<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/arm/include, branch v4.19.78</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ARM: prevent tracing IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE</title>
<updated>2019-06-15T09:54:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T22:41:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e0c3fc1f8fe3516529d2d399c6858846f895083b'/>
<id>e0c3fc1f8fe3516529d2d399c6858846f895083b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit be167862ae7dd85c56d385209a4890678e1b0488 ]

Patch series "compiler: allow all arches to enable
CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING", v3.

This patch (of 11):

When function tracing for IPIs is enabled, we get a warning for an
overflow of the ipi_types array with the IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE type as
triggered by raise_nmi():

  arch/arm/kernel/smp.c: In function 'raise_nmi':
  arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:489:2: error: array subscript is above array bounds [-Werror=array-bounds]
    trace_ipi_raise(target, ipi_types[ipinr]);

This is a correct warning as we actually overflow the array here.

This patch raise_nmi() to call __smp_cross_call() instead of
smp_cross_call(), to avoid calling into ftrace.  For clarification, I'm
also adding a two new code comments describing how this one is special.

The warning appears to have shown up after commit e7273ff49acf ("ARM:
8488/1: Make IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE a "non-secure" SGI"), which changed the
number assignment from '15' to '8', but as far as I can tell has existed
since the IPI tracepoints were first introduced.  If we decide to
backport this patch to stable kernels, we probably need to backport
e7273ff49acf as well.

[yamada.masahiro@socionext.com: rebase on v5.1-rc1]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190423034959.13525-2-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Fixes: e7273ff49acf ("ARM: 8488/1: Make IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE a "non-secure" SGI")
Fixes: 365ec7b17327 ("ARM: add IPI tracepoints") # v3.17
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@c-s.fr&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Malaterre &lt;malat@debian.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Cc: Stefan Agner &lt;stefan@agner.ch&gt;
Cc: Boris Brezillon &lt;bbrezillon@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Miquel Raynal &lt;miquel.raynal@bootlin.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Brian Norris &lt;computersforpeace@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Marek Vasut &lt;marek.vasut@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit be167862ae7dd85c56d385209a4890678e1b0488 ]

Patch series "compiler: allow all arches to enable
CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING", v3.

This patch (of 11):

When function tracing for IPIs is enabled, we get a warning for an
overflow of the ipi_types array with the IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE type as
triggered by raise_nmi():

  arch/arm/kernel/smp.c: In function 'raise_nmi':
  arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:489:2: error: array subscript is above array bounds [-Werror=array-bounds]
    trace_ipi_raise(target, ipi_types[ipinr]);

This is a correct warning as we actually overflow the array here.

This patch raise_nmi() to call __smp_cross_call() instead of
smp_cross_call(), to avoid calling into ftrace.  For clarification, I'm
also adding a two new code comments describing how this one is special.

The warning appears to have shown up after commit e7273ff49acf ("ARM:
8488/1: Make IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE a "non-secure" SGI"), which changed the
number assignment from '15' to '8', but as far as I can tell has existed
since the IPI tracepoints were first introduced.  If we decide to
backport this patch to stable kernels, we probably need to backport
e7273ff49acf as well.

[yamada.masahiro@socionext.com: rebase on v5.1-rc1]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190423034959.13525-2-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Fixes: e7273ff49acf ("ARM: 8488/1: Make IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE a "non-secure" SGI")
Fixes: 365ec7b17327 ("ARM: add IPI tracepoints") # v3.17
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@c-s.fr&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Malaterre &lt;malat@debian.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Cc: Stefan Agner &lt;stefan@agner.ch&gt;
Cc: Boris Brezillon &lt;bbrezillon@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Miquel Raynal &lt;miquel.raynal@bootlin.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Brian Norris &lt;computersforpeace@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Marek Vasut &lt;marek.vasut@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARM: vdso: Remove dependency with the arch_timer driver internals</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:46:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Zyngier</name>
<email>marc.zyngier@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-08T15:49:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9152b0815430633aabda98c816afc696915913ec'/>
<id>9152b0815430633aabda98c816afc696915913ec</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1f5b62f09f6b314c8d70b9de5182dae4de1f94da ]

The VDSO code uses the kernel helper that was originally designed
to abstract the access between 32 and 64bit systems. It worked so
far because this function is declared as 'inline'.

As we're about to revamp that part of the code, the VDSO would
break. Let's fix it by doing what should have been done from
the start, a proper system register access.

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1f5b62f09f6b314c8d70b9de5182dae4de1f94da ]

The VDSO code uses the kernel helper that was originally designed
to abstract the access between 32 and 64bit systems. It worked so
far because this function is declared as 'inline'.

As we're about to revamp that part of the code, the VDSO would
break. Let's fix it by doing what should have been done from
the start, a proper system register access.

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: arm/arm64: vgic-its: Take the srcu lock when writing to guest memory</title>
<updated>2019-05-04T07:20:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Zyngier</name>
<email>marc.zyngier@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-19T12:47:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0371fa033741a6dd2b308310d5364c28d8927001'/>
<id>0371fa033741a6dd2b308310d5364c28d8927001</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a6ecfb11bf37743c1ac49b266595582b107b61d4 ]

When halting a guest, QEMU flushes the virtual ITS caches, which
amounts to writing to the various tables that the guest has allocated.

When doing this, we fail to take the srcu lock, and the kernel
shouts loudly if running a lockdep kernel:

[   69.680416] =============================
[   69.680819] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[   69.681526] 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty #18 Not tainted
[   69.682096] -----------------------------
[   69.682501] ./include/linux/kvm_host.h:605 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
[   69.683225]
[   69.683225] other info that might help us debug this:
[   69.683225]
[   69.683975]
[   69.683975] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[   69.684598] 6 locks held by qemu-system-aar/4097:
[   69.685059]  #0: 0000000034196013 (&amp;kvm-&gt;lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x244/0x3a0
[   69.686087]  #1: 00000000f2ed935e (&amp;its-&gt;its_lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x250/0x3a0
[   69.686919]  #2: 000000005e71ea54 (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[   69.687698]  #3: 00000000c17e548d (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[   69.688475]  #4: 00000000ba386017 (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[   69.689978]  #5: 00000000c2c3c335 (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[   69.690729]
[   69.690729] stack backtrace:
[   69.691151] CPU: 2 PID: 4097 Comm: qemu-system-aar Not tainted 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty #18
[   69.691984] Hardware name: rockchip evb_rk3399/evb_rk3399, BIOS 2019.04-rc3-00124-g2feec69fb1 03/15/2019
[   69.692831] Call trace:
[   69.694072]  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xcc/0x110
[   69.694490]  gfn_to_memslot+0x174/0x190
[   69.694853]  kvm_write_guest+0x50/0xb0
[   69.695209]  vgic_its_save_tables_v0+0x248/0x330
[   69.695639]  vgic_its_set_attr+0x298/0x3a0
[   69.696024]  kvm_device_ioctl_attr+0x9c/0xd8
[   69.696424]  kvm_device_ioctl+0x8c/0xf8
[   69.696788]  do_vfs_ioctl+0xc8/0x960
[   69.697128]  ksys_ioctl+0x8c/0xa0
[   69.697445]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38
[   69.697817]  el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x138
[   69.698173]  el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
[   69.698528]  el0_svc+0x8/0xc

The fix is to obviously take the srcu lock, just like we do on the
read side of things since bf308242ab98. One wonders why this wasn't
fixed at the same time, but hey...

Fixes: bf308242ab98 ("KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock")
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a6ecfb11bf37743c1ac49b266595582b107b61d4 ]

When halting a guest, QEMU flushes the virtual ITS caches, which
amounts to writing to the various tables that the guest has allocated.

When doing this, we fail to take the srcu lock, and the kernel
shouts loudly if running a lockdep kernel:

[   69.680416] =============================
[   69.680819] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[   69.681526] 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty #18 Not tainted
[   69.682096] -----------------------------
[   69.682501] ./include/linux/kvm_host.h:605 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
[   69.683225]
[   69.683225] other info that might help us debug this:
[   69.683225]
[   69.683975]
[   69.683975] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[   69.684598] 6 locks held by qemu-system-aar/4097:
[   69.685059]  #0: 0000000034196013 (&amp;kvm-&gt;lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x244/0x3a0
[   69.686087]  #1: 00000000f2ed935e (&amp;its-&gt;its_lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x250/0x3a0
[   69.686919]  #2: 000000005e71ea54 (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[   69.687698]  #3: 00000000c17e548d (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[   69.688475]  #4: 00000000ba386017 (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[   69.689978]  #5: 00000000c2c3c335 (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[   69.690729]
[   69.690729] stack backtrace:
[   69.691151] CPU: 2 PID: 4097 Comm: qemu-system-aar Not tainted 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty #18
[   69.691984] Hardware name: rockchip evb_rk3399/evb_rk3399, BIOS 2019.04-rc3-00124-g2feec69fb1 03/15/2019
[   69.692831] Call trace:
[   69.694072]  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xcc/0x110
[   69.694490]  gfn_to_memslot+0x174/0x190
[   69.694853]  kvm_write_guest+0x50/0xb0
[   69.695209]  vgic_its_save_tables_v0+0x248/0x330
[   69.695639]  vgic_its_set_attr+0x298/0x3a0
[   69.696024]  kvm_device_ioctl_attr+0x9c/0xd8
[   69.696424]  kvm_device_ioctl+0x8c/0xf8
[   69.696788]  do_vfs_ioctl+0xc8/0x960
[   69.697128]  ksys_ioctl+0x8c/0xa0
[   69.697445]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38
[   69.697817]  el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x138
[   69.698173]  el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
[   69.698528]  el0_svc+0x8/0xc

The fix is to obviously take the srcu lock, just like we do on the
read side of things since bf308242ab98. One wonders why this wasn't
fixed at the same time, but hey...

Fixes: bf308242ab98 ("KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock")
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARM: avoid Cortex-A9 livelock on tight dmb loops</title>
<updated>2019-04-05T20:33:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Russell King</name>
<email>rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-10T10:35:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=30d503bae9673ff6b0c67c6fa61b95db66319088'/>
<id>30d503bae9673ff6b0c67c6fa61b95db66319088</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5388a5b82199facacd3d7ac0d05aca6e8f902fed ]

machine_crash_nonpanic_core() does this:

	while (1)
		cpu_relax();

because the kernel has crashed, and we have no known safe way to deal
with the CPU.  So, we place the CPU into an infinite loop which we
expect it to never exit - at least not until the system as a whole is
reset by some method.

In the absence of erratum 754327, this code assembles to:

	b	.

In other words, an infinite loop.  When erratum 754327 is enabled,
this becomes:

1:	dmb
	b	1b

It has been observed that on some systems (eg, OMAP4) where, if a
crash is triggered, the system tries to kexec into the panic kernel,
but fails after taking the secondary CPU down - placing it into one
of these loops.  This causes the system to livelock, and the most
noticable effect is the system stops after issuing:

	Loading crashdump kernel...

to the system console.

The tested as working solution I came up with was to add wfe() to
these infinite loops thusly:

	while (1) {
		cpu_relax();
		wfe();
	}

which, without 754327 builds to:

1:	wfe
	b	1b

or with 754327 is enabled:

1:	dmb
	wfe
	b	1b

Adding "wfe" does two things depending on the environment we're running
under:
- where we're running on bare metal, and the processor implements
  "wfe", it stops us spinning endlessly in a loop where we're never
  going to do any useful work.
- if we're running in a VM, it allows the CPU to be given back to the
  hypervisor and rescheduled for other purposes (maybe a different VM)
  rather than wasting CPU cycles inside a crashed VM.

However, in light of erratum 794072, Will Deacon wanted to see 10 nops
as well - which is reasonable to cover the case where we have erratum
754327 enabled _and_ we have a processor that doesn't implement the
wfe hint.

So, we now end up with:

1:      wfe
        b       1b

when erratum 754327 is disabled, or:

1:      dmb
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        wfe
        b       1b

when erratum 754327 is enabled.  We also get the dmb + 10 nop
sequence elsewhere in the kernel, in terminating loops.

This is reasonable - it means we get the workaround for erratum
794072 when erratum 754327 is enabled, but still relinquish the dead
processor - either by placing it in a lower power mode when wfe is
implemented as such or by returning it to the hypervisior, or in the
case where wfe is a no-op, we use the workaround specified in erratum
794072 to avoid the problem.

These as two entirely orthogonal problems - the 10 nops addresses
erratum 794072, and the wfe is an optimisation that makes the system
more efficient when crashed either in terms of power consumption or
by allowing the host/other VMs to make use of the CPU.

I don't see any reason not to use kexec() inside a VM - it has the
potential to provide automated recovery from a failure of the VMs
kernel with the opportunity for saving a crashdump of the failure.
A panic() with a reboot timeout won't do that, and reading the
libvirt documentation, setting on_reboot to "preserve" won't either
(the documentation states "The preserve action for an on_reboot event
is treated as a destroy".)  Surely it has to be a good thing to
avoiding having CPUs spinning inside a VM that is doing no useful
work.

Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5388a5b82199facacd3d7ac0d05aca6e8f902fed ]

machine_crash_nonpanic_core() does this:

	while (1)
		cpu_relax();

because the kernel has crashed, and we have no known safe way to deal
with the CPU.  So, we place the CPU into an infinite loop which we
expect it to never exit - at least not until the system as a whole is
reset by some method.

In the absence of erratum 754327, this code assembles to:

	b	.

In other words, an infinite loop.  When erratum 754327 is enabled,
this becomes:

1:	dmb
	b	1b

It has been observed that on some systems (eg, OMAP4) where, if a
crash is triggered, the system tries to kexec into the panic kernel,
but fails after taking the secondary CPU down - placing it into one
of these loops.  This causes the system to livelock, and the most
noticable effect is the system stops after issuing:

	Loading crashdump kernel...

to the system console.

The tested as working solution I came up with was to add wfe() to
these infinite loops thusly:

	while (1) {
		cpu_relax();
		wfe();
	}

which, without 754327 builds to:

1:	wfe
	b	1b

or with 754327 is enabled:

1:	dmb
	wfe
	b	1b

Adding "wfe" does two things depending on the environment we're running
under:
- where we're running on bare metal, and the processor implements
  "wfe", it stops us spinning endlessly in a loop where we're never
  going to do any useful work.
- if we're running in a VM, it allows the CPU to be given back to the
  hypervisor and rescheduled for other purposes (maybe a different VM)
  rather than wasting CPU cycles inside a crashed VM.

However, in light of erratum 794072, Will Deacon wanted to see 10 nops
as well - which is reasonable to cover the case where we have erratum
754327 enabled _and_ we have a processor that doesn't implement the
wfe hint.

So, we now end up with:

1:      wfe
        b       1b

when erratum 754327 is disabled, or:

1:      dmb
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        nop
        wfe
        b       1b

when erratum 754327 is enabled.  We also get the dmb + 10 nop
sequence elsewhere in the kernel, in terminating loops.

This is reasonable - it means we get the workaround for erratum
794072 when erratum 754327 is enabled, but still relinquish the dead
processor - either by placing it in a lower power mode when wfe is
implemented as such or by returning it to the hypervisior, or in the
case where wfe is a no-op, we use the workaround specified in erratum
794072 to avoid the problem.

These as two entirely orthogonal problems - the 10 nops addresses
erratum 794072, and the wfe is an optimisation that makes the system
more efficient when crashed either in terms of power consumption or
by allowing the host/other VMs to make use of the CPU.

I don't see any reason not to use kexec() inside a VM - it has the
potential to provide automated recovery from a failure of the VMs
kernel with the opportunity for saving a crashdump of the failure.
A panic() with a reboot timeout won't do that, and reading the
libvirt documentation, setting on_reboot to "preserve" won't either
(the documentation states "The preserve action for an on_reboot event
is treated as a destroy".)  Surely it has to be a good thing to
avoiding having CPUs spinning inside a VM that is doing no useful
work.

Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARM: 8830/1: NOMMU: Toggle only bits in EXC_RETURN we are really care of</title>
<updated>2019-04-05T20:33:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vladimir Murzin</name>
<email>vladimir.murzin@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-25T14:18:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d8945878ded6e5850b59e101bcc9fe4167ab7fb1'/>
<id>d8945878ded6e5850b59e101bcc9fe4167ab7fb1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 72cd4064fccaae15ab84d40d4be23667402df4ed ]

ARMv8M introduces support for Security extension to M class, among
other things it affects exception handling, especially, encoding of
EXC_RETURN.

The new bits have been added:

Bit [6]	Secure or Non-secure stack
Bit [5]	Default callee register stacking
Bit [0]	Exception Secure

which conflicts with hard-coded value of EXC_RETURN:

In fact, we only care of few bits:

Bit [3]	 Mode (0 - Handler, 1 - Thread)
Bit [2]	 Stack pointer selection (0 - Main, 1 - Process)

We can toggle only those bits and left other bits as they were on
exception entry.

It is basically, what patch does - saves EXC_RETURN when we do
transition form Thread to Handler mode (it is first svc), so later
saved value is used instead of EXC_RET_THREADMODE_PROCESSSTACK.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin &lt;vladimir.murzin@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 72cd4064fccaae15ab84d40d4be23667402df4ed ]

ARMv8M introduces support for Security extension to M class, among
other things it affects exception handling, especially, encoding of
EXC_RETURN.

The new bits have been added:

Bit [6]	Secure or Non-secure stack
Bit [5]	Default callee register stacking
Bit [0]	Exception Secure

which conflicts with hard-coded value of EXC_RETURN:

In fact, we only care of few bits:

Bit [3]	 Mode (0 - Handler, 1 - Thread)
Bit [2]	 Stack pointer selection (0 - Main, 1 - Process)

We can toggle only those bits and left other bits as they were on
exception entry.

It is basically, what patch does - saves EXC_RETURN when we do
transition form Thread to Handler mode (it is first svc), so later
saved value is used instead of EXC_RET_THREADMODE_PROCESSSTACK.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin &lt;vladimir.murzin@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARM: 8824/1: fix a migrating irq bug when hotplug cpu</title>
<updated>2019-03-23T19:09:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dietmar Eggemann</name>
<email>dietmar.eggemann@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-21T13:42:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=da3495301cda16f72bf5957c9ad2bf3993936f7e'/>
<id>da3495301cda16f72bf5957c9ad2bf3993936f7e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1b5ba350784242eb1f899bcffd95d2c7cff61e84 ]

Arm TC2 fails cpu hotplug stress test.

This issue was tracked down to a missing copy of the new affinity
cpumask for the vexpress-spc interrupt into struct
irq_common_data.affinity when the interrupt is migrated in
migrate_one_irq().

Fix it by replacing the arm specific hotplug cpu migration with the
generic irq code.

This is the counterpart implementation to commit 217d453d473c ("arm64:
fix a migrating irq bug when hotplug cpu").

Tested with cpu hotplug stress test on Arm TC2 (multi_v7_defconfig plus
CONFIG_ARM_BIG_LITTLE_CPUFREQ=y and CONFIG_ARM_VEXPRESS_SPC_CPUFREQ=y).
The vexpress-spc interrupt (irq=22) on this board is affine to CPU0.
Its affinity cpumask now changes correctly e.g. from 0 to 1-4 when
CPU0 is hotplugged out.

Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dietmar Eggemann &lt;dietmar.eggemann@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1b5ba350784242eb1f899bcffd95d2c7cff61e84 ]

Arm TC2 fails cpu hotplug stress test.

This issue was tracked down to a missing copy of the new affinity
cpumask for the vexpress-spc interrupt into struct
irq_common_data.affinity when the interrupt is migrated in
migrate_one_irq().

Fix it by replacing the arm specific hotplug cpu migration with the
generic irq code.

This is the counterpart implementation to commit 217d453d473c ("arm64:
fix a migrating irq bug when hotplug cpu").

Tested with cpu hotplug stress test on Arm TC2 (multi_v7_defconfig plus
CONFIG_ARM_BIG_LITTLE_CPUFREQ=y and CONFIG_ARM_VEXPRESS_SPC_CPUFREQ=y).
The vexpress-spc interrupt (irq=22) on this board is affine to CPU0.
Its affinity cpumask now changes correctly e.g. from 0 to 1-4 when
CPU0 is hotplugged out.

Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dietmar Eggemann &lt;dietmar.eggemann@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm/arm64: KVM: Allow a VCPU to fully reset itself</title>
<updated>2019-03-23T19:09:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Zyngier</name>
<email>marc.zyngier@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-20T11:36:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b78379c33723a6239f463c66e440e58011546867'/>
<id>b78379c33723a6239f463c66e440e58011546867</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 358b28f09f0ab074d781df72b8a671edb1547789 ]

The current kvm_psci_vcpu_on implementation will directly try to
manipulate the state of the VCPU to reset it.  However, since this is
not done on the thread that runs the VCPU, we can end up in a strangely
corrupted state when the source and target VCPUs are running at the same
time.

Fix this by factoring out all reset logic from the PSCI implementation
and forwarding the required information along with a request to the
target VCPU.

Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones &lt;drjones@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 358b28f09f0ab074d781df72b8a671edb1547789 ]

The current kvm_psci_vcpu_on implementation will directly try to
manipulate the state of the VCPU to reset it.  However, since this is
not done on the thread that runs the VCPU, we can end up in a strangely
corrupted state when the source and target VCPUs are running at the same
time.

Fix this by factoring out all reset logic from the PSCI implementation
and forwarding the required information along with a request to the
target VCPU.

Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones &lt;drjones@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARM: spectre-v2: per-CPU vtables to work around big.Little systems</title>
<updated>2019-02-20T09:25:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Russell King</name>
<email>rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-13T21:32:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4645c6ccbd7a6685f2c5629092e73662fc5ec370'/>
<id>4645c6ccbd7a6685f2c5629092e73662fc5ec370</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 383fb3ee8024d596f488d2dbaf45e572897acbdb upstream.

In big.Little systems, some CPUs require the Spectre workarounds in
paths such as the context switch, but other CPUs do not.  In order
to handle these differences, we need per-CPU vtables.

We are unable to use the kernel's per-CPU variables to support this
as per-CPU is not initialised at times when we need access to the
vtables, so we have to use an array indexed by logical CPU number.

We use an array-of-pointers to avoid having function pointers in
the kernel's read/write .data section.

Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David A. Long &lt;dave.long@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 383fb3ee8024d596f488d2dbaf45e572897acbdb upstream.

In big.Little systems, some CPUs require the Spectre workarounds in
paths such as the context switch, but other CPUs do not.  In order
to handle these differences, we need per-CPU vtables.

We are unable to use the kernel's per-CPU variables to support this
as per-CPU is not initialised at times when we need access to the
vtables, so we have to use an array indexed by logical CPU number.

We use an array-of-pointers to avoid having function pointers in
the kernel's read/write .data section.

Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David A. Long &lt;dave.long@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARM: add PROC_VTABLE and PROC_TABLE macros</title>
<updated>2019-02-20T09:25:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Russell King</name>
<email>rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-13T21:32:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b11fd96c0eca0c1840d82bc4999ee147ad2ebbdc'/>
<id>b11fd96c0eca0c1840d82bc4999ee147ad2ebbdc</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit e209950fdd065d2cc46e6338e47e52841b830cba upstream.

Allow the way we access members of the processor vtable to be changed
at compile time.  We will need to move to per-CPU vtables to fix the
Spectre variant 2 issues on big.Little systems.

However, we have a couple of calls that do not need the vtable
treatment, and indeed cause a kernel warning due to the (later) use
of smp_processor_id(), so also introduce the PROC_TABLE macro for
these which always use CPU 0's function pointers.

Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David A. Long &lt;dave.long@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit e209950fdd065d2cc46e6338e47e52841b830cba upstream.

Allow the way we access members of the processor vtable to be changed
at compile time.  We will need to move to per-CPU vtables to fix the
Spectre variant 2 issues on big.Little systems.

However, we have a couple of calls that do not need the vtable
treatment, and indeed cause a kernel warning due to the (later) use
of smp_processor_id(), so also introduce the PROC_TABLE macro for
these which always use CPU 0's function pointers.

Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David A. Long &lt;dave.long@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARM: clean up per-processor check_bugs method call</title>
<updated>2019-02-20T09:25:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Russell King</name>
<email>rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-13T21:32:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=06b5ec99f2eef0dcc2492f0623c95aa64fe064f3'/>
<id>06b5ec99f2eef0dcc2492f0623c95aa64fe064f3</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 945aceb1db8885d3a35790cf2e810f681db52756 upstream.

Call the per-processor type check_bugs() method in the same way as we
do other per-processor functions - move the "processor." detail into
proc-fns.h.

Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David A. Long &lt;dave.long@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 945aceb1db8885d3a35790cf2e810f681db52756 upstream.

Call the per-processor type check_bugs() method in the same way as we
do other per-processor functions - move the "processor." detail into
proc-fns.h.

Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David A. Long &lt;dave.long@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Julien Thierry &lt;julien.thierry@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
