<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/arm64/kernel, branch linux-4.2.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>arm64: page-align sections for DEBUG_RODATA</title>
<updated>2015-12-09T19:31:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-26T21:42:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d990487a527a347c078bb983500ef8a4bbaa06b8'/>
<id>d990487a527a347c078bb983500ef8a4bbaa06b8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cb083816ab5ac3d10a9417527f07fc5962cc3808 upstream.

A kernel built with DEBUG_RO_DATA &amp;&amp; !CONFIG_DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA doesn't
have .text aligned to a page boundary, though fixup_executable works at
page-granularity thanks to its use of create_mapping. If .text is not
page-aligned, the first page it exists in may be marked non-executable,
leading to failures when an attempt is made to execute code in said
page.

This patch upgrades ALIGN_DEBUG_RO and ALIGN_DEBUG_RO_MIN to force page
alignment for DEBUG_RO_DATA &amp;&amp; !CONFIG_DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA kernels,
ensuring that all sections with specific RWX permission requirements are
mapped with the correct permissions.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jeremy Linton &lt;jeremy.linton@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott &lt;laura@labbott.name&gt;
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Suzuki Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Fixes: da141706aea52c1a ("arm64: add better page protections to arm64")
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cb083816ab5ac3d10a9417527f07fc5962cc3808 upstream.

A kernel built with DEBUG_RO_DATA &amp;&amp; !CONFIG_DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA doesn't
have .text aligned to a page boundary, though fixup_executable works at
page-granularity thanks to its use of create_mapping. If .text is not
page-aligned, the first page it exists in may be marked non-executable,
leading to failures when an attempt is made to execute code in said
page.

This patch upgrades ALIGN_DEBUG_RO and ALIGN_DEBUG_RO_MIN to force page
alignment for DEBUG_RO_DATA &amp;&amp; !CONFIG_DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA kernels,
ensuring that all sections with specific RWX permission requirements are
mapped with the correct permissions.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jeremy Linton &lt;jeremy.linton@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott &lt;laura@labbott.name&gt;
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Suzuki Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Fixes: da141706aea52c1a ("arm64: add better page protections to arm64")
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: compat: fix stxr failure case in SWP emulation</title>
<updated>2015-11-09T22:37:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will.deacon@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-15T12:55:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5ce538743aafc5aef4775ae6e8aed57e23d5e40b'/>
<id>5ce538743aafc5aef4775ae6e8aed57e23d5e40b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 589cb22bbedacf325951014c07a35a2b01ca57f6 upstream.

If the STXR instruction fails in the SWP emulation code, we leave *data
overwritten with the loaded value, therefore corrupting the data written
by a subsequent, successful attempt.

This patch re-jigs the code so that we only write back to *data once we
know that the update has happened.

Fixes: bd35a4adc413 ("arm64: Port SWP/SWPB emulation support from arm")
Reported-by: Shengjiu Wang &lt;shengjiu.wang@freescale.com&gt;
Reported-by: Vladimir Murzin &lt;vladimir.murzin@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 589cb22bbedacf325951014c07a35a2b01ca57f6 upstream.

If the STXR instruction fails in the SWP emulation code, we leave *data
overwritten with the loaded value, therefore corrupting the data written
by a subsequent, successful attempt.

This patch re-jigs the code so that we only write back to *data once we
know that the update has happened.

Fixes: bd35a4adc413 ("arm64: Port SWP/SWPB emulation support from arm")
Reported-by: Shengjiu Wang &lt;shengjiu.wang@freescale.com&gt;
Reported-by: Vladimir Murzin &lt;vladimir.murzin@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: kernel: fix tcr_el1.t0sz restore on systems with extended idmap</title>
<updated>2015-11-09T22:37:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lorenzo Pieralisi</name>
<email>lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-27T17:29:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8005fd9888c0629857a8a5f5843ceaaf38161de9'/>
<id>8005fd9888c0629857a8a5f5843ceaaf38161de9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e13d918a19a7b6cba62b32884f5e336e764c2cc6 upstream.

Commit dd006da21646 ("arm64: mm: increase VA range of identity map")
introduced a mechanism to extend the virtual memory map range
to support arm64 systems with system RAM located at very high offset,
where the identity mapping used to enable/disable the MMU requires
additional translation levels to map the physical memory at an equal
virtual offset.

The kernel detects at boot time the tcr_el1.t0sz value required by the
identity mapping and sets-up the tcr_el1.t0sz register field accordingly,
any time the identity map is required in the kernel (ie when enabling the
MMU).

After enabling the MMU, in the cold boot path the kernel resets the
tcr_el1.t0sz to its default value (ie the actual configuration value for
the system virtual address space) so that after enabling the MMU the
memory space translated by ttbr0_el1 is restored as expected.

Commit dd006da21646 ("arm64: mm: increase VA range of identity map")
also added code to set-up the tcr_el1.t0sz value when the kernel resumes
from low-power states with the MMU off through cpu_resume() in order to
effectively use the identity mapping to enable the MMU but failed to add
the code required to restore the tcr_el1.t0sz to its default value, when
the core returns to the kernel with the MMU enabled, so that the kernel
might end up running with tcr_el1.t0sz value set-up for the identity
mapping which can be lower than the value required by the actual virtual
address space, resulting in an erroneous set-up.

This patchs adds code in the resume path that restores the tcr_el1.t0sz
default value upon core resume, mirroring this way the cold boot path
behaviour therefore fixing the issue.

Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Fixes: dd006da21646 ("arm64: mm: increase VA range of identity map")
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi &lt;lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e13d918a19a7b6cba62b32884f5e336e764c2cc6 upstream.

Commit dd006da21646 ("arm64: mm: increase VA range of identity map")
introduced a mechanism to extend the virtual memory map range
to support arm64 systems with system RAM located at very high offset,
where the identity mapping used to enable/disable the MMU requires
additional translation levels to map the physical memory at an equal
virtual offset.

The kernel detects at boot time the tcr_el1.t0sz value required by the
identity mapping and sets-up the tcr_el1.t0sz register field accordingly,
any time the identity map is required in the kernel (ie when enabling the
MMU).

After enabling the MMU, in the cold boot path the kernel resets the
tcr_el1.t0sz to its default value (ie the actual configuration value for
the system virtual address space) so that after enabling the MMU the
memory space translated by ttbr0_el1 is restored as expected.

Commit dd006da21646 ("arm64: mm: increase VA range of identity map")
also added code to set-up the tcr_el1.t0sz value when the kernel resumes
from low-power states with the MMU off through cpu_resume() in order to
effectively use the identity mapping to enable the MMU but failed to add
the code required to restore the tcr_el1.t0sz to its default value, when
the core returns to the kernel with the MMU enabled, so that the kernel
might end up running with tcr_el1.t0sz value set-up for the identity
mapping which can be lower than the value required by the actual virtual
address space, resulting in an erroneous set-up.

This patchs adds code in the resume path that restores the tcr_el1.t0sz
default value upon core resume, mirroring this way the cold boot path
behaviour therefore fixing the issue.

Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Fixes: dd006da21646 ("arm64: mm: increase VA range of identity map")
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi &lt;lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "ARM64: unwind: Fix PC calculation"</title>
<updated>2015-11-09T22:37:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will.deacon@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-28T16:56:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4e89852b460e6fad80c032f30498f056e58b1f68'/>
<id>4e89852b460e6fad80c032f30498f056e58b1f68</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9702970c7bd3e2d6fecb642a190269131d4ac16c upstream.

This reverts commit e306dfd06fcb44d21c80acb8e5a88d55f3d1cf63.

With this patch applied, we were the only architecture making this sort
of adjustment to the PC calculation in the unwinder. This causes
problems for ftrace, where the PC values are matched against the
contents of the stack frames in the callchain and fail to match any
records after the address adjustment.

Whilst there has been some effort to change ftrace to workaround this,
those patches are not yet ready for mainline and, since we're the odd
architecture in this regard, let's just step in line with other
architectures (like arch/arm/) for now.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9702970c7bd3e2d6fecb642a190269131d4ac16c upstream.

This reverts commit e306dfd06fcb44d21c80acb8e5a88d55f3d1cf63.

With this patch applied, we were the only architecture making this sort
of adjustment to the PC calculation in the unwinder. This causes
problems for ftrace, where the PC values are matched against the
contents of the stack frames in the callchain and fail to match any
records after the address adjustment.

Whilst there has been some effort to change ftrace to workaround this,
those patches are not yet ready for mainline and, since we're the odd
architecture in this regard, let's just step in line with other
architectures (like arch/arm/) for now.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: ftrace: fix function_graph tracer panic</title>
<updated>2015-10-22T21:49:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Bin</name>
<email>huawei.libin@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-30T02:49:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ec4aa911a03efd5a3e23c72b9c86ffc25b04f046'/>
<id>ec4aa911a03efd5a3e23c72b9c86ffc25b04f046</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ee556d00cf20012e889344a0adbbf809ab5015a3 upstream.

When function graph tracer is enabled, the following operation
will trigger panic:

mount -t debugfs nodev /sys/kernel
echo next_tgid &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/set_ftrace_filter
echo function_graph &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/current_tracer
ls /proc/

------------[ cut here ]------------
[  198.501417] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address cb88537fdc8ba316
[  198.506126] pgd = ffffffc008f79000
[  198.509363] [cb88537fdc8ba316] *pgd=00000000488c6003, *pud=00000000488c6003, *pmd=0000000000000000
[  198.517726] Internal error: Oops: 94000005 [#1] SMP
[  198.518798] Modules linked in:
[  198.520582] CPU: 1 PID: 1388 Comm: ls Tainted: G
[  198.521800] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[  198.522852] task: ffffffc0fa9e8000 ti: ffffffc0f9ab0000 task.ti: ffffffc0f9ab0000
[  198.524306] PC is at next_tgid+0x30/0x100
[  198.525205] LR is at return_to_handler+0x0/0x20
[  198.526090] pc : [&lt;ffffffc0002a1070&gt;] lr : [&lt;ffffffc0000907c0&gt;] pstate: 60000145
[  198.527392] sp : ffffffc0f9ab3d40
[  198.528084] x29: ffffffc0f9ab3d40 x28: ffffffc0f9ab0000
[  198.529406] x27: ffffffc000d6a000 x26: ffffffc000b786e8
[  198.530659] x25: ffffffc0002a1900 x24: ffffffc0faf16c00
[  198.531942] x23: ffffffc0f9ab3ea0 x22: 0000000000000002
[  198.533202] x21: ffffffc000d85050 x20: 0000000000000002
[  198.534446] x19: 0000000000000002 x18: 0000000000000000
[  198.535719] x17: 000000000049fa08 x16: ffffffc000242efc
[  198.537030] x15: 0000007fa472b54c x14: ffffffffff000000
[  198.538347] x13: ffffffc0fada84a0 x12: 0000000000000001
[  198.539634] x11: ffffffc0f9ab3d70 x10: ffffffc0f9ab3d70
[  198.540915] x9 : ffffffc0000907c0 x8 : ffffffc0f9ab3d40
[  198.542215] x7 : 0000002e330f08f0 x6 : 0000000000000015
[  198.543508] x5 : 0000000000000f08 x4 : ffffffc0f9835ec0
[  198.544792] x3 : cb88537fdc8ba316 x2 : cb88537fdc8ba306
[  198.546108] x1 : 0000000000000002 x0 : ffffffc000d85050
[  198.547432]
[  198.547920] Process ls (pid: 1388, stack limit = 0xffffffc0f9ab0020)
[  198.549170] Stack: (0xffffffc0f9ab3d40 to 0xffffffc0f9ab4000)
[  198.582568] Call trace:
[  198.583313] [&lt;ffffffc0002a1070&gt;] next_tgid+0x30/0x100
[  198.584359] [&lt;ffffffc0000907bc&gt;] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70
[  198.585503] [&lt;ffffffc0000907bc&gt;] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70
[  198.586574] [&lt;ffffffc0000907bc&gt;] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70
[  198.587660] [&lt;ffffffc0000907bc&gt;] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70
[  198.588896] Code: aa0003f5 2a0103f4 b4000102 91004043 (885f7c60)
[  198.591092] ---[ end trace 6a346f8f20949ac8 ]---

This is because when using function graph tracer, if the traced
function return value is in multi regs ([x0-x7]), return_to_handler
may corrupt them. So in return_to_handler, the parameter regs should
be protected properly.

Signed-off-by: Li Bin &lt;huawei.libin@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: AKASHI Takahiro &lt;takahiro.akashi@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ee556d00cf20012e889344a0adbbf809ab5015a3 upstream.

When function graph tracer is enabled, the following operation
will trigger panic:

mount -t debugfs nodev /sys/kernel
echo next_tgid &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/set_ftrace_filter
echo function_graph &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/current_tracer
ls /proc/

------------[ cut here ]------------
[  198.501417] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address cb88537fdc8ba316
[  198.506126] pgd = ffffffc008f79000
[  198.509363] [cb88537fdc8ba316] *pgd=00000000488c6003, *pud=00000000488c6003, *pmd=0000000000000000
[  198.517726] Internal error: Oops: 94000005 [#1] SMP
[  198.518798] Modules linked in:
[  198.520582] CPU: 1 PID: 1388 Comm: ls Tainted: G
[  198.521800] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[  198.522852] task: ffffffc0fa9e8000 ti: ffffffc0f9ab0000 task.ti: ffffffc0f9ab0000
[  198.524306] PC is at next_tgid+0x30/0x100
[  198.525205] LR is at return_to_handler+0x0/0x20
[  198.526090] pc : [&lt;ffffffc0002a1070&gt;] lr : [&lt;ffffffc0000907c0&gt;] pstate: 60000145
[  198.527392] sp : ffffffc0f9ab3d40
[  198.528084] x29: ffffffc0f9ab3d40 x28: ffffffc0f9ab0000
[  198.529406] x27: ffffffc000d6a000 x26: ffffffc000b786e8
[  198.530659] x25: ffffffc0002a1900 x24: ffffffc0faf16c00
[  198.531942] x23: ffffffc0f9ab3ea0 x22: 0000000000000002
[  198.533202] x21: ffffffc000d85050 x20: 0000000000000002
[  198.534446] x19: 0000000000000002 x18: 0000000000000000
[  198.535719] x17: 000000000049fa08 x16: ffffffc000242efc
[  198.537030] x15: 0000007fa472b54c x14: ffffffffff000000
[  198.538347] x13: ffffffc0fada84a0 x12: 0000000000000001
[  198.539634] x11: ffffffc0f9ab3d70 x10: ffffffc0f9ab3d70
[  198.540915] x9 : ffffffc0000907c0 x8 : ffffffc0f9ab3d40
[  198.542215] x7 : 0000002e330f08f0 x6 : 0000000000000015
[  198.543508] x5 : 0000000000000f08 x4 : ffffffc0f9835ec0
[  198.544792] x3 : cb88537fdc8ba316 x2 : cb88537fdc8ba306
[  198.546108] x1 : 0000000000000002 x0 : ffffffc000d85050
[  198.547432]
[  198.547920] Process ls (pid: 1388, stack limit = 0xffffffc0f9ab0020)
[  198.549170] Stack: (0xffffffc0f9ab3d40 to 0xffffffc0f9ab4000)
[  198.582568] Call trace:
[  198.583313] [&lt;ffffffc0002a1070&gt;] next_tgid+0x30/0x100
[  198.584359] [&lt;ffffffc0000907bc&gt;] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70
[  198.585503] [&lt;ffffffc0000907bc&gt;] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70
[  198.586574] [&lt;ffffffc0000907bc&gt;] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70
[  198.587660] [&lt;ffffffc0000907bc&gt;] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70
[  198.588896] Code: aa0003f5 2a0103f4 b4000102 91004043 (885f7c60)
[  198.591092] ---[ end trace 6a346f8f20949ac8 ]---

This is because when using function graph tracer, if the traced
function return value is in multi regs ([x0-x7]), return_to_handler
may corrupt them. So in return_to_handler, the parameter regs should
be protected properly.

Signed-off-by: Li Bin &lt;huawei.libin@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: AKASHI Takahiro &lt;takahiro.akashi@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64/efi: Fix boot crash by not padding between EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME regions</title>
<updated>2015-10-22T21:49:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-25T22:02:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=83b7575b3f8e0fd3ec19c28886523efbac4fa779'/>
<id>83b7575b3f8e0fd3ec19c28886523efbac4fa779</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0ce3cc008ec04258b6a6314b09f1a6012810881a upstream.

The new Properties Table feature introduced in UEFIv2.5 may
split memory regions that cover PE/COFF memory images into
separate code and data regions. Since these regions only differ
in the type (runtime code vs runtime data) and the permission
bits, but not in the memory type attributes (UC/WC/WT/WB), the
spec does not require them to be aligned to 64 KB.

Since the relative offset of PE/COFF .text and .data segments
cannot be changed on the fly, this means that we can no longer
pad out those regions to be mappable using 64 KB pages.
Unfortunately, there is no annotation in the UEFI memory map
that identifies data regions that were split off from a code
region, so we must apply this logic to all adjacent runtime
regions whose attributes only differ in the permission bits.

So instead of rounding each memory region to 64 KB alignment at
both ends, only round down regions that are not directly
preceded by another runtime region with the same type
attributes. Since the UEFI spec does not mandate that the memory
map be sorted, this means we also need to sort it first.

Note that this change will result in all EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
regions whose start addresses are not aligned to the OS page
size to be mapped with executable permissions (i.e., on kernels
compiled with 64 KB pages). However, since these mappings are
only active during the time that UEFI Runtime Services are being
invoked, the window for abuse is rather small.

Tested-by: Mark Salter &lt;msalter@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt; [UEFI 2.4 only]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt.fleming@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Salter &lt;msalter@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Leif Lindholm &lt;leif.lindholm@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-3-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0ce3cc008ec04258b6a6314b09f1a6012810881a upstream.

The new Properties Table feature introduced in UEFIv2.5 may
split memory regions that cover PE/COFF memory images into
separate code and data regions. Since these regions only differ
in the type (runtime code vs runtime data) and the permission
bits, but not in the memory type attributes (UC/WC/WT/WB), the
spec does not require them to be aligned to 64 KB.

Since the relative offset of PE/COFF .text and .data segments
cannot be changed on the fly, this means that we can no longer
pad out those regions to be mappable using 64 KB pages.
Unfortunately, there is no annotation in the UEFI memory map
that identifies data regions that were split off from a code
region, so we must apply this logic to all adjacent runtime
regions whose attributes only differ in the permission bits.

So instead of rounding each memory region to 64 KB alignment at
both ends, only round down regions that are not directly
preceded by another runtime region with the same type
attributes. Since the UEFI spec does not mandate that the memory
map be sorted, this means we also need to sort it first.

Note that this change will result in all EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
regions whose start addresses are not aligned to the OS page
size to be mapped with executable permissions (i.e., on kernels
compiled with 64 KB pages). However, since these mappings are
only active during the time that UEFI Runtime Services are being
invoked, the window for abuse is rather small.

Tested-by: Mark Salter &lt;msalter@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt; [UEFI 2.4 only]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt.fleming@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Salter &lt;msalter@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Leif Lindholm &lt;leif.lindholm@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-3-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: errata: add module build workaround for erratum #843419</title>
<updated>2015-09-29T17:33:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will.deacon@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-17T12:15:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bf0cdf4bfb785129798bc42d6ee8e2558f0934da'/>
<id>bf0cdf4bfb785129798bc42d6ee8e2558f0934da</id>
<content type='text'>
commit df057cc7b4fa59e9b55f07ffdb6c62bf02e99a00 upstream.

Cortex-A53 processors &lt;= r0p4 are affected by erratum #843419 which can
lead to a memory access using an incorrect address in certain sequences
headed by an ADRP instruction.

There is a linker fix to generate veneers for ADRP instructions, but
this doesn't work for kernel modules which are built as unlinked ELF
objects.

This patch adds a new config option for the erratum which, when enabled,
builds kernel modules with the mcmodel=large flag. This uses absolute
addressing for all kernel symbols, thereby removing the use of ADRP as
a PC-relative form of addressing. The ADRP relocs are removed from the
module loader so that we fail to load any potentially affected modules.

Acked-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit df057cc7b4fa59e9b55f07ffdb6c62bf02e99a00 upstream.

Cortex-A53 processors &lt;= r0p4 are affected by erratum #843419 which can
lead to a memory access using an incorrect address in certain sequences
headed by an ADRP instruction.

There is a linker fix to generate veneers for ADRP instructions, but
this doesn't work for kernel modules which are built as unlinked ELF
objects.

This patch adds a new config option for the erratum which, when enabled,
builds kernel modules with the mcmodel=large flag. This uses absolute
addressing for all kernel symbols, thereby removing the use of ADRP as
a PC-relative form of addressing. The ADRP relocs are removed from the
module loader so that we fail to load any potentially affected modules.

Acked-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: head.S: initialise mdcr_el2 in el2_setup</title>
<updated>2015-09-29T17:33:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will.deacon@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-02T17:49:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ae504f9787e587be8d8caa1d5ce809136def6ad6'/>
<id>ae504f9787e587be8d8caa1d5ce809136def6ad6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d10bcd473301888f957ec4b6b12aa3621be78d59 upstream.

When entering the kernel at EL2, we fail to initialise the MDCR_EL2
register which controls debug access and PMU capabilities at EL1.

This patch ensures that the register is initialised so that all traps
are disabled and all the PMU counters are available to the host. When a
guest is scheduled, KVM takes care to configure trapping appropriately.

Acked-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d10bcd473301888f957ec4b6b12aa3621be78d59 upstream.

When entering the kernel at EL2, we fail to initialise the MDCR_EL2
register which controls debug access and PMU capabilities at EL1.

This patch ensures that the register is initialised so that all traps
are disabled and all the PMU counters are available to the host. When a
guest is scheduled, KVM takes care to configure trapping appropriately.

Acked-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: compat: fix vfp save/restore across signal handlers in big-endian</title>
<updated>2015-09-29T17:33:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will.deacon@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-15T11:07:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=86fda1c12873b88bcc95f31a8f529e1f86ef08e4'/>
<id>86fda1c12873b88bcc95f31a8f529e1f86ef08e4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bdec97a855ef1e239f130f7a11584721c9a1bf04 upstream.

When saving/restoring the VFP registers from a compat (AArch32)
signal frame, we rely on the compat registers forming a prefix of the
native register file and therefore make use of copy_{to,from}_user to
transfer between the native fpsimd_state and the compat_vfp_sigframe.

Unfortunately, this doesn't work so well in a big-endian environment.
Our fpsimd save/restore code operates directly on 128-bit quantities
(Q registers) whereas the compat_vfp_sigframe represents the registers
as an array of 64-bit (D) registers. The architecture packs the compat D
registers into the Q registers, with the least significant bytes holding
the lower register. Consequently, we need to swap the 64-bit halves when
converting between these two representations on a big-endian machine.

This patch replaces the __copy_{to,from}_user invocations in our
compat VFP signal handling code with explicit __put_user loops that
operate on 64-bit values and swap them accordingly.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bdec97a855ef1e239f130f7a11584721c9a1bf04 upstream.

When saving/restoring the VFP registers from a compat (AArch32)
signal frame, we rely on the compat registers forming a prefix of the
native register file and therefore make use of copy_{to,from}_user to
transfer between the native fpsimd_state and the compat_vfp_sigframe.

Unfortunately, this doesn't work so well in a big-endian environment.
Our fpsimd save/restore code operates directly on 128-bit quantities
(Q registers) whereas the compat_vfp_sigframe represents the registers
as an array of 64-bit (D) registers. The architecture packs the compat D
registers into the Q registers, with the least significant bytes holding
the lower register. Consequently, we need to swap the 64-bit halves when
converting between these two representations on a big-endian machine.

This patch replaces the __copy_{to,from}_user invocations in our
compat VFP signal handling code with explicit __put_user loops that
operate on 64-bit values and swap them accordingly.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: flush FP/SIMD state correctly after execve()</title>
<updated>2015-09-29T17:33:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-27T06:12:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b14042c6fd0d952fa9d3be776c315ec456ab7e37'/>
<id>b14042c6fd0d952fa9d3be776c315ec456ab7e37</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 674c242c9323d3c293fc4f9a3a3a619fe3063290 upstream.

When a task calls execve(), its FP/SIMD state is flushed so that
none of the original program state is observeable by the incoming
program.

However, since this flushing consists of setting the in-memory copy
of the FP/SIMD state to all zeroes, the CPU field is set to CPU 0 as
well, which indicates to the lazy FP/SIMD preserve/restore code that
the FP/SIMD state does not need to be reread from memory if the task
is scheduled again on CPU 0 without any other tasks having entered
userland (or used the FP/SIMD in kernel mode) on the same CPU in the
mean time. If this happens, the FP/SIMD state of the old program will
still be present in the registers when the new program starts.

So set the CPU field to the invalid value of NR_CPUS when performing
the flush, by calling fpsimd_flush_task_state().

Reported-by: Chunyan Zhang &lt;chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com&gt;
Reported-by: Janet Liu &lt;janet.liu@spreadtrum.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 674c242c9323d3c293fc4f9a3a3a619fe3063290 upstream.

When a task calls execve(), its FP/SIMD state is flushed so that
none of the original program state is observeable by the incoming
program.

However, since this flushing consists of setting the in-memory copy
of the FP/SIMD state to all zeroes, the CPU field is set to CPU 0 as
well, which indicates to the lazy FP/SIMD preserve/restore code that
the FP/SIMD state does not need to be reread from memory if the task
is scheduled again on CPU 0 without any other tasks having entered
userland (or used the FP/SIMD in kernel mode) on the same CPU in the
mean time. If this happens, the FP/SIMD state of the old program will
still be present in the registers when the new program starts.

So set the CPU field to the invalid value of NR_CPUS when performing
the flush, by calling fpsimd_flush_task_state().

Reported-by: Chunyan Zhang &lt;chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com&gt;
Reported-by: Janet Liu &lt;janet.liu@spreadtrum.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
