linux-stable.git/Documentation, branch v5.1.4

dt-bindings: mmc: Add disable-cqe-dcmd property.

2019-05-22T05:39:46+00:00

commit 28f22fb755ecf9f933f045bc0afdb8140641b01c upstream.

Add disable-cqe-dcmd as optional property for MMC hosts.
This property allows to disable or not enable the direct command
features of the command queue engine.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Muellner 
Signed-off-by: Philipp Tomsich 
Fixes: 84362d79f436 ("mmc: sdhci-of-arasan: Add CQHCI support for arasan,sdhci-5.1")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/mds: Improve CPU buffer clear documentation

2019-05-22T05:39:39+00:00

commit 9d8d0294e78a164d407133dea05caf4b84247d6a upstream.

On x86_64, all returns to usermode go through
prepare_exit_to_usermode(), with the sole exception of do_nmi().
This even includes machine checks -- this was added several years
ago to support MCE recovery.  Update the documentation.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Jon Masters 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 04dcbdb80578 ("x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/999fa9e126ba6a48e9d214d2f18dbde5c62ac55c.1557865329.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/mds: Revert CPU buffer clear on double fault exit

2019-05-22T05:39:39+00:00

commit 88640e1dcd089879530a49a8d212d1814678dfe7 upstream.

The double fault ESPFIX path doesn't return to user mode at all --
it returns back to the kernel by simulating a #GP fault.
prepare_exit_to_usermode() will run on the way out of
general_protection before running user code.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Jon Masters 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 04dcbdb80578 ("x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ac97612445c0a44ee10374f6ea79c222fe22a5c4.1557865329.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo

2019-05-14T17:15:32+00:00

commit 95310e348a321b45fb746c176961d4da72344282 upstream

Fix a minor typo in the MDS documentation: "eanbled" -> "enabled".

Reported-by: Jeff Bastian 
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values

2019-05-14T17:15:32+00:00

commit ea01668f9f43021b28b3f4d5ffad50106a1e1301 upstream

Adjust the last two rows in the table that display possible values when
MDS mitigation is enabled. They both were slightly innacurate.

In addition, convert the table of possible values and their descriptions
to a list-table. The simple table format uses the top border of equals
signs to determine cell width which resulted in the first column being
far too wide in comparison to the second column that contained the
majority of the text.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation

2019-05-14T17:15:32+00:00

commit e672f8bf71c66253197e503f75c771dd28ada4a0 upstream

Updated the documentation for a new CVE-2019-11091 Microarchitectural Data
Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM) which is a variant of
Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS). MDS is a family of side channel
attacks on internal buffers in Intel CPUs.

MDSUM is a special case of MSBDS, MFBDS and MLPDS. An uncacheable load from
memory that takes a fault or assist can leave data in a microarchitectural
structure that may later be observed using one of the same methods used by
MSBDS, MFBDS or MLPDS. There are no new code changes expected for MDSUM.
The existing mitigation for MDS applies to MDSUM as well.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks 
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS

2019-05-14T17:15:32+00:00

commit 5c14068f87d04adc73ba3f41c2a303d3c3d1fa12 upstream

Add MDS to the new 'mitigations=' cmdline option.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

2019-05-14T17:15:31+00:00

commit 0336e04a6520bdaefdb0769d2a70084fa52e81ed upstream

Configure s390 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Spectre v1 and
Spectre v2.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina  (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Waiman Long 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: Jon Masters 
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Tyler Hicks 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Randy Dunlap 
Cc: Steven Price 
Cc: Phil Auld 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4a161805458a5ec88812aac0307ae3908a030fc.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

2019-05-14T17:15:31+00:00

commit 782e69efb3dfed6e8360bc612e8c7827a901a8f9 upstream

Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina  (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Waiman Long 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: Jon Masters 
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Tyler Hicks 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Randy Dunlap 
Cc: Steven Price 
Cc: Phil Auld 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/245a606e1a42a558a310220312d9b6adb9159df6.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

2019-05-14T17:15:31+00:00

commit d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812 upstream

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina  (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Waiman Long 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: Jon Masters 
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Tyler Hicks 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Randy Dunlap 
Cc: Steven Price 
Cc: Phil Auld 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman