Upstream commit: fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855

Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.

The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence.  To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.

To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference.  In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.

In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1b0fc0345f2852ffe54fb9ae0e12e2ee69ad6a20 upstream

These options clearly turn *off* XSAVE YMM support.  Correct the
typo.

Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: 553a5c03e90a ("x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 553a5c03e90a6087e88f8ff878335ef0621536fb upstream

The Gather Data Sampling (GDS) vulnerability allows malicious software
to infer stale data previously stored in vector registers. This may
include sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. GDS is mitigated in
microcode, and systems with up-to-date microcode are protected by
default. However, any affected system that is running with older
microcode will still be vulnerable to GDS attacks.

Since the gather instructions used by the attacker are part of the
AVX2 and AVX512 extensions, disabling these extensions prevents gather
instructions from being executed, thereby mitigating the system from
GDS. Disabling AVX2 is sufficient, but we don't have the granularity
to do this. The XCR0[2] disables AVX, with no option to just disable
AVX2.

Add a kernel parameter gather_data_sampling=force that will enable the
microcode mitigation if available, otherwise it will disable AVX on
affected systems.

This option will be ignored if cmdline mitigations=off.

This is a *big* hammer.  It is known to break buggy userspace that
uses incomplete, buggy AVX enumeration.  Unfortunately, such userspace
does exist in the wild:

	https://www.mail-archive.com/bug-coreutils@gnu.org/msg33046.html

[ dhansen: add some more ominous warnings about disabling AVX ]

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 8974eb588283b7d44a7c91fa09fcbaf380339f3a upstream

Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.

Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions
that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable
hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and
encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector
registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector
register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical
side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.

This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons.
First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it.
This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can
be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control
bit alone.

Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the
mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX.
It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be
mitigated against GDS.

The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by
setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with
mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:

    /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit fd470a8beed88440b160d690344fbae05a0b9b1b upstream.

Unlike Intel's Enhanced IBRS feature, AMD's Automatic IBRS does not
provide protection to processes running at CPL3/user mode, see section
"Extended Feature Enable Register (EFER)" in the APM v2 at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=304652

Explicitly enable STIBP to protect against cross-thread CPL3
branch target injections on systems with Automatic IBRS enabled.

Also update the relevant documentation.

Fixes: e7862eda309e ("x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS")
Reported-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230720194727.67022-1-kim.phillips@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Pull cgroup fixes from Tejun Heo:

 - Fix css_set reference leaks on fork failures

 - Fix CPU hotplug locking in cgroup_transfer_tasks() which is used by
   cgroup1 cpuset

 - Doc update

* tag 'cgroup-for-6.4-rc5-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
  cgroup: Documentation: Clarify usage of memory limits
  cgroup: always put cset in cgroup_css_set_put_fork
  cgroup: fix missing cpus_read_{lock,unlock}() in cgroup_transfer_tasks()

The existing documentation refers to memory.high as the "main mechanism
to control memory usage." This seems incorrect to me - memory.high can
result in reclaim pressure which simply leads to stalls unless some
external component observes and actions on it (e.g. systemd-oomd can be
used for this purpose). While this is feasible, users are unaware of
this interaction and are led to believe that memory.high alone is an
effective mechanism for limiting memory.

The documentation should recommend the use of memory.max as the
effective way to enforce memory limits - it triggers reclaim and results
in OOM kills by itself.

Signed-off-by: Dan Schatzberg <schatzberg.dan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

The fs/cifs directory has moved to fs/smb/client, correct mentions
of this in Documentation and comments.

Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

* improve the short description of localmodconfig in the step-by-step
  guide while fixing its broken first sentence

* briefly mention immutable Linux distributions

* use '--shallow-exclude=v6.0' throughout the document

* instead of "git reset --hard; git checkout ..." use "git checkout
  --force ..." in the step-by-step guide: this matches the TLDR and is
  one command less to execute. This led to a few small adjustments to
  the text and the flow in the surrounding area.

* fix two thinkos in the section explaining full git clones

Signed-off-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6f4684b9a5d11d3adb04e0af3cfc60db8b28eeb2.1684140700.git.linux@leemhuis.info
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>

Pull more block updates from Jens Axboe:

 - MD pull request via Song:
      - Improve raid5 sequential IO performance on spinning disks, which
        fixes a regression since v6.0 (Jan Kara)
      - Fix bitmap offset types, which fixes an issue introduced in this
        merge window (Jonathan Derrick)

 - Cleanup of hweight type used for cgroup writeback (Maxim)

 - Fix a regression with the "has_submit_bio" changes across partitions
   (Ming)

 - Cleanup of QUEUE_FLAG_ADD_RANDOM clearing.

   We used to set this flag on queues non blk-mq queues, and hence some
   drivers clear it unconditionally. Since all of these have since been
   converted to true blk-mq drivers, drop the useless clear as the bit
   is not set (Chaitanya)

 - Fix the flags being set in a bio for a flush for drbd (Christoph)

 - Cleanup and deduplication of the code handling setting block device
   capacity (Damien)

 - Fix for ublk handling IO timeouts (Ming)

 - Fix for a regression in blk-cgroup teardown (Tao)

 - NBD documentation and code fixes (Eric)

 - Convert blk-integrity to using device_attributes rather than a second
   kobject to manage lifetimes (Thomas)

* tag 'for-6.4/block-2023-05-06' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux:
  ublk: add timeout handler
  drbd: correctly submit flush bio on barrier
  mailmap: add mailmap entries for Jens Axboe
  block: Skip destroyed blkg when restart in blkg_destroy_all()
  writeback: fix call of incorrect macro
  md: Fix bitmap offset type in sb writer
  md/raid5: Improve performance for sequential IO
  docs nbd: userspace NBD now favors github over sourceforge
  block nbd: use req.cookie instead of req.handle
  uapi nbd: add cookie alias to handle
  uapi nbd: improve doc links to userspace spec
  blk-integrity: register sysfs attributes on struct device
  blk-integrity: convert to struct device_attribute
  blk-integrity: use sysfs_emit
  block/drivers: remove dead clear of random flag
  block: sync part's ->bd_has_submit_bio with disk's
  block: Cleanup set_capacity()/bdev_set_nr_sectors()