<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/Documentation, branch v4.19.239</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: update stable tree link</title>
<updated>2022-04-15T12:14:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bagas Sanjaya</name>
<email>bagasdotme@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-14T11:33:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2d235d26dcf81d34c93ba8616d75c804b5ee5f3f'/>
<id>2d235d26dcf81d34c93ba8616d75c804b5ee5f3f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 555d44932c67e617d89bc13c81c7efac5b51fcfa upstream.

The link to stable tree is redirected to
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git. Update
accordingly.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya &lt;bagasdotme@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314113329.485372-6-bagasdotme@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 555d44932c67e617d89bc13c81c7efac5b51fcfa upstream.

The link to stable tree is redirected to
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git. Update
accordingly.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya &lt;bagasdotme@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314113329.485372-6-bagasdotme@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: add link to stable release candidate tree</title>
<updated>2022-04-15T12:14:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bagas Sanjaya</name>
<email>bagasdotme@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-14T11:33:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=85f42b816487a725f1a52a41d646ea0b7631ef88'/>
<id>85f42b816487a725f1a52a41d646ea0b7631ef88</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 587d39b260c4d090166314d64be70b1f6a26b0b5 upstream.

There is also stable release candidate tree. Mention it, however with a
warning that the tree is for testing purposes.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya &lt;bagasdotme@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314113329.485372-5-bagasdotme@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 587d39b260c4d090166314d64be70b1f6a26b0b5 upstream.

There is also stable release candidate tree. Mention it, however with a
warning that the tree is for testing purposes.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya &lt;bagasdotme@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314113329.485372-5-bagasdotme@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper</title>
<updated>2022-03-11T09:15:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kim Phillips</name>
<email>kim.phillips@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-28T17:23:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c034d344e733a3ac574dd09e39e911a50025c607'/>
<id>c034d344e733a3ac574dd09e39e911a50025c607</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e9b6013a7ce31535b04b02ba99babefe8a8599fa upstream.

Update the link to the "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation
on AMD Processors" whitepaper.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e9b6013a7ce31535b04b02ba99babefe8a8599fa upstream.

Update the link to the "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation
on AMD Processors" whitepaper.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc</title>
<updated>2022-03-11T09:15:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-16T19:57:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7af95ef3ec6248696300fce5c68f6c8c4f50e4a4'/>
<id>7af95ef3ec6248696300fce5c68f6c8c4f50e4a4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5ad3eb1132453b9795ce5fd4572b1c18b292cca9 upstream.

Update the doc with the new fun.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden &lt;fllinden@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5ad3eb1132453b9795ce5fd4572b1c18b292cca9 upstream.

Update the doc with the new fun.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden &lt;fllinden@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Drivers: hv: vmbus: Expose monitor data only when monitor pages are used</title>
<updated>2022-02-23T10:58:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kimberly Brown</name>
<email>kimbrownkd@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-19T04:04:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b57705c0ecd0f0f87cb4565995431ac9fa2e8104'/>
<id>b57705c0ecd0f0f87cb4565995431ac9fa2e8104</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 46fc15487d02451448c11b83c4d086d87a6ad588 ]

There are two methods for signaling the host: the monitor page mechanism
and hypercalls. The monitor page mechanism is used by performance
critical channels (storage, networking, etc.) because it provides
improved throughput. However, latency is increased. Monitor pages are
allocated to these channels.

Monitor pages are not allocated to channels that do not use the monitor
page mechanism. Therefore, these channels do not have a valid monitor id
or valid monitor page data. In these cases, some of the "_show"
functions return incorrect data. They return an invalid monitor id and
data that is beyond the bounds of the hv_monitor_page array fields.

The "channel-&gt;offermsg.monitor_allocated" value can be used to determine
whether monitor pages have been allocated to a channel.

Add "is_visible()" callback functions for the device-level and
channel-level attribute groups. These functions will hide the monitor
sysfs files when the monitor mechanism is not used.

Remove ".default_attributes" from "vmbus_chan_attrs" and create a
channel-level attribute group. These changes allow the new
"is_visible()" callback function to be applied to the channel-level
attributes.

Call "sysfs_create_group()" in "vmbus_add_channel_kobj()" to create the
channel's sysfs files. Add a new function,
“vmbus_remove_channel_attr_group()”, and call it in "free_channel()" to
remove the channel's sysfs files when the channel is closed.

Signed-off-by: Kimberly Brown &lt;kimbrownkd@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mikelley@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 46fc15487d02451448c11b83c4d086d87a6ad588 ]

There are two methods for signaling the host: the monitor page mechanism
and hypercalls. The monitor page mechanism is used by performance
critical channels (storage, networking, etc.) because it provides
improved throughput. However, latency is increased. Monitor pages are
allocated to these channels.

Monitor pages are not allocated to channels that do not use the monitor
page mechanism. Therefore, these channels do not have a valid monitor id
or valid monitor page data. In these cases, some of the "_show"
functions return incorrect data. They return an invalid monitor id and
data that is beyond the bounds of the hv_monitor_page array fields.

The "channel-&gt;offermsg.monitor_allocated" value can be used to determine
whether monitor pages have been allocated to a channel.

Add "is_visible()" callback functions for the device-level and
channel-level attribute groups. These functions will hide the monitor
sysfs files when the monitor mechanism is not used.

Remove ".default_attributes" from "vmbus_chan_attrs" and create a
channel-level attribute group. These changes allow the new
"is_visible()" callback function to be applied to the channel-level
attributes.

Call "sysfs_create_group()" in "vmbus_add_channel_kobj()" to create the
channel's sysfs files. Add a new function,
“vmbus_remove_channel_attr_group()”, and call it in "free_channel()" to
remove the channel's sysfs files when the channel is closed.

Signed-off-by: Kimberly Brown &lt;kimbrownkd@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mikelley@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Add kconfig knob for disabling unpriv bpf by default</title>
<updated>2022-02-16T11:51:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-11T20:35:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=07e7f7cc619d15645e45d04b1c99550c6d292e9c'/>
<id>07e7f7cc619d15645e45d04b1c99550c6d292e9c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 08389d888287c3823f80b0216766b71e17f0aba5 upstream.

Add a kconfig knob which allows for unprivileged bpf to be disabled by default.
If set, the knob sets /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled to value of 2.

This still allows a transition of 2 -&gt; {0,1} through an admin. Similarly,
this also still keeps 1 -&gt; {1} behavior intact, so that once set to permanently
disabled, it cannot be undone aside from a reboot.

We've also added extra2 with max of 2 for the procfs handler, so that an admin
still has a chance to toggle between 0 &lt;-&gt; 2.

Either way, as an additional alternative, applications can make use of CAP_BPF
that we added a while ago.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/74ec548079189e4e4dffaeb42b8987bb3c852eee.1620765074.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden &lt;fllinden@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 08389d888287c3823f80b0216766b71e17f0aba5 upstream.

Add a kconfig knob which allows for unprivileged bpf to be disabled by default.
If set, the knob sets /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled to value of 2.

This still allows a transition of 2 -&gt; {0,1} through an admin. Similarly,
this also still keeps 1 -&gt; {1} behavior intact, so that once set to permanently
disabled, it cannot be undone aside from a reboot.

We've also added extra2 with max of 2 for the procfs handler, so that an admin
still has a chance to toggle between 0 &lt;-&gt; 2.

Either way, as an additional alternative, applications can make use of CAP_BPF
that we added a while ago.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/74ec548079189e4e4dffaeb42b8987bb3c852eee.1620765074.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden &lt;fllinden@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization</title>
<updated>2022-01-27T08:04:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lukas Bulwahn</name>
<email>lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-30T17:19:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=08d7a0495a9fcff94f5ec2e4cde0ce6132c66369'/>
<id>08d7a0495a9fcff94f5ec2e4cde0ce6132c66369</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 upstream.

The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to
refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space
randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two
four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also
point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within
the same sentence.

Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to
the config that provides that.

Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn &lt;lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 upstream.

The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to
refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space
randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two
four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also
point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within
the same sentence.

Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to
the config that provides that.

Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn &lt;lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Input: i8042 - add deferred probe support</title>
<updated>2022-01-05T11:34:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-29T07:21:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=68fdb0499653a2519691e645fcb72944f6e1e220'/>
<id>68fdb0499653a2519691e645fcb72944f6e1e220</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9222ba68c3f4065f6364b99cc641b6b019ef2d42 ]

We've got a bug report about the non-working keyboard on ASUS ZenBook
UX425UA.  It seems that the PS/2 device isn't ready immediately at
boot but takes some seconds to get ready.  Until now, the only
workaround is to defer the probe, but it's available only when the
driver is a module.  However, many distros, including openSUSE as in
the original report, build the PS/2 input drivers into kernel, hence
it won't work easily.

This patch adds the support for the deferred probe for i8042 stuff as
a workaround of the problem above.  When the deferred probe mode is
enabled and the device couldn't be probed, it'll be repeated with the
standard deferred probe mechanism.

The deferred probe mode is enabled either via the new option
i8042.probe_defer or via the quirk table entry.  As of this patch, the
quirk table contains only ASUS ZenBook UX425UA.

The deferred probe part is based on Fabio's initial work.

BugLink: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1190256
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Tested-by: Samuel Čavoj &lt;samuel@cavoj.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211117063757.11380-1-tiwai@suse.de

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9222ba68c3f4065f6364b99cc641b6b019ef2d42 ]

We've got a bug report about the non-working keyboard on ASUS ZenBook
UX425UA.  It seems that the PS/2 device isn't ready immediately at
boot but takes some seconds to get ready.  Until now, the only
workaround is to defer the probe, but it's available only when the
driver is a module.  However, many distros, including openSUSE as in
the original report, build the PS/2 input drivers into kernel, hence
it won't work easily.

This patch adds the support for the deferred probe for i8042 stuff as
a workaround of the problem above.  When the deferred probe mode is
enabled and the device couldn't be probed, it'll be repeated with the
standard deferred probe mechanism.

The deferred probe mode is enabled either via the new option
i8042.probe_defer or via the quirk table entry.  As of this patch, the
quirk table contains only ASUS ZenBook UX425UA.

The deferred probe part is based on Fabio's initial work.

BugLink: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1190256
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Tested-by: Samuel Čavoj &lt;samuel@cavoj.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211117063757.11380-1-tiwai@suse.de

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: VMX: Fix stale docs for kvm-intel.emulate_invalid_guest_state</title>
<updated>2021-12-29T11:20:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-07T19:30:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1d372494388f4bfaeb0e2dd17e51f4af8a3c1542'/>
<id>1d372494388f4bfaeb0e2dd17e51f4af8a3c1542</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0ff29701ffad9a5d5a24344d8b09f3af7b96ffda upstream.

Update the documentation for kvm-intel's emulate_invalid_guest_state to
rectify the description of KVM's default behavior, and to document that
the behavior and thus parameter only applies to L1.

Fixes: a27685c33acc ("KVM: VMX: Emulate invalid guest state by default")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20211207193006.120997-4-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0ff29701ffad9a5d5a24344d8b09f3af7b96ffda upstream.

Update the documentation for kvm-intel's emulate_invalid_guest_state to
rectify the description of KVM's default behavior, and to document that
the behavior and thus parameter only applies to L1.

Fixes: a27685c33acc ("KVM: VMX: Emulate invalid guest state by default")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20211207193006.120997-4-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky &lt;mlevitsk@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bonding: fix ad_actor_system option setting to default</title>
<updated>2021-12-29T11:20:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fernando Fernandez Mancera</name>
<email>ffmancera@riseup.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-21T11:13:45+00:00</published>
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[ Upstream commit 1c15b05baea71a5ff98235783e3e4ad227760876 ]

When 802.3ad bond mode is configured the ad_actor_system option is set to
"00:00:00:00:00:00". But when trying to set the all-zeroes MAC as actors'
system address it was failing with EINVAL.

An all-zeroes ethernet address is valid, only multicast addresses are not
valid values.

Fixes: 171a42c38c6e ("bonding: add netlink support for sys prio, actor sys mac, and port key")
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera &lt;ffmancera@riseup.net&gt;
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh &lt;jay.vosburgh@canonical.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211221111345.2462-1-ffmancera@riseup.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
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<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1c15b05baea71a5ff98235783e3e4ad227760876 ]

When 802.3ad bond mode is configured the ad_actor_system option is set to
"00:00:00:00:00:00". But when trying to set the all-zeroes MAC as actors'
system address it was failing with EINVAL.

An all-zeroes ethernet address is valid, only multicast addresses are not
valid values.

Fixes: 171a42c38c6e ("bonding: add netlink support for sys prio, actor sys mac, and port key")
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera &lt;ffmancera@riseup.net&gt;
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh &lt;jay.vosburgh@canonical.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211221111345.2462-1-ffmancera@riseup.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
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