linux-stable.git/Documentation, branch v6.1.142

dt-bindings: i2c: nvidia,tegra20-i2c: Specify the required properties

2025-06-27T10:07:40+00:00

commit 903cc7096db22f889d48e2cee8840709ce04fdac upstream.

Specify the properties which are essential and which are not for the
Tegra I2C driver to function correctly. This was not added correctly when
the TXT binding was converted to yaml. All the existing DT nodes have
these properties already and hence this does not break the ABI.

dmas and dma-names which were specified as a must in the TXT binding
is now made optional since the driver can work in PIO mode if dmas are
missing.

Fixes: f10a9b722f80 ("dt-bindings: i2c: tegra: Convert to json-schema”)
Signed-off-by: Akhil R 
Cc:  # v5.17+
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski 
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603153022.39434-1-akhilrajeev@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "x86/bugs: Make spectre user default depend on MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2" on v6.6 and older

2025-06-27T10:07:36+00:00

This reverts commit 594dbf0a19d607f106ed552332b9b8fecd2b64a3 which is
commit 98fdaeb296f51ef08e727a7cc72e5b5c864c4f4d upstream.

commit 7adb96687ce8 ("x86/bugs: Make spectre user default depend on
MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2") depends on commit 72c70f480a70 ("x86/bugs: Add
a separate config for Spectre V2"), which introduced
MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2.

commit 72c70f480a70 ("x86/bugs: Add a separate config for Spectre V2")
never landed in stable tree, thus, stable tree doesn't have
MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2, that said, commit 7adb96687ce8 ("x86/bugs: Make
spectre user default depend on MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2") has no value if
the dependecy was not applied.

Revert commit 7adb96687ce8 ("x86/bugs: Make spectre user default
depend on MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2")  in stable kernel which landed in in
5.4.294, 5.10.238, 5.15.185, 6.1.141 and 6.6.93 stable versions.

Cc: David.Kaplan@amd.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Cc: mingo@kernel.org
Cc: brad.spengler@opensrcsec.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.6 6.1 5.15 5.10 5.4
Reported-by: Brad Spengler 
Reported-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso 
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfs: fix the contact address for the sysfs ABI documentation

2025-06-27T10:07:19+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9ff4490e2ab364ec433f15668ef3f5edfb53feca ]

oss.sgi.com is long dead, refer to the current linux-xfs list instead.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong 
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R 
Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik 
Acked-by: "Darrick J. Wong" 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

dt-bindings: vendor-prefixes: Add Liontron name

2025-06-27T10:07:13+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9baa27a2e9fc746143ab686b6dbe2d515284a4c5 ]

Liontron is a company based in Shenzen, China, making industrial
development boards and embedded computers, mostly using Rockchip and
Allwinner SoCs.

Add their name to the list of vendors.

Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara 
Acked-by: Rob Herring (Arm) 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250505164729.18175-2-andre.przywara@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Chen-Yu Tsai 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

serial: mctrl_gpio: split disable_ms into sync and no_sync APIs

2025-06-04T12:40:13+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1bd2aad57da95f7f2d2bb52f7ad15c0f4993a685 ]

The following splat has been observed on a SAMA5D27 platform using
atmel_serial:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/irq/manage.c:738
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 27, name: kworker/u5:0
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
irq event stamp: 0
hardirqs last  enabled at (0): [<00000000>] 0x0
hardirqs last disabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x1c4c/0x7bec
softirqs last  enabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x1ca0/0x7bec
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<00000000>] 0x0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/u5:0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7+ #74
Hardware name: Atmel SAMA5
Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [bluetooth]
Call trace:
  unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c
  show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x70
  dump_stack_lvl from __might_resched+0x38c/0x598
  __might_resched from disable_irq+0x1c/0x48
  disable_irq from mctrl_gpio_disable_ms+0x74/0xc0
  mctrl_gpio_disable_ms from atmel_disable_ms.part.0+0x80/0x1f4
  atmel_disable_ms.part.0 from atmel_set_termios+0x764/0x11e8
  atmel_set_termios from uart_change_line_settings+0x15c/0x994
  uart_change_line_settings from uart_set_termios+0x2b0/0x668
  uart_set_termios from tty_set_termios+0x600/0x8ec
  tty_set_termios from ttyport_set_flow_control+0x188/0x1e0
  ttyport_set_flow_control from wilc_setup+0xd0/0x524 [hci_wilc]
  wilc_setup [hci_wilc] from hci_dev_open_sync+0x330/0x203c [bluetooth]
  hci_dev_open_sync [bluetooth] from hci_dev_do_open+0x40/0xb0 [bluetooth]
  hci_dev_do_open [bluetooth] from hci_power_on+0x12c/0x664 [bluetooth]
  hci_power_on [bluetooth] from process_one_work+0x998/0x1a38
  process_one_work from worker_thread+0x6e0/0xfb4
  worker_thread from kthread+0x3d4/0x484
  kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28

This warning is emitted when trying to toggle, at the highest level,
some flow control (with serdev_device_set_flow_control) in a device
driver. At the lowest level, the atmel_serial driver is using
serial_mctrl_gpio lib to enable/disable the corresponding IRQs
accordingly.  The warning emitted by CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is due to
disable_irq (called in mctrl_gpio_disable_ms) being possibly called in
some atomic context (some tty drivers perform modem lines configuration
in regions protected by port lock).

Split mctrl_gpio_disable_ms into two differents APIs, a non-blocking one
and a blocking one. Replace mctrl_gpio_disable_ms calls with the
relevant version depending on whether the call is protected by some port
lock.

Suggested-by: Jiri Slaby 
Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré 
Acked-by: Richard Genoud 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250217-atomic_sleep_mctrl_serial_gpio-v3-1-59324b313eef@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/bugs: Make spectre user default depend on MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2

2025-06-04T12:40:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit 98fdaeb296f51ef08e727a7cc72e5b5c864c4f4d ]

Change the default value of spectre v2 in user mode to respect the
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 config option.

Currently, user mode spectre v2 is set to auto
(SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO) by default, even if
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 is disabled.

Set the spectre_v2 value to auto (SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO) if the
Spectre v2 config (CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) is enabled, otherwise
set the value to none (SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE).

Important to say the command line argument "spectre_v2_user" overwrites
the default value in both cases.

When CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 is not set, users have the flexibility
to opt-in for specific mitigations independently. In this scenario,
setting spectre_v2= will not enable spectre_v2_user=, and command line
options spectre_v2_user and spectre_v2 are independent when
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2=n.

Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta 
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: David Kaplan 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241031-x86_bugs_last_v2-v2-2-b7ff1dab840e@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

hwmon: (dell-smm) Increment the number of fans

2025-06-04T12:40:07+00:00

[ Upstream commit dbcfcb239b3b452ef8782842c36fb17dd1b9092f ]

Some Alienware laptops that support the SMM interface, may have up to 4
fans.

Tested on an Alienware x15 r1.

Signed-off-by: Kurt Borja 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250304055249.51940-2-kuurtb@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs

2025-05-18T06:21:26+00:00

commit 2665281a07e19550944e8354a2024635a7b2714a upstream.

Ice Lake generation CPUs are not affected by guest/host isolation part of
ITS. If a user is only concerned about KVM guests, they can now choose a
new cmdline option "vmexit" that will not deploy the ITS mitigation when
CPU is not affected by guest/host isolation. This saves the performance
overhead of ITS mitigation on Ice Lake gen CPUs.

When "vmexit" option selected, if the CPU is affected by ITS guest/host
isolation, the default ITS mitigation is deployed.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/its: Enable Indirect Target Selection mitigation

2025-05-18T06:21:26+00:00

commit f4818881c47fd91fcb6d62373c57c7844e3de1c0 upstream.

Indirect Target Selection (ITS) is a bug in some pre-ADL Intel CPUs with
eIBRS. It affects prediction of indirect branch and RETs in the
lower half of cacheline. Due to ITS such branches may get wrongly predicted
to a target of (direct or indirect) branch that is located in the upper
half of the cacheline.

Scope of impact
===============

Guest/host isolation
--------------------
When eIBRS is used for guest/host isolation, the indirect branches in the
VMM may still be predicted with targets corresponding to branches in the
guest.

Intra-mode
----------
cBPF or other native gadgets can be used for intra-mode training and
disclosure using ITS.

User/kernel isolation
---------------------
When eIBRS is enabled user/kernel isolation is not impacted.

Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
-----------------------------------------
After an IBPB, indirect branches may be predicted with targets
corresponding to direct branches which were executed prior to IBPB. This is
mitigated by a microcode update.

Add cmdline parameter indirect_target_selection=off|on|force to control the
mitigation to relocate the affected branches to an ITS-safe thunk i.e.
located in the upper half of cacheline. Also add the sysfs reporting.

When retpoline mitigation is deployed, ITS safe-thunks are not needed,
because retpoline sequence is already ITS-safe. Similarly, when call depth
tracking (CDT) mitigation is deployed (retbleed=stuff), ITS safe return
thunk is not used, as CDT prevents RSB-underflow.

To not overcomplicate things, ITS mitigation is not supported with
spectre-v2 lfence;jmp mitigation. Moreover, it is less practical to deploy
lfence;jmp mitigation on ITS affected parts anyways.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Documentation: x86/bugs/its: Add ITS documentation

2025-05-18T06:21:26+00:00

commit 1ac116ce6468670eeda39345a5585df308243dca upstream.

Add the admin-guide for Indirect Target Selection (ITS).

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman