<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/powerpc, branch v4.19.76</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/xive: Fix bogus error code returned by OPAL</title>
<updated>2019-10-01T06:26:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kurz</name>
<email>groug@kaod.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-11T15:52:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=80fc27953e74d664bf946d45feae90df1023327b'/>
<id>80fc27953e74d664bf946d45feae90df1023327b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6ccb4ac2bf8a35c694ead92f8ac5530a16e8f2c8 upstream.

There's a bug in skiboot that causes the OPAL_XIVE_ALLOCATE_IRQ call
to return the 32-bit value 0xffffffff when OPAL has run out of IRQs.
Unfortunatelty, OPAL return values are signed 64-bit entities and
errors are supposed to be negative. If that happens, the linux code
confusingly treats 0xffffffff as a valid IRQ number and panics at some
point.

A fix was recently merged in skiboot:

e97391ae2bb5 ("xive: fix return value of opal_xive_allocate_irq()")

but we need a workaround anyway to support older skiboots already
in the field.

Internally convert 0xffffffff to OPAL_RESOURCE which is the usual error
returned upon resource exhaustion.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz &lt;groug@kaod.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater &lt;clg@kaod.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/156821713818.1985334.14123187368108582810.stgit@bahia.lan
(groug: fix arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-wrappers.S instead of
        non-existing arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz &lt;groug@kaod.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6ccb4ac2bf8a35c694ead92f8ac5530a16e8f2c8 upstream.

There's a bug in skiboot that causes the OPAL_XIVE_ALLOCATE_IRQ call
to return the 32-bit value 0xffffffff when OPAL has run out of IRQs.
Unfortunatelty, OPAL return values are signed 64-bit entities and
errors are supposed to be negative. If that happens, the linux code
confusingly treats 0xffffffff as a valid IRQ number and panics at some
point.

A fix was recently merged in skiboot:

e97391ae2bb5 ("xive: fix return value of opal_xive_allocate_irq()")

but we need a workaround anyway to support older skiboots already
in the field.

Internally convert 0xffffffff to OPAL_RESOURCE which is the usual error
returned upon resource exhaustion.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz &lt;groug@kaod.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater &lt;clg@kaod.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/156821713818.1985334.14123187368108582810.stgit@bahia.lan
(groug: fix arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-wrappers.S instead of
        non-existing arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz &lt;groug@kaod.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/mm/radix: Use the right page size for vmemmap mapping</title>
<updated>2019-09-21T05:16:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Aneesh Kumar K.V</name>
<email>aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-01T14:34:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b01b1eb24c04ce95e923843a145bff716eefa2f7'/>
<id>b01b1eb24c04ce95e923843a145bff716eefa2f7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 89a3496e0664577043666791ec07fb731d57c950 upstream.

We use mmu_vmemmap_psize to find the page size for mapping the vmmemap area.
With radix translation, we are suboptimally setting this value to PAGE_SIZE.

We do check for 2M page size support and update mmu_vmemap_psize to use
hugepage size but we suboptimally reset the value to PAGE_SIZE in
radix__early_init_mmu(). This resulted in always mapping vmemmap area with
64K page size.

Fixes: 2bfd65e45e87 ("powerpc/mm/radix: Add radix callbacks for early init routines")
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 89a3496e0664577043666791ec07fb731d57c950 upstream.

We use mmu_vmemmap_psize to find the page size for mapping the vmmemap area.
With radix translation, we are suboptimally setting this value to PAGE_SIZE.

We do check for 2M page size support and update mmu_vmemap_psize to use
hugepage size but we suboptimally reset the value to PAGE_SIZE in
radix__early_init_mmu(). This resulted in always mapping vmemmap area with
64K page size.

Fixes: 2bfd65e45e87 ("powerpc/mm/radix: Add radix callbacks for early init routines")
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Add barrier_nospec to raw_copy_in_user()</title>
<updated>2019-09-19T07:09:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Suraj Jitindar Singh</name>
<email>sjitindarsingh@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-06T01:10:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d9e8b4ba039766141014e20490d33178c96feb10'/>
<id>d9e8b4ba039766141014e20490d33178c96feb10</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6fbcdd59094ade30db63f32316e9502425d7b256 upstream.

Commit ddf35cf3764b ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()")
Added barrier_nospec before loading from user-controlled pointers. The
intention was to order the load from the potentially user-controlled
pointer vs a previous branch based on an access_ok() check or similar.

In order to achieve the same result, add a barrier_nospec to the
raw_copy_in_user() function before loading from such a user-controlled
pointer.

Fixes: ddf35cf3764b ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()")
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh &lt;sjitindarsingh@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6fbcdd59094ade30db63f32316e9502425d7b256 upstream.

Commit ddf35cf3764b ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()")
Added barrier_nospec before loading from user-controlled pointers. The
intention was to order the load from the potentially user-controlled
pointer vs a previous branch based on an access_ok() check or similar.

In order to achieve the same result, add a barrier_nospec to the
raw_copy_in_user() function before loading from such a user-controlled
pointer.

Fixes: ddf35cf3764b ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()")
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh &lt;sjitindarsingh@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/tm: Fix restoring FP/VMX facility incorrectly on interrupts</title>
<updated>2019-09-16T06:22:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo Romero</name>
<email>gromero@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-04T04:55:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=569775bd536416ed9049aa580d9f89a0b4307d60'/>
<id>569775bd536416ed9049aa580d9f89a0b4307d60</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a8318c13e79badb92bc6640704a64cc022a6eb97 ]

When in userspace and MSR FP=0 the hardware FP state is unrelated to
the current process. This is extended for transactions where if tbegin
is run with FP=0, the hardware checkpoint FP state will also be
unrelated to the current process. Due to this, we need to ensure this
hardware checkpoint is updated with the correct state before we enable
FP for this process.

Unfortunately we get this wrong when returning to a process from a
hardware interrupt. A process that starts a transaction with FP=0 can
take an interrupt. When the kernel returns back to that process, we
change to FP=1 but with hardware checkpoint FP state not updated. If
this transaction is then rolled back, the FP registers now contain the
wrong state.

The process looks like this:
   Userspace:                      Kernel

               Start userspace
                with MSR FP=0 TM=1
                  &lt; -----
   ...
   tbegin
   bne
               Hardware interrupt
                   ---- &gt;
                                    &lt;do_IRQ...&gt;
                                    ....
                                    ret_from_except
                                      restore_math()
				        /* sees FP=0 */
                                        restore_fp()
                                          tm_active_with_fp()
					    /* sees FP=1 (Incorrect) */
                                          load_fp_state()
                                        FP = 0 -&gt; 1
                  &lt; -----
               Return to userspace
                 with MSR TM=1 FP=1
                 with junk in the FP TM checkpoint
   TM rollback
   reads FP junk

When returning from the hardware exception, tm_active_with_fp() is
incorrectly making restore_fp() call load_fp_state() which is setting
FP=1.

The fix is to remove tm_active_with_fp().

tm_active_with_fp() is attempting to handle the case where FP state
has been changed inside a transaction. In this case the checkpointed
and transactional FP state is different and hence we must restore the
FP state (ie. we can't do lazy FP restore inside a transaction that's
used FP). It's safe to remove tm_active_with_fp() as this case is
handled by restore_tm_state(). restore_tm_state() detects if FP has
been using inside a transaction and will set load_fp and call
restore_math() to ensure the FP state (checkpoint and transaction) is
restored.

This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP
registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP
registers from one process may be leaked to another.

Similarly for VMX.

A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c

This fixes CVE-2019-15031.

Fixes: a7771176b439 ("powerpc: Don't enable FP/Altivec if not checkpointed")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.15+
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero &lt;gromero@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling &lt;mikey@neuling.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904045529.23002-2-gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a8318c13e79badb92bc6640704a64cc022a6eb97 ]

When in userspace and MSR FP=0 the hardware FP state is unrelated to
the current process. This is extended for transactions where if tbegin
is run with FP=0, the hardware checkpoint FP state will also be
unrelated to the current process. Due to this, we need to ensure this
hardware checkpoint is updated with the correct state before we enable
FP for this process.

Unfortunately we get this wrong when returning to a process from a
hardware interrupt. A process that starts a transaction with FP=0 can
take an interrupt. When the kernel returns back to that process, we
change to FP=1 but with hardware checkpoint FP state not updated. If
this transaction is then rolled back, the FP registers now contain the
wrong state.

The process looks like this:
   Userspace:                      Kernel

               Start userspace
                with MSR FP=0 TM=1
                  &lt; -----
   ...
   tbegin
   bne
               Hardware interrupt
                   ---- &gt;
                                    &lt;do_IRQ...&gt;
                                    ....
                                    ret_from_except
                                      restore_math()
				        /* sees FP=0 */
                                        restore_fp()
                                          tm_active_with_fp()
					    /* sees FP=1 (Incorrect) */
                                          load_fp_state()
                                        FP = 0 -&gt; 1
                  &lt; -----
               Return to userspace
                 with MSR TM=1 FP=1
                 with junk in the FP TM checkpoint
   TM rollback
   reads FP junk

When returning from the hardware exception, tm_active_with_fp() is
incorrectly making restore_fp() call load_fp_state() which is setting
FP=1.

The fix is to remove tm_active_with_fp().

tm_active_with_fp() is attempting to handle the case where FP state
has been changed inside a transaction. In this case the checkpointed
and transactional FP state is different and hence we must restore the
FP state (ie. we can't do lazy FP restore inside a transaction that's
used FP). It's safe to remove tm_active_with_fp() as this case is
handled by restore_tm_state(). restore_tm_state() detects if FP has
been using inside a transaction and will set load_fp and call
restore_math() to ensure the FP state (checkpoint and transaction) is
restored.

This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP
registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP
registers from one process may be leaked to another.

Similarly for VMX.

A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c

This fixes CVE-2019-15031.

Fixes: a7771176b439 ("powerpc: Don't enable FP/Altivec if not checkpointed")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.15+
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero &lt;gromero@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling &lt;mikey@neuling.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904045529.23002-2-gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/tm: Remove msr_tm_active()</title>
<updated>2019-09-16T06:22:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Breno Leitao</name>
<email>leitao@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-16T17:21:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=052bc385f97054973c0140c474e6d5de624130c8'/>
<id>052bc385f97054973c0140c474e6d5de624130c8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5c784c8414fba11b62e12439f11e109fb5751f38 ]

Currently msr_tm_active() is a wrapper around MSR_TM_ACTIVE() if
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is set, or it is just a function that
returns false if CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is not set.

This function is not necessary, since MSR_TM_ACTIVE() just do the same and
could be used, removing the dualism and simplifying the code.

This patchset remove every instance of msr_tm_active() and replaced it
by MSR_TM_ACTIVE().

Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5c784c8414fba11b62e12439f11e109fb5751f38 ]

Currently msr_tm_active() is a wrapper around MSR_TM_ACTIVE() if
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is set, or it is just a function that
returns false if CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is not set.

This function is not necessary, since MSR_TM_ACTIVE() just do the same and
could be used, removing the dualism and simplifying the code.

This patchset remove every instance of msr_tm_active() and replaced it
by MSR_TM_ACTIVE().

Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/mm: Limit rma_size to 1TB when running without HV mode</title>
<updated>2019-09-16T06:22:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Suraj Jitindar Singh</name>
<email>sjitindarsingh@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-10T05:20:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c4fc7cb93e0a9f428389f3a70ea4ac2de8769a44'/>
<id>c4fc7cb93e0a9f428389f3a70ea4ac2de8769a44</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit da0ef93310e67ae6902efded60b6724dab27a5d1 ]

The virtual real mode addressing (VRMA) mechanism is used when a
partition is using HPT (Hash Page Table) translation and performs real
mode accesses (MSR[IR|DR] = 0) in non-hypervisor mode. In this mode
effective address bits 0:23 are treated as zero (i.e. the access is
aliased to 0) and the access is performed using an implicit 1TB SLB
entry.

The size of the RMA (Real Memory Area) is communicated to the guest as
the size of the first memory region in the device tree. And because of
the mechanism described above can be expected to not exceed 1TB. In
the event that the host erroneously represents the RMA as being larger
than 1TB, guest accesses in real mode to memory addresses above 1TB
will be aliased down to below 1TB. This means that a memory access
performed in real mode may differ to one performed in virtual mode for
the same memory address, which would likely have unintended
consequences.

To avoid this outcome have the guest explicitly limit the size of the
RMA to the current maximum, which is 1TB. This means that even if the
first memory block is larger than 1TB, only the first 1TB should be
accessed in real mode.

Fixes: c610d65c0ad0 ("powerpc/pseries: lift RTAS limit for hash")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16+
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh &lt;sjitindarsingh@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Satheesh Rajendran &lt;sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Gibson &lt;david@gibson.dropbear.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190710052018.14628-1-sjitindarsingh@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit da0ef93310e67ae6902efded60b6724dab27a5d1 ]

The virtual real mode addressing (VRMA) mechanism is used when a
partition is using HPT (Hash Page Table) translation and performs real
mode accesses (MSR[IR|DR] = 0) in non-hypervisor mode. In this mode
effective address bits 0:23 are treated as zero (i.e. the access is
aliased to 0) and the access is performed using an implicit 1TB SLB
entry.

The size of the RMA (Real Memory Area) is communicated to the guest as
the size of the first memory region in the device tree. And because of
the mechanism described above can be expected to not exceed 1TB. In
the event that the host erroneously represents the RMA as being larger
than 1TB, guest accesses in real mode to memory addresses above 1TB
will be aliased down to below 1TB. This means that a memory access
performed in real mode may differ to one performed in virtual mode for
the same memory address, which would likely have unintended
consequences.

To avoid this outcome have the guest explicitly limit the size of the
RMA to the current maximum, which is 1TB. This means that even if the
first memory block is larger than 1TB, only the first 1TB should be
accessed in real mode.

Fixes: c610d65c0ad0 ("powerpc/pseries: lift RTAS limit for hash")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16+
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh &lt;sjitindarsingh@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Satheesh Rajendran &lt;sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Gibson &lt;david@gibson.dropbear.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190710052018.14628-1-sjitindarsingh@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix CR0 setting in TM emulation</title>
<updated>2019-09-16T06:22:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Neuling</name>
<email>mikey@neuling.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-20T06:00:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3a1b79ade460080cc7dd45e08ddac7312b91129d'/>
<id>3a1b79ade460080cc7dd45e08ddac7312b91129d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3fefd1cd95df04da67c83c1cb93b663f04b3324f ]

When emulating tsr, treclaim and trechkpt, we incorrectly set CR0. The
code currently sets:
    CR0 &lt;- 00 || MSR[TS]
but according to the ISA it should be:
    CR0 &lt;-  0 || MSR[TS] || 0

This fixes the bit shift to put the bits in the correct location.

This is a data integrity issue as CR0 is corrupted.

Fixes: 4bb3c7a0208f ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Work around transactional memory bugs in POWER9")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+
Tested-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh &lt;sjitindarsingh@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling &lt;mikey@neuling.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3fefd1cd95df04da67c83c1cb93b663f04b3324f ]

When emulating tsr, treclaim and trechkpt, we incorrectly set CR0. The
code currently sets:
    CR0 &lt;- 00 || MSR[TS]
but according to the ISA it should be:
    CR0 &lt;-  0 || MSR[TS] || 0

This fixes the bit shift to put the bits in the correct location.

This is a data integrity issue as CR0 is corrupted.

Fixes: 4bb3c7a0208f ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Work around transactional memory bugs in POWER9")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+
Tested-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh &lt;sjitindarsingh@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling &lt;mikey@neuling.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: PPC: Use ccr field in pt_regs struct embedded in vcpu struct</title>
<updated>2019-09-16T06:22:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Mackerras</name>
<email>paulus@ozlabs.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-08T05:30:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3ac718069f7c542cbf4b133c1026db93dc2bc09a'/>
<id>3ac718069f7c542cbf4b133c1026db93dc2bc09a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fd0944baad806dfb4c777124ec712c55b714ff51 ]

When the 'regs' field was added to struct kvm_vcpu_arch, the code
was changed to use several of the fields inside regs (e.g., gpr, lr,
etc.) but not the ccr field, because the ccr field in struct pt_regs
is 64 bits on 64-bit platforms, but the cr field in kvm_vcpu_arch is
only 32 bits.  This changes the code to use the regs.ccr field
instead of cr, and changes the assembly code on 64-bit platforms to
use 64-bit loads and stores instead of 32-bit ones.

Reviewed-by: David Gibson &lt;david@gibson.dropbear.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fd0944baad806dfb4c777124ec712c55b714ff51 ]

When the 'regs' field was added to struct kvm_vcpu_arch, the code
was changed to use several of the fields inside regs (e.g., gpr, lr,
etc.) but not the ccr field, because the ccr field in struct pt_regs
is 64 bits on 64-bit platforms, but the cr field in kvm_vcpu_arch is
only 32 bits.  This changes the code to use the regs.ccr field
instead of cr, and changes the assembly code on 64-bit platforms to
use 64-bit loads and stores instead of 32-bit ones.

Reviewed-by: David Gibson &lt;david@gibson.dropbear.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/kvm: Save and restore host AMR/IAMR/UAMOR</title>
<updated>2019-09-16T06:22:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Ellerman</name>
<email>mpe@ellerman.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-22T02:22:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=915c9d0a1d683c74d725c0d149afb8106f1b5303'/>
<id>915c9d0a1d683c74d725c0d149afb8106f1b5303</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c3c7470c75566a077c8dc71dcf8f1948b8ddfab4 ]

When the hash MMU is active the AMR, IAMR and UAMOR are used for
pkeys. The AMR is directly writable by user space, and the UAMOR masks
those writes, meaning both registers are effectively user register
state. The IAMR is used to create an execute only key.

Also we must maintain the value of at least the AMR when running in
process context, so that any memory accesses done by the kernel on
behalf of the process are correctly controlled by the AMR.

Although we are correctly switching all registers when going into a
guest, on returning to the host we just write 0 into all regs, except
on Power9 where we restore the IAMR correctly.

This could be observed by a user process if it writes the AMR, then
runs a guest and we then return immediately to it without
rescheduling. Because we have written 0 to the AMR that would have the
effect of granting read/write permission to pages that the process was
trying to protect.

In addition, when using the Radix MMU, the AMR can prevent inadvertent
kernel access to userspace data, writing 0 to the AMR disables that
protection.

So save and restore AMR, IAMR and UAMOR.

Fixes: cf43d3b26452 ("powerpc: Enable pkey subsystem")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16+
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey &lt;ruscur@russell.cc&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c3c7470c75566a077c8dc71dcf8f1948b8ddfab4 ]

When the hash MMU is active the AMR, IAMR and UAMOR are used for
pkeys. The AMR is directly writable by user space, and the UAMOR masks
those writes, meaning both registers are effectively user register
state. The IAMR is used to create an execute only key.

Also we must maintain the value of at least the AMR when running in
process context, so that any memory accesses done by the kernel on
behalf of the process are correctly controlled by the AMR.

Although we are correctly switching all registers when going into a
guest, on returning to the host we just write 0 into all regs, except
on Power9 where we restore the IAMR correctly.

This could be observed by a user process if it writes the AMR, then
runs a guest and we then return immediately to it without
rescheduling. Because we have written 0 to the AMR that would have the
effect of granting read/write permission to pages that the process was
trying to protect.

In addition, when using the Radix MMU, the AMR can prevent inadvertent
kernel access to userspace data, writing 0 to the AMR disables that
protection.

So save and restore AMR, IAMR and UAMOR.

Fixes: cf43d3b26452 ("powerpc: Enable pkey subsystem")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16+
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey &lt;ruscur@russell.cc&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/pkeys: Fix handling of pkey state across fork()</title>
<updated>2019-09-16T06:22:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ram Pai</name>
<email>linuxram@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-20T20:03:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cfbf227e05911bffd07a958254e1c41972e64338'/>
<id>cfbf227e05911bffd07a958254e1c41972e64338</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2cd4bd192ee94848695c1c052d87913260e10f36 ]

Protection key tracking information is not copied over to the
mm_struct of the child during fork(). This can cause the child to
erroneously allocate keys that were already allocated. Any allocated
execute-only key is lost aswell.

Add code; called by dup_mmap(), to copy the pkey state from parent to
child explicitly.

This problem was originally found by Dave Hansen on x86, which turns
out to be a problem on powerpc aswell.

Fixes: cf43d3b26452 ("powerpc: Enable pkey subsystem")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16+
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann &lt;bauerman@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai &lt;linuxram@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2cd4bd192ee94848695c1c052d87913260e10f36 ]

Protection key tracking information is not copied over to the
mm_struct of the child during fork(). This can cause the child to
erroneously allocate keys that were already allocated. Any allocated
execute-only key is lost aswell.

Add code; called by dup_mmap(), to copy the pkey state from parent to
child explicitly.

This problem was originally found by Dave Hansen on x86, which turns
out to be a problem on powerpc aswell.

Fixes: cf43d3b26452 ("powerpc: Enable pkey subsystem")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16+
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann &lt;bauerman@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai &lt;linuxram@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
