linux-stable.git/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h, branch linux-5.2.y

x86/alternatives: Use temporary mm for text poking

2019-04-30T10:37:52+00:00

text_poke() can potentially compromise security as it sets temporary
PTEs in the fixmap. These PTEs might be used to rewrite the kernel code
from other cores accidentally or maliciously, if an attacker gains the
ability to write onto kernel memory.

Moreover, since remote TLBs are not flushed after the temporary PTEs are
removed, the time-window in which the code is writable is not limited if
the fixmap PTEs - maliciously or accidentally - are cached in the TLB.
To address these potential security hazards, use a temporary mm for
patching the code.

Finally, text_poke() is also not conservative enough when mapping pages,
as it always tries to map 2 pages, even when a single one is sufficient.
So try to be more conservative, and do not map more than needed.

Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit 
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-8-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

Merge branch 'x86-paravirt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2018-10-23T16:54:58+00:00

Pull x86 paravirt updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two main changes:

   - Remove no longer used parts of the paravirt infrastructure and put
     large quantities of paravirt ops under a new config option
     PARAVIRT_XXL=y, which is selected by XEN_PV only. (Joergen Gross)

   - Enable PV spinlocks on Hyperv (Yi Sun)"

* 'x86-paravirt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/hyperv: Enable PV qspinlock for Hyper-V
  x86/hyperv: Add GUEST_IDLE_MSR support
  x86/paravirt: Clean up native_patch()
  x86/paravirt: Prevent redefinition of SAVE_FLAGS macro
  x86/xen: Make xen_reservation_lock static
  x86/paravirt: Remove unneeded mmu related paravirt ops bits
  x86/paravirt: Move the Xen-only pv_mmu_ops under the PARAVIRT_XXL umbrella
  x86/paravirt: Move the pv_irq_ops under the PARAVIRT_XXL umbrella
  x86/paravirt: Move the Xen-only pv_cpu_ops under the PARAVIRT_XXL umbrella
  x86/paravirt: Move items in pv_info under PARAVIRT_XXL umbrella
  x86/paravirt: Introduce new config option PARAVIRT_XXL
  x86/paravirt: Remove unused paravirt bits
  x86/paravirt: Use a single ops structure
  x86/paravirt: Remove clobbers from struct paravirt_patch_site
  x86/paravirt: Remove clobbers parameter from paravirt patch functions
  x86/paravirt: Make paravirt_patch_call() and paravirt_patch_jmp() static
  x86/xen: Add SPDX identifier in arch/x86/xen files
  x86/xen: Link platform-pci-unplug.o only if CONFIG_XEN_PVHVM
  x86/xen: Move pv specific parts of arch/x86/xen/mmu.c to mmu_pv.c
  x86/xen: Move pv irq related functions under CONFIG_XEN_PV umbrella

x86/mm: Expand static page table for fixmap space

2018-09-20T21:17:22+00:00

We met a kernel panic when enabling earlycon, which is due to the fixmap
address of earlycon is not statically setup.

Currently the static fixmap setup in head_64.S only covers 2M virtual
address space, while it actually could be in 4M space with different
kernel configurations, e.g. when VSYSCALL emulation is disabled.

So increase the static space to 4M for now by defining FIXMAP_PMD_NUM to 2,
and add a build time check to ensure that the fixmap is covered by the
initial static page tables.

Fixes: 1ad83c858c7d ("x86_64,vsyscall: Make vsyscall emulation configurable")
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Feng Tang 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: kernel test robot 
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross  (Xen parts)
Cc: H Peter Anvin 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Yinghai Lu 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180920025828.23699-1-feng.tang@intel.com

x86/paravirt: Move the Xen-only pv_mmu_ops under the PARAVIRT_XXL umbrella

2018-09-03T14:50:37+00:00

Most of the paravirt ops defined in pv_mmu_ops are for Xen PV guests
only. Define them only if CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL is set.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: akataria@vmware.com
Cc: rusty@rustcorp.com.au
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828074026.820-15-jgross@suse.com

x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP

2018-01-30T14:30:35+00:00

Since commit 92a0f81d8957 ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the
fixmap"), i386's CPU_ENTRY_AREA has been mapped to the memory area just
below FIXADDR_START. But already immediately before FIXADDR_START is the
FIX_BTMAP area, which means that early_ioremap can collide with the entry
area.

It's especially bad on PAE where FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN gets aligned to exactly
match CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE, so the first early_ioremap slot clobbers the
IDT and causes interrupts during early boot to reset the system.

The overlap wasn't a problem before the CPU entry area was introduced,
as the fixmap has classically been preceded by the pkmap or vmalloc
areas, neither of which is used until early_ioremap is out of the
picture.

Relocate CPU_ENTRY_AREA to below FIX_BTMAP, not just below the permanent
fixmap area.

Fixes: commit 92a0f81d8957 ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap")
Signed-off-by: William Grant 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7041d181-a019-e8b9-4e4e-48215f841e2c@canonical.com

x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap

2017-12-22T19:13:05+00:00

Put the cpu_entry_area into a separate P4D entry. The fixmap gets too big
and 0-day already hit a case where the fixmap PTEs were cleared by
cleanup_highmap().

Aside of that the fixmap API is a pain as it's all backwards.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it to a separate unit

2017-12-22T19:13:04+00:00

Separate the cpu_entry_area code out of cpu/common.c and the fixmap.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/entry: Rename SYSENTER_stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack

2017-12-22T19:13:02+00:00

If the kernel oopses while on the trampoline stack, it will print
"" even if SYSENTER is not involved.  That is rather confusing.

The "SYSENTER" stack is used for a lot more than SYSENTER now.  Give it a
better string to display in stack dumps, and rename the kernel code to
match.

Also move the 32-bit code over to the new naming even though it still uses
the entry stack only for SYSENTER.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brian Gerst 
Cc: Denys Vlasenko 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only

2017-12-17T13:27:52+00:00

The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS
is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR.  Make it
read-only on x86_64.

On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task
switches, and we use a task gate for double faults.  I'd also be
nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations
without double fault handling.

[ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO.  So
  	it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel
  	might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for
  	confirmation. ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brian Gerst 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: David Laight 
Cc: Denys Vlasenko 
Cc: Eduardo Valentin 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code

2017-12-17T13:27:51+00:00

The existing code was a mess, mainly because C arrays are nasty.  Turn
SYSENTER_stack into a struct, add a helper to find it, and do all the
obvious cleanups this enables.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brian Gerst 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: David Laight 
Cc: Denys Vlasenko 
Cc: Eduardo Valentin 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.653244723@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar