<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/x86/include/asm, branch v6.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2023-02-14T17:17:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-14T17:17:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=82eac0c830b7d917bd2a8806eb6ed21ef1e0f84e'/>
<id>82eac0c830b7d917bd2a8806eb6ed21ef1e0f84e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "Certain AMD processors are vulnerable to a cross-thread return address
  predictions bug. When running in SMT mode and one of the sibling
  threads transitions out of C0 state, the other thread gets access to
  twice as many entries in the RSB, but unfortunately the predictions of
  the now-halted logical processor are not purged. Therefore, the
  executing processor could speculatively execute from locations that
  the now-halted processor had trained the RSB on.

  The Spectre v2 mitigations cover the Linux kernel, as it fills the RSB
  when context switching to the idle thread. However, KVM allows a VMM
  to prevent exiting guest mode when transitioning out of C0 using the
  KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS capability can be used by a VMM to change
  this behavior. To mitigate the cross-thread return address predictions
  bug, a VMM must not be allowed to override the default behavior to
  intercept C0 transitions.

  These patches introduce a KVM module parameter that, if set, will
  prevent the user from disabling the HLT, MWAIT and CSTATE exits"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  Documentation/hw-vuln: Add documentation for Cross-Thread Return Predictions
  KVM: x86: Mitigate the cross-thread return address predictions bug
  x86/speculation: Identify processors vulnerable to SMT RSB predictions
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "Certain AMD processors are vulnerable to a cross-thread return address
  predictions bug. When running in SMT mode and one of the sibling
  threads transitions out of C0 state, the other thread gets access to
  twice as many entries in the RSB, but unfortunately the predictions of
  the now-halted logical processor are not purged. Therefore, the
  executing processor could speculatively execute from locations that
  the now-halted processor had trained the RSB on.

  The Spectre v2 mitigations cover the Linux kernel, as it fills the RSB
  when context switching to the idle thread. However, KVM allows a VMM
  to prevent exiting guest mode when transitioning out of C0 using the
  KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS capability can be used by a VMM to change
  this behavior. To mitigate the cross-thread return address predictions
  bug, a VMM must not be allowed to override the default behavior to
  intercept C0 transitions.

  These patches introduce a KVM module parameter that, if set, will
  prevent the user from disabling the HLT, MWAIT and CSTATE exits"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  Documentation/hw-vuln: Add documentation for Cross-Thread Return Predictions
  KVM: x86: Mitigate the cross-thread return address predictions bug
  x86/speculation: Identify processors vulnerable to SMT RSB predictions
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Identify processors vulnerable to SMT RSB predictions</title>
<updated>2023-02-10T11:43:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-09T15:22:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=be8de49bea505e7777a69ef63d60e02ac1712683'/>
<id>be8de49bea505e7777a69ef63d60e02ac1712683</id>
<content type='text'>
Certain AMD processors are vulnerable to a cross-thread return address
predictions bug. When running in SMT mode and one of the sibling threads
transitions out of C0 state, the other sibling thread could use return
target predictions from the sibling thread that transitioned out of C0.

The Spectre v2 mitigations cover the Linux kernel, as it fills the RSB
when context switching to the idle thread. However, KVM allows a VMM to
prevent exiting guest mode when transitioning out of C0. A guest could
act maliciously in this situation, so create a new x86 BUG that can be
used to detect if the processor is vulnerable.

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;91cec885656ca1fcd4f0185ce403a53dd9edecb7.1675956146.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Certain AMD processors are vulnerable to a cross-thread return address
predictions bug. When running in SMT mode and one of the sibling threads
transitions out of C0 state, the other sibling thread could use return
target predictions from the sibling thread that transitioned out of C0.

The Spectre v2 mitigations cover the Linux kernel, as it fills the RSB
when context switching to the idle thread. However, KVM allows a VMM to
prevent exiting guest mode when transitioning out of C0. A guest could
act maliciously in this situation, so create a new x86 BUG that can be
used to detect if the processor is vulnerable.

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;91cec885656ca1fcd4f0185ce403a53dd9edecb7.1675956146.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Add Lunar Lake M</title>
<updated>2023-02-08T20:04:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kan Liang</name>
<email>kan.liang@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-08T17:23:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f545e8831e70065e127f903fc7aca09aa50422c7'/>
<id>f545e8831e70065e127f903fc7aca09aa50422c7</id>
<content type='text'>
Intel confirmed the existence of this CPU in Q4'2022
earnings presentation.

Add the CPU model number.

[ dhansen: Merging these as soon as possible makes it easier
	   on all the folks developing model-specific features. ]

Signed-off-by: Kan Liang &lt;kan.liang@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230208172340.158548-1-tony.luck%40intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Intel confirmed the existence of this CPU in Q4'2022
earnings presentation.

Add the CPU model number.

[ dhansen: Merging these as soon as possible makes it easier
	   on all the folks developing model-specific features. ]

Signed-off-by: Kan Liang &lt;kan.liang@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230208172340.158548-1-tony.luck%40intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/debug: Fix stack recursion caused by wrongly ordered DR7 accesses</title>
<updated>2023-01-31T11:51:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joerg Roedel</name>
<email>jroedel@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-31T08:57:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9d2c7203ffdb846399b82b0660563c89e918c751'/>
<id>9d2c7203ffdb846399b82b0660563c89e918c751</id>
<content type='text'>
In kernels compiled with CONFIG_PARAVIRT=n, the compiler re-orders the
DR7 read in exc_nmi() to happen before the call to sev_es_ist_enter().

This is problematic when running as an SEV-ES guest because in this
environment the DR7 read might cause a #VC exception, and taking #VC
exceptions is not safe in exc_nmi() before sev_es_ist_enter() has run.

The result is stack recursion if the NMI was caused on the #VC IST
stack, because a subsequent #VC exception in the NMI handler will
overwrite the stack frame of the interrupted #VC handler.

As there are no compiler barriers affecting the ordering of DR7
reads/writes, make the accesses to this register volatile, forbidding
the compiler to re-order them.

  [ bp: Massage text, make them volatile too, to make sure some
  aggressive compiler optimization pass doesn't discard them. ]

Fixes: 315562c9af3d ("x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler")
Reported-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230127035616.508966-1-aik@amd.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In kernels compiled with CONFIG_PARAVIRT=n, the compiler re-orders the
DR7 read in exc_nmi() to happen before the call to sev_es_ist_enter().

This is problematic when running as an SEV-ES guest because in this
environment the DR7 read might cause a #VC exception, and taking #VC
exceptions is not safe in exc_nmi() before sev_es_ist_enter() has run.

The result is stack recursion if the NMI was caused on the #VC IST
stack, because a subsequent #VC exception in the NMI handler will
overwrite the stack frame of the interrupted #VC handler.

As there are no compiler barriers affecting the ordering of DR7
reads/writes, make the accesses to this register volatile, forbidding
the compiler to re-order them.

  [ bp: Massage text, make them volatile too, to make sure some
  aggressive compiler optimization pass doesn't discard them. ]

Fixes: 315562c9af3d ("x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler")
Reported-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230127035616.508966-1-aik@amd.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>acpi: Fix suspend with Xen PV</title>
<updated>2023-01-19T21:52:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-17T15:57:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fe0ba8c23f9a35b0307eb662f16dd3a75fcdae41'/>
<id>fe0ba8c23f9a35b0307eb662f16dd3a75fcdae41</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit f1e525009493 ("x86/boot: Skip realmode init code when running as
Xen PV guest") missed one code path accessing real_mode_header, leading
to dereferencing NULL when suspending the system under Xen:

    [  348.284004] PM: suspend entry (deep)
    [  348.289532] Filesystems sync: 0.005 seconds
    [  348.291545] Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.000 seconds) done.
    [  348.292457] OOM killer disabled.
    [  348.292462] Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.104 seconds) done.
    [  348.396612] printk: Suspending console(s) (use no_console_suspend to debug)
    [  348.749228] PM: suspend devices took 0.352 seconds
    [  348.769713] ACPI: EC: interrupt blocked
    [  348.816077] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c
    [  348.816080] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    [  348.816081] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    [  348.816083] PGD 0 P4D 0
    [  348.816086] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
    [  348.816089] CPU: 0 PID: 6764 Comm: systemd-sleep Not tainted 6.1.3-1.fc32.qubes.x86_64 #1
    [  348.816092] Hardware name: Star Labs StarBook/StarBook, BIOS 8.01 07/03/2022
    [  348.816093] RIP: e030:acpi_get_wakeup_address+0xc/0x20

Fix that by adding an optional acpi callback allowing to skip setting
the wakeup address, as in the Xen PV case this will be handled by the
hypervisor anyway.

Fixes: f1e525009493 ("x86/boot: Skip realmode init code when running as Xen PV guest")
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki &lt;marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230117155724.22940-1-jgross%40suse.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit f1e525009493 ("x86/boot: Skip realmode init code when running as
Xen PV guest") missed one code path accessing real_mode_header, leading
to dereferencing NULL when suspending the system under Xen:

    [  348.284004] PM: suspend entry (deep)
    [  348.289532] Filesystems sync: 0.005 seconds
    [  348.291545] Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.000 seconds) done.
    [  348.292457] OOM killer disabled.
    [  348.292462] Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.104 seconds) done.
    [  348.396612] printk: Suspending console(s) (use no_console_suspend to debug)
    [  348.749228] PM: suspend devices took 0.352 seconds
    [  348.769713] ACPI: EC: interrupt blocked
    [  348.816077] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c
    [  348.816080] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    [  348.816081] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    [  348.816083] PGD 0 P4D 0
    [  348.816086] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
    [  348.816089] CPU: 0 PID: 6764 Comm: systemd-sleep Not tainted 6.1.3-1.fc32.qubes.x86_64 #1
    [  348.816092] Hardware name: Star Labs StarBook/StarBook, BIOS 8.01 07/03/2022
    [  348.816093] RIP: e030:acpi_get_wakeup_address+0xc/0x20

Fix that by adding an optional acpi callback allowing to skip setting
the wakeup address, as in the Xen PV case this will be handled by the
hypervisor anyway.

Fixes: f1e525009493 ("x86/boot: Skip realmode init code when running as Xen PV guest")
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki &lt;marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230117155724.22940-1-jgross%40suse.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support</title>
<updated>2023-01-19T16:29:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nikunj A Dadhania</name>
<email>nikunj@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-18T06:19:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8c29f016540532582721cec1dbf6d144873433ba'/>
<id>8c29f016540532582721cec1dbf6d144873433ba</id>
<content type='text'>
The hypervisor can enable various new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) and start a
SNP guest. Some of these features need guest side implementation. If any of
these features are enabled without it, the behavior of the SNP guest will be
undefined.  It may fail booting in a non-obvious way making it difficult to
debug.

Instead of allowing the guest to continue and have it fail randomly later,
detect this early and fail gracefully.

The SEV_STATUS MSR indicates features which the hypervisor has enabled.  While
booting, SNP guests should ascertain that all the enabled features have guest
side implementation. In case a feature is not implemented in the guest, the
guest terminates booting with GHCB protocol Non-Automatic Exit(NAE) termination
request event, see "SEV-ES Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization"
document (currently at https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf),
section "Termination Request".

Populate SW_EXITINFO2 with mask of unsupported features that the hypervisor can
easily report to the user.

More details in the AMD64 APM Vol 2, Section "SEV_STATUS MSR".

  [ bp:
    - Massage.
    - Move snp_check_features() call to C code.
    Note: the CC:stable@ aspect here is to be able to protect older, stable
    kernels when running on newer hypervisors. Or not "running" but fail
    reliably and in a well-defined manner instead of randomly. ]

Fixes: cbd3d4f7c4e5 ("x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support")
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania &lt;nikunj@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230118061943.534309-1-nikunj@amd.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The hypervisor can enable various new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) and start a
SNP guest. Some of these features need guest side implementation. If any of
these features are enabled without it, the behavior of the SNP guest will be
undefined.  It may fail booting in a non-obvious way making it difficult to
debug.

Instead of allowing the guest to continue and have it fail randomly later,
detect this early and fail gracefully.

The SEV_STATUS MSR indicates features which the hypervisor has enabled.  While
booting, SNP guests should ascertain that all the enabled features have guest
side implementation. In case a feature is not implemented in the guest, the
guest terminates booting with GHCB protocol Non-Automatic Exit(NAE) termination
request event, see "SEV-ES Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization"
document (currently at https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf),
section "Termination Request".

Populate SW_EXITINFO2 with mask of unsupported features that the hypervisor can
easily report to the user.

More details in the AMD64 APM Vol 2, Section "SEV_STATUS MSR".

  [ bp:
    - Massage.
    - Move snp_check_features() call to C code.
    Note: the CC:stable@ aspect here is to be able to protect older, stable
    kernels when running on newer hypervisors. Or not "running" but fail
    reliably and in a well-defined manner instead of randomly. ]

Fixes: cbd3d4f7c4e5 ("x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support")
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania &lt;nikunj@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230118061943.534309-1-nikunj@amd.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86/xen: Avoid deadlock by adding kvm-&gt;arch.xen.xen_lock leaf node lock</title>
<updated>2023-01-11T22:45:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Woodhouse</name>
<email>dwmw@amazon.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-11T18:06:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=310bc39546a435c83cc27a0eba878afac0d74714'/>
<id>310bc39546a435c83cc27a0eba878afac0d74714</id>
<content type='text'>
In commit 14243b387137a ("KVM: x86/xen: Add KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN
and event channel delivery") the clever version of me left some helpful
notes for those who would come after him:

       /*
        * For the irqfd workqueue, using the main kvm-&gt;lock mutex is
        * fine since this function is invoked from kvm_set_irq() with
        * no other lock held, no srcu. In future if it will be called
        * directly from a vCPU thread (e.g. on hypercall for an IPI)
        * then it may need to switch to using a leaf-node mutex for
        * serializing the shared_info mapping.
        */
       mutex_lock(&amp;kvm-&gt;lock);

In commit 2fd6df2f2b47 ("KVM: x86/xen: intercept EVTCHNOP_send from guests")
the other version of me ran straight past that comment without reading it,
and introduced a potential deadlock by taking vcpu-&gt;mutex and kvm-&gt;lock
in the wrong order.

Solve this as originally suggested, by adding a leaf-node lock in the Xen
state rather than using kvm-&gt;lock for it.

Fixes: 2fd6df2f2b47 ("KVM: x86/xen: intercept EVTCHNOP_send from guests")
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20230111180651.14394-4-dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
[Rebase, add docs. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In commit 14243b387137a ("KVM: x86/xen: Add KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN
and event channel delivery") the clever version of me left some helpful
notes for those who would come after him:

       /*
        * For the irqfd workqueue, using the main kvm-&gt;lock mutex is
        * fine since this function is invoked from kvm_set_irq() with
        * no other lock held, no srcu. In future if it will be called
        * directly from a vCPU thread (e.g. on hypercall for an IPI)
        * then it may need to switch to using a leaf-node mutex for
        * serializing the shared_info mapping.
        */
       mutex_lock(&amp;kvm-&gt;lock);

In commit 2fd6df2f2b47 ("KVM: x86/xen: intercept EVTCHNOP_send from guests")
the other version of me ran straight past that comment without reading it,
and introduced a potential deadlock by taking vcpu-&gt;mutex and kvm-&gt;lock
in the wrong order.

Solve this as originally suggested, by adding a leaf-node lock in the Xen
state rather than using kvm-&gt;lock for it.

Fixes: 2fd6df2f2b47 ("KVM: x86/xen: intercept EVTCHNOP_send from guests")
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20230111180651.14394-4-dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
[Rebase, add docs. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/insn: Avoid namespace clash by separating instruction decoder MMIO type from MMIO trace type</title>
<updated>2023-01-03T17:46:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-01T16:29:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=72bb8f8cc088730c4d84117a6906f458c2fc64bb'/>
<id>72bb8f8cc088730c4d84117a6906f458c2fc64bb</id>
<content type='text'>
Both &lt;linux/mmiotrace.h&gt; and &lt;asm/insn-eval.h&gt; define various MMIO_ enum constants,
whose namespace overlaps.

Rename the &lt;asm/insn-eval.h&gt; ones to have a INSN_ prefix, so that the headers can be
used from the same source file.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230101162910.710293-2-Jason@zx2c4.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Both &lt;linux/mmiotrace.h&gt; and &lt;asm/insn-eval.h&gt; define various MMIO_ enum constants,
whose namespace overlaps.

Rename the &lt;asm/insn-eval.h&gt; ones to have a INSN_ prefix, so that the headers can be
used from the same source file.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230101162910.710293-2-Jason@zx2c4.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_mm_for_6.2_v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2022-12-17T20:06:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-17T20:06:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4f292c4de4f6fb83776c0ff22674121eb6ddfa2f'/>
<id>4f292c4de4f6fb83776c0ff22674121eb6ddfa2f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 mm updates from Dave Hansen:
 "New Feature:

   - Randomize the per-cpu entry areas

  Cleanups:

   - Have CR3_ADDR_MASK use PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK instead of open coding it

   - Move to "native" set_memory_rox() helper

   - Clean up pmd_get_atomic() and i386-PAE

   - Remove some unused page table size macros"

* tag 'x86_mm_for_6.2_v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (35 commits)
  x86/mm: Ensure forced page table splitting
  x86/kasan: Populate shadow for shared chunk of the CPU entry area
  x86/kasan: Add helpers to align shadow addresses up and down
  x86/kasan: Rename local CPU_ENTRY_AREA variables to shorten names
  x86/mm: Populate KASAN shadow for entire per-CPU range of CPU entry area
  x86/mm: Recompute physical address for every page of per-CPU CEA mapping
  x86/mm: Rename __change_page_attr_set_clr(.checkalias)
  x86/mm: Inhibit _PAGE_NX changes from cpa_process_alias()
  x86/mm: Untangle __change_page_attr_set_clr(.checkalias)
  x86/mm: Add a few comments
  x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK
  x86/mm: Remove P*D_PAGE_MASK and P*D_PAGE_SIZE macros
  mm: Convert __HAVE_ARCH_P..P_GET to the new style
  mm: Remove pointless barrier() after pmdp_get_lockless()
  x86/mm/pae: Get rid of set_64bit()
  x86_64: Remove pointless set_64bit() usage
  x86/mm/pae: Be consistent with pXXp_get_and_clear()
  x86/mm/pae: Use WRITE_ONCE()
  x86/mm/pae: Don't (ab)use atomic64
  mm/gup: Fix the lockless PMD access
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 mm updates from Dave Hansen:
 "New Feature:

   - Randomize the per-cpu entry areas

  Cleanups:

   - Have CR3_ADDR_MASK use PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK instead of open coding it

   - Move to "native" set_memory_rox() helper

   - Clean up pmd_get_atomic() and i386-PAE

   - Remove some unused page table size macros"

* tag 'x86_mm_for_6.2_v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (35 commits)
  x86/mm: Ensure forced page table splitting
  x86/kasan: Populate shadow for shared chunk of the CPU entry area
  x86/kasan: Add helpers to align shadow addresses up and down
  x86/kasan: Rename local CPU_ENTRY_AREA variables to shorten names
  x86/mm: Populate KASAN shadow for entire per-CPU range of CPU entry area
  x86/mm: Recompute physical address for every page of per-CPU CEA mapping
  x86/mm: Rename __change_page_attr_set_clr(.checkalias)
  x86/mm: Inhibit _PAGE_NX changes from cpa_process_alias()
  x86/mm: Untangle __change_page_attr_set_clr(.checkalias)
  x86/mm: Add a few comments
  x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK
  x86/mm: Remove P*D_PAGE_MASK and P*D_PAGE_SIZE macros
  mm: Convert __HAVE_ARCH_P..P_GET to the new style
  mm: Remove pointless barrier() after pmdp_get_lockless()
  x86/mm/pae: Get rid of set_64bit()
  x86_64: Remove pointless set_64bit() usage
  x86/mm/pae: Be consistent with pXXp_get_and_clear()
  x86/mm/pae: Use WRITE_ONCE()
  x86/mm/pae: Don't (ab)use atomic64
  mm/gup: Fix the lockless PMD access
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2022-12-15T19:12:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-15T19:12:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8fa590bf344816c925810331eea8387627bbeb40'/>
<id>8fa590bf344816c925810331eea8387627bbeb40</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM64:

   - Enable the per-vcpu dirty-ring tracking mechanism, together with an
     option to keep the good old dirty log around for pages that are
     dirtied by something other than a vcpu.

   - Switch to the relaxed parallel fault handling, using RCU to delay
     page table reclaim and giving better performance under load.

   - Relax the MTE ABI, allowing a VMM to use the MAP_SHARED mapping
     option, which multi-process VMMs such as crosvm rely on (see merge
     commit 382b5b87a97d: "Fix a number of issues with MTE, such as
     races on the tags being initialised vs the PG_mte_tagged flag as
     well as the lack of support for VM_SHARED when KVM is involved.
     Patches from Catalin Marinas and Peter Collingbourne").

   - Merge the pKVM shadow vcpu state tracking that allows the
     hypervisor to have its own view of a vcpu, keeping that state
     private.

   - Add support for the PMUv3p5 architecture revision, bringing support
     for 64bit counters on systems that support it, and fix the
     no-quite-compliant CHAIN-ed counter support for the machines that
     actually exist out there.

   - Fix a handful of minor issues around 52bit VA/PA support (64kB
     pages only) as a prefix of the oncoming support for 4kB and 16kB
     pages.

   - Pick a small set of documentation and spelling fixes, because no
     good merge window would be complete without those.

  s390:

   - Second batch of the lazy destroy patches

   - First batch of KVM changes for kernel virtual != physical address
     support

   - Removal of a unused function

  x86:

   - Allow compiling out SMM support

   - Cleanup and documentation of SMM state save area format

   - Preserve interrupt shadow in SMM state save area

   - Respond to generic signals during slow page faults

   - Fixes and optimizations for the non-executable huge page errata
     fix.

   - Reprogram all performance counters on PMU filter change

   - Cleanups to Hyper-V emulation and tests

   - Process Hyper-V TLB flushes from a nested guest (i.e. from a L2
     guest running on top of a L1 Hyper-V hypervisor)

   - Advertise several new Intel features

   - x86 Xen-for-KVM:

      - Allow the Xen runstate information to cross a page boundary

      - Allow XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag behaviour to be configured

      - Add support for 32-bit guests in SCHEDOP_poll

   - Notable x86 fixes and cleanups:

      - One-off fixes for various emulation flows (SGX, VMXON, NRIPS=0).

      - Reinstate IBPB on emulated VM-Exit that was incorrectly dropped
        a few years back when eliminating unnecessary barriers when
        switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02.

      - Clean up vmread_error_trampoline() to make it more obvious that
        params must be passed on the stack, even for x86-64.

      - Let userspace set all supported bits in MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL
        irrespective of the current guest CPUID.

      - Fudge around a race with TSC refinement that results in KVM
        incorrectly thinking a guest needs TSC scaling when running on a
        CPU with a constant TSC, but no hardware-enumerated TSC
        frequency.

      - Advertise (on AMD) that the SMM_CTL MSR is not supported

      - Remove unnecessary exports

  Generic:

   - Support for responding to signals during page faults; introduces
     new FOLL_INTERRUPTIBLE flag that was reviewed by mm folks

  Selftests:

   - Fix an inverted check in the access tracking perf test, and restore
     support for asserting that there aren't too many idle pages when
     running on bare metal.

   - Fix build errors that occur in certain setups (unsure exactly what
     is unique about the problematic setup) due to glibc overriding
     static_assert() to a variant that requires a custom message.

   - Introduce actual atomics for clear/set_bit() in selftests

   - Add support for pinning vCPUs in dirty_log_perf_test.

   - Rename the so called "perf_util" framework to "memstress".

   - Add a lightweight psuedo RNG for guest use, and use it to randomize
     the access pattern and write vs. read percentage in the memstress
     tests.

   - Add a common ucall implementation; code dedup and pre-work for
     running SEV (and beyond) guests in selftests.

   - Provide a common constructor and arch hook, which will eventually
     be used by x86 to automatically select the right hypercall (AMD vs.
     Intel).

   - A bunch of added/enabled/fixed selftests for ARM64, covering
     memslots, breakpoints, stage-2 faults and access tracking.

   - x86-specific selftest changes:

      - Clean up x86's page table management.

      - Clean up and enhance the "smaller maxphyaddr" test, and add a
        related test to cover generic emulation failure.

      - Clean up the nEPT support checks.

      - Add X86_PROPERTY_* framework to retrieve multi-bit CPUID values.

      - Fix an ordering issue in the AMX test introduced by recent
        conversions to use kvm_cpu_has(), and harden the code to guard
        against similar bugs in the future. Anything that tiggers
        caching of KVM's supported CPUID, kvm_cpu_has() in this case,
        effectively hides opt-in XSAVE features if the caching occurs
        before the test opts in via prctl().

  Documentation:

   - Remove deleted ioctls from documentation

   - Clean up the docs for the x86 MSR filter.

   - Various fixes"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (361 commits)
  KVM: x86: Add proper ReST tables for userspace MSR exits/flags
  KVM: selftests: Allocate ucall pool from MEM_REGION_DATA
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Align VA space allocator with TTBR0
  KVM: arm64: Fix benign bug with incorrect use of VA_BITS
  KVM: arm64: PMU: Fix period computation for 64bit counters with 32bit overflow
  KVM: x86: Advertise that the SMM_CTL MSR is not supported
  KVM: x86: remove unnecessary exports
  KVM: selftests: Fix spelling mistake "probabalistic" -&gt; "probabilistic"
  tools: KVM: selftests: Convert clear/set_bit() to actual atomics
  tools: Drop "atomic_" prefix from atomic test_and_set_bit()
  tools: Drop conflicting non-atomic test_and_{clear,set}_bit() helpers
  KVM: selftests: Use non-atomic clear/set bit helpers in KVM tests
  perf tools: Use dedicated non-atomic clear/set bit helpers
  tools: Take @bit as an "unsigned long" in {clear,set}_bit() helpers
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Enable single-step without a "full" ucall()
  KVM: x86: fix APICv/x2AVIC disabled when vm reboot by itself
  KVM: Remove stale comment about KVM_REQ_UNHALT
  KVM: Add missing arch for KVM_CREATE_DEVICE and KVM_{SET,GET}_DEVICE_ATTR
  KVM: Reference to kvm_userspace_memory_region in doc and comments
  KVM: Delete all references to removed KVM_SET_MEMORY_ALIAS ioctl
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM64:

   - Enable the per-vcpu dirty-ring tracking mechanism, together with an
     option to keep the good old dirty log around for pages that are
     dirtied by something other than a vcpu.

   - Switch to the relaxed parallel fault handling, using RCU to delay
     page table reclaim and giving better performance under load.

   - Relax the MTE ABI, allowing a VMM to use the MAP_SHARED mapping
     option, which multi-process VMMs such as crosvm rely on (see merge
     commit 382b5b87a97d: "Fix a number of issues with MTE, such as
     races on the tags being initialised vs the PG_mte_tagged flag as
     well as the lack of support for VM_SHARED when KVM is involved.
     Patches from Catalin Marinas and Peter Collingbourne").

   - Merge the pKVM shadow vcpu state tracking that allows the
     hypervisor to have its own view of a vcpu, keeping that state
     private.

   - Add support for the PMUv3p5 architecture revision, bringing support
     for 64bit counters on systems that support it, and fix the
     no-quite-compliant CHAIN-ed counter support for the machines that
     actually exist out there.

   - Fix a handful of minor issues around 52bit VA/PA support (64kB
     pages only) as a prefix of the oncoming support for 4kB and 16kB
     pages.

   - Pick a small set of documentation and spelling fixes, because no
     good merge window would be complete without those.

  s390:

   - Second batch of the lazy destroy patches

   - First batch of KVM changes for kernel virtual != physical address
     support

   - Removal of a unused function

  x86:

   - Allow compiling out SMM support

   - Cleanup and documentation of SMM state save area format

   - Preserve interrupt shadow in SMM state save area

   - Respond to generic signals during slow page faults

   - Fixes and optimizations for the non-executable huge page errata
     fix.

   - Reprogram all performance counters on PMU filter change

   - Cleanups to Hyper-V emulation and tests

   - Process Hyper-V TLB flushes from a nested guest (i.e. from a L2
     guest running on top of a L1 Hyper-V hypervisor)

   - Advertise several new Intel features

   - x86 Xen-for-KVM:

      - Allow the Xen runstate information to cross a page boundary

      - Allow XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag behaviour to be configured

      - Add support for 32-bit guests in SCHEDOP_poll

   - Notable x86 fixes and cleanups:

      - One-off fixes for various emulation flows (SGX, VMXON, NRIPS=0).

      - Reinstate IBPB on emulated VM-Exit that was incorrectly dropped
        a few years back when eliminating unnecessary barriers when
        switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02.

      - Clean up vmread_error_trampoline() to make it more obvious that
        params must be passed on the stack, even for x86-64.

      - Let userspace set all supported bits in MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL
        irrespective of the current guest CPUID.

      - Fudge around a race with TSC refinement that results in KVM
        incorrectly thinking a guest needs TSC scaling when running on a
        CPU with a constant TSC, but no hardware-enumerated TSC
        frequency.

      - Advertise (on AMD) that the SMM_CTL MSR is not supported

      - Remove unnecessary exports

  Generic:

   - Support for responding to signals during page faults; introduces
     new FOLL_INTERRUPTIBLE flag that was reviewed by mm folks

  Selftests:

   - Fix an inverted check in the access tracking perf test, and restore
     support for asserting that there aren't too many idle pages when
     running on bare metal.

   - Fix build errors that occur in certain setups (unsure exactly what
     is unique about the problematic setup) due to glibc overriding
     static_assert() to a variant that requires a custom message.

   - Introduce actual atomics for clear/set_bit() in selftests

   - Add support for pinning vCPUs in dirty_log_perf_test.

   - Rename the so called "perf_util" framework to "memstress".

   - Add a lightweight psuedo RNG for guest use, and use it to randomize
     the access pattern and write vs. read percentage in the memstress
     tests.

   - Add a common ucall implementation; code dedup and pre-work for
     running SEV (and beyond) guests in selftests.

   - Provide a common constructor and arch hook, which will eventually
     be used by x86 to automatically select the right hypercall (AMD vs.
     Intel).

   - A bunch of added/enabled/fixed selftests for ARM64, covering
     memslots, breakpoints, stage-2 faults and access tracking.

   - x86-specific selftest changes:

      - Clean up x86's page table management.

      - Clean up and enhance the "smaller maxphyaddr" test, and add a
        related test to cover generic emulation failure.

      - Clean up the nEPT support checks.

      - Add X86_PROPERTY_* framework to retrieve multi-bit CPUID values.

      - Fix an ordering issue in the AMX test introduced by recent
        conversions to use kvm_cpu_has(), and harden the code to guard
        against similar bugs in the future. Anything that tiggers
        caching of KVM's supported CPUID, kvm_cpu_has() in this case,
        effectively hides opt-in XSAVE features if the caching occurs
        before the test opts in via prctl().

  Documentation:

   - Remove deleted ioctls from documentation

   - Clean up the docs for the x86 MSR filter.

   - Various fixes"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (361 commits)
  KVM: x86: Add proper ReST tables for userspace MSR exits/flags
  KVM: selftests: Allocate ucall pool from MEM_REGION_DATA
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Align VA space allocator with TTBR0
  KVM: arm64: Fix benign bug with incorrect use of VA_BITS
  KVM: arm64: PMU: Fix period computation for 64bit counters with 32bit overflow
  KVM: x86: Advertise that the SMM_CTL MSR is not supported
  KVM: x86: remove unnecessary exports
  KVM: selftests: Fix spelling mistake "probabalistic" -&gt; "probabilistic"
  tools: KVM: selftests: Convert clear/set_bit() to actual atomics
  tools: Drop "atomic_" prefix from atomic test_and_set_bit()
  tools: Drop conflicting non-atomic test_and_{clear,set}_bit() helpers
  KVM: selftests: Use non-atomic clear/set bit helpers in KVM tests
  perf tools: Use dedicated non-atomic clear/set bit helpers
  tools: Take @bit as an "unsigned long" in {clear,set}_bit() helpers
  KVM: arm64: selftests: Enable single-step without a "full" ucall()
  KVM: x86: fix APICv/x2AVIC disabled when vm reboot by itself
  KVM: Remove stale comment about KVM_REQ_UNHALT
  KVM: Add missing arch for KVM_CREATE_DEVICE and KVM_{SET,GET}_DEVICE_ATTR
  KVM: Reference to kvm_userspace_memory_region in doc and comments
  KVM: Delete all references to removed KVM_SET_MEMORY_ALIAS ioctl
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
