linux-stable.git/arch/arm64/include, branch linux-6.14.y Linux kernel stable tree arm64/mm: Check PUD_TYPE_TABLE in pud_bad() 2025-05-29T09:12:46+00:00 Ryan Roberts ryan.roberts@arm.com 2025-02-21T04:42:25+00:00 b0be50144308fe04c8df5ec5c247304d53e88ae6 [ Upstream commit bfb1d2b9021c21891427acc86eb848ccedeb274e ] pud_bad() is currently defined in terms of pud_table(). Although for some configs, pud_table() is hard-coded to true i.e. when using 64K base pages or when page table levels are less than 3. pud_bad() is intended to check that the pud is configured correctly. Hence let's open-code the same check that the full version of pud_table() uses into pud_bad(). Then it always performs the check regardless of the config. Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221044227.1145393-7-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit bfb1d2b9021c21891427acc86eb848ccedeb274e ]

pud_bad() is currently defined in terms of pud_table(). Although for some
configs, pud_table() is hard-coded to true i.e. when using 64K base pages
or when page table levels are less than 3.

pud_bad() is intended to check that the pud is configured correctly. Hence
let's open-code the same check that the full version of pud_table() uses
into pud_bad(). Then it always performs the check regardless of the config.

Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221044227.1145393-7-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
arm64/mm: Check pmd_table() in pmd_trans_huge() 2025-05-29T09:12:46+00:00 Ryan Roberts ryan.roberts@arm.com 2025-02-21T04:42:26+00:00 4c75f24c9cd9e4daddf63e3b28731da0bed9c4a4 [ Upstream commit d1770e909898c108e8c7d30ca039053e8818a9c9 ] Check for pmd_table() in pmd_trans_huge() rather then just checking for the PMD_TABLE_BIT. But ensure all present-invalid entries are handled correctly by always setting PTE_VALID before checking with pmd_table(). Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221044227.1145393-8-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit d1770e909898c108e8c7d30ca039053e8818a9c9 ]

Check for pmd_table() in pmd_trans_huge() rather then just checking for the
PMD_TABLE_BIT. But ensure all present-invalid entries are handled correctly
by always setting PTE_VALID before checking with pmd_table().

Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221044227.1145393-8-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
arm64: Add support for HIP09 Spectre-BHB mitigation 2025-05-29T09:12:24+00:00 Jinqian Yang yangjinqian1@huawei.com 2025-03-25T14:19:00+00:00 06bef2f1194cf6b1670e928f06921da5daa31aa6 [ Upstream commit e18c09b204e81702ea63b9f1a81ab003b72e3174 ] The HIP09 processor is vulnerable to the Spectre-BHB (Branch History Buffer) attack, which can be exploited to leak information through branch prediction side channels. This commit adds the MIDR of HIP09 to the list for software mitigation. Signed-off-by: Jinqian Yang <yangjinqian1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250325141900.2057314-1-yangjinqian1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit e18c09b204e81702ea63b9f1a81ab003b72e3174 ]

The HIP09 processor is vulnerable to the Spectre-BHB (Branch History
Buffer) attack, which can be exploited to leak information through
branch prediction side channels. This commit adds the MIDR of HIP09
to the list for software mitigation.

Signed-off-by: Jinqian Yang <yangjinqian1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250325141900.2057314-1-yangjinqian1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
arm64: proton-pack: Add new CPUs 'k' values for branch mitigation 2025-05-18T06:26:08+00:00 James Morse james.morse@arm.com 2024-08-12T16:50:22+00:00 2dc0e36bb9424ed18b3ea8cc2a795b0840d8c64c commit efe676a1a7554219eae0b0dcfe1e0cdcc9ef9aef upstream. Update the list of 'k' values for the branch mitigation from arm's website. Add the values for Cortex-X1C. The MIDR_EL1 value can be found here: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101968/0002/Register-descriptions/AArch> Link: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/110280/2-0/?lang=en Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit efe676a1a7554219eae0b0dcfe1e0cdcc9ef9aef upstream.

Update the list of 'k' values for the branch mitigation from arm's
website.

Add the values for Cortex-X1C. The MIDR_EL1 value can be found here:
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101968/0002/Register-descriptions/AArch>

Link: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/110280/2-0/?lang=en
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arm64: bpf: Add BHB mitigation to the epilogue for cBPF programs 2025-05-18T06:26:08+00:00 James Morse james.morse@arm.com 2021-12-09T15:13:24+00:00 852b8ae934b5cbdc62496fa56ce9969aa2edda7f commit 0dfefc2ea2f29ced2416017d7e5b1253a54c2735 upstream. A malicious BPF program may manipulate the branch history to influence what the hardware speculates will happen next. On exit from a BPF program, emit the BHB mititgation sequence. This is only applied for 'classic' cBPF programs that are loaded by seccomp. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 0dfefc2ea2f29ced2416017d7e5b1253a54c2735 upstream.

A malicious BPF program may manipulate the branch history to influence
what the hardware speculates will happen next.

On exit from a BPF program, emit the BHB mititgation sequence.

This is only applied for 'classic' cBPF programs that are loaded by
seccomp.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the branchy loop k value 2025-05-18T06:26:08+00:00 James Morse james.morse@arm.com 2025-04-29T12:55:17+00:00 00565e8c0860e99b475fd33c0539aaa8a4e5c066 commit a1152be30a043d2d4dcb1683415f328bf3c51978 upstream. Add a helper to expose the k value of the branchy loop. This is needed by the BPF JIT to generate the mitigation sequence in BPF programs. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit a1152be30a043d2d4dcb1683415f328bf3c51978 upstream.

Add a helper to expose the k value of the branchy loop. This is needed
by the BPF JIT to generate the mitigation sequence in BPF programs.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the platform is mitigated by firmware 2025-05-18T06:26:08+00:00 James Morse james.morse@arm.com 2024-08-19T13:15:53+00:00 aa32707744d6240b80b7abf5a46e6e0dffe27b7d commit e7956c92f396a44eeeb6eaf7a5b5e1ad24db6748 upstream. is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected() allows the caller to determine if the CPU is known to need a firmware mitigation. CPUs are either on the list of CPUs we know about, or firmware has been queried and reported that the platform is affected - and mitigated by firmware. This helper is not useful to determine if the platform is mitigated by firmware. A CPU could be on the know list, but the firmware may not be implemented. Its affected but not mitigated. spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation() handles this distinction by checking the firmware state before enabling the mitigation. Add a helper to expose this state. This will be used by the BPF JIT to determine if calling firmware for a mitigation is necessary and supported. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit e7956c92f396a44eeeb6eaf7a5b5e1ad24db6748 upstream.

is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected() allows the caller to determine if the CPU
is known to need a firmware mitigation. CPUs are either on the list
of CPUs we know about, or firmware has been queried and reported that
the platform is affected - and mitigated by firmware.

This helper is not useful to determine if the platform is mitigated
by firmware. A CPU could be on the know list, but the firmware may
not be implemented. Its affected but not mitigated.

spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation() handles this distinction by checking
the firmware state before enabling the mitigation.

Add a helper to expose this state. This will be used by the BPF JIT
to determine if calling firmware for a mitigation is necessary and
supported.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arm64: insn: Add support for encoding DSB 2025-05-18T06:26:08+00:00 James Morse james.morse@arm.com 2021-12-09T15:12:19+00:00 1e19632057847914a36edc9f02a4da13bcb8b92a commit 63de8abd97ddb9b758bd8f915ecbd18e1f1a87a0 upstream. To generate code in the eBPF epilogue that uses the DSB instruction, insn.c needs a heler to encode the type and domain. Re-use the crm encoding logic from the DMB instruction. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 63de8abd97ddb9b758bd8f915ecbd18e1f1a87a0 upstream.

To generate code in the eBPF epilogue that uses the DSB instruction,
insn.c needs a heler to encode the type and domain.

Re-use the crm encoding logic from the DMB instruction.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arm64/boot: Enable EL2 requirements for FEAT_PMUv3p9 2025-04-25T08:51:19+00:00 Anshuman Khandual anshuman.khandual@arm.com 2025-04-14T04:58:48+00:00 882f78400322c0aec4b641a7168adad9a66bc0c2 commit 858c7bfcb35e1100b58bb63c9f562d86e09418d9 upstream. FEAT_PMUv3p9 registers such as PMICNTR_EL0, PMICFILTR_EL0, and PMUACR_EL1 access from EL1 requires appropriate EL2 fine grained trap configuration via FEAT_FGT2 based trap control registers HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2. Otherwise such register accesses will result in traps into EL2. Add a new helper __init_el2_fgt2() which initializes FEAT_FGT2 based fine grained trap control registers HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2 (setting the bits nPMICNTR_EL0, nPMICFILTR_EL0 and nPMUACR_EL1) to enable access into PMICNTR_EL0, PMICFILTR_EL0, and PMUACR_EL1 registers. Also update booting.rst with SCR_EL3.FGTEn2 requirement for all FEAT_FGT2 based registers to be accessible in EL2. Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev Fixes: 0bbff9ed8165 ("perf/arm_pmuv3: Add PMUv3.9 per counter EL0 access control") Fixes: d8226d8cfbaf ("perf: arm_pmuv3: Add support for Armv9.4 PMU instruction counter") Tested-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227035119.2025171-1-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 858c7bfcb35e1100b58bb63c9f562d86e09418d9 upstream.

FEAT_PMUv3p9 registers such as PMICNTR_EL0, PMICFILTR_EL0, and PMUACR_EL1
access from EL1 requires appropriate EL2 fine grained trap configuration
via FEAT_FGT2 based trap control registers HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2.
Otherwise such register accesses will result in traps into EL2.

Add a new helper __init_el2_fgt2() which initializes FEAT_FGT2 based fine
grained trap control registers HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2 (setting the
bits nPMICNTR_EL0, nPMICFILTR_EL0 and nPMUACR_EL1) to enable access into
PMICNTR_EL0, PMICFILTR_EL0, and PMUACR_EL1 registers.

Also update booting.rst with SCR_EL3.FGTEn2 requirement for all FEAT_FGT2
based registers to be accessible in EL2.

Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Fixes: 0bbff9ed8165 ("perf/arm_pmuv3: Add PMUv3.9 per counter EL0 access control")
Fixes: d8226d8cfbaf ("perf: arm_pmuv3: Add support for Armv9.4 PMU instruction counter")
Tested-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227035119.2025171-1-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arm64: mops: Do not dereference src reg for a set operation 2025-04-20T08:23:04+00:00 Keir Fraser keirf@google.com 2025-03-26T11:04:47+00:00 5f6022a74147675124b781fdc056b291850e7786 commit a13bfa4fe0d6949cea14718df2d1fe84c38cd113 upstream. The source register is not used for SET* and reading it can result in a UBSAN out-of-bounds array access error, specifically when the MOPS exception is taken from a SET* sequence with XZR (reg 31) as the source. Architecturally this is the only case where a src/dst/size field in the ESR can be reported as 31. Prior to 2de451a329cf662b the code in do_el0_mops() was benign as the use of pt_regs_read_reg() prevented the out-of-bounds access. Fixes: 2de451a329cf ("KVM: arm64: Add handler for MOPS exceptions") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.12.x Cc: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keirf@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kristina Martšenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250326110448.3792396-1-keirf@google.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit a13bfa4fe0d6949cea14718df2d1fe84c38cd113 upstream.

The source register is not used for SET* and reading it can result in
a UBSAN out-of-bounds array access error, specifically when the MOPS
exception is taken from a SET* sequence with XZR (reg 31) as the
source. Architecturally this is the only case where a src/dst/size
field in the ESR can be reported as 31.

Prior to 2de451a329cf662b the code in do_el0_mops() was benign as the
use of pt_regs_read_reg() prevented the out-of-bounds access.

Fixes: 2de451a329cf ("KVM: arm64: Add handler for MOPS exceptions")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.12.x
Cc: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keirf@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kristina Martšenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250326110448.3792396-1-keirf@google.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>