linux-stable.git/arch/arm/include, branch v4.4.210

ARM: 8813/1: Make aligned 2-byte getuser()/putuser() atomic on ARMv6+

2019-12-21T09:34:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit 344eb5539abf3e0b6ce22568c03e86450073e097 ]

getuser() and putuser() (and there underscored variants) use two
strb[t]/ldrb[t] instructions when they are asked to get/put 16-bits.
This means that the read/write is not atomic even when performed to a
16-bit-aligned address.

This leads to problems with vhost: vhost uses __getuser() to read the
vring's 16-bit avail.index field, and if it happens to observe a partial
update of the index, wrong descriptors will be used which will lead to a
breakdown of the virtio communication.  A similar problem exists for
__putuser() which is used to write to the vring's used.index field.

The reason these functions use strb[t]/ldrb[t] is because strht/ldrht
instructions did not exist until ARMv6T2/ARMv7.  So we should be easily
able to fix this on ARMv7.  Also, since all ARMv6 processors also don't
actually use the unprivileged instructions anymore for uaccess (since
CONFIG_CPU_USE_DOMAINS is not used) we can easily fix them too.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: spectre-v2: per-CPU vtables to work around big.Little systems

2019-11-10T10:21:37+00:00

Commit 383fb3ee8024d596f488d2dbaf45e572897acbdb upstream.

In big.Little systems, some CPUs require the Spectre workarounds in
paths such as the context switch, but other CPUs do not.  In order
to handle these differences, we need per-CPU vtables.

We are unable to use the kernel's per-CPU variables to support this
as per-CPU is not initialised at times when we need access to the
vtables, so we have to use an array indexed by logical CPU number.

We use an array-of-pointers to avoid having function pointers in
the kernel's read/write .data section.

Note: Added include of linux/slab.h in arch/arm/smp.c.

Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: add PROC_VTABLE and PROC_TABLE macros

2019-11-10T10:21:37+00:00

Commit e209950fdd065d2cc46e6338e47e52841b830cba upstream.

Allow the way we access members of the processor vtable to be changed
at compile time.  We will need to move to per-CPU vtables to fix the
Spectre variant 2 issues on big.Little systems.

However, we have a couple of calls that do not need the vtable
treatment, and indeed cause a kernel warning due to the (later) use
of smp_processor_id(), so also introduce the PROC_TABLE macro for
these which always use CPU 0's function pointers.

Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: clean up per-processor check_bugs method call

2019-11-10T10:21:37+00:00

Commit 945aceb1db8885d3a35790cf2e810f681db52756 upstream.

Call the per-processor type check_bugs() method in the same way as we
do other per-processor functions - move the "processor." detail into
proc-fns.h.

Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: split out processor lookup

2019-11-10T10:21:36+00:00

Commit 65987a8553061515b5851b472081aedb9837a391 upstream.

Split out the lookup of the processor type and associated error handling
from the rest of setup_processor() - we will need to use this in the
secondary CPU bringup path for big.Little Spectre variant 2 mitigation.

Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: 8796/1: spectre-v1,v1.1: provide helpers for address sanitization

2019-11-10T10:21:35+00:00

Commit afaf6838f4bc896a711180b702b388b8cfa638fc upstream.

Introduce C and asm helpers to sanitize user address, taking the
address range they target into account.

Use asm helper for existing sanitization in __copy_from_user().

Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: 8795/1: spectre-v1.1: use put_user() for __put_user()

2019-11-10T10:21:35+00:00

Commit e3aa6243434fd9a82e84bb79ab1abd14f2d9a5a7 upstream.

When Spectre mitigation is required, __put_user() needs to include
check_uaccess. This is already the case for put_user(), so just make
__put_user() an alias of put_user().

Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: 8794/1: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit

2019-11-10T10:21:34+00:00

Commit 621afc677465db231662ed126ae1f355bf8eac47 upstream.

A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong
addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok
check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess
routines.

This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy
barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit.

Porting commit c2f0ad4fc089cff8 ("arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use
of the current addr_limit").

Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: 8791/1: vfp: use __copy_to_user() when saving VFP state

2019-11-10T10:21:33+00:00

Commit 3aa2df6ec2ca6bc143a65351cca4266d03a8bc41 upstream.

Use __copy_to_user() rather than __put_user_error() for individual
members when saving VFP state.
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once per copied struct
intead of once per write.

Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses

2019-11-10T10:21:32+00:00

Commit a3c0f84765bb429ba0fd23de1c57b5e1591c9389 upstream.

Spectre variant 1 attacks are about this sequence of pseudo-code:

	index = load(user-manipulated pointer);
	access(base + index * stride);

In order for the cache side-channel to work, the access() must me made
to memory which userspace can detect whether cache lines have been
loaded.  On 32-bit ARM, this must be either user accessible memory, or
a kernel mapping of that same user accessible memory.

The problem occurs when the load() speculatively loads privileged data,
and the subsequent access() is made to user accessible memory.

Any load() which makes use of a user-maniplated pointer is a potential
problem if the data it has loaded is used in a subsequent access.  This
also applies for the access() if the data loaded by that access is used
by a subsequent access.

Harden the get_user() accessors against Spectre attacks by forcing out
of bounds addresses to a NULL pointer.  This prevents get_user() being
used as the load() step above.  As a side effect, put_user() will also
be affected even though it isn't implicated.

Also harden copy_from_user() by redoing the bounds check within the
arm_copy_from_user() code, and NULLing the pointer if out of bounds.

Acked-by: Mark Rutland 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman