linux-stable.git/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h, branch v4.14.331

ARM: fix co-processor register typo

2022-03-11T09:13:31+00:00

commit 33970b031dc4653cc9dc80f2886976706c4c8ef1 upstream.

In the recent Spectre BHB patches, there was a typo that is only
exposed in certain configurations: mcr p15,0,XX,c7,r5,4 should have
been mcr p15,0,XX,c7,c5,4

Reported-by: kernel test robot 
Fixes: b9baf5c8c5c3 ("ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround")
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) 
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround

2022-03-11T09:13:30+00:00

commit b9baf5c8c5c356757f4f9d8180b5e9d234065bc3 upstream.

Workaround the Spectre BHB issues for Cortex-A15, Cortex-A57,
Cortex-A72, Cortex-A73 and Cortex-A75. We also include Brahma B15 as
well to be safe, which is affected by Spectre V2 in the same ways as
Cortex-A15.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas 
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) 
[changes due to lack of SYSTEM_FREEING_INITMEM - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: uaccess: consolidate uaccess asm to asm/uaccess-asm.h

2020-06-03T06:17:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 747ffc2fcf969eff9309d7f2d1d61cb8b9e1bb40 ]

Consolidate the user access assembly code to asm/uaccess-asm.h.  This
moves the csdb, check_uaccess, uaccess_mask_range_ptr, uaccess_enable,
uaccess_disable, uaccess_save, uaccess_restore macros, and creates two
new ones for exception entry and exit - uaccess_entry and uaccess_exit.

This makes the uaccess_save and uaccess_restore macros private to
asm/uaccess-asm.h.

Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: 8843/1: use unified assembler in headers

2020-06-03T06:17:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit c001899a5d6c2d7a0f3b75b2307ddef137fb46a6 ]

Use unified assembler syntax (UAL) in headers. Divided syntax is
considered deprecated. This will also allow to build the kernel
using LLVM's integrated assembler.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner 
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: 8796/1: spectre-v1,v1.1: provide helpers for address sanitization

2019-02-20T09:20:46+00:00

Commit afaf6838f4bc896a711180b702b388b8cfa638fc upstream.

Introduce C and asm helpers to sanitize user address, taking the
address range they target into account.

Use asm helper for existing sanitization in __copy_from_user().

Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses

2018-10-18T07:16:28+00:00

Commit a3c0f84765bb429ba0fd23de1c57b5e1591c9389 upstream.

Spectre variant 1 attacks are about this sequence of pseudo-code:

	index = load(user-manipulated pointer);
	access(base + index * stride);

In order for the cache side-channel to work, the access() must me made
to memory which userspace can detect whether cache lines have been
loaded.  On 32-bit ARM, this must be either user accessible memory, or
a kernel mapping of that same user accessible memory.

The problem occurs when the load() speculatively loads privileged data,
and the subsequent access() is made to user accessible memory.

Any load() which makes use of a user-maniplated pointer is a potential
problem if the data it has loaded is used in a subsequent access.  This
also applies for the access() if the data loaded by that access is used
by a subsequent access.

Harden the get_user() accessors against Spectre attacks by forcing out
of bounds addresses to a NULL pointer.  This prevents get_user() being
used as the load() step above.  As a side effect, put_user() will also
be affected even though it isn't implicated.

Also harden copy_from_user() by redoing the bounds check within the
arm_copy_from_user() code, and NULLing the pointer if out of bounds.

Acked-by: Mark Rutland 
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros

2018-10-18T07:16:27+00:00

Commit a78d156587931a2c3b354534aa772febf6c9e855 upstream.

Add assembly and C macros for the new CSDB instruction.

Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Acked-by: Mark Rutland 
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren 
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren 
Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: 8772/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on get_user functions

2018-05-22T16:54:00+00:00

commit 0d73c3f8e7f6ee2aab1bb350f60c180f5ae21a2c upstream.

Since do_undefinstr() uses get_user to get the undefined
instruction, it can be called before kprobes processes
recursive check. This can cause an infinit recursive
exception.
Prohibit probing on get_user functions.

Fixes: 24ba613c9d6c ("ARM kprobes: core code")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: BUG if jumping to usermode address in kernel mode

2017-12-14T08:53:05+00:00

commit 8bafae202c82dc257f649ea3c275a0f35ee15113 upstream.

Detect if we are returning to usermode via the normal kernel exit paths
but the saved PSR value indicates that we are in kernel mode.  This
could occur due to corrupted stack state, which has been observed with
"ftracetest".

This ensures that we catch the problem case before we get to user code.

Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Cc: Alex Shi 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: Prepare for randomized task_struct

2017-06-30T19:00:50+00:00

With the new task struct randomization, we can run into a build
failure for certain random seeds, which will place fields beyond
the allow immediate size in the assembly:

arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S: Assembler messages:
arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S:803: Error: bad immediate value for offset (4096)

Only two constants in asm-offset.h are affected, and I'm changing
both of them here to work correctly in all configurations.

One more macro has the problem, but is currently unused, so this
removes it instead of adding complexity.

Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
[kees: Adjust commit log slightly]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook