linux-stable.git/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c, branch linux-3.10.y Linux kernel stable tree Revert "powerpc/tm: Always reclaim in start_thread() for exec() class syscalls" 2016-10-19T22:46:30+00:00 Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu 2016-10-19T21:18:05+00:00 baa032f71a5afac624f3626243ac26e5bef1adea This reverts commit 8110080dc53335d5dd99b123144a6174f19ffc65. Guenter noticed that this breaks PPC build when CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is set, because this patch was not for 3.10. Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> 
This reverts commit 8110080dc53335d5dd99b123144a6174f19ffc65.

Guenter noticed that this breaks PPC build when CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
is set, because this patch was not for 3.10.

Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
powerpc/tm: Always reclaim in start_thread() for exec() class syscalls 2016-08-21T21:22:45+00:00 Cyril Bur cyrilbur@gmail.com 2016-06-17T04:58:34+00:00 8110080dc53335d5dd99b123144a6174f19ffc65 commit 8e96a87c5431c256feb65bcfc5aec92d9f7839b6 upstream. Userspace can quite legitimately perform an exec() syscall with a suspended transaction. exec() does not return to the old process, rather it load a new one and starts that, the expectation therefore is that the new process starts not in a transaction. Currently exec() is not treated any differently to any other syscall which creates problems. Firstly it could allow a new process to start with a suspended transaction for a binary that no longer exists. This means that the checkpointed state won't be valid and if the suspended transaction were ever to be resumed and subsequently aborted (a possibility which is exceedingly likely as exec()ing will likely doom the transaction) the new process will jump to invalid state. Secondly the incorrect attempt to keep the transactional state while still zeroing state for the new process creates at least two TM Bad Things. The first triggers on the rfid to return to userspace as start_thread() has given the new process a 'clean' MSR but the suspend will still be set in the hardware MSR. The second TM Bad Thing triggers in __switch_to() as the processor is still transactionally suspended but __switch_to() wants to zero the TM sprs for the new process. This is an example of the outcome of calling exec() with a suspended transaction. Note the first 700 is likely the first TM bad thing decsribed earlier only the kernel can't report it as we've loaded userspace registers. c000000000009980 is the rfid in fast_exception_return() Bad kernel stack pointer 3fffcfa1a370 at c000000000009980 Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1] CPU: 0 PID: 2006 Comm: tm-execed Not tainted NIP: c000000000009980 LR: 0000000000000000 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000003ffefd40 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted MSR: 8000000300201031 <SF,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 00000000 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c0000000000098b4 SOFTE: 0 PACATMSCRATCH: b00000010000d033 GPR00: 0000000000000000 00003fffcfa1a370 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 00003fff966611c0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 NIP [c000000000009980] fast_exception_return+0xb0/0xb8 LR [0000000000000000] (null) Call Trace: Instruction dump: f84d0278 e9a100d8 7c7b03a6 e84101a0 7c4ff120 e8410170 7c5a03a6 e8010070 e8410080 e8610088 e8810090 e8210078 <4c000024> 48000000 e8610178 88ed023b Kernel BUG at c000000000043e80 [verbose debug info unavailable] Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c000000000043e80 (msr 0x201033) Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#2] CPU: 0 PID: 2006 Comm: tm-execed Tainted: G D task: c0000000fbea6d80 ti: c00000003ffec000 task.ti: c0000000fb7ec000 NIP: c000000000043e80 LR: c000000000015a24 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000003ffef7e0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G D MSR: 8000000300201033 <SF,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 28002828 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c000000000015a20 SOFTE: 0 PACATMSCRATCH: b00000010000d033 GPR00: 0000000000000000 c00000003ffefa60 c000000000db5500 c0000000fbead000 GPR04: 8000000300001033 2222222222222222 2222222222222222 00000000ff160000 GPR08: 0000000000000000 800000010000d033 c0000000fb7e3ea0 c00000000fe00004 GPR12: 0000000000002200 c00000000fe00000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000fbea7410 00000000ff160000 GPR24: c0000000ffe1f600 c0000000fbea8700 c0000000fbea8700 c0000000fbead000 GPR28: c000000000e20198 c0000000fbea6d80 c0000000fbeab680 c0000000fbea6d80 NIP [c000000000043e80] tm_restore_sprs+0xc/0x1c LR [c000000000015a24] __switch_to+0x1f4/0x420 Call Trace: Instruction dump: 7c800164 4e800020 7c0022a6 f80304a8 7c0222a6 f80304b0 7c0122a6 f80304b8 4e800020 e80304a8 7c0023a6 e80304b0 <7c0223a6> e80304b8 7c0123a6 4e800020 This fixes CVE-2016-5828. Fixes: bc2a9408fa65 ("powerpc: Hook in new transactional memory code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+ Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> 
commit 8e96a87c5431c256feb65bcfc5aec92d9f7839b6 upstream.

Userspace can quite legitimately perform an exec() syscall with a
suspended transaction. exec() does not return to the old process, rather
it load a new one and starts that, the expectation therefore is that the
new process starts not in a transaction. Currently exec() is not treated
any differently to any other syscall which creates problems.

Firstly it could allow a new process to start with a suspended
transaction for a binary that no longer exists. This means that the
checkpointed state won't be valid and if the suspended transaction were
ever to be resumed and subsequently aborted (a possibility which is
exceedingly likely as exec()ing will likely doom the transaction) the
new process will jump to invalid state.

Secondly the incorrect attempt to keep the transactional state while
still zeroing state for the new process creates at least two TM Bad
Things. The first triggers on the rfid to return to userspace as
start_thread() has given the new process a 'clean' MSR but the suspend
will still be set in the hardware MSR. The second TM Bad Thing triggers
in __switch_to() as the processor is still transactionally suspended but
__switch_to() wants to zero the TM sprs for the new process.

This is an example of the outcome of calling exec() with a suspended
transaction. Note the first 700 is likely the first TM bad thing
decsribed earlier only the kernel can't report it as we've loaded
userspace registers. c000000000009980 is the rfid in
fast_exception_return()

  Bad kernel stack pointer 3fffcfa1a370 at c000000000009980
  Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1]
  CPU: 0 PID: 2006 Comm: tm-execed Not tainted
  NIP: c000000000009980 LR: 0000000000000000 CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c00000003ffefd40 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted
  MSR: 8000000300201031 <SF,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[SE]>  CR: 00000000  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: c0000000000098b4 SOFTE: 0
  PACATMSCRATCH: b00000010000d033
  GPR00: 0000000000000000 00003fffcfa1a370 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR12: 00003fff966611c0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  NIP [c000000000009980] fast_exception_return+0xb0/0xb8
  LR [0000000000000000]           (null)
  Call Trace:
  Instruction dump:
  f84d0278 e9a100d8 7c7b03a6 e84101a0 7c4ff120 e8410170 7c5a03a6 e8010070
  e8410080 e8610088 e8810090 e8210078 <4c000024> 48000000 e8610178 88ed023b

  Kernel BUG at c000000000043e80 [verbose debug info unavailable]
  Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c000000000043e80 (msr 0x201033)
  Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#2]
  CPU: 0 PID: 2006 Comm: tm-execed Tainted: G      D
  task: c0000000fbea6d80 ti: c00000003ffec000 task.ti: c0000000fb7ec000
  NIP: c000000000043e80 LR: c000000000015a24 CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c00000003ffef7e0 TRAP: 0700   Tainted: G      D
  MSR: 8000000300201033 <SF,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[SE]>  CR: 28002828  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: c000000000015a20 SOFTE: 0
  PACATMSCRATCH: b00000010000d033
  GPR00: 0000000000000000 c00000003ffefa60 c000000000db5500 c0000000fbead000
  GPR04: 8000000300001033 2222222222222222 2222222222222222 00000000ff160000
  GPR08: 0000000000000000 800000010000d033 c0000000fb7e3ea0 c00000000fe00004
  GPR12: 0000000000002200 c00000000fe00000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000fbea7410 00000000ff160000
  GPR24: c0000000ffe1f600 c0000000fbea8700 c0000000fbea8700 c0000000fbead000
  GPR28: c000000000e20198 c0000000fbea6d80 c0000000fbeab680 c0000000fbea6d80
  NIP [c000000000043e80] tm_restore_sprs+0xc/0x1c
  LR [c000000000015a24] __switch_to+0x1f4/0x420
  Call Trace:
  Instruction dump:
  7c800164 4e800020 7c0022a6 f80304a8 7c0222a6 f80304b0 7c0122a6 f80304b8
  4e800020 e80304a8 7c0023a6 e80304b0 <7c0223a6> e80304b8 7c0123a6 4e800020

This fixes CVE-2016-5828.

Fixes: bc2a9408fa65 ("powerpc: Hook in new transactional memory code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction 2014-06-07T20:25:38+00:00 Michael Neuling mikey@neuling.org 2014-03-03T03:21:40+00:00 aece4fa7368debd14ac07ebaf569587ff02cc596 commit 621b5060e823301d0cba4cb52a7ee3491922d291 upstream. When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we end up with something like this: Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40] pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148 lr: 0000000000000000 sp: 0 msr: 9000000100201030 current = 0xc000001dd1417c30 paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01 pid = 0, comm = swapper/2 WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state and the TM mode for the current task. To make this fail from userspace is simply: tbegin li r0, 2 sc <boom> Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this. Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [Backported to 3.10: context adjust] Signed-off-by: Xue Liu <liuxueliu.liu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 621b5060e823301d0cba4cb52a7ee3491922d291 upstream.

When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread.  This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set.  Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection.  So we
end up with something like this:

   Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
   cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
       pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
       lr: 0000000000000000
       sp: 0
      msr: 9000000100201030
     current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
     paca    = 0xc00000000fe00800   softe: 0        irq_happened: 0x01
       pid   = 0, comm = swapper/2
   WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue

The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone.  To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode.  Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.

To make this fail from userspace is simply:
	tbegin
	li	r0, 2
	sc
	<boom>

Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.

Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
[Backported to 3.10: context adjust]
Signed-off-by: Xue Liu <liuxueliu.liu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
powerpc/tm: Disable IRQ in tm_recheckpoint 2014-05-13T11:59:42+00:00 Michael Neuling mikey@neuling.org 2014-04-04T09:19:48+00:00 b2b708cf2f9c51bf5a75845eb0b2f2390707957c commit e6b8fd028b584ffca7a7255b8971f254932c9fce upstream. We can't take an IRQ when we're about to do a trechkpt as our GPR state is set to user GPR values. We've hit this when running some IBM Java stress tests in the lab resulting in the following dump: cpu 0x3f: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c000000007eb3d40] pc: c000000000050074: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148 lr: 00000000b52a8184 sp: ac57d360 msr: 8000000100201030 current = 0xc00000002c500000 paca = 0xc000000007dbfc00 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x00 pid = 34535, comm = Pooled Thread # R00 = 00000000b52a8184 R16 = 00000000b3e48fda R01 = 00000000ac57d360 R17 = 00000000ade79bd8 R02 = 00000000ac586930 R18 = 000000000fac9bcc R03 = 00000000ade60000 R19 = 00000000ac57f930 R04 = 00000000f6624918 R20 = 00000000ade79be8 R05 = 00000000f663f238 R21 = 00000000ac218a54 R06 = 0000000000000002 R22 = 000000000f956280 R07 = 0000000000000008 R23 = 000000000000007e R08 = 000000000000000a R24 = 000000000000000c R09 = 00000000b6e69160 R25 = 00000000b424cf00 R10 = 0000000000000181 R26 = 00000000f66256d4 R11 = 000000000f365ec0 R27 = 00000000b6fdcdd0 R12 = 00000000f66400f0 R28 = 0000000000000001 R13 = 00000000ada71900 R29 = 00000000ade5a300 R14 = 00000000ac2185a8 R30 = 00000000f663f238 R15 = 0000000000000004 R31 = 00000000f6624918 pc = c000000000050074 restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148 cfar= c00000000004fe28 dont_restore_vec+0x1c/0x1a4 lr = 00000000b52a8184 msr = 8000000100201030 cr = 24804888 ctr = 0000000000000000 xer = 0000000000000000 trap = 700 This moves tm_recheckpoint to a C function and moves the tm_restore_sprs into that function. It then adds IRQ disabling over the trechkpt critical section. It also sets the TEXASR FS in the signals code to ensure this is never set now that we explictly write the TM sprs in tm_recheckpoint. Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit e6b8fd028b584ffca7a7255b8971f254932c9fce upstream.

We can't take an IRQ when we're about to do a trechkpt as our GPR state is set
to user GPR values.

We've hit this when running some IBM Java stress tests in the lab resulting in
the following dump:

  cpu 0x3f: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c000000007eb3d40]
      pc: c000000000050074: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
      lr: 00000000b52a8184
      sp: ac57d360
     msr: 8000000100201030
    current = 0xc00000002c500000
    paca    = 0xc000000007dbfc00     softe: 0     irq_happened: 0x00
      pid   = 34535, comm = Pooled Thread #
  R00 = 00000000b52a8184   R16 = 00000000b3e48fda
  R01 = 00000000ac57d360   R17 = 00000000ade79bd8
  R02 = 00000000ac586930   R18 = 000000000fac9bcc
  R03 = 00000000ade60000   R19 = 00000000ac57f930
  R04 = 00000000f6624918   R20 = 00000000ade79be8
  R05 = 00000000f663f238   R21 = 00000000ac218a54
  R06 = 0000000000000002   R22 = 000000000f956280
  R07 = 0000000000000008   R23 = 000000000000007e
  R08 = 000000000000000a   R24 = 000000000000000c
  R09 = 00000000b6e69160   R25 = 00000000b424cf00
  R10 = 0000000000000181   R26 = 00000000f66256d4
  R11 = 000000000f365ec0   R27 = 00000000b6fdcdd0
  R12 = 00000000f66400f0   R28 = 0000000000000001
  R13 = 00000000ada71900   R29 = 00000000ade5a300
  R14 = 00000000ac2185a8   R30 = 00000000f663f238
  R15 = 0000000000000004   R31 = 00000000f6624918
  pc  = c000000000050074 restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
  cfar= c00000000004fe28 dont_restore_vec+0x1c/0x1a4
  lr  = 00000000b52a8184
  msr = 8000000100201030   cr  = 24804888
  ctr = 0000000000000000   xer = 0000000000000000   trap =  700

This moves tm_recheckpoint to a C function and moves the tm_restore_sprs into
that function.  It then adds IRQ disabling over the trechkpt critical section.
It also sets the TEXASR FS in the signals code to ensure this is never set now
that we explictly write the TM sprs in tm_recheckpoint.

Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
powerpc: Save the TAR register earlier 2013-08-15T05:59:05+00:00 Michael Neuling mikey@neuling.org 2013-08-09T07:29:30+00:00 80737512591c7b56b6e66e17d0b373218b1428b0 commit c2d52644e2da8a07ecab5ca62dd0bc563089e8dc upstream. This moves us to save the Target Address Register (TAR) a earlier in __switch_to. It introduces a new function save_tar() to do this. We need to save the TAR earlier as we will overwrite it in the transactional memory reclaim/recheckpoint path. We are going to do this in a subsequent patch which will fix saving the TAR register when it's modified inside a transaction. Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit c2d52644e2da8a07ecab5ca62dd0bc563089e8dc upstream.

This moves us to save the Target Address Register (TAR) a earlier in
__switch_to.  It introduces a new function save_tar() to do this.

We need to save the TAR earlier as we will overwrite it in the transactional
memory reclaim/recheckpoint path.  We are going to do this in a subsequent
patch which will fix saving the TAR register when it's modified inside a
transaction.

Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
powerpc: Fix stack overflow crash in resume_kernel when ftracing 2013-06-15T02:21:57+00:00 Michael Ellerman michael@ellerman.id.au 2013-06-13T11:04:56+00:00 0e37739b1c96d65e6433998454985de994383019 It's possible for us to crash when running with ftrace enabled, eg: Bad kernel stack pointer bffffd12 at c00000000000a454 cpu 0x3: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c00000000ffe3d40] pc: c00000000000a454: resume_kernel+0x34/0x60 lr: c00000000000335c: performance_monitor_common+0x15c/0x180 sp: bffffd12 msr: 8000000000001032 dar: bffffd12 dsisr: 42000000 If we look at current's stack (paca->__current->stack) we see it is equal to c0000002ecab0000. Our stack is 16K, and comparing to paca->kstack (c0000002ecab3e30) we can see that we have overflowed our kernel stack. This leads to us writing over our struct thread_info, and in this case we have corrupted thread_info->flags and set _TIF_EMULATE_STACK_STORE. Dumping the stack we see: 3:mon> t c0000002ecab0000 [c0000002ecab0000] c00000000002131c .performance_monitor_exception+0x5c/0x70 [c0000002ecab0080] c00000000000335c performance_monitor_common+0x15c/0x180 --- Exception: f01 (Performance Monitor) at c0000000000fb2ec .trace_hardirqs_off+0x1c/0x30 [c0000002ecab0370] c00000000016fdb0 .trace_graph_entry+0xb0/0x280 (unreliable) [c0000002ecab0410] c00000000003d038 .prepare_ftrace_return+0x98/0x130 [c0000002ecab04b0] c00000000000a920 .ftrace_graph_caller+0x14/0x28 [c0000002ecab0520] c0000000000d6b58 .idle_cpu+0x18/0x90 [c0000002ecab05a0] c00000000000a934 .return_to_handler+0x0/0x34 [c0000002ecab0620] c00000000001e660 .timer_interrupt+0x160/0x300 [c0000002ecab06d0] c0000000000025dc decrementer_common+0x15c/0x180 --- Exception: 901 (Decrementer) at c0000000000104d4 .arch_local_irq_restore+0x74/0xa0 [c0000002ecab09c0] c0000000000fe044 .trace_hardirqs_on+0x14/0x30 (unreliable) [c0000002ecab0fb0] c00000000016fe3c .trace_graph_entry+0x13c/0x280 [c0000002ecab1050] c00000000003d038 .prepare_ftrace_return+0x98/0x130 [c0000002ecab10f0] c00000000000a920 .ftrace_graph_caller+0x14/0x28 [c0000002ecab1160] c0000000000161f0 .__ppc64_runlatch_on+0x10/0x40 [c0000002ecab11d0] c00000000000a934 .return_to_handler+0x0/0x34 --- Exception: 901 (Decrementer) at c0000000000104d4 .arch_local_irq_restore+0x74/0xa0 ... and so on __ppc64_runlatch_on() is called from RUNLATCH_ON in the exception entry path. At that point the irq state is not consistent, ie. interrupts are hard disabled (by the exception entry), but the paca soft-enabled flag may be out of sync. This leads to the local_irq_restore() in trace_graph_entry() actually enabling interrupts, which we do not want. Because we have not yet reprogrammed the decrementer we immediately take another decrementer exception, and recurse. The fix is twofold. Firstly make sure we call DISABLE_INTS before calling RUNLATCH_ON. The badly named DISABLE_INTS actually reconciles the irq state in the paca with the hardware, making it safe again to call local_irq_save/restore(). Although that should be sufficient to fix the bug, we also mark the runlatch routines as notrace. They are called very early in the exception entry and we are asking for trouble tracing them. They are also fairly uninteresting and tracing them just adds unnecessary overhead. [ This regression was introduced by fe1952fc0afb9a2e4c79f103c08aef5d13db1873 "powerpc: Rework runlatch code" by myself --BenH ] CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.4+] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> 
It's possible for us to crash when running with ftrace enabled, eg:

  Bad kernel stack pointer bffffd12 at c00000000000a454
  cpu 0x3: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c00000000ffe3d40]
      pc: c00000000000a454: resume_kernel+0x34/0x60
      lr: c00000000000335c: performance_monitor_common+0x15c/0x180
      sp: bffffd12
     msr: 8000000000001032
     dar: bffffd12
   dsisr: 42000000

If we look at current's stack (paca->__current->stack) we see it is
equal to c0000002ecab0000. Our stack is 16K, and comparing to
paca->kstack (c0000002ecab3e30) we can see that we have overflowed our
kernel stack. This leads to us writing over our struct thread_info, and
in this case we have corrupted thread_info->flags and set
_TIF_EMULATE_STACK_STORE.

Dumping the stack we see:

  3:mon> t c0000002ecab0000
  [c0000002ecab0000] c00000000002131c .performance_monitor_exception+0x5c/0x70
  [c0000002ecab0080] c00000000000335c performance_monitor_common+0x15c/0x180
  --- Exception: f01 (Performance Monitor) at c0000000000fb2ec .trace_hardirqs_off+0x1c/0x30
  [c0000002ecab0370] c00000000016fdb0 .trace_graph_entry+0xb0/0x280 (unreliable)
  [c0000002ecab0410] c00000000003d038 .prepare_ftrace_return+0x98/0x130
  [c0000002ecab04b0] c00000000000a920 .ftrace_graph_caller+0x14/0x28
  [c0000002ecab0520] c0000000000d6b58 .idle_cpu+0x18/0x90
  [c0000002ecab05a0] c00000000000a934 .return_to_handler+0x0/0x34
  [c0000002ecab0620] c00000000001e660 .timer_interrupt+0x160/0x300
  [c0000002ecab06d0] c0000000000025dc decrementer_common+0x15c/0x180
  --- Exception: 901 (Decrementer) at c0000000000104d4 .arch_local_irq_restore+0x74/0xa0
  [c0000002ecab09c0] c0000000000fe044 .trace_hardirqs_on+0x14/0x30 (unreliable)
  [c0000002ecab0fb0] c00000000016fe3c .trace_graph_entry+0x13c/0x280
  [c0000002ecab1050] c00000000003d038 .prepare_ftrace_return+0x98/0x130
  [c0000002ecab10f0] c00000000000a920 .ftrace_graph_caller+0x14/0x28
  [c0000002ecab1160] c0000000000161f0 .__ppc64_runlatch_on+0x10/0x40
  [c0000002ecab11d0] c00000000000a934 .return_to_handler+0x0/0x34
  --- Exception: 901 (Decrementer) at c0000000000104d4 .arch_local_irq_restore+0x74/0xa0

  ... and so on

__ppc64_runlatch_on() is called from RUNLATCH_ON in the exception entry
path. At that point the irq state is not consistent, ie. interrupts are
hard disabled (by the exception entry), but the paca soft-enabled flag
may be out of sync.

This leads to the local_irq_restore() in trace_graph_entry() actually
enabling interrupts, which we do not want. Because we have not yet
reprogrammed the decrementer we immediately take another decrementer
exception, and recurse.

The fix is twofold. Firstly make sure we call DISABLE_INTS before
calling RUNLATCH_ON. The badly named DISABLE_INTS actually reconciles
the irq state in the paca with the hardware, making it safe again to
call local_irq_save/restore().

Although that should be sufficient to fix the bug, we also mark the
runlatch routines as notrace. They are called very early in the
exception entry and we are asking for trouble tracing them. They are
also fairly uninteresting and tracing them just adds unnecessary
overhead.

[ This regression was introduced by fe1952fc0afb9a2e4c79f103c08aef5d13db1873
  "powerpc: Rework runlatch code" by myself --BenH
]

CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.4+]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
powerpc/hw_breakpoints: Add DABRX cpu feature to fix 32-bit regression 2013-06-09T22:36:29+00:00 Michael Neuling mikey@neuling.org 2013-05-16T20:27:31+00:00 82a9f16adc12f51c3f8ea59a7c3c120241aff836 When introducing support for DABRX in 4474ef0, we broke older 32-bit CPUs that don't have that register. Some CPUs have a DABR but not DABRX. Configuration are: - No 32bit CPUs have DABRX but some have DABR. - POWER4+ and below have the DABR but no DABRX. - 970 and POWER5 and above have DABR and DABRX. - POWER8 has DAWR, hence no DABRX. This introduces CPU_FTR_DABRX and sets it on appropriate CPUs. We use the top 64 bits for CPU FTR bits since only 64 bit CPUs have this. Processors that don't have the DABRX will still work as they will fall back to software filtering these breakpoints via perf_exclude_event(). Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Reported-by: "Gorelik, Jacob (335F)" <jacob.gorelik@jpl.nasa.gov> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.9 only) Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> 
When introducing support for DABRX in 4474ef0, we broke older 32-bit CPUs
that don't have that register.

Some CPUs have a DABR but not DABRX.  Configuration are:
- No 32bit CPUs have DABRX but some have DABR.
- POWER4+ and below have the DABR but no DABRX.
- 970 and POWER5 and above have DABR and DABRX.
- POWER8 has DAWR, hence no DABRX.

This introduces CPU_FTR_DABRX and sets it on appropriate CPUs.  We use
the top 64 bits for CPU FTR bits since only 64 bit CPUs have this.

Processors that don't have the DABRX will still work as they will fall
back to software filtering these breakpoints via perf_exclude_event().

Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Reported-by: "Gorelik, Jacob (335F)" <jacob.gorelik@jpl.nasa.gov>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.9 only)
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
powerpc/booke64: Fix kernel hangs at kernel_dbg_exc 2013-05-14T06:00:19+00:00 Scott Wood scottwood@freescale.com 2013-05-13T14:14:53+00:00 6cecf76b47ba6bea3c81d170afc2e0b244e5849c MSR_DE is not cleared on entry to the kernel, and we don't clear it explicitly outside of debug code. If we have MSR_DE set in prime_debug_regs(), and the new thread has events enabled in DBCR0 (e.g. ICMP is set in thread->dbsr0, even though it was cleared in the real DBCR0 when the thread got scheduled out), we'll end up taking a debug exception in the kernel when DBCR0 is loaded. DSRR0 will not point to an exception vector, and the kernel ends up hanging at kernel_dbg_exc. Fix this by always clearing MSR_DE when we load new debug state. Another observed source of kernel_dbg_exc hangs is with the branch taken event. If this event is active, but we take a non-debug trap (e.g. a TLB miss or an asynchronous interrupt) before the next branch. We end up taking a branch-taken debug exception on the initial branch instruction of the exception vector, but because the debug exception is DBSR_BT rather than DBSR_IC we branch to kernel_dbg_exc before even checking the DSRR0 address. Fix this by checking for DBSR_BT as well as DBSR_IC, which is what 32-bit does and what the comments suggest was intended in the 64-bit code as well. Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <scottwood@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> 
MSR_DE is not cleared on entry to the kernel, and we don't clear it
explicitly outside of debug code.  If we have MSR_DE set in
prime_debug_regs(), and the new thread has events enabled in DBCR0
(e.g.  ICMP is set in thread->dbsr0, even though it was cleared in the
real DBCR0 when the thread got scheduled out), we'll end up taking a
debug exception in the kernel when DBCR0 is loaded.  DSRR0 will not
point to an exception vector, and the kernel ends up hanging at
kernel_dbg_exc.  Fix this by always clearing MSR_DE when we load new
debug state.

Another observed source of kernel_dbg_exc hangs is with the branch
taken event.  If this event is active, but we take a non-debug trap
(e.g. a TLB miss or an asynchronous interrupt) before the next branch.
We end up taking a branch-taken debug exception on the initial branch
instruction of the exception vector, but because the debug exception is
DBSR_BT rather than DBSR_IC we branch to kernel_dbg_exc before even
checking the DSRR0 address.  Fix this by checking for DBSR_BT as well
as DBSR_IC, which is what 32-bit does and what the comments suggest was
intended in the 64-bit code as well.

Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <scottwood@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
powerpc: Fix MAX_STACK_TRACE_ENTRIES too low warning again 2013-05-14T04:36:35+00:00 Li Zhong zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com 2013-05-06T22:44:41+00:00 af945cf4bfc6586f0739b8c7f67af75576dec25e Saw this warning again, and this time from the ret_from_fork path. It seems we could clear the back chain earlier in copy_thread(), which could cover both path, and also fix potential lockdep usage in schedule_tail(), or exception occurred before we clear the back chain. Signed-off-by: Li Zhong <zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> 
Saw this warning again, and this time from the ret_from_fork path.

It seems we could clear the back chain earlier in copy_thread(), which
could cover both path, and also fix potential lockdep usage in
schedule_tail(), or exception occurred before we clear the back chain.

Signed-off-by: Li Zhong <zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/benh/powerpc 2013-05-02T17:16:16+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2013-05-02T17:16:16+00:00 5a148af66932c31814e263366094b5812210b501 Pull powerpc update from Benjamin Herrenschmidt: "The main highlights this time around are: - A pile of addition POWER8 bits and nits, such as updated performance counter support (Michael Ellerman), new branch history buffer support (Anshuman Khandual), base support for the new PCI host bridge when not using the hypervisor (Gavin Shan) and other random related bits and fixes from various contributors. - Some rework of our page table format by Aneesh Kumar which fixes a thing or two and paves the way for THP support. THP itself will not make it this time around however. - More Freescale updates, including Altivec support on the new e6500 cores, new PCI controller support, and a pile of new boards support and updates. - The usual batch of trivial cleanups & fixes" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/benh/powerpc: (156 commits) powerpc: Fix build error for book3e powerpc: Context switch the new EBB SPRs powerpc: Turn on the EBB H/FSCR bits powerpc: Replace CPU_FTR_BCTAR with CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S powerpc: Setup BHRB instructions facility in HFSCR for POWER8 powerpc: Fix interrupt range check on debug exception powerpc: Update tlbie/tlbiel as per ISA doc powerpc: Print page size info during boot powerpc: print both base and actual page size on hash failure powerpc: Fix hpte_decode to use the correct decoding for page sizes powerpc: Decode the pte-lp-encoding bits correctly. powerpc: Use encode avpn where we need only avpn values powerpc: Reduce PTE table memory wastage powerpc: Move the pte free routines from common header powerpc: Reduce the PTE_INDEX_SIZE powerpc: Switch 16GB and 16MB explicit hugepages to a different page table format powerpc: New hugepage directory format powerpc: Don't truncate pgd_index wrongly powerpc: Don't hard code the size of pte page powerpc: Save DAR and DSISR in pt_regs on MCE ... 
Pull powerpc update from Benjamin Herrenschmidt:
 "The main highlights this time around are:

   - A pile of addition POWER8 bits and nits, such as updated
     performance counter support (Michael Ellerman), new branch history
     buffer support (Anshuman Khandual), base support for the new PCI
     host bridge when not using the hypervisor (Gavin Shan) and other
     random related bits and fixes from various contributors.

   - Some rework of our page table format by Aneesh Kumar which fixes a
     thing or two and paves the way for THP support.  THP itself will
     not make it this time around however.

   - More Freescale updates, including Altivec support on the new e6500
     cores, new PCI controller support, and a pile of new boards support
     and updates.

   - The usual batch of trivial cleanups & fixes"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/benh/powerpc: (156 commits)
  powerpc: Fix build error for book3e
  powerpc: Context switch the new EBB SPRs
  powerpc: Turn on the EBB H/FSCR bits
  powerpc: Replace CPU_FTR_BCTAR with CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S
  powerpc: Setup BHRB instructions facility in HFSCR for POWER8
  powerpc: Fix interrupt range check on debug exception
  powerpc: Update tlbie/tlbiel as per ISA doc
  powerpc: Print page size info during boot
  powerpc: print both base and actual page size on hash failure
  powerpc: Fix hpte_decode to use the correct decoding for page sizes
  powerpc: Decode the pte-lp-encoding bits correctly.
  powerpc: Use encode avpn where we need only avpn values
  powerpc: Reduce PTE table memory wastage
  powerpc: Move the pte free routines from common header
  powerpc: Reduce the PTE_INDEX_SIZE
  powerpc: Switch 16GB and 16MB explicit hugepages to a different page table format
  powerpc: New hugepage directory format
  powerpc: Don't truncate pgd_index wrongly
  powerpc: Don't hard code the size of pte page
  powerpc: Save DAR and DSISR in pt_regs on MCE
  ...