linux-stable.git/arch/x86/kernel/acpi, branch linux-5.4.y

x86/i8259: Skip probing when ACPI/MADT advertises PCAT compatibility

2023-11-08T10:23:38+00:00

commit 128b0c9781c9f2651bea163cb85e52a6c7be0f9e upstream.

David and a few others reported that on certain newer systems some legacy
interrupts fail to work correctly.

Debugging revealed that the BIOS of these systems leaves the legacy PIC in
uninitialized state which makes the PIC detection fail and the kernel
switches to a dummy implementation.

Unfortunately this fallback causes quite some code to fail as it depends on
checks for the number of legacy PIC interrupts or the availability of the
real PIC.

In theory there is no reason to use the PIC on any modern system when
IO/APIC is available, but the dependencies on the related checks cannot be
resolved trivially and on short notice. This needs lots of analysis and
rework.

The PIC detection has been added to avoid quirky checks and force selection
of the dummy implementation all over the place, especially in VM guest
scenarios. So it's not an option to revert the relevant commit as that
would break a lot of other scenarios.

One solution would be to try to initialize the PIC on detection fail and
retry the detection, but that puts the burden on everything which does not
have a PIC.

Fortunately the ACPI/MADT table header has a flag field, which advertises
in bit 0 that the system is PCAT compatible, which means it has a legacy
8259 PIC.

Evaluate that bit and if set avoid the detection routine and keep the real
PIC installed, which then gets initialized (for nothing) and makes the rest
of the code with all the dependencies work again.

Fixes: e179f6914152 ("x86, irq, pic: Probe for legacy PIC and set legacy_pic appropriately")
Reported-by: David Lazar 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: David Lazar 
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede 
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218003
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/875y2u5s8g.ffs@tglx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ACPI / x86: Work around broken XSDT on Advantech DAC-BJ01 board

2022-03-28T06:46:47+00:00

commit e702196bf85778f2c5527ca47f33ef2e2fca8297 upstream.

On this board the ACPI RSDP structure points to both a RSDT and an XSDT,
but the XSDT points to a truncated FADT. This causes all sorts of trouble
and usually a complete failure to boot after the following error occurs:

  ACPI Error: Unsupported address space: 0x20 (*/hwregs-*)
  ACPI Error: AE_SUPPORT, Unable to initialize fixed events (*/evevent-*)
  ACPI: Unable to start ACPI Interpreter

This leaves the ACPI implementation in such a broken state that subsequent
kernel subsystem initialisations go wrong, resulting in among others
mismapped PCI memory, SATA and USB enumeration failures, and freezes.

As this is an older embedded platform that will likely never see any BIOS
updates to address this issue and its default shipping OS only complies to
ACPI 1.0, work around this by forcing `acpi=rsdt`. This patch, applied on
top of Linux 5.10.102, was confirmed on real hardware to fix the issue.

Signed-off-by: Mark Cilissen 
Cc: All applicable 
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede 
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ACPI: tables: x86: Reserve memory occupied by ACPI tables

2021-05-07T08:51:36+00:00

commit 1a1c130ab7575498eed5bcf7220037ae09cd1f8a upstream.

The following problem has been reported by George Kennedy:

 Since commit 7fef431be9c9 ("mm/page_alloc: place pages to tail
 in __free_pages_core()") the following use after free occurs
 intermittently when ACPI tables are accessed.

 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ibft_init+0x134/0xc49
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880be453004 by task swapper/0/1
 CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc1-7a7fd0d #1
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0xf6/0x158
  print_address_description.constprop.9+0x41/0x60
  kasan_report.cold.14+0x7b/0xd4
  __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20
  ibft_init+0x134/0xc49
  do_one_initcall+0xc4/0x3e0
  kernel_init_freeable+0x5af/0x66b
  kernel_init+0x16/0x1d0
  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

 ACPI tables mapped via kmap() do not have their mapped pages
 reserved and the pages can be "stolen" by the buddy allocator.

Apparently, on the affected system, the ACPI table in question is
not located in "reserved" memory, like ACPI NVS or ACPI Data, that
will not be used by the buddy allocator, so the memory occupied by
that table has to be explicitly reserved to prevent the buddy
allocator from using it.

In order to address this problem, rearrange the initialization of the
ACPI tables on x86 to locate the initial tables earlier and reserve
the memory occupied by them.

The other architectures using ACPI should not be affected by this
change.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-acpi/1614802160-29362-1-git-send-email-george.kennedy@oracle.com/
Reported-by: George Kennedy 
Tested-by: George Kennedy 
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki 
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport 
Cc: 5.10+  # 5.10+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/asm/32: Add ENDs to some functions and relabel with SYM_CODE_*

2021-01-17T13:05:30+00:00

commit 78762b0e79bc1dd01347be061abdf505202152c9 upstream.

All these are functions which are invoked from elsewhere but they are
not typical C functions. So annotate them using the new SYM_CODE_START.
All these were not balanced with any END, so mark their ends by
SYM_CODE_END, appropriately.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky  [xen bits]
Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki  [hibernate]
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Len Brown 
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Pavel Machek 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Pingfan Liu 
Cc: Stefano Stabellini 
Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: x86-ml 
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191011115108.12392-26-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86: ACPI: fix CPU hotplug deadlock

2020-04-23T08:36:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit 696ac2e3bf267f5a2b2ed7d34e64131f2287d0ad ]

Similar to commit 0266d81e9bf5 ("acpi/processor: Prevent cpu hotplug
deadlock") except this is for acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe():

"The problem is that the work is scheduled on the current CPU from the
hotplug thread associated with that CPU.

It's not required to invoke these functions via the workqueue because
the hotplug thread runs on the target CPU already.

Check whether current is a per cpu thread pinned on the target CPU and
invoke the function directly to avoid the workqueue."

 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 ------------------------------------------------------
 cpuhp/1/15 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffffc90003447a28 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x4c6/0x630

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffffafa1c0e8 (cpuidle_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpuidle_pause_and_lock+0x17/0x20

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
 cpus_read_lock+0x3e/0xc0
 irq_calc_affinity_vectors+0x5f/0x91
 __pci_enable_msix_range+0x10f/0x9a0
 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0x13e/0x1f0
 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity at drivers/pci/msi.c:1208
 pqi_ctrl_init+0x72f/0x1618 [smartpqi]
 pqi_pci_probe.cold.63+0x882/0x892 [smartpqi]
 local_pci_probe+0x7a/0xc0
 work_for_cpu_fn+0x2e/0x50
 process_one_work+0x57e/0xb90
 worker_thread+0x363/0x5b0
 kthread+0x1f4/0x220
 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
 __lock_acquire+0x2244/0x32a0
 lock_acquire+0x1a2/0x680
 __flush_work+0x4e6/0x630
 work_on_cpu+0x114/0x160
 acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe+0x129/0x250
 acpi_processor_evaluate_cst+0x4c8/0x580
 acpi_processor_get_power_info+0x86/0x740
 acpi_processor_hotplug+0xc3/0x140
 acpi_soft_cpu_online+0x102/0x1d0
 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x197/0x1120
 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x252/0x2f0
 smpboot_thread_fn+0x255/0x440
 kthread+0x1f4/0x220
 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
 (work_completion)(&wfc.work) --> cpuhp_state-up --> cpuidle_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

 CPU0                    CPU1
 ----                    ----
 lock(cpuidle_lock);
                         lock(cpuhp_state-up);
                         lock(cpuidle_lock);
 lock((work_completion)(&wfc.work));

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 3 locks held by cpuhp/1/15:
 #0: ffffffffaf51ab10 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x69/0x2f0
 #1: ffffffffaf51ad40 (cpuhp_state-up){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x69/0x2f0
 #2: ffffffffafa1c0e8 (cpuidle_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpuidle_pause_and_lock+0x17/0x20

 Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xa0/0xea
 print_circular_bug.cold.52+0x147/0x14c
 check_noncircular+0x295/0x2d0
 __lock_acquire+0x2244/0x32a0
 lock_acquire+0x1a2/0x680
 __flush_work+0x4e6/0x630
 work_on_cpu+0x114/0x160
 acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe+0x129/0x250
 acpi_processor_evaluate_cst+0x4c8/0x580
 acpi_processor_get_power_info+0x86/0x740
 acpi_processor_hotplug+0xc3/0x140
 acpi_soft_cpu_online+0x102/0x1d0
 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x197/0x1120
 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x252/0x2f0
 smpboot_thread_fn+0x255/0x440
 kthread+0x1f4/0x220
 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

Signed-off-by: Qian Cai 
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov 
[ rjw: Subject ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

acpi/x86: ignore unspecified bit positions in the ACPI global lock field

2020-04-17T08:50:09+00:00

commit ecb9c790999fd6c5af0f44783bd0217f0b89ec2b upstream.

The value in "new" is constructed from "old" such that all bits defined
as reserved by the ACPI spec[1] are left untouched. But if those bits
do not happen to be all zero, "new < 3" will not evaluate to true.

The firmware of the laptop(s) Medion MD63490 / Akoya P15648 comes with
garbage inside the "FACS" ACPI table. The starting value is
old=0x4944454d, therefore new=0x4944454e, which is >= 3. Mask off
the reserved bits.

[1] https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/ACPI_6_2.pdf

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206553
Cc: All applicable 
Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt 
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2019-09-28T15:14:15+00:00

Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.

From the original description:

This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.

The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.

There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:

- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/

- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.

The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.

The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:

lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}

Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.

This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.

New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.

The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.

Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"

* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...

x86/asm/suspend: Get rid of bogus_64_magic

2019-09-06T08:34:15+00:00

bogus_64_magic is only a dead-end loop. There is no need for an
out-of-order function (and unannotated local label), so just handle it
in-place and also store 0xbad-m-a-g-i-c to %rcx beforehand, in case
someone is inspecting registers.

Here a qemu+gdb example:

  Remote debugging using localhost:1235
  wakeup_long64 () at arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S:26
  26              jmp 1b
  (gdb) info registers
  rax            0x123456789abcdef0       1311768467463790320
  rbx            0x0      0
  rcx            0xbad6d61676963  3286910041024867
  		 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

 [ bp: Add the gdb example. ]

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Len Brown 
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Pavel Machek 
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: x86-ml 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190906075550.23435-1-jslaby@suse.cz

acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down

2019-08-20T04:54:16+00:00

This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
makes it possible for a user to modify the workings of hardware. Reject
the option when the kernel is locked down. This requires some reworking
of the existing RSDP command line logic, since the early boot code also
makes use of a command-line passed RSDP when locating the SRAT table
before the lockdown code has been initialised. This is achieved by
separating the command line RSDP path in the early boot code from the
generic RSDP path, and then copying the command line RSDP into boot
params in the kernel proper if lockdown is not enabled. If lockdown is
enabled and an RSDP is provided on the command line, this will only be
used when parsing SRAT (which shouldn't permit kernel code execution)
and will be ignored in the rest of the kernel.

(Modified by Matthew Garrett in order to handle the early boot RSDP
environment)

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett 
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook 
cc: Dave Young 
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris

x86/acpi/cstate: Add Zhaoxin processors support for cache flush policy in C3

2019-06-22T09:45:58+00:00

Same as Intel, Zhaoxin MP CPUs support C3 share cache and on all
recent Zhaoxin platforms ARB_DISABLE is a nop. So set related
flags correctly in the same way as Intel does.

Signed-off-by: Tony W Wang-oc 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: "hpa@zytor.com" 
Cc: "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" 
Cc: "rjw@rjwysocki.net" 
Cc: "lenb@kernel.org" 
Cc: David Wang 
Cc: "Cooper Yan(BJ-RD)" 
Cc: "Qiyuan Wang(BJ-RD)" 
Cc: "Herry Yang(BJ-RD)" 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a370503660994669991a7f7cda7c5e98@zhaoxin.com