linux-stable.git/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h, branch v4.4.239

powerpc/fsl: Add nospectre_v2 command line argument

2019-05-16T17:44:50+00:00

commit f633a8ad636efb5d4bba1a047d4a0f1ef719aa06 upstream.

When the command line argument is present, the Spectre variant 2
mitigations are disabled.

Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/fsl: Add infrastructure to fixup branch predictor flush

2019-05-16T17:44:50+00:00

commit 76a5eaa38b15dda92cd6964248c39b5a6f3a4e9d upstream.

In order to protect against speculation attacks (Spectre
variant 2) on NXP PowerPC platforms, the branch predictor
should be flushed when the privillege level is changed.
This patch is adding the infrastructure to fixup at runtime
the code sections that are performing the branch predictor flush
depending on a boot arg parameter which is added later in a
separate patch.

Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc: Avoid code patching freed init sections

2019-05-16T17:44:50+00:00

commit 51c3c62b58b357e8d35e4cc32f7b4ec907426fe3 upstream.

This stops us from doing code patching in init sections after they've
been freed.

In this chain:
  kvm_guest_init() ->
    kvm_use_magic_page() ->
      fault_in_pages_readable() ->
	 __get_user() ->
	   __get_user_nocheck() ->
	     barrier_nospec();

We have a code patching location at barrier_nospec() and
kvm_guest_init() is an init function. This whole chain gets inlined,
so when we free the init section (hence kvm_guest_init()), this code
goes away and hence should no longer be patched.

We seen this as userspace memory corruption when using a memory
checker while doing partition migration testing on powervm (this
starts the code patching post migration via
/sys/kernel/mobility/migration). In theory, it could also happen when
using /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/barrier_nospec.

Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling 
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin 
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/64: Call setup_barrier_nospec() from setup_arch()

2019-05-16T17:44:49+00:00

commit af375eefbfb27cbb5b831984e66d724a40d26b5c upstream.

Currently we require platform code to call setup_barrier_nospec(). But
if we add an empty definition for the !CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC case
then we can call it in setup_arch().

Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/64: Add CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC

2019-05-16T17:44:49+00:00

commit 179ab1cbf883575c3a585bcfc0f2160f1d22a149 upstream.

Add a config symbol to encode which platforms support the
barrier_nospec speculation barrier. Currently this is just Book3S 64
but we will add Book3E in a future patch.

Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/64s: Enable barrier_nospec based on firmware settings

2019-05-16T17:44:48+00:00

commit cb3d6759a93c6d0aea1c10deb6d00e111c29c19c upstream.

Check what firmware told us and enable/disable the barrier_nospec as
appropriate.

We err on the side of enabling the barrier, as it's no-op on older
systems, see the comment for more detail.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/64s: Patch barrier_nospec in modules

2019-05-16T17:44:48+00:00

commit 815069ca57c142eb71d27439bc27f41a433a67b3 upstream.

Note that unlike RFI which is patched only in kernel the nospec state
reflects settings at the time the module was loaded.

Iterating all modules and re-patching every time the settings change
is not implemented.

Based on lwsync patching.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/64s: Add support for ori barrier_nospec patching

2019-05-16T17:44:47+00:00

commit 2eea7f067f495e33b8b116b35b5988ab2b8aec55 upstream.

Based on the RFI patching. This is required to be able to disable the
speculation barrier.

Only one barrier type is supported and it does nothing when the
firmware does not enable it. Also re-patching modules is not supported
So the only meaningful thing that can be done is patching out the
speculation barrier at boot when the user says it is not wanted.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/rfi-flush: Make it possible to call setup_rfi_flush() again

2019-05-16T17:44:45+00:00

commit abf110f3e1cea40f5ea15e85f5d67c39c14568a7 upstream.

For PowerVM migration we want to be able to call setup_rfi_flush()
again after we've migrated the partition.

To support that we need to check that we're not trying to allocate the
fallback flush area after memblock has gone away (i.e., boot-time only).

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache

2018-02-16T19:09:35+00:00

commit aa8a5e0062ac940f7659394f4817c948dc8c0667 upstream.

On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the
L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to
guest.

This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At
this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs
such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale
CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other
mechanisms on those CPUs.

The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally
inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is
speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the
address of a subsequent speculatively executed load.

In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1,
because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is
performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the
vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by
flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for
hypervisor vs guest.

In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at
each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and
patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise
to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D.
If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement
flush in software.

For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and
different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are
prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction
activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at
boot if the hypervisor tells us to.

In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and
Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis
of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc.
Many thanks to all of them.

Tested-by: Jon Masters 
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
[Balbir - back ported to stable with changes]
Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman