<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/powerpc, branch v3.2.94</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Fix emulation of mfocrf in emulate_step()</title>
<updated>2017-10-12T14:27:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anton Blanchard</name>
<email>anton@samba.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-14T23:46:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8712783ddcba8851207e852b6acd2e0950e496b5'/>
<id>8712783ddcba8851207e852b6acd2e0950e496b5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 64e756c55aa46fc18fd53e8f3598b73b528d8637 upstream.

From POWER4 onwards, mfocrf() only places the specified CR field into
the destination GPR, and the rest of it is set to 0. The PowerPC AS
from version 3.0 now requires this behaviour.

The emulation code currently puts the entire CR into the destination GPR.
Fix it.

Fixes: 6888199f7fe5 ("[POWERPC] Emulate more instructions in software")
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard &lt;anton@samba.org&gt;
Acked-by: Naveen N. Rao &lt;naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 64e756c55aa46fc18fd53e8f3598b73b528d8637 upstream.

From POWER4 onwards, mfocrf() only places the specified CR field into
the destination GPR, and the rest of it is set to 0. The PowerPC AS
from version 3.0 now requires this behaviour.

The emulation code currently puts the entire CR into the destination GPR.
Fix it.

Fixes: 6888199f7fe5 ("[POWERPC] Emulate more instructions in software")
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard &lt;anton@samba.org&gt;
Acked-by: Naveen N. Rao &lt;naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/asm: Mark cr0 as clobbered in mftb()</title>
<updated>2017-10-12T14:27:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver O'Halloran</name>
<email>oohall@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-06T08:46:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=19660de3f6528fba95eaaf322a997fbb1f241c1b'/>
<id>19660de3f6528fba95eaaf322a997fbb1f241c1b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2400fd822f467cb4c886c879d8ad99feac9cf319 upstream.

The workaround for the CELL timebase bug does not correctly mark cr0 as
being clobbered. This means GCC doesn't know that the asm block changes cr0 and
might leave the result of an unrelated comparison in cr0 across the block, which
we then trash, leading to basically random behaviour.

Fixes: 859deea949c3 ("[POWERPC] Cell timebase bug workaround")
Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran &lt;oohall@gmail.com&gt;
[mpe: Tweak change log and flag for stable]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2400fd822f467cb4c886c879d8ad99feac9cf319 upstream.

The workaround for the CELL timebase bug does not correctly mark cr0 as
being clobbered. This means GCC doesn't know that the asm block changes cr0 and
might leave the result of an unrelated comparison in cr0 across the block, which
we then trash, leading to basically random behaviour.

Fixes: 859deea949c3 ("[POWERPC] Cell timebase bug workaround")
Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran &lt;oohall@gmail.com&gt;
[mpe: Tweak change log and flag for stable]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64: Initialise thread_info for emergency stacks</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-21T05:58:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7c9465d11cd1057399d3183d29d223615bb4ecc6'/>
<id>7c9465d11cd1057399d3183d29d223615bb4ecc6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 34f19ff1b5a0d11e46df479623d6936460105c9f upstream.

Emergency stacks have their thread_info mostly uninitialised, which in
particular means garbage preempt_count values.

Emergency stack code runs with interrupts disabled entirely, and is
used very rarely, so this has been unnoticed so far. It was found by a
proposed new powerpc watchdog that takes a soft-NMI directly from the
masked_interrupt handler and using the emergency stack. That crashed
at BUG_ON(in_nmi()) in nmi_enter(). preempt_count()s were found to be
garbage.

To fix this, zero the entire THREAD_SIZE allocation, and initialize
the thread_info.

Reported-by: Abdul Haleem &lt;abdhalee@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
[mpe: Move it all into setup_64.c, use a function not a macro. Fix
      crashes on Cell by setting preempt_count to 0 not HARDIRQ_OFFSET]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - There's only one emergency stack
 - No need to call klp_init_thread_info()
 - Add the ti variable in emergency_stack_init()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 34f19ff1b5a0d11e46df479623d6936460105c9f upstream.

Emergency stacks have their thread_info mostly uninitialised, which in
particular means garbage preempt_count values.

Emergency stack code runs with interrupts disabled entirely, and is
used very rarely, so this has been unnoticed so far. It was found by a
proposed new powerpc watchdog that takes a soft-NMI directly from the
masked_interrupt handler and using the emergency stack. That crashed
at BUG_ON(in_nmi()) in nmi_enter(). preempt_count()s were found to be
garbage.

To fix this, zero the entire THREAD_SIZE allocation, and initialize
the thread_info.

Reported-by: Abdul Haleem &lt;abdhalee@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
[mpe: Move it all into setup_64.c, use a function not a macro. Fix
      crashes on Cell by setting preempt_count to 0 not HARDIRQ_OFFSET]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - There's only one emergency stack
 - No need to call klp_init_thread_info()
 - Add the ti variable in emergency_stack_init()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/kprobes: Pause function_graph tracing during jprobes handling</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Naveen N. Rao</name>
<email>naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-01T10:48:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=80f9b59cfb74661077b31a9853ffb62191d989d8'/>
<id>80f9b59cfb74661077b31a9853ffb62191d989d8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a9f8553e935f26cb5447f67e280946b0923cd2dc upstream.

This fixes a crash when function_graph and jprobes are used together.
This is essentially commit 237d28db036e ("ftrace/jprobes/x86: Fix
conflict between jprobes and function graph tracing"), but for powerpc.

Jprobes breaks function_graph tracing since the jprobe hook needs to use
jprobe_return(), which never returns back to the hook, but instead to
the original jprobe'd function. The solution is to momentarily pause
function_graph tracing before invoking the jprobe hook and re-enable it
when returning back to the original jprobe'd function.

Fixes: 6794c78243bf ("powerpc64: port of the function graph tracer")
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao &lt;naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: include &lt;linux/ftrace.h&gt;, which apparently gets
 included indirectly upstream]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a9f8553e935f26cb5447f67e280946b0923cd2dc upstream.

This fixes a crash when function_graph and jprobes are used together.
This is essentially commit 237d28db036e ("ftrace/jprobes/x86: Fix
conflict between jprobes and function graph tracing"), but for powerpc.

Jprobes breaks function_graph tracing since the jprobe hook needs to use
jprobe_return(), which never returns back to the hook, but instead to
the original jprobe'd function. The solution is to momentarily pause
function_graph tracing before invoking the jprobe hook and re-enable it
when returning back to the original jprobe'd function.

Fixes: 6794c78243bf ("powerpc64: port of the function graph tracer")
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao &lt;naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: include &lt;linux/ftrace.h&gt;, which apparently gets
 included indirectly upstream]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/mm: Fix virt_addr_valid() etc. on 64-bit hash</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Ellerman</name>
<email>mpe@ellerman.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-18T10:37:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ebe0e38ccaf4a9741308c8b9ca0e3cba7e56c721'/>
<id>ebe0e38ccaf4a9741308c8b9ca0e3cba7e56c721</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e41e53cd4fe331d0d1f06f8e4ed7e2cc63ee2c34 upstream.

virt_addr_valid() is supposed to tell you if it's OK to call virt_to_page() on
an address. What this means in practice is that it should only return true for
addresses in the linear mapping which are backed by a valid PFN.

We are failing to properly check that the address is in the linear mapping,
because virt_to_pfn() will return a valid looking PFN for more or less any
address. That bug is actually caused by __pa(), used in virt_to_pfn().

eg: __pa(0xc000000000010000) = 0x10000  # Good
    __pa(0xd000000000010000) = 0x10000  # Bad!
    __pa(0x0000000000010000) = 0x10000  # Bad!

This started happening after commit bdbc29c19b26 ("powerpc: Work around gcc
miscompilation of __pa() on 64-bit") (Aug 2013), where we changed the definition
of __pa() to work around a GCC bug. Prior to that we subtracted PAGE_OFFSET from
the value passed to __pa(), meaning __pa() of a 0xd or 0x0 address would give
you something bogus back.

Until we can verify if that GCC bug is no longer an issue, or come up with
another solution, this commit does the minimal fix to make virt_addr_valid()
work, by explicitly checking that the address is in the linear mapping region.

Fixes: bdbc29c19b26 ("powerpc: Work around gcc miscompilation of __pa() on 64-bit")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Balbir Singh &lt;bsingharora@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Breno Leitao &lt;breno.leitao@gmail.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: open-code virt_to_pfn()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e41e53cd4fe331d0d1f06f8e4ed7e2cc63ee2c34 upstream.

virt_addr_valid() is supposed to tell you if it's OK to call virt_to_page() on
an address. What this means in practice is that it should only return true for
addresses in the linear mapping which are backed by a valid PFN.

We are failing to properly check that the address is in the linear mapping,
because virt_to_pfn() will return a valid looking PFN for more or less any
address. That bug is actually caused by __pa(), used in virt_to_pfn().

eg: __pa(0xc000000000010000) = 0x10000  # Good
    __pa(0xd000000000010000) = 0x10000  # Bad!
    __pa(0x0000000000010000) = 0x10000  # Bad!

This started happening after commit bdbc29c19b26 ("powerpc: Work around gcc
miscompilation of __pa() on 64-bit") (Aug 2013), where we changed the definition
of __pa() to work around a GCC bug. Prior to that we subtracted PAGE_OFFSET from
the value passed to __pa(), meaning __pa() of a 0xd or 0x0 address would give
you something bogus back.

Until we can verify if that GCC bug is no longer an issue, or come up with
another solution, this commit does the minimal fix to make virt_addr_valid()
work, by explicitly checking that the address is in the linear mapping region.

Fixes: bdbc29c19b26 ("powerpc: Work around gcc miscompilation of __pa() on 64-bit")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Balbir Singh &lt;bsingharora@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Breno Leitao &lt;breno.leitao@gmail.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: open-code virt_to_pfn()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: ethernet: ucc_geth: fix MEM_PART_MURAM mode</title>
<updated>2017-08-26T01:14:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@c-s.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-07T09:05:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=36c08d834f3d2a3b0b4c897105dd12e7c0c25217'/>
<id>36c08d834f3d2a3b0b4c897105dd12e7c0c25217</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8b8642af15ed14b9a7a34d3401afbcc274533e13 upstream.

Since commit 5093bb965a163 ("powerpc/QE: switch to the cpm_muram
implementation"), muram area is not part of immrbar mapping anymore
so immrbar_virt_to_phys() is not usable anymore.

Fixes: 5093bb965a163 ("powerpc/QE: switch to the cpm_muram implementation")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@c-s.fr&gt;
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Acked-by: Li Yang &lt;pku.leo@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood &lt;oss@buserror.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8b8642af15ed14b9a7a34d3401afbcc274533e13 upstream.

Since commit 5093bb965a163 ("powerpc/QE: switch to the cpm_muram
implementation"), muram area is not part of immrbar mapping anymore
so immrbar_virt_to_phys() is not usable anymore.

Fixes: 5093bb965a163 ("powerpc/QE: switch to the cpm_muram implementation")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@c-s.fr&gt;
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Acked-by: Li Yang &lt;pku.leo@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood &lt;oss@buserror.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Don't try to fix up misaligned load-with-reservation instructions</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Mackerras</name>
<email>paulus@ozlabs.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-04T04:56:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dda727efc6640aa5d084ae0c2f6eeabdd6710259'/>
<id>dda727efc6640aa5d084ae0c2f6eeabdd6710259</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 48fe9e9488743eec9b7c1addd3c93f12f2123d54 upstream.

In the past, there was only one load-with-reservation instruction,
lwarx, and if a program attempted a lwarx on a misaligned address, it
would take an alignment interrupt and the kernel handler would emulate
it as though it was lwzx, which was not really correct, but benign since
it is loading the right amount of data, and the lwarx should be paired
with a stwcx. to the same address, which would also cause an alignment
interrupt which would result in a SIGBUS being delivered to the process.

We now have 5 different sizes of load-with-reservation instruction. Of
those, lharx and ldarx cause an immediate SIGBUS by luck since their
entries in aligninfo[] overlap instructions which were not fixed up, but
lqarx overlaps with lhz and will be emulated as such. lbarx can never
generate an alignment interrupt since it only operates on 1 byte.

To straighten this out and fix the lqarx case, this adds code to detect
the l[hwdq]arx instructions and return without fixing them up, resulting
in a SIGBUS being delivered to the process.

Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: open-code get_xop()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 48fe9e9488743eec9b7c1addd3c93f12f2123d54 upstream.

In the past, there was only one load-with-reservation instruction,
lwarx, and if a program attempted a lwarx on a misaligned address, it
would take an alignment interrupt and the kernel handler would emulate
it as though it was lwzx, which was not really correct, but benign since
it is loading the right amount of data, and the lwarx should be paired
with a stwcx. to the same address, which would also cause an alignment
interrupt which would result in a SIGBUS being delivered to the process.

We now have 5 different sizes of load-with-reservation instruction. Of
those, lharx and ldarx cause an immediate SIGBUS by luck since their
entries in aligninfo[] overlap instructions which were not fixed up, but
lqarx overlaps with lhz and will be emulated as such. lbarx can never
generate an alignment interrupt since it only operates on 1 byte.

To straighten this out and fix the lqarx case, this adds code to detect
the l[hwdq]arx instructions and return without fixing them up, resulting
in a SIGBUS being delivered to the process.

Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: open-code get_xop()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas</title>
<updated>2017-07-02T16:12:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
<email>hughd@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-19T18:32:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=640c7dfdc7c723143b1ce42f5569ec8565cbbde7'/>
<id>640c7dfdc7c723143b1ce42f5569ec8565cbbde7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[Hugh Dickins: Backported to 3.2]
[bwh: Fix more instances of vma-&gt;vm_start in sparc64 impl. of
 arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown() and generic impl. of
 hugetlb_get_unmapped_area()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[Hugh Dickins: Backported to 3.2]
[bwh: Fix more instances of vma-&gt;vm_start in sparc64 impl. of
 arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown() and generic impl. of
 hugetlb_get_unmapped_area()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/xmon: Fix data-breakpoint</title>
<updated>2017-06-05T20:13:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ravi Bangoria</name>
<email>ravi.bangoria@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-22T09:25:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=249207e4f46d4a491228e8655a3433946c54ba2a'/>
<id>249207e4f46d4a491228e8655a3433946c54ba2a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c21a493a2b44650707d06741601894329486f2ad upstream.

Currently xmon data-breakpoint feature is broken.

Whenever there is a watchpoint match occurs, hw_breakpoint_handler will
be called by do_break via notifier chains mechanism. If watchpoint is
registered by xmon, hw_breakpoint_handler won't find any associated
perf_event and returns immediately with NOTIFY_STOP. Similarly, do_break
also returns without notifying to xmon.

Solve this by returning NOTIFY_DONE when hw_breakpoint_handler does not
find any perf_event associated with matched watchpoint, rather than
NOTIFY_STOP, which tells the core code to continue calling the other
breakpoint handlers including the xmon one.

Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c21a493a2b44650707d06741601894329486f2ad upstream.

Currently xmon data-breakpoint feature is broken.

Whenever there is a watchpoint match occurs, hw_breakpoint_handler will
be called by do_break via notifier chains mechanism. If watchpoint is
registered by xmon, hw_breakpoint_handler won't find any associated
perf_event and returns immediately with NOTIFY_STOP. Similarly, do_break
also returns without notifying to xmon.

Solve this by returning NOTIFY_DONE when hw_breakpoint_handler does not
find any perf_event associated with matched watchpoint, rather than
NOTIFY_STOP, which tells the core code to continue calling the other
breakpoint handlers including the xmon one.

Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Ignore reserved field in DCSR and PVR reads and writes</title>
<updated>2017-03-16T02:18:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anton Blanchard</name>
<email>anton@samba.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-19T03:19:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5ada085f76385ce115d11de36f640e1a64b6a423'/>
<id>5ada085f76385ce115d11de36f640e1a64b6a423</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 178f358208ceb8b38e5cff3f815e0db4a6a70a07 upstream.

IBM bit 31 (for the rest of us - bit 0) is a reserved field in the
instruction definition of mtspr and mfspr. Hardware is encouraged to
(and does) ignore it.

As a result, if userspace executes an mtspr DSCR with the reserved bit
set, we get a DSCR facility unavailable exception. The kernel fails to
match against the expected value/mask, and we silently return to
userspace to try and re-execute the same mtspr DSCR instruction. We
loop forever until the process is killed.

We should do something here, and it seems mirroring what hardware does
is the better option vs killing the process. While here, relax the
matching of mfspr PVR too.

Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard &lt;anton@samba.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: drop changes to PPC_INST_M{F,T}SPR_DSCR_USER_MASK]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 178f358208ceb8b38e5cff3f815e0db4a6a70a07 upstream.

IBM bit 31 (for the rest of us - bit 0) is a reserved field in the
instruction definition of mtspr and mfspr. Hardware is encouraged to
(and does) ignore it.

As a result, if userspace executes an mtspr DSCR with the reserved bit
set, we get a DSCR facility unavailable exception. The kernel fails to
match against the expected value/mask, and we silently return to
userspace to try and re-execute the same mtspr DSCR instruction. We
loop forever until the process is killed.

We should do something here, and it seems mirroring what hardware does
is the better option vs killing the process. While here, relax the
matching of mfspr PVR too.

Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard &lt;anton@samba.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: drop changes to PPC_INST_M{F,T}SPR_DSCR_USER_MASK]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
