<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/powerpc/include, branch v5.4.86</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/8xx: Fix early debug when SMC1 is relocated</title>
<updated>2020-12-30T10:51:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-04T10:11:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=32e29541b5aaf345fb8685a8d771b421251b6ff0'/>
<id>32e29541b5aaf345fb8685a8d771b421251b6ff0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1e78f723d6a52966bfe3804209dbf404fdc9d3bb upstream.

When SMC1 is relocated and early debug is selected, the
board hangs is ppc_md.setup_arch(). This is because ones
the microcode has been loaded and SMC1 relocated, early
debug writes in the weed.

To allow smooth continuation, the SMC1 parameter RAM set up
by the bootloader have to be copied into the new location.

Fixes: 43db76f41824 ("powerpc/8xx: Add microcode patch to move SMC parameter RAM.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b2f71f39eca543f1e4ec06596f09a8b12235c701.1607076683.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1e78f723d6a52966bfe3804209dbf404fdc9d3bb upstream.

When SMC1 is relocated and early debug is selected, the
board hangs is ppc_md.setup_arch(). This is because ones
the microcode has been loaded and SMC1 relocated, early
debug writes in the weed.

To allow smooth continuation, the SMC1 parameter RAM set up
by the bootloader have to be copied into the new location.

Fixes: 43db76f41824 ("powerpc/8xx: Add microcode patch to move SMC parameter RAM.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b2f71f39eca543f1e4ec06596f09a8b12235c701.1607076683.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/feature: Add CPU_FTR_NOEXECUTE to G2_LE</title>
<updated>2020-12-30T10:51:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-12T08:02:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c7b89d0d71863e24f593dc39fea7bd4956c16a1f'/>
<id>c7b89d0d71863e24f593dc39fea7bd4956c16a1f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 197493af414ee22427be3343637ac290a791925a upstream.

G2_LE has a 603 core, add CPU_FTR_NOEXECUTE.

Fixes: 385e89d5b20f ("powerpc/mm: add exec protection on powerpc 603")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/39a530ee41d83f49747ab3af8e39c056450b9b4d.1602489653.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 197493af414ee22427be3343637ac290a791925a upstream.

G2_LE has a 603 core, add CPU_FTR_NOEXECUTE.

Fixes: 385e89d5b20f ("powerpc/mm: add exec protection on powerpc 603")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/39a530ee41d83f49747ab3af8e39c056450b9b4d.1602489653.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Fix incorrect stw{, ux, u, x} instructions in __set_pte_at</title>
<updated>2020-12-30T10:51:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathieu Desnoyers</name>
<email>mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-22T09:29:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=30a58a3f7c85a2a9d0a632190f66136ec5ee6b82'/>
<id>30a58a3f7c85a2a9d0a632190f66136ec5ee6b82</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d85be8a49e733dcd23674aa6202870d54bf5600d upstream.

The placeholder for instruction selection should use the second
argument's operand, which is %1, not %0. This could generate incorrect
assembly code if the memory addressing of operand %0 is a different
form from that of operand %1.

Also remove the %Un placeholder because having %Un placeholders
for two operands which are based on the same local var (ptep) doesn't
make much sense. By the way, it doesn't change the current behaviour
because "&lt;&gt;" constraint is missing for the associated "=m".

[chleroy: revised commit log iaw segher's comments and removed %U0]

Fixes: 9bf2b5cdc5fe ("powerpc: Fixes for CONFIG_PTE_64BIT for SMP support")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v2.6.28+
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool &lt;segher@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/96354bd77977a6a933fe9020da57629007fdb920.1603358942.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d85be8a49e733dcd23674aa6202870d54bf5600d upstream.

The placeholder for instruction selection should use the second
argument's operand, which is %1, not %0. This could generate incorrect
assembly code if the memory addressing of operand %0 is a different
form from that of operand %1.

Also remove the %Un placeholder because having %Un placeholders
for two operands which are based on the same local var (ptep) doesn't
make much sense. By the way, it doesn't change the current behaviour
because "&lt;&gt;" constraint is missing for the associated "=m".

[chleroy: revised commit log iaw segher's comments and removed %U0]

Fixes: 9bf2b5cdc5fe ("powerpc: Fixes for CONFIG_PTE_64BIT for SMP support")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v2.6.28+
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool &lt;segher@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/96354bd77977a6a933fe9020da57629007fdb920.1603358942.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/feature: Fix CPU_FTRS_ALWAYS by removing CPU_FTRS_GENERIC_32</title>
<updated>2020-12-30T10:51:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-03T18:07:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0789349204a67280b3416bedaf14f742c9a87f1c'/>
<id>0789349204a67280b3416bedaf14f742c9a87f1c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 78665179e569c7e1fe102fb6c21d0f5b6951f084 ]

On 8xx, we get the following features:

[    0.000000] cpu_features      = 0x0000000000000100
[    0.000000]   possible        = 0x0000000000000120
[    0.000000]   always          = 0x0000000000000000

This is not correct. As CONFIG_PPC_8xx is mutually exclusive with all
other configurations, the three lines should be equal.

The problem is due to CPU_FTRS_GENERIC_32 which is taken when
CONFIG_BOOK3S_32 is NOT selected. This CPU_FTRS_GENERIC_32 is
pointless because there is no generic configuration supporting
all 32 bits but book3s/32.

Remove this pointless generic features definition to unbreak the
calculation of 'possible' features and 'always' features.

Fixes: 76bc080ef5a3 ("[POWERPC] Make default cputable entries reflect selected CPU family")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/76a85f30bf981d1aeaae00df99321235494da254.1604426550.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 78665179e569c7e1fe102fb6c21d0f5b6951f084 ]

On 8xx, we get the following features:

[    0.000000] cpu_features      = 0x0000000000000100
[    0.000000]   possible        = 0x0000000000000120
[    0.000000]   always          = 0x0000000000000000

This is not correct. As CONFIG_PPC_8xx is mutually exclusive with all
other configurations, the three lines should be equal.

The problem is due to CPU_FTRS_GENERIC_32 which is taken when
CONFIG_BOOK3S_32 is NOT selected. This CPU_FTRS_GENERIC_32 is
pointless because there is no generic configuration supporting
all 32 bits but book3s/32.

Remove this pointless generic features definition to unbreak the
calculation of 'possible' features and 'always' features.

Fixes: 76bc080ef5a3 ("[POWERPC] Make default cputable entries reflect selected CPU family")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/76a85f30bf981d1aeaae00df99321235494da254.1604426550.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: Fix allnoconfig build since uaccess flush</title>
<updated>2020-12-02T07:49:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Rothwell</name>
<email>sfr@canb.auug.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-23T07:40:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=22f821fa5cbbf0cf841bc68ae939be8eb6cb76e4'/>
<id>22f821fa5cbbf0cf841bc68ae939be8eb6cb76e4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b6b79dd53082db11070b4368d85dd6699ff0b063 ]

Using DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE needs linux/jump_table.h.

Otherwise the build fails with eg:

  arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h:66:1: warning: data definition has no type or storage class
     66 | DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(uaccess_flush_key);

Fixes: 9a32a7e78bd0 ("powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
[mpe: Massage change log]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201123184016.693fe464@canb.auug.org.au
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b6b79dd53082db11070b4368d85dd6699ff0b063 ]

Using DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE needs linux/jump_table.h.

Otherwise the build fails with eg:

  arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h:66:1: warning: data definition has no type or storage class
     66 | DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(uaccess_flush_key);

Fixes: 9a32a7e78bd0 ("powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
[mpe: Massage change log]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201123184016.693fe464@canb.auug.org.au
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arch: pgtable: define MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS where needed</title>
<updated>2020-12-02T07:49:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-11T16:52:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1bef5f25a69234613b92a0e2456870fee4a57efc'/>
<id>1bef5f25a69234613b92a0e2456870fee4a57efc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cef397038167ac15d085914493d6c86385773709 ]

Stefan Agner reported a bug when using zsram on 32-bit Arm machines
with RAM above the 4GB address boundary:

  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000
  pgd = a27bd01c
  [00000000] *pgd=236a0003, *pmd=1ffa64003
  Internal error: Oops: 207 [#1] SMP ARM
  Modules linked in: mdio_bcm_unimac(+) brcmfmac cfg80211 brcmutil raspberrypi_hwmon hci_uart crc32_arm_ce bcm2711_thermal phy_generic genet
  CPU: 0 PID: 123 Comm: mkfs.ext4 Not tainted 5.9.6 #1
  Hardware name: BCM2711
  PC is at zs_map_object+0x94/0x338
  LR is at zram_bvec_rw.constprop.0+0x330/0xa64
  pc : [&lt;c0602b38&gt;]    lr : [&lt;c0bda6a0&gt;]    psr: 60000013
  sp : e376bbe0  ip : 00000000  fp : c1e2921c
  r10: 00000002  r9 : c1dda730  r8 : 00000000
  r7 : e8ff7a00  r6 : 00000000  r5 : 02f9ffa0  r4 : e3710000
  r3 : 000fdffe  r2 : c1e0ce80  r1 : ebf979a0  r0 : 00000000
  Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
  Control: 30c5383d  Table: 235c2a80  DAC: fffffffd
  Process mkfs.ext4 (pid: 123, stack limit = 0x495a22e6)
  Stack: (0xe376bbe0 to 0xe376c000)

As it turns out, zsram needs to know the maximum memory size, which
is defined in MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS when CONFIG_SPARSEMEM is set, or in
MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS on the x86 architecture.

The same problem will be hit on all 32-bit architectures that have a
physical address space larger than 4GB and happen to not enable sparsemem
and include asm/sparsemem.h from asm/pgtable.h.

After the initial discussion, I suggested just always defining
MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS whenever CONFIG_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT is
set, or provoking a build error otherwise. This addresses all
configurations that can currently have this runtime bug, but
leaves all other configurations unchanged.

I looked up the possible number of bits in source code and
datasheets, here is what I found:

 - on ARC, CONFIG_ARC_HAS_PAE40 controls whether 32 or 40 bits are used
 - on ARM, CONFIG_LPAE enables 40 bit addressing, without it we never
   support more than 32 bits, even though supersections in theory allow
   up to 40 bits as well.
 - on MIPS, some MIPS32r1 or later chips support 36 bits, and MIPS32r5
   XPA supports up to 60 bits in theory, but 40 bits are more than
   anyone will ever ship
 - On PowerPC, there are three different implementations of 36 bit
   addressing, but 32-bit is used without CONFIG_PTE_64BIT
 - On RISC-V, the normal page table format can support 34 bit
   addressing. There is no highmem support on RISC-V, so anything
   above 2GB is unused, but it might be useful to eventually support
   CONFIG_ZRAM for high pages.

Fixes: 61989a80fb3a ("staging: zsmalloc: zsmalloc memory allocation library")
Fixes: 02390b87a945 ("mm/zsmalloc: Prepare to variable MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS")
Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer &lt;tsbogend@alpha.franken.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Agner &lt;stefan@agner.ch&gt;
Tested-by: Stefan Agner &lt;stefan@agner.ch&gt;
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/bdfa44bf1c570b05d6c70898e2bbb0acf234ecdf.1604762181.git.stefan@agner.ch/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit cef397038167ac15d085914493d6c86385773709 ]

Stefan Agner reported a bug when using zsram on 32-bit Arm machines
with RAM above the 4GB address boundary:

  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000
  pgd = a27bd01c
  [00000000] *pgd=236a0003, *pmd=1ffa64003
  Internal error: Oops: 207 [#1] SMP ARM
  Modules linked in: mdio_bcm_unimac(+) brcmfmac cfg80211 brcmutil raspberrypi_hwmon hci_uart crc32_arm_ce bcm2711_thermal phy_generic genet
  CPU: 0 PID: 123 Comm: mkfs.ext4 Not tainted 5.9.6 #1
  Hardware name: BCM2711
  PC is at zs_map_object+0x94/0x338
  LR is at zram_bvec_rw.constprop.0+0x330/0xa64
  pc : [&lt;c0602b38&gt;]    lr : [&lt;c0bda6a0&gt;]    psr: 60000013
  sp : e376bbe0  ip : 00000000  fp : c1e2921c
  r10: 00000002  r9 : c1dda730  r8 : 00000000
  r7 : e8ff7a00  r6 : 00000000  r5 : 02f9ffa0  r4 : e3710000
  r3 : 000fdffe  r2 : c1e0ce80  r1 : ebf979a0  r0 : 00000000
  Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
  Control: 30c5383d  Table: 235c2a80  DAC: fffffffd
  Process mkfs.ext4 (pid: 123, stack limit = 0x495a22e6)
  Stack: (0xe376bbe0 to 0xe376c000)

As it turns out, zsram needs to know the maximum memory size, which
is defined in MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS when CONFIG_SPARSEMEM is set, or in
MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS on the x86 architecture.

The same problem will be hit on all 32-bit architectures that have a
physical address space larger than 4GB and happen to not enable sparsemem
and include asm/sparsemem.h from asm/pgtable.h.

After the initial discussion, I suggested just always defining
MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS whenever CONFIG_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT is
set, or provoking a build error otherwise. This addresses all
configurations that can currently have this runtime bug, but
leaves all other configurations unchanged.

I looked up the possible number of bits in source code and
datasheets, here is what I found:

 - on ARC, CONFIG_ARC_HAS_PAE40 controls whether 32 or 40 bits are used
 - on ARM, CONFIG_LPAE enables 40 bit addressing, without it we never
   support more than 32 bits, even though supersections in theory allow
   up to 40 bits as well.
 - on MIPS, some MIPS32r1 or later chips support 36 bits, and MIPS32r5
   XPA supports up to 60 bits in theory, but 40 bits are more than
   anyone will ever ship
 - On PowerPC, there are three different implementations of 36 bit
   addressing, but 32-bit is used without CONFIG_PTE_64BIT
 - On RISC-V, the normal page table format can support 34 bit
   addressing. There is no highmem support on RISC-V, so anything
   above 2GB is unused, but it might be useful to eventually support
   CONFIG_ZRAM for high pages.

Fixes: 61989a80fb3a ("staging: zsmalloc: zsmalloc memory allocation library")
Fixes: 02390b87a945 ("mm/zsmalloc: Prepare to variable MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS")
Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer &lt;tsbogend@alpha.franken.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Agner &lt;stefan@agner.ch&gt;
Tested-by: Stefan Agner &lt;stefan@agner.ch&gt;
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/bdfa44bf1c570b05d6c70898e2bbb0acf234ecdf.1604762181.git.stefan@agner.ch/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Only include kup-radix.h for 64-bit Book3S</title>
<updated>2020-11-22T09:14:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Ellerman</name>
<email>mpe@ellerman.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-19T23:35:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eb37345ed224c579b0a1b0e9bd72b788122ae91d'/>
<id>eb37345ed224c579b0a1b0e9bd72b788122ae91d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 178d52c6e89c38d0553b0ac8b99927b11eb995b0 upstream.

In kup.h we currently include kup-radix.h for all 64-bit builds, which
includes Book3S and Book3E. The latter doesn't make sense, Book3E
never uses the Radix MMU.

This has worked up until now, but almost by accident, and the recent
uaccess flush changes introduced a build breakage on Book3E because of
the bad structure of the code.

So disentangle things so that we only use kup-radix.h for Book3S. This
requires some more stubs in kup.h.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 178d52c6e89c38d0553b0ac8b99927b11eb995b0 upstream.

In kup.h we currently include kup-radix.h for all 64-bit builds, which
includes Book3S and Book3E. The latter doesn't make sense, Book3E
never uses the Radix MMU.

This has worked up until now, but almost by accident, and the recent
uaccess flush changes introduced a build breakage on Book3E because of
the bad structure of the code.

So disentangle things so that we only use kup-radix.h for Book3S. This
requires some more stubs in kup.h.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses</title>
<updated>2020-11-22T09:14:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-19T23:35:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=09495b5f7aab84cf41ef54259cfea4da86a7df98'/>
<id>09495b5f7aab84cf41ef54259cfea4da86a7df98</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry</title>
<updated>2020-11-22T09:14:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-19T23:35:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b65458b6be8032c5179d4f562038575d7b3a6be3'/>
<id>b65458b6be8032c5179d4f562038575d7b3a6be3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 upstream.

[backporting note: we need to mark some exception handlers as out-of-line
 because the flushing makes them take too much space -- dja]

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 upstream.

[backporting note: we need to mark some exception handlers as out-of-line
 because the flushing makes them take too much space -- dja]

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/drmem: Make lmb_size 64 bit</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:43:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Aneesh Kumar K.V</name>
<email>aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-07T11:48:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=73597ab2a9b9ab069779aaf1ef8551b8569247e6'/>
<id>73597ab2a9b9ab069779aaf1ef8551b8569247e6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ec72024e35dddb88a81e40071c87ceb18b5ee835 upstream.

Similar to commit 89c140bbaeee ("pseries: Fix 64 bit logical memory block panic")
make sure different variables tracking lmb_size are updated to be 64 bit.

This was found by code audit.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nathan Lynch &lt;nathanl@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201007114836.282468-2-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ec72024e35dddb88a81e40071c87ceb18b5ee835 upstream.

Similar to commit 89c140bbaeee ("pseries: Fix 64 bit logical memory block panic")
make sure different variables tracking lmb_size are updated to be 64 bit.

This was found by code audit.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nathan Lynch &lt;nathanl@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201007114836.282468-2-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
