<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/Documentation, branch v5.4.233</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>docs: Fix path paste-o for /sys/kernel/warn_count</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:52:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-02T04:42:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eb768617dafacb627adb30b5e229c180ef9e2e9b'/>
<id>eb768617dafacb627adb30b5e229c180ef9e2e9b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 00dd027f721e0458418f7750d8a5a664ed3e5994 upstream.

Running "make htmldocs" shows that "/sys/kernel/oops_count" was
duplicated. This should have been "warn_count":

  Warning: /sys/kernel/oops_count is defined 2 times:
  ./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count:0
  ./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count:0

Fix the typo.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/202212110529.A3Qav8aR-lkp@intel.com
Fixes: 8b05aa263361 ("panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs")
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 00dd027f721e0458418f7750d8a5a664ed3e5994 upstream.

Running "make htmldocs" shows that "/sys/kernel/oops_count" was
duplicated. This should have been "warn_count":

  Warning: /sys/kernel/oops_count is defined 2 times:
  ./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count:0
  ./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count:0

Fix the typo.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/202212110529.A3Qav8aR-lkp@intel.com
Fixes: 8b05aa263361 ("panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs")
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:52:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-02T04:42:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6f18d28c26346ad41a9bced3d7a9bf281c3203f5'/>
<id>6f18d28c26346ad41a9bced3d7a9bf281c3203f5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8b05aa26336113c4cea25f1c333ee8cd4fc212a6 upstream.

Since Warn count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
the entry /sys/kernel/warn_count to expose it to userspace.

Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: tangmeng &lt;tangmeng@uniontech.com&gt;
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-6-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8b05aa26336113c4cea25f1c333ee8cd4fc212a6 upstream.

Since Warn count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
the entry /sys/kernel/warn_count to expose it to userspace.

Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: tangmeng &lt;tangmeng@uniontech.com&gt;
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-6-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>panic: Introduce warn_limit</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:52:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-02T04:42:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7c1273646f7e0239f7f8812e491c33a6aa329a6b'/>
<id>7c1273646f7e0239f7f8812e491c33a6aa329a6b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9fc9e278a5c0b708eeffaf47d6eb0c82aa74ed78 upstream.

Like oops_limit, add warn_limit for limiting the number of warnings when
panic_on_warn is not set.

Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Baolin Wang &lt;baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Huang Ying &lt;ying.huang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: tangmeng &lt;tangmeng@uniontech.com&gt;
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Cc: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-5-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9fc9e278a5c0b708eeffaf47d6eb0c82aa74ed78 upstream.

Like oops_limit, add warn_limit for limiting the number of warnings when
panic_on_warn is not set.

Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Baolin Wang &lt;baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Huang Ying &lt;ying.huang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: tangmeng &lt;tangmeng@uniontech.com&gt;
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Cc: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-5-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:52:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-02T04:42:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7020a9234e867764c09c22f54d8eddf66060dd66'/>
<id>7020a9234e867764c09c22f54d8eddf66060dd66</id>
<content type='text'>
commit de92f65719cd672f4b48397540b9f9eff67eca40 upstream.

In preparation for keeping oops_limit logic in sync with warn_limit,
have oops_limit == 0 disable checking the Oops counter.

Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Baolin Wang &lt;baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Huang Ying &lt;ying.huang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit de92f65719cd672f4b48397540b9f9eff67eca40 upstream.

In preparation for keeping oops_limit logic in sync with warn_limit,
have oops_limit == 0 disable checking the Oops counter.

Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Baolin Wang &lt;baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Huang Ying &lt;ying.huang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:52:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-02T04:42:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5a3482f2c1ccbee3537b99a63e4837cfd10257ce'/>
<id>5a3482f2c1ccbee3537b99a63e4837cfd10257ce</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9db89b41117024f80b38b15954017fb293133364 upstream.

Since Oops count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
the entry /sys/kernel/oops_count to expose it to userspace.

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9db89b41117024f80b38b15954017fb293133364 upstream.

Since Oops count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
the entry /sys/kernel/oops_count to expose it to userspace.

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:52:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-02T04:42:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=28facdf7b0971ecba43662e6395c761fd2931d43'/>
<id>28facdf7b0971ecba43662e6395c761fd2931d43</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d4ccd54d28d3c8598e2354acc13e28c060961dbb upstream.

Many Linux systems are configured to not panic on oops; but allowing an
attacker to oops the system **really** often can make even bugs that look
completely unexploitable exploitable (like NULL dereferences and such) if
each crash elevates a refcount by one or a lock is taken in read mode, and
this causes a counter to eventually overflow.

The most interesting counters for this are 32 bits wide (like open-coded
refcounts that don't use refcount_t). (The ldsem reader count on 32-bit
platforms is just 16 bits, but probably nobody cares about 32-bit platforms
that much nowadays.)

So let's panic the system if the kernel is constantly oopsing.

The speed of oopsing 2^32 times probably depends on several factors, like
how long the stack trace is and which unwinder you're using; an empirically
important one is whether your console is showing a graphical environment or
a text console that oopses will be printed to.
In a quick single-threaded benchmark, it looks like oopsing in a vfork()
child with a very short stack trace only takes ~510 microseconds per run
when a graphical console is active; but switching to a text console that
oopses are printed to slows it down around 87x, to ~45 milliseconds per
run.
(Adding more threads makes this faster, but the actual oops printing
happens under &amp;die_lock on x86, so you can maybe speed this up by a factor
of around 2 and then any further improvement gets eaten up by lock
contention.)

It looks like it would take around 8-12 days to overflow a 32-bit counter
with repeated oopsing on a multi-core X86 system running a graphical
environment; both me (in an X86 VM) and Seth (with a distro kernel on
normal hardware in a standard configuration) got numbers in that ballpark.

12 days aren't *that* short on a desktop system, and you'd likely need much
longer on a typical server system (assuming that people don't run graphical
desktop environments on their servers), and this is a *very* noisy and
violent approach to exploiting the kernel; and it also seems to take orders
of magnitude longer on some machines, probably because stuff like EFI
pstore will slow it down a ton if that's active.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221107201317.324457-1-jannh@google.com
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d4ccd54d28d3c8598e2354acc13e28c060961dbb upstream.

Many Linux systems are configured to not panic on oops; but allowing an
attacker to oops the system **really** often can make even bugs that look
completely unexploitable exploitable (like NULL dereferences and such) if
each crash elevates a refcount by one or a lock is taken in read mode, and
this causes a counter to eventually overflow.

The most interesting counters for this are 32 bits wide (like open-coded
refcounts that don't use refcount_t). (The ldsem reader count on 32-bit
platforms is just 16 bits, but probably nobody cares about 32-bit platforms
that much nowadays.)

So let's panic the system if the kernel is constantly oopsing.

The speed of oopsing 2^32 times probably depends on several factors, like
how long the stack trace is and which unwinder you're using; an empirically
important one is whether your console is showing a graphical environment or
a text console that oopses will be printed to.
In a quick single-threaded benchmark, it looks like oopsing in a vfork()
child with a very short stack trace only takes ~510 microseconds per run
when a graphical console is active; but switching to a text console that
oopses are printed to slows it down around 87x, to ~45 milliseconds per
run.
(Adding more threads makes this faster, but the actual oops printing
happens under &amp;die_lock on x86, so you can maybe speed this up by a factor
of around 2 and then any further improvement gets eaten up by lock
contention.)

It looks like it would take around 8-12 days to overflow a 32-bit counter
with repeated oopsing on a multi-core X86 system running a graphical
environment; both me (in an X86 VM) and Seth (with a distro kernel on
normal hardware in a standard configuration) got numbers in that ballpark.

12 days aren't *that* short on a desktop system, and you'd likely need much
longer on a typical server system (assuming that people don't run graphical
desktop environments on their servers), and this is a *very* noisy and
violent approach to exploiting the kernel; and it also seems to take orders
of magnitude longer on some machines, probably because stuff like EFI
pstore will slow it down a ton if that's active.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221107201317.324457-1-jannh@google.com
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dt-bindings: phy: g12a-usb3-pcie-phy: fix compatible string documentation</title>
<updated>2023-01-24T06:18:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Heiner Kallweit</name>
<email>hkallweit1@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-16T20:19:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=97697a252ba0f043593768fb1321f263a193d3ed'/>
<id>97697a252ba0f043593768fb1321f263a193d3ed</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e181119046a0ec16126b682163040e8e33f310c1 upstream.

The compatible string in the driver doesn't have the meson prefix.
Fix this in the documentation and rename the file accordingly.

Fixes: 87a55485f2fc ("dt-bindings: phy: meson-g12a-usb3-pcie-phy: convert to yaml")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit &lt;hkallweit1@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Martin Blumenstingl &lt;martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0a82be92-ce85-da34-9d6f-4b33034473e5@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul &lt;vkoul@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e181119046a0ec16126b682163040e8e33f310c1 upstream.

The compatible string in the driver doesn't have the meson prefix.
Fix this in the documentation and rename the file accordingly.

Fixes: 87a55485f2fc ("dt-bindings: phy: meson-g12a-usb3-pcie-phy: convert to yaml")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit &lt;hkallweit1@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Martin Blumenstingl &lt;martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0a82be92-ce85-da34-9d6f-4b33034473e5@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul &lt;vkoul@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>docs: Fix the docs build with Sphinx 6.0</title>
<updated>2023-01-18T10:42:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonathan Corbet</name>
<email>corbet@lwn.net</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-04T17:47:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2e4164d3d1e7231b743fe6e0f483800aff6a928e'/>
<id>2e4164d3d1e7231b743fe6e0f483800aff6a928e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0283189e8f3d0917e2ac399688df85211f48447b upstream.

Sphinx 6.0 removed the execfile_() function, which we use as part of the
configuration process.  They *did* warn us...  Just open-code the
functionality as is done in Sphinx itself.

Tested (using SPHINX_CONF, since this code is only executed with an
alternative config file) on various Sphinx versions from 2.5 through 6.0.

Reported-by: Martin Liška &lt;mliska@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0283189e8f3d0917e2ac399688df85211f48447b upstream.

Sphinx 6.0 removed the execfile_() function, which we use as part of the
configuration process.  They *did* warn us...  Just open-code the
functionality as is done in Sphinx itself.

Tested (using SPHINX_CONF, since this code is only executed with an
alternative config file) on various Sphinx versions from 2.5 through 6.0.

Reported-by: Martin Liška &lt;mliska@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ASoC: dt-bindings: wcd9335: fix reset line polarity in example</title>
<updated>2023-01-18T10:41:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Torokhov</name>
<email>dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-27T07:46:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d63e9eca94854be1a31717ed7bebd53d0030b103'/>
<id>d63e9eca94854be1a31717ed7bebd53d0030b103</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 34cb111f8a7b98b5fec809dd194003bca20ef1b2 ]

When resetting the block, the reset line is being driven low and then
high, which means that the line in DTS should be annotated as "active
low".

Fixes: 1877c9fda1b7 ("ASoC: dt-bindings: add dt bindings for wcd9335 audio codec")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027074652.1044235-2-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 34cb111f8a7b98b5fec809dd194003bca20ef1b2 ]

When resetting the block, the reset line is being driven low and then
high, which means that the line in DTS should be annotated as "active
low".

Fixes: 1877c9fda1b7 ("ASoC: dt-bindings: add dt bindings for wcd9335 audio codec")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027074652.1044235-2-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>spi: Update reference to struct spi_controller</title>
<updated>2023-01-18T10:41:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonathan Neuschäfer</name>
<email>j.neuschaefer@gmx.net</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-01T17:32:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3fcdc1534b4c4866761ef7cedd1349fe5ba04090'/>
<id>3fcdc1534b4c4866761ef7cedd1349fe5ba04090</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bf585ccee22faf469d82727cf375868105b362f7 ]

struct spi_master has been renamed to struct spi_controller. Update the
reference in spi.rst to make it clickable again.

Fixes: 8caab75fd2c2 ("spi: Generalize SPI "master" to "controller"")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer &lt;j.neuschaefer@gmx.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221101173252.1069294-1-j.neuschaefer@gmx.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit bf585ccee22faf469d82727cf375868105b362f7 ]

struct spi_master has been renamed to struct spi_controller. Update the
reference in spi.rst to make it clickable again.

Fixes: 8caab75fd2c2 ("spi: Generalize SPI "master" to "controller"")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer &lt;j.neuschaefer@gmx.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221101173252.1069294-1-j.neuschaefer@gmx.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
