linux-stable.git/arch/parisc/kernel, branch linux-4.1.y

parisc: Fix out of array access in match_pci_device()

2018-05-23T01:36:31+00:00

[ Upstream commit 615b2665fd20c327b631ff1e79426775de748094 ]

As found by the ubsan checker, the value of the 'index' variable can be
out of range for the bc[] array:

UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in arch/parisc/kernel/drivers.c:655:21
index 6 is out of range for type 'char [6]'
Backtrace:
 [<104fa850>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x68/0x80
 [<1019d83c>] check_parent+0xc0/0x170
 [<1019d91c>] descend_children+0x30/0x6c
 [<1059e164>] device_for_each_child+0x60/0x98
 [<1019cd54>] parse_tree_node+0x40/0x54
 [<1019d86c>] check_parent+0xf0/0x170
 [<1019d91c>] descend_children+0x30/0x6c
 [<1059e164>] device_for_each_child+0x60/0x98
 [<1019d938>] descend_children+0x4c/0x6c
 [<1059e164>] device_for_each_child+0x60/0x98
 [<1019cd54>] parse_tree_node+0x40/0x54
 [<1019cffc>] hwpath_to_device+0xa4/0xc4

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

parisc: Fix alignment of pa_tlb_lock in assembly on 32-bit SMP kernel

2018-03-01T00:32:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit 88776c0e70be0290f8357019d844aae15edaa967 ]

Qemu for PARISC reported on a 32bit SMP parisc kernel strange failures
about "Not-handled unaligned insn 0x0e8011d6 and 0x0c2011c9."

Those opcodes evaluate to the ldcw() assembly instruction which requires
(on 32bit) an alignment of 16 bytes to ensure atomicity.

As it turns out, qemu is correct and in our assembly code in entry.S and
pacache.S we don't pay attention to the required alignment.

This patch fixes the problem by aligning the lock offset in assembly
code in the same manner as we do in our C-code.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller 
Cc:  # v4.0+
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

parisc: Fix validity check of pointer size argument in new CAS implementation

2017-12-08T23:01:07+00:00

[ Upstream commit 05f016d2ca7a4fab99d5d5472168506ddf95e74f ]

As noted by Christoph Biedl, passing a pointer size of 4 in the new CAS
implementation causes a kernel crash.  The attached patch corrects the
off by one error in the argument validity check.

In reviewing the code, I noticed that we only perform word operations
with the pointer size argument.  The subi instruction intentionally uses
a word condition on 64-bit kernels.  Nullification was used instead of a
cmpib instruction as the branch should never be taken.  The shlw
pseudo-operation generates a depw,z instruction and it clears the target
before doing a shift left word deposit.  Thus, we don't need to clip the
upper 32 bits of this argument on 64-bit kernels.

Tested with a gcc testsuite run with a 64-bit kernel.  The gcc atomic
code in libgcc is the only direct user of the new CAS implementation
that I am aware of.

Signed-off-by: John David Anglin 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

parisc: Fix double-word compare and exchange in LWS code on 32-bit kernels

2017-11-06T04:54:36+00:00

[ Upstream commit 374b3bf8e8b519f61eb9775888074c6e46b3bf0c ]

As discussed on the debian-hppa list, double-wordcompare and exchange
operations fail on 32-bit kernels.  Looking at the code, I realized that
the ",ma" completer does the wrong thing in the  "ldw,ma  4(%r26), %r29"
instruction.  This increments %r26 and causes the following store to
write to the wrong location.

Note by Helge Deller:
The patch applies cleanly to stable kernel series if this upstream
commit is merged in advance:
f4125cfdb300 ("parisc: Avoid trashing sr2 and sr3 in LWS code").

Signed-off-by: John David Anglin 
Tested-by: Christoph Biedl 
Fixes: 89206491201c ("parisc: Implement new LWS CAS supporting 64 bit operations.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

parisc: Avoid trashing sr2 and sr3 in LWS code

2017-11-06T04:54:36+00:00

[ Upstream commit f4125cfdb3008363137f744c101e5d76ead760ba ]

There is no need to trash sr2 and sr3 in the Light-weight syscall (LWS).  sr2
already points to kernel space (it's zero in userspace, otherwise syscalls
wouldn't work), and since the LWS code is executed in userspace, we can simply
ignore to preload sr3.

Signed-off-by: John David Anglin 
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

parisc: perf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference

2017-11-06T04:54:17+00:00

[ Upstream commit 74e3f6e63da6c8e8246fba1689e040bc926b4a1a ]

Fix potential NULL pointer dereference and clean up
coding style errors (code indent, trailing whitespaces).

Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav 
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

parisc: use compat_sys_keyctl()

2017-07-31T17:37:54+00:00

[ Upstream commit b0f94efd5aa8daa8a07d7601714c2573266cd4c9 ]

Architectures with a compat syscall table must put compat_sys_keyctl()
in it, not sys_keyctl().  The parisc architecture was not doing this;
fix it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers 
Acked-by: Helge Deller 
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas

2017-06-28T22:57:15+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb ]

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko 
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Tested-by: Helge Deller  # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

parisc: Ensure consistent state when switching to kernel stack at syscall entry

2016-11-26T03:57:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6ed518328d0189e0fdf1bb7c73290d546143ea66 ]

We have one critical section in the syscall entry path in which we switch from
the userspace stack to kernel stack. In the event of an external interrupt, the
interrupt code distinguishes between those two states by analyzing the value of
sr7. If sr7 is zero, it uses the kernel stack. Therefore it's important, that
the value of sr7 is in sync with the currently enabled stack.

This patch now disables interrupts while executing the critical section.  This
prevents the interrupt handler to possibly see an inconsistent state which in
the worst case can lead to crashes.

Interestingly, in the syscall exit path interrupts were already disabled in the
critical section which switches back to the userspace stack.

Cc: 
Signed-off-by: John David Anglin 
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

parisc: Fix pagefault crash in unaligned __get_user() call

2016-06-17T19:39:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8b78f260887df532da529f225c49195d18fef36b ]

One of the debian buildd servers had this crash in the syslog without
any other information:

 Unaligned handler failed, ret = -2
 clock_adjtime (pid 22578): Unaligned data reference (code 28)
 CPU: 1 PID: 22578 Comm: clock_adjtime Tainted: G  E  4.5.0-2-parisc64-smp #1 Debian 4.5.4-1
 task: 000000007d9960f8 ti: 00000001bde7c000 task.ti: 00000001bde7c000

      YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI
 PSW: 00001000000001001111100000001111 Tainted: G            E
 r00-03  000000ff0804f80f 00000001bde7c2b0 00000000402d2be8 00000001bde7c2b0
 r04-07  00000000409e1fd0 00000000fa6f7fff 00000001bde7c148 00000000fa6f7fff
 r08-11  0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 00000000fac9bb7b 000000000002b4d4
 r12-15  000000000015241c 000000000015242c 000000000000002d 00000000fac9bb7b
 r16-19  0000000000028800 0000000000000001 0000000000000070 00000001bde7c218
 r20-23  0000000000000000 00000001bde7c210 0000000000000002 0000000000000000
 r24-27  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001bde7c148 00000000409e1fd0
 r28-31  0000000000000001 00000001bde7c320 00000001bde7c350 00000001bde7c218
 sr00-03  0000000001200000 0000000001200000 0000000000000000 0000000001200000
 sr04-07  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000

 IASQ: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 IAOQ: 00000000402d2e84 00000000402d2e88
  IIR: 0ca0d089    ISR: 0000000001200000  IOR: 00000000fa6f7fff
  CPU:        1   CR30: 00000001bde7c000 CR31: ffffffffffffffff
  ORIG_R28: 00000002369fe628
  IAOQ[0]: compat_get_timex+0x2dc/0x3c0
  IAOQ[1]: compat_get_timex+0x2e0/0x3c0
  RP(r2): compat_get_timex+0x40/0x3c0
 Backtrace:
  [<00000000402d4608>] compat_SyS_clock_adjtime+0x40/0xc0
  [<0000000040205024>] syscall_exit+0x0/0x14

This means the userspace program clock_adjtime called the clock_adjtime()
syscall and then crashed inside the compat_get_timex() function.
Syscalls should never crash programs, but instead return EFAULT.

The IIR register contains the executed instruction, which disassebles
into "ldw 0(sr3,r5),r9".
This load-word instruction is part of __get_user() which tried to read the word
at %r5/IOR (0xfa6f7fff). This means the unaligned handler jumped in.  The
unaligned handler is able to emulate all ldw instructions, but it fails if it
fails to read the source e.g. because of page fault.

The following program reproduces the problem:

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include 
#include 
#include 

int main(void) {
        /* allocate 8k */
        char *ptr = mmap(NULL, 2*4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
        /* free second half (upper 4k) and make it invalid. */
        munmap(ptr+4096, 4096);
        /* syscall where first int is unaligned and clobbers into invalid memory region */
        /* syscall should return EFAULT */
        return syscall(__NR_clock_adjtime, 0, ptr+4095);
}

To fix this issue we simply need to check if the faulting instruction address
is in the exception fixup table when the unaligned handler failed. If it
is, call the fixup routine instead of crashing.

While looking at the unaligned handler I found another issue as well: The
target register should not be modified if the handler was unsuccessful.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin