linux-stable.git/arch/x86/boot, branch linux-6.5.y

x86/sev: Check for user-space IOIO pointing to kernel space

2023-10-25T10:16:10+00:00

Upstream commit: 63e44bc52047f182601e7817da969a105aa1f721

Check the memory operand of INS/OUTS before emulating the instruction.
The #VC exception can get raised from user-space, but the memory operand
can be manipulated to access kernel memory before the emulation actually
begins and after the exception handler has run.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Fixes: 597cfe48212a ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Setup a GHCB-based VC Exception handler")
Reported-by: Tom Dohrmann 
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/sev: Check IOBM for IOIO exceptions from user-space

2023-10-25T10:16:10+00:00

Upstream commit: b9cb9c45583b911e0db71d09caa6b56469eb2bdf

Check the IO permission bitmap (if present) before emulating IOIO #VC
exceptions for user-space. These permissions are checked by hardware
already before the #VC is raised, but due to the VC-handler decoding
race it needs to be checked again in software.

Fixes: 25189d08e516 ("x86/sev-es: Add support for handling IOIO exceptions")
Reported-by: Tom Dohrmann 
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Tested-by: Tom Dohrmann 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/boot/compressed: Reserve more memory for page tables

2023-09-23T09:14:33+00:00

[ Upstream commit f530ee95b72e77b09c141c4b1a4b94d1199ffbd9 ]

The decompressor has a hard limit on the number of page tables it can
allocate. This limit is defined at compile-time and will cause boot
failure if it is reached.

The kernel is very strict and calculates the limit precisely for the
worst-case scenario based on the current configuration. However, it is
easy to forget to adjust the limit when a new use-case arises. The
worst-case scenario is rarely encountered during sanity checks.

In the case of enabling 5-level paging, a use-case was overlooked. The
limit needs to be increased by one to accommodate the additional level.
This oversight went unnoticed until Aaron attempted to run the kernel
via kexec with 5-level paging and unaccepted memory enabled.

Update wost-case calculations to include 5-level paging.

To address this issue, let's allocate some extra space for page tables.
128K should be sufficient for any use-case. The logic can be simplified
by using a single value for all kernel configurations.

[ Also add a warning, should this memory run low - by Dave Hansen. ]

Fixes: 34bbb0009f3b ("x86/boot/compressed: Enable 5-level paging during decompression stage")
Reported-by: Aaron Lu 
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230915070221.10266-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/decompressor: Don't rely on upper 32 bits of GPRs being preserved

2023-09-13T07:52:59+00:00

[ Upstream commit 264b82fdb4989cf6a44a2bcd0c6ea05e8026b2ac ]

The 4-to-5 level mode switch trampoline disables long mode and paging in
order to be able to flick the LA57 bit. According to section 3.4.1.1 of
the x86 architecture manual [0], 64-bit GPRs might not retain the upper
32 bits of their contents across such a mode switch.

Given that RBP, RBX and RSI are live at this point, preserve them on the
stack, along with the return address that might be above 4G as well.

[0] Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual, Volume 1: Basic Architecture

  "Because the upper 32 bits of 64-bit general-purpose registers are
   undefined in 32-bit modes, the upper 32 bits of any general-purpose
   register are not preserved when switching from 64-bit mode to a 32-bit
   mode (to protected mode or compatibility mode). Software must not
   depend on these bits to maintain a value after a 64-bit to 32-bit
   mode switch."

Fixes: 194a9749c73d650c ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Handle 5-level paging boot if kernel is above 4G")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807162720.545787-2-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/sev: Do not try to parse for the CC blob on non-AMD hardware

2023-08-07T16:05:13+00:00

Tao Liu reported a boot hang on an Intel Atom machine due to an unmapped
EFI config table. The reason being that the CC blob which contains the
CPUID page for AMD SNP guests is parsed for before even checking
whether the machine runs on AMD hardware.

Usually that's not a problem on !AMD hw - it simply won't find the CC
blob's GUID and return. However, if any parts of the config table
pointers array is not mapped, the kernel will #PF very early in the
decompressor stage without any opportunity to recover.

Therefore, do a superficial CPUID check before poking for the CC blob.
This will fix the current issue on real hardware. It would also work as
a guest on a non-lying hypervisor.

For the lying hypervisor, the check is done again, *after* parsing the
CC blob as the real CPUID page will be present then.

Clear the #VC handler in case SEV-{ES,SNP} hasn't been detected, as
a precaution.

Fixes: c01fce9cef84 ("x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup")
Reported-by: Tao Liu 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky 
Tested-by: Tao Liu 
Cc: 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230601072043.24439-1-ltao@redhat.com

Merge tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2023-06-26T23:32:47+00:00

Pull x86 tdx updates from Dave Hansen:

 - Fix a race window where load_unaligned_zeropad() could cause a fatal
   shutdown during TDX private<=>shared conversion

   The race has never been observed in practice but might allow
   load_unaligned_zeropad() to catch a TDX page in the middle of its
   conversion process which would lead to a fatal and unrecoverable
   guest shutdown.

 - Annotate sites where VM "exit reasons" are reused as hypercall
   numbers.

* tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mm: Fix enc_status_change_finish_noop()
  x86/tdx: Fix race between set_memory_encrypted() and load_unaligned_zeropad()
  x86/mm: Allow guest.enc_status_change_prepare() to fail
  x86/tdx: Wrap exit reason with hcall_func()

Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2023-06-26T22:42:34+00:00

Pull x86 cpu updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Compute the purposeful misalignment of zen_untrain_ret automatically
   and assert __x86_return_thunk's alignment so that future changes to
   the symbol macros do not accidentally break them.

 - Remove CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES Kconfig option as its existence is
   pointless

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/retbleed: Add __x86_return_thunk alignment checks
  x86/cpu: Remove X86_FEATURE_NAMES
  x86/Kconfig: Make X86_FEATURE_NAMES non-configurable in prompt

Merge tag 'x86_cc_for_v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2023-06-26T22:32:39+00:00

Pull x86 confidential computing update from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add support for unaccepted memory as specified in the UEFI spec v2.9.

   The gist of it all is that Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP confidential
   computing guests define the notion of accepting memory before using
   it and thus preventing a whole set of attacks against such guests
   like memory replay and the like.

   There are a couple of strategies of how memory should be accepted -
   the current implementation does an on-demand way of accepting.

* tag 'x86_cc_for_v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  virt: sevguest: Add CONFIG_CRYPTO dependency
  x86/efi: Safely enable unaccepted memory in UEFI
  x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support
  x86/sev: Use large PSC requests if applicable
  x86/sev: Allow for use of the early boot GHCB for PSC requests
  x86/sev: Put PSC struct on the stack in prep for unaccepted memory support
  x86/sev: Fix calculation of end address based on number of pages
  x86/tdx: Add unaccepted memory support
  x86/tdx: Refactor try_accept_one()
  x86/tdx: Make _tdx_hypercall() and __tdx_module_call() available in boot stub
  efi/unaccepted: Avoid load_unaligned_zeropad() stepping into unaccepted memory
  efi: Add unaccepted memory support
  x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
  efi/libstub: Implement support for unaccepted memory
  efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
  mm: Add support for unaccepted memory

x86/build: Avoid relocation information in final vmlinux

2023-06-14T17:54:40+00:00

The Linux build process on x86 roughly consists of compiling all input
files, statically linking them into a vmlinux ELF file, and then taking
and turning this file into an actual bzImage bootable file.

vmlinux has in this process two main purposes:
1) It is an intermediate build target on the way to produce the final
   bootable image.
2) It is a file that is expected to be used by debuggers and standard
   ELF tooling to work with the built kernel.

For the second purpose, a vmlinux file is typically collected by various
package build recipes, such as distribution spec files, including the
kernel's own tar-pkg target.

When building a kernel supporting KASLR with CONFIG_X86_NEED_RELOCS,
vmlinux contains also relocation information produced by using the
--emit-relocs linker option. This is utilized by subsequent build steps
to create vmlinux.relocs and produce a relocatable image. However, the
information is not needed by debuggers and other standard ELF tooling.

The issue is then that the collected vmlinux file and hence distribution
packages end up unnecessarily large because of this extra data. The
following is a size comparison of vmlinux v6.0 with and without the
relocation information:

  | Configuration      | With relocs | Stripped relocs |
  | x86_64_defconfig   |       70 MB |           43 MB |
  | +CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO |      818 MB |          367 MB |

Optimize a resulting vmlinux by adding a postlink step that splits the
relocation information into vmlinux.relocs and then strips it from the
vmlinux binary.

Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220927084632.14531-1-petr.pavlu@suse.com

x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support

2023-06-06T16:31:37+00:00

Add SNP-specific hooks to the unaccepted memory support in the boot
path (__accept_memory()) and the core kernel (accept_memory()) in order
to support booting SNP guests when unaccepted memory is present. Without
this support, SNP guests will fail to boot and/or panic() when unaccepted
memory is present in the EFI memory map.

The process of accepting memory under SNP involves invoking the hypervisor
to perform a page state change for the page to private memory and then
issuing a PVALIDATE instruction to accept the page.

Since the boot path and the core kernel paths perform similar operations,
move the pvalidate_pages() and vmgexit_psc() functions into sev-shared.c
to avoid code duplication.

Create the new header file arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.h because adding
the function declaration to any of the existing SEV related header files
pulls in too many other header files, causing the build to fail.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a52fa69f460fd1876d70074b20ad68210dfc31dd.1686063086.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com