linux-stable.git/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile, branch linux-6.6.y

x86/kexec: Disable KCOV instrumentation after load_segments()

2026-06-19T11:39:24+00:00

[ Upstream commit 917e3ad3321e75ca0223d5ccf26ceda116aa51e1 ]

The load_segments() function changes segment registers, invalidating GS base
(which KCOV relies on for per-cpu data). When CONFIG_KCOV is enabled, any
subsequent instrumented C code call (e.g. native_gdt_invalidate()) begins
crashing the kernel in an endless loop.

To reproduce the problem, it's sufficient to do kexec on a KCOV-instrumented
kernel:

  $ kexec -l /boot/otherKernel
  $ kexec -e

The real-world context for this problem is enabling crash dump collection in
syzkaller. For this, the tool loads a panic kernel before fuzzing and then
calls makedumpfile after the panic. This workflow requires both CONFIG_KEXEC
and CONFIG_KCOV to be enabled simultaneously.

Adding safeguards directly to the KCOV fast-path (__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc())
is also undesirable as it would introduce an extra performance overhead.

Disabling instrumentation for the individual functions would be too fragile,
so disable KCOV instrumentation for the entire machine_kexec_64.c and
physaddr.c. If coverage-guided fuzzing ever needs these components in the
future, other approaches should be considered.

The problem is not relevant for 32 bit kernels as CONFIG_KCOV is not supported
there.

  [ bp: Space out comment for better readability. ]

Fixes: 0d345996e4cb ("x86/kernel: increase kcov coverage under arch/x86/kernel folder")
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260325154825.551191-1-nogikh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Miles Wang <13621186580@139.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/boot/32: Disable stackprotector and tracing for mk_early_pgtbl_32()

2025-03-09T08:55:03+00:00

commit 242db7589460ca94e28c51ffbddd621756f97e11 upstream

Stackprotector cannot work before paging is enabled. The read from the per
CPU variable __stack_chk_guard is always accessing the virtual address
either directly on UP or via FS on SMP. In physical address mode this
results in an access to memory above 3GB.

So this works by chance as the hardware returns the same value when there
is no RAM at this physical address. When there is RAM populated above 3G
then the read is by chance the same as nothing changes that memory during
the very early boot stage.

Stop relying on pure luck and disable the stack protector for the only C
function which is called during early boot before paging is enabled.

Remove function tracing from the whole source file as there is no way to
trace this at all, but in case of CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE=n
mk_early_pgtbl_32() would access global function tracer variables in
physical address mode which again might work by chance.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231002115902.156063939@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "x86, crash: wrap crash dumping code into crash related ifdefs"

2025-01-10T13:31:36+00:00

This reverts commit e5b1574a8ca28c40cf53eda43f6c3b016ed41e27 which is
commit a4eeb2176d89fdf2785851521577b94b31690a60 upstream.

When this change is backported to the 6.6.y tree, it can cause build
errors on some configurations when KEXEC is not enabled, so revert it
for now.

Reported-by: Ignat Korchagin 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3DB3A6D3-0D3A-4682-B4FA-407B2D3263B2@cloudflare.com
Reported-by: Lars Wendler 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250110103328.0e3906a8@chagall.paradoxon.rec
Reported-by: Chris Clayton 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/10c7be00-b1f8-4389-801b-fb2d0b22468d@googlemail.com
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Dexuan Cui 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Cc: Hari Bathini 
Cc: Klara Modin 
Cc: Michael Kelley 
Cc: Michael Kelley 
Cc: Naman Jain 
Cc: Nathan Chancellor 
Cc: Pingfan Liu 
Cc: Sasha Levin 
Cc: Stephen Rothwell 
Cc: Wei Liu 
Cc: Yang Li 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86, crash: wrap crash dumping code into crash related ifdefs

2025-01-09T12:31:49+00:00

[ Upstream commit a4eeb2176d89fdf2785851521577b94b31690a60 ]

Now crash codes under kernel/ folder has been split out from kexec
code, crash dumping can be separated from kexec reboot in config
items on x86 with some adjustments.

Here, also change some ifdefs or IS_ENABLED() check to more appropriate
ones, e,g
 - #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE -> #ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
 - (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE)) - > (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRASH_RESERVE))

[bhe@redhat.com: don't nest CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP ifdef inside CONFIG_KEXEC_CODE ifdef scope]
  Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/SN6PR02MB4157931105FA68D72E3D3DB8D47B2@SN6PR02MB4157.namprd02.prod.outlook.com/T/#u
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240124051254.67105-7-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Cc: Hari Bathini 
Cc: Pingfan Liu 
Cc: Klara Modin 
Cc: Michael Kelley 
Cc: Nathan Chancellor 
Cc: Stephen Rothwell 
Cc: Yang Li 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Stable-dep-of: bcc80dec91ee ("x86/hyperv: Fix hv tsc page based sched_clock for hibernation")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Merge tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2023-08-31T19:20:12+00:00

Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen:
 "This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's
  Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

  CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and
  indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack
  part of this feature, and just for userspace.

  The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against
  return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a
  secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has
  protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction,
  the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and
  to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops
  the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy.

  For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier
  versions of this patch set"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/

* tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits)
  x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type
  x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm
  x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR
  x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference
  x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm
  x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS
  x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK
  x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
  selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test
  x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
  x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface
  x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status
  x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
  x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
  x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem
  x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn
  x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
  x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
  ...

x86/kernel: increase kcov coverage under arch/x86/kernel folder

2023-08-18T17:19:01+00:00

Currently kcov instrument is disabled for object files under
arch/x86/kernel folder.

For object files under arch/x86/kernel, actually just disabling the kcov
instrument of files:"head32.o or head64.o and sev.o" could achieve
successful booting and provide kcov coverage for object files that do not
disable kcov instrument.  The additional kcov coverage collected from
arch/x86/kernel folder helps kernel fuzzing efforts to find bugs.

Link to related improvement discussion is below:
https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller/c/Dsl-RYGCqs8/m/x-tfpTyFBAAJ Related
ticket is as follow: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198443

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/06c0bb7b5f61e5884bf31180e8c122648c752010.1690771380.git.pengfei.xu@intel.com
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov 
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov 
Signed-off-by: Pengfei Xu 
Cc: Aleksandr Nogikh 
Cc: 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Kees Cook ,
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Cc: Sohil Mehta 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton

x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm

2023-08-17T15:07:09+00:00

The following warning is reported when frame pointers and kernel IBT are
enabled:

  vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ibt_selftest+0x11: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame

The problem is that objtool interprets the indirect branch in
ibt_selftest() as a sibling call, and GCC inserts a (partial) frame
pointer prologue before it:

  0000 000000000003f550 :
  0000    3f550:	f3 0f 1e fa          	endbr64
  0004    3f554:	e8 00 00 00 00       	call   3f559 	3f555: R_X86_64_PLT32	__fentry__-0x4
  0009    3f559:	55                   	push   %rbp
  000a    3f55a:	48 8d 05 02 00 00 00 	lea    0x2(%rip),%rax        # 3f563 
  0011    3f561:	ff e0                	jmp    *%rax

Note the inline asm is missing ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, so the 'push %rbp'
happens before the indirect branch and the 'mov %rsp, %rbp' happens
afterwards.

Simplify the generated code and make it easier to understand for both
tools and humans by moving the selftest to proper asm.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/99a7e16b97bda97bf0a04aa141d6241cd8a839a2.1680912949.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org

x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack

2023-08-02T22:01:50+00:00

Add three new arch_prctl() handles:

 - ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE/DISABLE enables or disables the specified
   feature. Returns 0 on success or a negative value on error.

 - ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK prevents future disabling or enabling of the
   specified feature. Returns 0 on success or a negative value
   on error.

The features are handled per-thread and inherited over fork(2)/clone(2),
but reset on exec().

Co-developed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe 
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) 
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu 
Tested-by: John Allen 
Tested-by: Kees Cook 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-27-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com

x86/traps: Move control protection handler to separate file

2023-07-11T21:12:18+00:00

Today the control protection handler is defined in traps.c and used only
for the kernel IBT feature. To reduce ifdeffery, move it to it's own file.
In future patches, functionality will be added to make this handler also
handle user shadow stack faults. So name the file cet.c.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe 
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) 
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu 
Tested-by: John Allen 
Tested-by: Kees Cook 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-8-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com

rethook, fprobe: do not trace rethook related functions

2023-05-17T22:08:01+00:00

These functions are already marked as NOKPROBE to prevent recursion and
we have the same reason to blacklist them if rethook is used with fprobe,
since they are beyond the recursion-free region ftrace can guard.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230517034510.15639-5-zegao@tencent.com/

Fixes: f3a112c0c40d ("x86,rethook,kprobes: Replace kretprobe with rethook on x86")
Signed-off-by: Ze Gao 
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google)