linux-stable.git/arch/powerpc/lib, branch v4.14.331

powerpc/lib/sstep: Fix build errors with newer binutils

2022-04-20T07:08:23+00:00

commit 8219d31effa7be5dbc7ff915d7970672e028c701 upstream.

Building tinyconfig with gcc (Debian 11.2.0-16) and assembler (Debian
2.37.90.20220207) the following build error shows up:

  {standard input}: Assembler messages:
  {standard input}:10576: Error: unrecognized opcode: `stbcx.'
  {standard input}:10680: Error: unrecognized opcode: `lharx'
  {standard input}:10694: Error: unrecognized opcode: `lbarx'

Rework to add assembler directives [1] around the instruction.  The
problem with this might be that we can trick a power6 into
single-stepping through an stbcx. for instance, and it will execute that
in kernel mode.

[1] https://sourceware.org/binutils/docs/as/PowerPC_002dPseudo.html#PowerPC_002dPseudo

Fixes: 350779a29f11 ("powerpc: Handle most loads and stores in instruction emulation code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell 
Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220224162215.3406642-3-anders.roxell@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/lib/sstep: Fix 'sthcx' instruction

2022-04-20T07:08:23+00:00

commit a633cb1edddaa643fadc70abc88f89a408fa834a upstream.

Looks like there been a copy paste mistake when added the instruction
'stbcx' twice and one was probably meant to be 'sthcx'. Changing to
'sthcx' from 'stbcx'.

Fixes: 350779a29f11 ("powerpc: Handle most loads and stores in instruction emulation code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220224162215.3406642-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/lib/sstep: fix 'ptesync' build error

2022-02-23T10:57:35+00:00

commit fe663df7825811358531dc2e8a52d9eaa5e3515e upstream.

Building tinyconfig with gcc (Debian 11.2.0-16) and assembler (Debian
2.37.90.20220207) the following build error shows up:

  {standard input}: Assembler messages:
  {standard input}:2088: Error: unrecognized opcode: `ptesync'
  make[3]: *** [/builds/linux/scripts/Makefile.build:287: arch/powerpc/lib/sstep.o] Error 1

Add the 'ifdef CONFIG_PPC64' around the 'ptesync' in function
'emulate_update_regs()' to like it is in 'analyse_instr()'. Since it looks like
it got dropped inadvertently by commit 3cdfcbfd32b9 ("powerpc: Change
analyse_instr so it doesn't modify *regs").

A key detail is that analyse_instr() will never recognise lwsync or
ptesync on 32-bit (because of the existing ifdef), and as a result
emulate_update_regs() should never be called with an op specifying
either of those on 32-bit. So removing them from emulate_update_regs()
should be a nop in terms of runtime behaviour.

Fixes: 3cdfcbfd32b9 ("powerpc: Change analyse_instr so it doesn't modify *regs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell 
[mpe: Add last paragraph of change log mentioning analyse_instr() details]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220211005113.1361436-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/32: Fix boot failure with GCC latent entropy plugin

2022-02-08T17:16:25+00:00

commit bba496656a73fc1d1330b49c7f82843836e9feb1 upstream.

Boot fails with GCC latent entropy plugin enabled.

This is due to early boot functions trying to access 'latent_entropy'
global data while the kernel is not relocated at its final
destination yet.

As there is no way to tell GCC to use PTRRELOC() to access it,
disable latent entropy plugin in early_32.o and feature-fixups.o and
code-patching.o

Fixes: 38addce8b600 ("gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+
Reported-by: Erhard Furtner 
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215217
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2bac55483b8daf5b1caa163a45fa5f9cdbe18be4.1640178426.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/lib: Add helper to check if offset is within conditional branch range

2021-11-26T10:40:36+00:00

upstream commit 4549c3ea3160fa8b3f37dfe2f957657bb265eda9

Add a helper to check if a given offset is within the branch range for a
powerpc conditional branch instruction, and update some sites to use the
new helper.

Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao 
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy 
Acked-by: Song Liu 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/442b69a34ced32ca346a0d9a855f3f6cfdbbbd41.1633464148.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/64s: Fix crashes when toggling entry flush barrier

2021-05-22T08:57:39+00:00

commit aec86b052df6541cc97c5fca44e5934cbea4963b upstream.

The entry flush mitigation can be enabled/disabled at runtime via a
debugfs file (entry_flush), which causes the kernel to patch itself to
enable/disable the relevant mitigations.

However depending on which mitigation we're using, it may not be safe to
do that patching while other CPUs are active. For example the following
crash:

  sleeper[15639]: segfault (11) at c000000000004c20 nip c000000000004c20 lr c000000000004c20

Shows that we returned to userspace with a corrupted LR that points into
the kernel, due to executing the partially patched call to the fallback
entry flush (ie. we missed the LR restore).

Fix it by doing the patching under stop machine. The CPUs that aren't
doing the patching will be spinning in the core of the stop machine
logic. That is currently sufficient for our purposes, because none of
the patching we do is to that code or anywhere in the vicinity.

Fixes: f79643787e0a ("powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506044959.1298123-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/64s: Fix crashes when toggling stf barrier

2021-05-22T08:57:39+00:00

commit 8ec7791bae1327b1c279c5cd6e929c3b12daaf0a upstream.

The STF (store-to-load forwarding) barrier mitigation can be
enabled/disabled at runtime via a debugfs file (stf_barrier), which
causes the kernel to patch itself to enable/disable the relevant
mitigations.

However depending on which mitigation we're using, it may not be safe to
do that patching while other CPUs are active. For example the following
crash:

  User access of kernel address (c00000003fff5af0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
  segfault (11) at c00000003fff5af0 nip 7fff8ad12198 lr 7fff8ad121f8 code 1
  code: 40820128 e93c00d0 e9290058 7c292840 40810058 38600000 4bfd9a81 e8410018
  code: 2c030006 41810154 3860ffb6 e9210098  7d295279 39400000 40820a3c

Shows that we returned to userspace without restoring the user r13
value, due to executing the partially patched STF exit code.

Fix it by doing the patching under stop machine. The CPUs that aren't
doing the patching will be spinning in the core of the stop machine
logic. That is currently sufficient for our purposes, because none of
the patching we do is to that code or anywhere in the vicinity.

Fixes: a048a07d7f45 ("powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel entry/exit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506044959.1298123-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses

2020-11-22T09:00:24+00:00

commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before
it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible
for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method,
since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures
to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the
attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel
user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of
Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility
it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the
privileged code to construct an attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries
of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc: Fix __clear_user() with KUAP enabled

2020-11-22T09:00:23+00:00

commit 61e3acd8c693a14fc69b824cb5b08d02cb90a6e7 upstream.

The KUAP implementation adds calls in clear_user() to enable and
disable access to userspace memory. However, it doesn't add these to
__clear_user(), which is used in the ptrace regset code.

As there's only one direct user of __clear_user() (the regset code),
and the time taken to set the AMR for KUAP purposes is going to
dominate the cost of a quick access_ok(), there's not much point
having a separate path.

Rename __clear_user() to __arch_clear_user(), and make __clear_user()
just call clear_user().

Reported-by: syzbot+f25ecf4b2982d8c7a640@syzkaller-ppc64.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens 
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman 
Fixes: de78a9c42a79 ("powerpc: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan 
[mpe: Use __arch_clear_user() for the asm version like arm64 & nds32]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209132221.15328-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc: Add a framework for user access tracking

2020-11-22T09:00:23+00:00

Backported from commit de78a9c42a79 ("powerpc: Add a framework
for Kernel Userspace Access Protection"). Here we don't try to
add the KUAP framework, we just want the helper functions
because we want to put uaccess flush helpers in them.

In terms of fixes, we don't need commit 1d8f739b07bd ("powerpc/kuap:
Fix set direction in allow/prevent_user_access()") as we don't have
real KUAP. Likewise as all our allows are noops and all our prevents
are just flushes, we don't need commit 9dc086f1e9ef ("powerpc/futex:
Fix incorrect user access blocking") The other 2 fixes we do need.

The original description is:

This patch implements a framework for Kernel Userspace Access
Protection.

Then subarches will have the possibility to provide their own
implementation by providing setup_kuap() and
allow/prevent_user_access().

Some platforms will need to know the area accessed and whether it is
accessed from read, write or both. Therefore source, destination and
size and handed over to the two functions.

mpe: Rename to allow/prevent rather than unlock/lock, and add
read/write wrappers. Drop the 32-bit code for now until we have an
implementation for it. Add kuap to pt_regs for 64-bit as well as
32-bit. Don't split strings, use pr_crit_ratelimited().

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy 
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman