<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c, branch v5.0.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ARCv2: don't assume core 0x54 has dual issue</title>
<updated>2019-02-21T22:53:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vineet Gupta</name>
<email>vgupta@synopsys.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-21T21:44:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7b2e932f633bcb7b190fc7031ce6dac75f8c3472'/>
<id>7b2e932f633bcb7b190fc7031ce6dac75f8c3472</id>
<content type='text'>
The first release of core4 (0x54) was dual issue only (HS4x).
Newer releases allow hardware to be configured as single issue (HS3x)
or dual issue.

Prevent accessing a HS4x only aux register in HS3x, which otherwise
leads to illegal instruction exceptions

Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The first release of core4 (0x54) was dual issue only (HS4x).
Newer releases allow hardware to be configured as single issue (HS3x)
or dual issue.

Prevent accessing a HS4x only aux register in HS3x, which otherwise
leads to illegal instruction exceptions

Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARC: enable uboot support unconditionally</title>
<updated>2019-02-21T19:03:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eugeniy Paltsev</name>
<email>Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-14T15:07:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=493a2f812446e92bcb1e69a77381b4d39808d730'/>
<id>493a2f812446e92bcb1e69a77381b4d39808d730</id>
<content type='text'>
After reworking U-boot args handling code and adding paranoid
arguments check we can eliminate CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT and
enable uboot support unconditionally.

For JTAG case we can assume that core registers will come up
reset value of 0 or in worst case we rely on user passing
'-on=clear_regs' to Metaware debugger.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Corentin LABBE &lt;clabbe@baylibre.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev &lt;Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
After reworking U-boot args handling code and adding paranoid
arguments check we can eliminate CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT and
enable uboot support unconditionally.

For JTAG case we can assume that core registers will come up
reset value of 0 or in worst case we rely on user passing
'-on=clear_regs' to Metaware debugger.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Corentin LABBE &lt;clabbe@baylibre.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev &lt;Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARC: U-boot: check arguments paranoidly</title>
<updated>2019-02-21T19:03:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eugeniy Paltsev</name>
<email>Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-14T15:07:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a66f2e57bd566240d8b3884eedf503928fbbe557'/>
<id>a66f2e57bd566240d8b3884eedf503928fbbe557</id>
<content type='text'>
Handle U-boot arguments paranoidly:
 * don't allow to pass unknown tag.
 * try to use external device tree blob only if corresponding tag
   (TAG_DTB) is set.
 * don't check uboot_tag if kernel build with no ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT.

NOTE:
If U-boot args are invalid we skip them and try to use embedded device
tree blob. We can't panic on invalid U-boot args as we really pass
invalid args due to bug in U-boot code.
This happens if we don't provide external DTB to U-boot and
don't set 'bootargs' U-boot environment variable (which is default
case at least for HSDK board) In that case we will pass
{r0 = 1 (bootargs in r2); r1 = 0; r2 = 0;} to linux which is invalid.

While I'm at it refactor U-boot arguments handling code.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Corentin LABBE &lt;clabbe@baylibre.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev &lt;Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Handle U-boot arguments paranoidly:
 * don't allow to pass unknown tag.
 * try to use external device tree blob only if corresponding tag
   (TAG_DTB) is set.
 * don't check uboot_tag if kernel build with no ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT.

NOTE:
If U-boot args are invalid we skip them and try to use embedded device
tree blob. We can't panic on invalid U-boot args as we really pass
invalid args due to bug in U-boot code.
This happens if we don't provide external DTB to U-boot and
don't set 'bootargs' U-boot environment variable (which is default
case at least for HSDK board) In that case we will pass
{r0 = 1 (bootargs in r2); r1 = 0; r2 = 0;} to linux which is invalid.

While I'm at it refactor U-boot arguments handling code.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Corentin LABBE &lt;clabbe@baylibre.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev &lt;Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARC: fix actionpoints configuration detection</title>
<updated>2019-02-21T19:03:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eugeniy Paltsev</name>
<email>Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-04T18:41:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cdf92962adb0cb23efc3c8bcf6465d16ab7c3a81'/>
<id>cdf92962adb0cb23efc3c8bcf6465d16ab7c3a81</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix reversed logic while actionpoints configuration (full/min)
detection.

Fixies: 7dd380c338f1e ("ARC: boot log: print Action point details")
Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev &lt;Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix reversed logic while actionpoints configuration (full/min)
detection.

Fixies: 7dd380c338f1e ("ARC: boot log: print Action point details")
Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev &lt;Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARC: boot log: print Action point details</title>
<updated>2019-01-17T22:38:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vineet Gupta</name>
<email>vgupta@synopsys.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-09T17:36:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7dd380c338f1ec20ed46607ccd03541a7683cd67'/>
<id>7dd380c338f1ec20ed46607ccd03541a7683cd67</id>
<content type='text'>
This now prints the number of action points {2,4,8} and {min,full}
targets supported.

Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This now prints the number of action points {2,4,8} and {min,full}
targets supported.

Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARCv2: boot log: BPU return stack depth</title>
<updated>2019-01-17T22:38:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vineet Gupta</name>
<email>vgupta@synopsys.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-06T08:17:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=97e981324d492340e33baa9680780046377b561f'/>
<id>97e981324d492340e33baa9680780046377b561f</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2019-01-05T21:25:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-05T21:25:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=505b050fdf42097883b2d37b8e796e1f11dbef50'/>
<id>505b050fdf42097883b2d37b8e796e1f11dbef50</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs mount API prep from Al Viro:
 "Mount API prereqs.

  Mostly that's LSM mount options cleanups. There are several minor
  fixes in there, but nothing earth-shattering (leaks on failure exits,
  mostly)"

* 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (27 commits)
  mount_fs: suppress MAC on MS_SUBMOUNT as well as MS_KERNMOUNT
  smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  smack: get rid of match_token()
  smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helper
  LSM: new method: -&gt;sb_add_mnt_opt()
  selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  selinux: regularize Opt_... names a bit
  selinux: switch away from match_token()
  selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()
  LSM: bury struct security_mnt_opts
  smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts
  selinux: switch to private struct selinux_mnt_opts
  LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code
  selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts()
  LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a method
  nfs_remount(): don't leak, don't ignore LSM options quietly
  btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts use
  selinux; don't open-code a loop in sb_finish_set_opts()
  LSM: split -&gt;sb_set_mnt_opts() out of -&gt;sb_kern_mount()
  new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull vfs mount API prep from Al Viro:
 "Mount API prereqs.

  Mostly that's LSM mount options cleanups. There are several minor
  fixes in there, but nothing earth-shattering (leaks on failure exits,
  mostly)"

* 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (27 commits)
  mount_fs: suppress MAC on MS_SUBMOUNT as well as MS_KERNMOUNT
  smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  smack: get rid of match_token()
  smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helper
  LSM: new method: -&gt;sb_add_mnt_opt()
  selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  selinux: regularize Opt_... names a bit
  selinux: switch away from match_token()
  selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()
  LSM: bury struct security_mnt_opts
  smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts
  selinux: switch to private struct selinux_mnt_opts
  LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code
  selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts()
  LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a method
  nfs_remount(): don't leak, don't ignore LSM options quietly
  btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts use
  selinux; don't open-code a loop in sb_finish_set_opts()
  LSM: split -&gt;sb_set_mnt_opts() out of -&gt;sb_kern_mount()
  new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Suppress MS_* flag defs within the kernel unless explicitly enabled</title>
<updated>2018-12-20T16:32:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-01T23:07:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e262e32d6bde0f77fb0c95d977482fc872c51996'/>
<id>e262e32d6bde0f77fb0c95d977482fc872c51996</id>
<content type='text'>
Only the mount namespace code that implements mount(2) should be using the
MS_* flags.  Suppress them inside the kernel unless uapi/linux/mount.h is
included.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Only the mount namespace code that implements mount(2) should be using the
MS_* flags.  Suppress them inside the kernel unless uapi/linux/mount.h is
included.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARCv2: boot log unaligned access in use</title>
<updated>2018-11-12T18:38:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vineet Gupta</name>
<email>vgupta@synopsys.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-29T16:44:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=afba5d157fe1f2e64bc3df46fe83841657ec8fdd'/>
<id>afba5d157fe1f2e64bc3df46fe83841657ec8fdd</id>
<content type='text'>
ARC gcc 8.x generates unaligned accesses by default, so call that out

Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
ARC gcc 8.x generates unaligned accesses by default, so call that out

Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARCv2: boot log: fix HS48 release number</title>
<updated>2018-02-28T18:45:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vineet Gupta</name>
<email>vgupta@synopsys.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-21T23:10:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=701eda01cbd212bae2f7d29cf14322bd49b94657'/>
<id>701eda01cbd212bae2f7d29cf14322bd49b94657</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
