linux-stable.git/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h, branch v5.2

Merge branch 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2019-05-14T14:57:29+00:00

Pull x86 MDS mitigations from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a hardware vulnerability
  which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is
  available in various CPU internal buffers. This new set of misfeatures
  has the following CVEs assigned:

     CVE-2018-12126  MSBDS  Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
     CVE-2018-12130  MFBDS  Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
     CVE-2018-12127  MLPDS  Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
     CVE-2019-11091  MDSUM  Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory

  MDS attacks target microarchitectural buffers which speculatively
  forward data under certain conditions. Disclosure gadgets can expose
  this data via cache side channels.

  Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS
  vulnerability does not allow the attacker to control the memory target
  address. As a consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but
  as demonstrated with the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed
  successfully.

  The mitigation is to flush the microarchitectural buffers on return to
  user space and before entering a VM. It's bolted on the VERW
  instruction and requires a microcode update. As some of the attacks
  exploit data structures shared between hyperthreads, full protection
  requires to disable hyperthreading. The kernel does not do that by
  default to avoid breaking unattended updates.

  The mitigation set comes with documentation for administrators and a
  deeper technical view"

* 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
  x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo
  Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values
  x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation
  x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS
  x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
  x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment
  x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message
  x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option
  Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation
  Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
  x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS
  x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry
  x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active
  x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
  x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
  x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
  ...

x86/irq/64: Split the IRQ stack into its own pages

2019-04-17T13:37:02+00:00

Currently, the IRQ stack is hardcoded as the first page of the percpu
area, and the stack canary lives on the IRQ stack. The former gets in
the way of adding an IRQ stack guard page, and the latter is a potential
weakness in the stack canary mechanism.

Split the IRQ stack into its own private percpu pages.

[ tglx: Make 64 and 32 bit share struct irq_stack ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel 
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky 
Cc: Brijesh Singh 
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" 
Cc: Dominik Brodowski 
Cc: Feng Tang 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Jan Beulich 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Joerg Roedel 
Cc: Jordan Borgner 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Cc: Maran Wilson 
Cc: Masahiro Yamada 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Mike Rapoport 
Cc: Nick Desaulniers 
Cc: Nicolai Stange 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Pu Wen 
Cc: "Rafael Ávila de Espíndola" 
Cc: Sean Christopherson 
Cc: Stefano Stabellini 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: x86-ml 
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160146.267376656@linutronix.de

x86/irq/64: Rename irq_stack_ptr to hardirq_stack_ptr

2019-04-17T13:27:10+00:00

Preparatory patch to share code with 32bit.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" 
Cc: Dominik Brodowski 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Mike Rapoport 
Cc: Nick Desaulniers 
Cc: Nicolai Stange 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Pingfan Liu 
Cc: Sean Christopherson 
Cc: Stephen Rothwell 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: x86-ml 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.912584074@linutronix.de

x86/irq/32: Rename hard/softirq_stack to hard/softirq_stack_ptr

2019-04-17T13:24:18+00:00

The percpu storage holds a pointer to the stack not the stack
itself. Rename it before sharing struct irq_stack with 64-bit.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Nick Desaulniers 
Cc: Nicolai Stange 
Cc: Sean Christopherson 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: x86-ml 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.824805922@linutronix.de

x86/irq/32: Make irq stack a character array

2019-04-17T13:21:21+00:00

There is no reason to have an u32 array in struct irq_stack. The only
purpose of the array is to size the struct properly.

Preparatory change for sharing struct irq_stack with 64-bit.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Nick Desaulniers 
Cc: Pingfan Liu 
Cc: Pu Wen 
Cc: Sean Christopherson 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: x86-ml 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.736241969@linutronix.de

x86/irq/32: Define IRQ_STACK_SIZE

2019-04-17T13:18:36+00:00

On 32-bit IRQ_STACK_SIZE is the same as THREAD_SIZE.

To allow sharing struct irq_stack with 32-bit, define IRQ_STACK_SIZE for
32-bit and use it for struct irq_stack.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Nick Desaulniers 
Cc: Sean Christopherson 
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: x86-ml 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.632513987@linutronix.de

x86/cpu: Remove orig_ist array

2019-04-17T12:44:17+00:00

All users gone.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Dominik Brodowski 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Cc: Nick Desaulniers 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Pingfan Liu 
Cc: Pu Wen 
Cc: Sean Christopherson 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: x86-ml 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.151435667@linutronix.de

x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV

2019-03-06T20:52:15+00:00

In virtualized environments it can happen that the host has the microcode
update which utilizes the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers, but the
hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR CPUID bit
to guests.

Introduce an internal mitigation mode VMWERV which enables the invocation
of the CPU buffer clearing even if X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is not set. If the
system has no updated microcode this results in a pointless execution of
the VERW instruction wasting a few CPU cycles. If the microcode is updated,
but not exposed to a guest then the CPU buffers will be cleared.

That said: Virtual Machines Will Eventually Receive Vaccine

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters 
Tested-by: Jon Masters

x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS

2019-03-06T20:52:14+00:00

Now that the mitigations are in place, add a command line parameter to
control the mitigation, a mitigation selector function and a SMT update
mechanism.

This is the minimal straight forward initial implementation which just
provides an always on/off mode. The command line parameter is:

  mds=[full|off]

This is consistent with the existing mitigations for other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.

The idle invocation is dynamically updated according to the SMT state of
the system similar to the dynamic update of the STIBP mitigation. The idle
mitigation is limited to CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS and not any
other variant, because the other variants cannot be mitigated on SMT
enabled systems.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters 
Tested-by: Jon Masters

x86/trap: Remove useless declaration

2019-01-29T21:09:12+00:00

There is no early_trap_pf_init() implementation, hence remove this useless
declaration.

Signed-off-by: Pingfan Liu 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1546591579-23502-1-git-send-email-kernelfans@gmail.com