e2ecf4aa4c8ddff1d35683671a09b05e'/>
<id>3ef3ace4e2ecf4aa4c8ddff1d35683671a09b05e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 cpu updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Split MTRR and PAT init code to accomodate at least Xen PV and TDX
   guests which do not get MTRRs exposed but only PAT. (TDX guests do
   not support the cache disabling dance when setting up MTRRs so they
   fall under the same category)

   This is a cleanup work to remove all the ugly workarounds for such
   guests and init things separately (Juergen Gross)

 - Add two new Intel CPUs to the list of CPUs with "normal" Energy
   Performance Bias, leading to power savings

 - Do not do bus master arbitration in C3 (ARB_DISABLE) on modern
   Centaur CPUs

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
  x86/mtrr: Make message for disabled MTRRs more descriptive
  x86/pat: Handle TDX guest PAT initialization
  x86/cpuid: Carve out all CPUID functionality
  x86/cpu: Switch to cpu_feature_enabled() for X86_FEATURE_XENPV
  x86/cpu: Remove X86_FEATURE_XENPV usage in setup_cpu_entry_area()
  x86/cpu: Drop 32-bit Xen PV guest code in update_task_stack()
  x86/cpu: Remove unneeded 64-bit dependency in arch_enter_from_user_mode()
  x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_XENPV to disabled-features.h
  x86/acpi/cstate: Optimize ARB_DISABLE on Centaur CPUs
  x86/mtrr: Simplify mtrr_ops initialization
  x86/cacheinfo: Switch cache_ap_init() to hotplug callback
  x86: Decouple PAT and MTRR handling
  x86/mtrr: Add a stop_machine() handler calling only cache_cpu_init()
  x86/mtrr: Let cache_aps_delayed_init replace mtrr_aps_delayed_init
  x86/mtrr: Get rid of __mtrr_enabled bool
  x86/mtrr: Simplify mtrr_bp_init()
  x86/mtrr: Remove set_all callback from struct mtrr_ops
  x86/mtrr: Disentangle MTRR init from PAT init
  x86/mtrr: Move cache control code to cacheinfo.c
  x86/mtrr: Split MTRR-specific handling from cache dis/enabling
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 cpu updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Split MTRR and PAT init code to accomodate at least Xen PV and TDX
   guests which do not get MTRRs exposed but only PAT. (TDX guests do
   not support the cache disabling dance when setting up MTRRs so they
   fall under the same category)

   This is a cleanup work to remove all the ugly workarounds for such
   guests and init things separately (Juergen Gross)

 - Add two new Intel CPUs to the list of CPUs with "normal" Energy
   Performance Bias, leading to power savings

 - Do not do bus master arbitration in C3 (ARB_DISABLE) on modern
   Centaur CPUs

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
  x86/mtrr: Make message for disabled MTRRs more descriptive
  x86/pat: Handle TDX guest PAT initialization
  x86/cpuid: Carve out all CPUID functionality
  x86/cpu: Switch to cpu_feature_enabled() for X86_FEATURE_XENPV
  x86/cpu: Remove X86_FEATURE_XENPV usage in setup_cpu_entry_area()
  x86/cpu: Drop 32-bit Xen PV guest code in update_task_stack()
  x86/cpu: Remove unneeded 64-bit dependency in arch_enter_from_user_mode()
  x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_XENPV to disabled-features.h
  x86/acpi/cstate: Optimize ARB_DISABLE on Centaur CPUs
  x86/mtrr: Simplify mtrr_ops initialization
  x86/cacheinfo: Switch cache_ap_init() to hotplug callback
  x86: Decouple PAT and MTRR handling
  x86/mtrr: Add a stop_machine() handler calling only cache_cpu_init()
  x86/mtrr: Let cache_aps_delayed_init replace mtrr_aps_delayed_init
  x86/mtrr: Get rid of __mtrr_enabled bool
  x86/mtrr: Simplify mtrr_bp_init()
  x86/mtrr: Remove set_all callback from struct mtrr_ops
  x86/mtrr: Disentangle MTRR init from PAT init
  x86/mtrr: Move cache control code to cacheinfo.c
  x86/mtrr: Split MTRR-specific handling from cache dis/enabling
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
