linux-stable.git/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt, branch v4.9.76 Linux kernel stable tree x86/kaiser: Check boottime cmdline params 2018-01-05T14:46:35+00:00 Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de 2018-01-02T13:19:48+00:00 8018307a45a90ab2eecfd03d48b7efb31707df37 AMD (and possibly other vendors) are not affected by the leak KAISER is protecting against. Keep the "nopti" for traditional reasons and add pti=<on|off|auto> like upstream. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
AMD (and possibly other vendors) are not affected by the leak
KAISER is protecting against.

Keep the "nopti" for traditional reasons and add pti=<on|off|auto>
like upstream.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
x86/kaiser: Rename and simplify X86_FEATURE_KAISER handling 2018-01-05T14:46:34+00:00 Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de 2018-01-02T13:19:48+00:00 50624dd12d6df936f80cb9f02e9a0e40197b5d91 Concentrate it in arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c and use the upstream string "nopti". Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
Concentrate it in arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c and use the upstream string "nopti".

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kaiser: add "nokaiser" boot option, using ALTERNATIVE 2018-01-05T14:46:34+00:00 Hugh Dickins hughd@google.com 2017-09-24T23:59:49+00:00 23e09439aa460e4e194c8d2542a16977ee8ed142 Added "nokaiser" boot option: an early param like "noinvpcid". Most places now check int kaiser_enabled (#defined 0 when not CONFIG_KAISER) instead of #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER; but entry_64.S and entry_64_compat.S are using the ALTERNATIVE technique, which patches in the preferred instructions at runtime. That technique is tied to x86 cpu features, so X86_FEATURE_KAISER is fabricated. Prior to "nokaiser", Kaiser #defined _PAGE_GLOBAL 0: revert that, but be careful with both _PAGE_GLOBAL and CR4.PGE: setting them when nokaiser like when !CONFIG_KAISER, but not setting either when kaiser - neither matters on its own, but it's hard to be sure that _PAGE_GLOBAL won't get set in some obscure corner, or something add PGE into CR4. By omitting _PAGE_GLOBAL from __supported_pte_mask when kaiser_enabled, all page table setup which uses pte_pfn() masks it out of the ptes. It's slightly shameful that the same declaration versus definition of kaiser_enabled appears in not one, not two, but in three header files (asm/kaiser.h, asm/pgtable.h, asm/tlbflush.h). I felt safer that way, than with #including any of those in any of the others; and did not feel it worth an asm/kaiser_enabled.h - kernel/cpu/common.c includes them all, so we shall hear about it if they get out of synch. Cleanups while in the area: removed the silly #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER from kaiser.c; removed the unused native_get_normal_pgd(); removed the spurious reg clutter from SWITCH_*_CR3 macro stubs; corrected some comments. But more interestingly, set CR4.PSE in secondary_startup_64: the manual is clear that it does not matter whether it's 0 or 1 when 4-level-pts are enabled, but I was distracted to find cr4 different on BSP and auxiliaries - BSP alone was adding PSE, in probe_page_size_mask(). Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
Added "nokaiser" boot option: an early param like "noinvpcid".
Most places now check int kaiser_enabled (#defined 0 when not
CONFIG_KAISER) instead of #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER; but entry_64.S
and entry_64_compat.S are using the ALTERNATIVE technique, which
patches in the preferred instructions at runtime.  That technique
is tied to x86 cpu features, so X86_FEATURE_KAISER is fabricated.

Prior to "nokaiser", Kaiser #defined _PAGE_GLOBAL 0: revert that,
but be careful with both _PAGE_GLOBAL and CR4.PGE: setting them when
nokaiser like when !CONFIG_KAISER, but not setting either when kaiser -
neither matters on its own, but it's hard to be sure that _PAGE_GLOBAL
won't get set in some obscure corner, or something add PGE into CR4.
By omitting _PAGE_GLOBAL from __supported_pte_mask when kaiser_enabled,
all page table setup which uses pte_pfn() masks it out of the ptes.

It's slightly shameful that the same declaration versus definition of
kaiser_enabled appears in not one, not two, but in three header files
(asm/kaiser.h, asm/pgtable.h, asm/tlbflush.h).  I felt safer that way,
than with #including any of those in any of the others; and did not
feel it worth an asm/kaiser_enabled.h - kernel/cpu/common.c includes
them all, so we shall hear about it if they get out of synch.

Cleanups while in the area: removed the silly #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER
from kaiser.c; removed the unused native_get_normal_pgd(); removed
the spurious reg clutter from SWITCH_*_CR3 macro stubs; corrected some
comments.  But more interestingly, set CR4.PSE in secondary_startup_64:
the manual is clear that it does not matter whether it's 0 or 1 when
4-level-pts are enabled, but I was distracted to find cr4 different on
BSP and auxiliaries - BSP alone was adding PSE, in probe_page_size_mask().

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
x86/mm: Add the 'nopcid' boot option to turn off PCID 2018-01-02T19:35:09+00:00 Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org 2017-06-29T15:53:20+00:00 e6a29320de005792c06f2deec2c77b19c42d1e6a commit 0790c9aad84901ca1bdc14746175549c8b5da215 upstream. The parameter is only present on x86_64 systems to save a few bytes, as PCID is always disabled on x86_32. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8bbb2e65bcd249a5f18bfb8128b4689f08ac2b60.1498751203.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 0790c9aad84901ca1bdc14746175549c8b5da215 upstream.

The parameter is only present on x86_64 systems to save a few bytes,
as PCID is always disabled on x86_32.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8bbb2e65bcd249a5f18bfb8128b4689f08ac2b60.1498751203.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas 2017-06-24T05:11:18+00:00 Hugh Dickins hughd@google.com 2017-06-19T11:03:24+00:00 cfc0eb403816c5c4f9667d959de5e22789b5421e commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream. Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping. But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX] which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN. This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical, unfortunatelly. Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot. One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace, but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units). Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page: because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point, a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK and strict non-overcommit mode. Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start (or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(), and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that. Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context] [wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ACPI / sysfs: Provide quirk mechanism to prevent GPE flooding 2017-04-12T10:41:18+00:00 Lv Zheng lv.zheng@intel.com 2017-04-04T19:32:17+00:00 c1e94148f93c4319a1aea4ae29835cd1e2017ff9 [ Upstream commit 9c4aa1eecb48cfac18ed5e3aca9d9ae58fbafc11 ] Sometimes, the users may require a quirk to be provided from ACPI subsystem core to prevent a GPE from flooding. Normally, if a GPE cannot be dispatched, ACPICA core automatically prevents the GPE from firing. But there are cases the GPE is dispatched by _Lxx/_Exx provided via AML table, and OSPM is lacking of the knowledge to get _Lxx/_Exx correctly executed to handle the GPE, thus the GPE flooding may still occur. The existing quirk mechanism can be enabled/disabled using the following commands to prevent such kind of GPE flooding during runtime: # echo mask > /sys/firmware/acpi/interrupts/gpe00 # echo unmask > /sys/firmware/acpi/interrupts/gpe00 To avoid GPE flooding during boot, we need a boot stage mechanism. This patch provides such a boot stage quirk mechanism to stop this kind of GPE flooding. This patch doesn't fix any feature gap but since the new feature gaps could be found in the future endlessly, and can disappear if the feature gaps are filled, providing a boot parameter rather than a DMI table should suffice. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=53071 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=117481 Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/887793 Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 9c4aa1eecb48cfac18ed5e3aca9d9ae58fbafc11 ]

Sometimes, the users may require a quirk to be provided from ACPI subsystem
core to prevent a GPE from flooding.
Normally, if a GPE cannot be dispatched, ACPICA core automatically prevents
the GPE from firing. But there are cases the GPE is dispatched by _Lxx/_Exx
provided via AML table, and OSPM is lacking of the knowledge to get
_Lxx/_Exx correctly executed to handle the GPE, thus the GPE flooding may
still occur.

The existing quirk mechanism can be enabled/disabled using the following
commands to prevent such kind of GPE flooding during runtime:
 # echo mask > /sys/firmware/acpi/interrupts/gpe00
 # echo unmask > /sys/firmware/acpi/interrupts/gpe00
To avoid GPE flooding during boot, we need a boot stage mechanism.

This patch provides such a boot stage quirk mechanism to stop this kind of
GPE flooding. This patch doesn't fix any feature gap but since the new
feature gaps could be found in the future endlessly, and can disappear if
the feature gaps are filled, providing a boot parameter rather than a DMI
table should suffice.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=53071
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=117481
Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/887793
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
x86/platform/goldfish: Prevent unconditional loading 2017-02-26T10:10:52+00:00 Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de 2017-02-15T10:11:50+00:00 2709c2a1b0165e7b4084077148697175ecd9d2c7 commit 47512cfd0d7a8bd6ab71d01cd89fca19eb2093eb upstream. The goldfish platform code registers the platform device unconditionally which causes havoc in several ways if the goldfish_pdev_bus driver is enabled: - Access to the hardcoded physical memory region, which is either not available or contains stuff which is completely unrelated. - Prevents that the interrupt of the serial port can be requested - In case of a spurious interrupt it goes into a infinite loop in the interrupt handler of the pdev_bus driver (which needs to be fixed seperately). Add a 'goldfish' command line option to make the registration opt-in when the platform is compiled in. I'm seriously grumpy about this engineering trainwreck, which has seven SOBs from Intel developers for 50 lines of code. And none of them figured out that this is broken. Impressive fail! Fixes: ddd70cf93d78 ("goldfish: platform device for x86") Reported-by: Gabriel C <nix.or.die@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 47512cfd0d7a8bd6ab71d01cd89fca19eb2093eb upstream.

The goldfish platform code registers the platform device unconditionally
which causes havoc in several ways if the goldfish_pdev_bus driver is
enabled:

 - Access to the hardcoded physical memory region, which is either not
   available or contains stuff which is completely unrelated.

 - Prevents that the interrupt of the serial port can be requested

 - In case of a spurious interrupt it goes into a infinite loop in the
   interrupt handler of the pdev_bus driver (which needs to be fixed
   seperately).

Add a 'goldfish' command line option to make the registration opt-in when
the platform is compiled in.

I'm seriously grumpy about this engineering trainwreck, which has seven
SOBs from Intel developers for 50 lines of code. And none of them figured
out that this is broken. Impressive fail!

Fixes: ddd70cf93d78 ("goldfish: platform device for x86")
Reported-by: Gabriel C <nix.or.die@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
swiotlb: Add swiotlb=noforce debug option 2017-01-26T07:24:44+00:00 Geert Uytterhoeven geert+renesas@glider.be 2016-12-16T13:28:42+00:00 41c6b3e8989e79772a50429d92cf91959bcce96d commit fff5d99225107f5f13fe4a9805adc2a1c4b5fb00 upstream. On architectures like arm64, swiotlb is tied intimately to the core architecture DMA support. In addition, ZONE_DMA cannot be disabled. To aid debugging and catch devices not supporting DMA to memory outside the 32-bit address space, add a kernel command line option "swiotlb=noforce", which disables the use of bounce buffers. If specified, trying to map memory that cannot be used with DMA will fail, and a rate-limited warning will be printed. Note that io_tlb_nslabs is set to 1, which is the minimal supported value. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit fff5d99225107f5f13fe4a9805adc2a1c4b5fb00 upstream.

On architectures like arm64, swiotlb is tied intimately to the core
architecture DMA support. In addition, ZONE_DMA cannot be disabled.

To aid debugging and catch devices not supporting DMA to memory outside
the 32-bit address space, add a kernel command line option
"swiotlb=noforce", which disables the use of bounce buffers.
If specified, trying to map memory that cannot be used with DMA will
fail, and a rate-limited warning will be printed.

Note that io_tlb_nslabs is set to 1, which is the minimal supported
value.

Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dtor/input 2016-10-14T20:19:30+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2016-10-14T20:19:30+00:00 689f891c980949d3eb64f61651db53cb347e0a13 Pull some more input subsystem updates from Dmitry Torokhov: "An update to the ALPS driver to support the V8 protocol with touchstick, a change for i8042 to skip selftest on many Asus laptops which helps to keep their touchpads working after resume, and a couple other driver fixes" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dtor/input: Input: i8042 - skip selftest on ASUS laptops Input: melfas_mip4 - add ic_name sysfs attribute Input: melfas_mip4 - add maintainer information Input: melfas_mip4 - add devicetree binding documentations Input: elantech - add Fujitsu Lifebook E556 to force crc_enabled Input: synaptics-rmi4 - fix error handling in I2C transport driver Input: synaptics-rmi4 - fix error handling in SPI transport driver Input: ALPS - add V8 protocol documentation Input: ALPS - set DualPoint flag for 74 03 28 devices Input: ALPS - allow touchsticks to report pressure Input: ALPS - handle 0-pressure 1F events Input: ALPS - add touchstick support for SS5 hardware Input: elantech - force needed quirks on Fujitsu H760 Input: elantech - fix Lenovo version typo 
Pull some more input subsystem updates from Dmitry Torokhov:
 "An update to the ALPS driver to support the V8 protocol with
  touchstick, a change for i8042 to skip selftest on many Asus laptops
  which helps to keep their touchpads working after resume, and a couple
  other driver fixes"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dtor/input:
  Input: i8042 - skip selftest on ASUS laptops
  Input: melfas_mip4 - add ic_name sysfs attribute
  Input: melfas_mip4 - add maintainer information
  Input: melfas_mip4 - add devicetree binding documentations
  Input: elantech - add Fujitsu Lifebook E556 to force crc_enabled
  Input: synaptics-rmi4 - fix error handling in I2C transport driver
  Input: synaptics-rmi4 - fix error handling in SPI transport driver
  Input: ALPS - add V8 protocol documentation
  Input: ALPS - set DualPoint flag for 74 03 28 devices
  Input: ALPS - allow touchsticks to report pressure
  Input: ALPS - handle 0-pressure 1F events
  Input: ALPS - add touchstick support for SS5 hardware
  Input: elantech - force needed quirks on Fujitsu H760
  Input: elantech - fix Lenovo version typo
Merge tag 'nfs-for-4.9-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/anna/linux-nfs 2016-10-14T04:28:20+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2016-10-14T04:28:20+00:00 c4a86165d1ec70c8e592fa7b7cc7070971533021 Pull NFS client updates from Anna Schumaker: "Highlights include: Stable bugfixes: - sunrpc: fix writ espace race causing stalls - NFS: Fix inode corruption in nfs_prime_dcache() - NFSv4: Don't report revoked delegations as valid in nfs_have_delegation() - NFSv4: nfs4_copy_delegation_stateid() must fail if the delegation is invalid - NFSv4: Open state recovery must account for file permission changes - NFSv4.2: Fix a reference leak in nfs42_proc_layoutstats_generic Features: - Add support for tracking multiple layout types with an ordered list - Add support for using multiple backchannel threads on the client - Add support for pNFS file layout session trunking - Delay xprtrdma use of DMA API (for device driver removal) - Add support for xprtrdma remote invalidation - Add support for larger xprtrdma inline thresholds - Use a scatter/gather list for sending xprtrdma RPC calls - Add support for the CB_NOTIFY_LOCK callback - Improve hashing sunrpc auth_creds by using both uid and gid Bugfixes: - Fix xprtrdma use of DMA API - Validate filenames before adding to the dcache - Fix corruption of xdr->nwords in xdr_copy_to_scratch - Fix setting buffer length in xdr_set_next_buffer() - Don't deadlock the state manager on the SEQUENCE status flags - Various delegation and stateid related fixes - Retry operations if an interrupted slot receives EREMOTEIO - Make nfs boot time y2038 safe" * tag 'nfs-for-4.9-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/anna/linux-nfs: (100 commits) NFSv4.2: Fix a reference leak in nfs42_proc_layoutstats_generic fs: nfs: Make nfs boot time y2038 safe sunrpc: replace generic auth_cred hash with auth-specific function sunrpc: add RPCSEC_GSS hash_cred() function sunrpc: add auth_unix hash_cred() function sunrpc: add generic_auth hash_cred() function sunrpc: add hash_cred() function to rpc_authops struct Retry operation on EREMOTEIO on an interrupted slot pNFS: Fix atime updates on pNFS clients sunrpc: queue work on system_power_efficient_wq NFSv4.1: Even if the stateid is OK, we may need to recover the open modes NFSv4: If recovery failed for a specific open stateid, then don't retry NFSv4: Fix retry issues with nfs41_test/free_stateid NFSv4: Open state recovery must account for file permission changes NFSv4: Mark the lock and open stateids as invalid after freeing them NFSv4: Don't test open_stateid unless it is set NFSv4: nfs4_do_handle_exception() handle revoke/expiry of a single stateid NFS: Always call nfs_inode_find_state_and_recover() when revoking a delegation NFSv4: Fix a race when updating an open_stateid NFSv4: Fix a race in nfs_inode_reclaim_delegation() ... 
Pull NFS client updates from Anna Schumaker:
 "Highlights include:

  Stable bugfixes:
   - sunrpc: fix writ espace race causing stalls
   - NFS: Fix inode corruption in nfs_prime_dcache()
   - NFSv4: Don't report revoked delegations as valid in nfs_have_delegation()
   - NFSv4: nfs4_copy_delegation_stateid() must fail if the delegation is invalid
   - NFSv4: Open state recovery must account for file permission changes
   - NFSv4.2: Fix a reference leak in nfs42_proc_layoutstats_generic

  Features:
   - Add support for tracking multiple layout types with an ordered list
   - Add support for using multiple backchannel threads on the client
   - Add support for pNFS file layout session trunking
   - Delay xprtrdma use of DMA API (for device driver removal)
   - Add support for xprtrdma remote invalidation
   - Add support for larger xprtrdma inline thresholds
   - Use a scatter/gather list for sending xprtrdma RPC calls
   - Add support for the CB_NOTIFY_LOCK callback
   - Improve hashing sunrpc auth_creds by using both uid and gid

  Bugfixes:
   - Fix xprtrdma use of DMA API
   - Validate filenames before adding to the dcache
   - Fix corruption of xdr->nwords in xdr_copy_to_scratch
   - Fix setting buffer length in xdr_set_next_buffer()
   - Don't deadlock the state manager on the SEQUENCE status flags
   - Various delegation and stateid related fixes
   - Retry operations if an interrupted slot receives EREMOTEIO
   - Make nfs boot time y2038 safe"

* tag 'nfs-for-4.9-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/anna/linux-nfs: (100 commits)
  NFSv4.2: Fix a reference leak in nfs42_proc_layoutstats_generic
  fs: nfs: Make nfs boot time y2038 safe
  sunrpc: replace generic auth_cred hash with auth-specific function
  sunrpc: add RPCSEC_GSS hash_cred() function
  sunrpc: add auth_unix hash_cred() function
  sunrpc: add generic_auth hash_cred() function
  sunrpc: add hash_cred() function to rpc_authops struct
  Retry operation on EREMOTEIO on an interrupted slot
  pNFS: Fix atime updates on pNFS clients
  sunrpc: queue work on system_power_efficient_wq
  NFSv4.1: Even if the stateid is OK, we may need to recover the open modes
  NFSv4: If recovery failed for a specific open stateid, then don't retry
  NFSv4: Fix retry issues with nfs41_test/free_stateid
  NFSv4: Open state recovery must account for file permission changes
  NFSv4: Mark the lock and open stateids as invalid after freeing them
  NFSv4: Don't test open_stateid unless it is set
  NFSv4: nfs4_do_handle_exception() handle revoke/expiry of a single stateid
  NFS: Always call nfs_inode_find_state_and_recover() when revoking a delegation
  NFSv4: Fix a race when updating an open_stateid
  NFSv4: Fix a race in nfs_inode_reclaim_delegation()
  ...